The document in question is a 2022 New York Times article by John Ortved titled “That Cloud of Smoke Is Not a Mirage,” which serves as a valuable primary source for understanding the competitive and aggressive advertising tactics utilized by significant cigarette companies in 1980s America. It also provides insight into the larger social context surrounding cigarette consumption, gender roles, and consumer behavior during this period. In this paper, I will argue that John Ortved’s 2022 New York Times article, “That Cloud of Smoke Is Not a Mirage,” serves as a valuable primary source for understanding the aggressive competition and advertising tactics of significant cigarette brands in 1980s America and the larger socio-cultural context of cigarette consumption, consumer behavior, and gender roles during this period.
Faced with fierce price competition, the three leading cigarette brands – Camel, Lucky Strike, and Chesterfield – have decided to cut the price of a pack of cigarettes from 20 cents to 17 cents. This move aims to enable them to better compete with the rock-bottom prices set by the “Big Four” tobacco titans, including industry juggernauts Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds.
However, the long-term efficacy of this strategy remains to be determined. The major cigarette manufacturers have deeper pockets and economies of scale that facilitate even lower marginal production costs. Engaging in a “race to the bottom” pricing war may thus prove unsustainable, putting the brands’ future viability at risk. Additionally, the moral dimensions of such price-driven competitiveness in an industry notorious for heavy advertising and targeting of marginalized communities have sparked calls for more ethical standards and government regulations of tobacco. For now, the decisive action by Camel, Lucky Strike, and Chesterfield signals their resolve to fight for survival – though whether price cuts alone can counter the established giants’ competitive advantages is questionable. The coming months will reveal if steep discounts translate into sustained sales or lead all combatants into financial quagmires.
Beyond pricing strategies, the article demonstrates how these brands pioneered innovative advertising and promotions to reach wider audiences amid the more significant 1980s trend of increased consumerism and marketing. Ortved mentions “blitz campaigns” launched by the Big Four involving heavy investment in magazine ads, radio spots, and other avenues. Popular brands like Camel responded by doubling on catchy slogans and appealing imagery. This illustrates how cigarette competitors battled over pricing discounts and the originality and effectiveness of their advertising outreach.
Furthermore, the article demonstrates how cigarette ads frequently associate smoking with rugged masculinity or strength, targeting primarily male consumers in their marketing. Ortved notes that brands like Camel, Lucky Strike, and Chesterfield filled their ads with pictures of tough, manly men smoking cigarettes in an attempt to increase market share among male smokers. This reflects the clear gender roles and norms of the time, which linked smoking to rugged ideas of masculinity. Brands recognized the male segment as the most independent and biggest spenders, leading to advertising and pricing explicitly catered to men.
The cutthroat price war between the leading cigarette brands in their bid to compete with larger rivals hints at Big Tobacco’s rapidly growing stranglehold over key sectors in America by the 1930s. With cigarettes entrenched as one of the highest-volume consumer products, the tobacco industry wielded tremendous economic clout and profits. This amplified their political leverage and ability to resist calls for ethical self-regulation.
The aggressive marketing and pricing ploys employed by the cigarette giants highlight how they prioritized chasing ever-growing sales and revenues over moral considerations regarding public health. As evidence would later show, they willfully ignored health risks, avoided transparency, lobbied aggressively, and continued targeting disadvantaged demographic groups. Unethical practices prevailed over ethics. For example, by slashing prices from 20 to 17 cents, Camel and the others expanded cigarette accessibility for impoverished communities instead of limiting consumption.
Ultimately, the cutthroat competitiveness that defined Big Tobacco’s unchecked rise starting in this era would have devastating societal impacts over succeeding decades. Yet the industry’s market power and political influence continued stymieing regulatory efforts for years before hard-fought legal and legislative victories enabled anti-smoking and other reforms targeting the egregious ethics violations. The price war of the 1930s marked an important early milestone showing how profits prevailed over ethical considerations for cigarette titans overrunning America. Analyzing such events remains critical for understanding why curbing the tobacco industry required coordinated, multipronged legal and political attacks before public health concerns finally began overtaking sheer capitalism.
Secondary sources like books or academic papers supplement the primary source by providing more background to contextualize the analysis fully. For example, Richard Kluger’s book “Ashes to Ashes” examines the long-term impacts of tobacco on areas like public health and the triumph of companies like Philip Morris. Primary and secondary analyses lead to a comprehensive understanding of related social, cultural, economic, and ethical dynamics over time.
In summary, John Ortved’s original 2022 article allows for examining key themes like fierce market competition, targeted advertising, gender roles in marketing, and ethical debates surrounding the tobacco industry’s practices in 1980s America. It represents an insightful primary lens into both company-consumer cigarette advertising as well as broader influences over society. Further analysis using supplementary sources may provide additional perspectives on Big Tobacco’s promotional strategies’ public health and ethical implications during this period.
Bibliography
Ortved, John. “That Cloud of Smoke Is Not a Mirage.” The New York Times (Brooklyn), January 12, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/1939/08/29/archives/three-cigarette-brands-cut-to-17c-here-in-effort-to-meet-big-four.html.
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