Many philosophers have tried to apply virtue ethics to Chinese philosophers. One such scholar is Yong Huang. Huang applies virtue ethics theory to Zhuangzi. His main argument is that Zhuangzi urges people to accept different ways of life from other people. Huang argues that this is the most excellent virtue people need to adopt in modern society. Huang derives his arguments from Zhuangzi’s knack stories. His main argument is that Zhuangzi urges people to do a particular work to the best of their ability without imposing it on others. (Huang, 2010). Another scholar is Brian Van Norden. Norden argues that there is a similarity between some aspects of virtue ethics when compared to Confucianism. However, he adds that the two are from different traditions, so the applications differ. This paper will examine the two authors’ apply virtue ethics to Zhuangzi’s Dao and Confucianism. It will evaluate whether the application is plausible or it contains errors.
Huang(2010) argues that the knack of stories is to harmonize with dao, not perfect a particular skill. To harmonize with dao is to follow nature(Tian li). As understood in Zhuangzi, Tian li means the nature and natural disposition of things. For example, the natural disposition of seabirds is “to roost in a deep forest …wander over the plain, swim in a river or lake, feed upon fish, and fly in formation with others (Zhuangzi 18.621). According to Huang(2010), Zhuangzi urges people to follow the natural disposition and nature of things when performing an activity. In this way, they will achieve Dao, which is beyond the skill. Huang argues that knack stories are not literal, meaning that Zhuangzi did not intend to teach people how to deal with non-human objects or animals. It is indeed meant to teach people how to relate to other people. People need to learn the nature of others and their natural disposition and relate with them by following their nature.
Huang relates these knack stories of skilful men to the story about Emperors Shu and Hu’s treatment of Emperor Hundun in chapter 7. Shu and hu regularly met in Hundun’s land because he was hospitable. On one occasion, when they were visiting, he and Shu offered to open seven apertures which Hundun did not possess. So they said, ‘Let us try to open them on him.” (Zhuangzi 7.309) They opened one each day, and on the seventh day, Hundun died. In this story, Huang argues that Shu and Hu did not consider the nature of Hundun and tried to treat him the way he is, but instead, they tried to change him to become like them, and they failed in the end. His overarching argument is that Zhuangzi needs to tell people what to do but how to do things.
Huangs attempt to apply virtue ethics to Zhuangzi is problematic because it is anchored on the claim that virtue ethics does not prescribe how people should do things but how they should be to be moral. The first issue is that Virtue ethics, as Plato understood, distinguishes between virtues and vices. Zhuangzi, in its stories, needs to make such a distinction. Knack stories explain how people were able to do things effortlessly and gracefully. It does not call out what the vices are and what the virtues are. What Huang describes as Virtue Ethics in Zhuangzi does not qualify to be virtue ethics but ethics of difference. Ethics of difference requires people to recognize the differences in ideas, ways of life, and nature and to consider these differences when dealing with people. Ethics of difference closely resembles moral relativism, and it resembles virtue ethics. Huang even mentions in the article that his argument implies ethics of difference which clashes with his earlier argument that it aligns with virtue ethics.
Van Norden(2003) argues that there is a link between virtue ethics and Confucianism. He, however, makes clear that the application of Confucian virtues differs from how Confucianism applies them. The first comparison he makes is that Plato listed four cardinal virtues. Virtues that supersede the other virtues. Those virtues are moderation, wisdom, courage and justice. He argues that zengzi, his disciple said that understanding and loyalty were core teachings of Confuscious. (Analects, 4.15) In Other passages, Vorden says wisdom and human(ren)were key teachings. He also adds that Confucius said that a wise person could appreciate his abilities, has understanding and can commit to virtuous behaviour. (analects, 4.7, 4.17,5.9, 7.28) Norden argues that these forms three important parts of Confucius’s understanding of wisdom. In this, Vordern makes the first comparison that both Western thought of virtue ethics and Confucianism makes a distinction between genuine virtues and those that bear a semblance to it. To illustrate this point of genuine virtues, he uses a passage that Confucius shows his disdain for a semblance of virtues. Mencius says that Confucius said, ‘… I hate cleverness, that it will be confused with righteousness. I hate glibness that it will be confused with trustworthiness…'(Mencius, 7B;37, Analects 17;13)
Secondly, Norden argues that western virtue ethics espouses the unity of virtue. This means that if a person is virtuous, he must have all of them. Norden points out that no clear passages show what Confucius thought about the unity of virtue, but Mencius believed there has to be unity of virtue. Mencius believed that there is an innate disposition towards particular virtues. For these virtues to flourish, they need to be cultivated. Mencius suggested a scenario where a person may ‘suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well.’ He argues that the first reaction of any human being is to show ‘alarm and compassion.’ (Mencius,2A:6)
Norden comparison of virtue ethics to Confucianism is very rational. He does not try to show that they are very similar, but he shows both their differences and similarities in application of virtues. He points out ethical particularism that is present in Consfuscianism but is absent in the western virtue ethics. His argument is that the absence of ethical rules will lead to an extreme version of virtue ethics which is particularism. Norden’s assertion that particularism is an extreme virtue ethics is to judge confuscianism using virtue ethics standards. Which is not acceptable.
In conclusion Norden’s attempt of comparing virtue ethics to Confucianism is well informed compared to Huangs attempt to apply virtue ethics to Zhuangzi. Norden is more cautious in his comparison, while Huang is bold but in the attempt he ends up describing ethics of difference and not virtue ethics as he intended.
References
ZHUANGZI. 1995. In Zhuangzi jie jie 莊子集解[Collected commentaries on the Zhuangzi].
Comp. by Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
Huang, Yong. (2010). Respecting Different Ways of Life: A Daoist Ethics of Virtue in the Zhuangzi. The Journal of Asian Studies. 69. 1049 – 1069. 10.1017/S0021911810002913.
Huang, C. (Ed.). (1997). The analects of Confucius. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Van Norden, B.W. “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 32:2 (June 1992), pp. 161-184.
Van Norden, B. W. (2003). Virtue ethics and Confucianism. Comparative approaches to chinese philosophy, 23, 99-121.
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