Introduction
Under international law order, territorial sovereignty, as espoused under United Nations Charter, is a fundamental principle that requires other states not to meddle with another nation’s affairs unless the prevailing circumstances allow such actions (Goldsmith and jack 1999, pp 29). For a recent couple of weeks, Russia invaded Ukraine for the same reason that article 2 of the United Nations Charter was crafted to cure, such act of aggression and assault to sovereign independent states. As Article 2 (1) of the United Nations Charter gravely affirms, territory and its normative translation, territorial sovereignty, remain the cornerstone of the current international legal order (Annan and Kofi, 1999 pp 13).
Since the end of the Second World War and the advent of the Cold War, world superpowers were found on two divides. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) consisted of the western and the Warsaw Pact of the Eastern champion by the USSR, these two divides were formed by states to watch each other’s back in case war breaks out. In 1991, the USSR fell and was disintegrated into many states, including Ukraine and present-day Russia. When he rose to power, Vladimir Putin had the ambition to revive the Russian lost glory and unite the former USSR (Krastev and Holmes 2012 pp 36). During his over two decades reign, Putin has embarked on building and modernizing Russian military power to exceed that of the United States and, by use of his military capability, annexed some of the former USSR territories like Crimea. This article will examine realism as a theory in political science and further expound Putinism by looking at how Putinism plays out power politics, state-centrism, anarchy, and egoism to its neighboring states and world politics?
Putinism
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a significant danger to global liberalism and democracy in the twenty-first century after the fall of the Soviet Union (Mamonova and Natalia 2019 pp 201). Provocatively manipulating existing democracies, creating an international media network, supporting despots abroad, and aggressively expanding weaponry contribute to the war (Fish 2017 pp 71). There is a more prominent tendency behind Russia’s current policies: the country is once again being run by an elite that believes it can provide a better alternative to liberal democracy than the Soviet Union did before Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms (1985–91). Also, as they see politicians from other nations, including the United States, rise to prominence with mentalities similar to their own, Russia’s leaders have become more optimistic, therefore Russia therefore has shaped its policy to fit this kind of rise to world power.
Vladimir Putin’s form of dictatorship is conservative, populist, and personal. There are considerable differences between this regime and other transformative dictatorships, such as the former Soviet party-state. Keeping the status quo is essential to Putinism, but so is expressing antipathy toward potential sources of upheaval, which makes Putinism both conservative domestically and globally. These impulses are inexorably intertwined because of Russia’s extraction and rent-seeking economy. On issues like gay rights, women’s equality, and homosexuality, Putinism combines its populism with its conservatism to counteract what Russian leaders regard as an outmoded liberal ideology (Simma and Bruno 1995 pp26).
In contrast, Putinism’s conservatism restricts the employment of populist measures such as excessive social spending. Furthermore, it explains why Putin’s kind of populism, as opposed to Western populism, stresses multi-ethnic and multi-religious cohabitation. A personalist autocrat such as Putin has little regard for political parties, institutions, or anybody other than himself when running the country (Taylor 2018 pp 19). As a result, Putinism’s self-described role as an anti-instability bulwark may be compromised by this close relationship with one man.
Realism, therefore, best fits the description of Putinism, Putin and his associates embrace at home and trumpet abroad? Putinism is a form of autocracy that is conservative, populist, and personalistic. Thus, characteristics of Putinism exhibit all the four propositions of realism theory, which includes; power politics, state-centrism, anarchy, and egoism. It stresses maintaining the status quo and rejects any transformational measures (Gudkov 2011 pp 47). Although most rulers value stability, Putin regards it as holy (Laqueur and Walter 2015 pp 40). Unlike Islamists who aim to restore the immaculate Muslim community of Muhammad’s time (570–632 C.E.) or interwar fascists who exalted a mythical lost period of martial righteousness and racial purity, Putin and his entourage reject reactionary views that need significantly modifying current circumstances or using techniques that endanger peace, like mass mobilization and violence (Gudkov 2011 pp 37).
There are several ways Putinism’s goals collide with any kind of development. Because it needs a lot of money upfront, the rich will have to settle for just a few bites rather than devouring the whole cake. Second, developmentalism threatens the ruler’s monopoly on power, especially in technologically advanced contemporary economies. It may also lead to societal unrest, including mobilizing social movements calling for a more transparent and responsible administration. Fourth, it necessitates that officials be hired and promoted based on their abilities rather than their devotion (Applebaum 2013 pp 109).
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s adamant opposition to social movements such as revolution, homosexuality, and women’s rights is more than simply a ploy to elevate Russia to the top of the worldwide anti-liberal hierarchy. In addition to his more considerable efforts to restore Russia’s global prestige, which it lost after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, these positions are targeted at home audiences and constitute elements of Putinism’s populism (Mamovova and natalia, 2019 pp 222). As a result of Russia’s turmoil under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, Putin’s dedication to preventing regime change resonates with Russian citizens. They are well-versed in polling data and are well aware of Russians’ inclination toward social conservatism. When asked, “should society tolerate homosexuality?” in a Pew study in 2013, 74% of them said no, compared to 57% of Chinese, 36% of Japanese, 36% of Brazilians, 33% of Americans, and 11% of Spaniards (Krastev and Holmes 2012 pp 39). Russians are also opposed to feminist views on gender equality and gender roles (Gudkov 2011 pp 37). One recent World Values Survey found that when asked whether men or women make better political leaders, 57 percent of Russians said that men do.
Future of Putinism
It is difficult to deny that Putin’s conservative populist autocracy is among the twenty-first century’s most successful and imposing authoritarian governments. Its petroeconomy’s parasitic practices can’t support the ideology, economic development, and social fairness; its ideology cannot provide an appealing vision for the future. Its extreme personalization makes it utterly reliant on one flawed man.
Limits exist in Russia’s present economic paradigm, which is a source of legitimacy. As long as the nation has an ample supply of hydrocarbons, the ruler will always be able to reward his favorites and support social programs that maintain popular peace. Still, the overarching aim of keeping things the exact and avoiding change will always remain (Applebaum 2013 pp 109), allowing elite predation to rule out measures that may lead to healthy economic growth. Private ownership and investment played an essential part in nations that have grown effectively over the last decades, notwithstanding the critical role played by the state.
Works Cited
Applebaum, Anne. “Putinism: the ideology.” (2013).
Fish, M. Steven. “The Kremlin emboldened: what is Putinism?.” Journal of Democracy 28.4 (2017): 61-75.
Gudkov, Lev. “The Nature of” Putinism.” Russian Social Science Review 52.6 (2011): 21-47.
Krastev, Ivan, and Stephen Holmes. “Putinism Under Siege: An Autopsy of Managed Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 23.3 (2012): 33-45.
Mamonova, Natalia. “Understanding the silent majority in authoritarian populism: what can we learn from popular support for Putin in rural Russia?.” Critical Agrarian Studies (2019): 201.
Taylor, Brian D. The code of Putinism. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Goldsmith, Jack. “Sovereignty, international relations theory, and international law.” (1999): 959.
Simma, Bruno, ed. The charter of the United Nations. oup, 1995.
Annan, Kofi. “Two concepts of sovereignty.” The economist 18.9 (1999): 1999.
Laqueur, Walter. Putinism: Russia and its Future with the West. Macmillan, 2015.
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