Introduction
The American political scientist and international relations (IR) scholar John Joseph Mearsheimer (born 14 December 1947) is among the greatest realists ever. Currently the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, he has previously been cited as the most influential realist of his generation, having been significantly influenced by former realist scholars like Paul Kennedy, Leo Strauss, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. He is best known for his groundbreaking works on offensive realism, which posits that states’ need for security, and ultimately for survival, forces them to aggressively maximise their power. Thus, states only cooperate during temporary alliances, although they constantly strive to reduce their competitor’s power and simultaneously enhance their own. The tenets of offensive realism are embodied in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, wherein Mearsheimer held that “[the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (p.3). The quote proposes that states can only act offensively within the anarchic international system to maximise their power and ensure survival. It is within the province of this statement that the current essay is based. The paper has acknowledged and recognised the theoretical contributions of offensive realism in the contemporary realist tradition. Notably, offensive realism has significant complementarity contributions to structural realism because, unlike defensive realism, offensive realism goes a notch higher by successfully theorising both foreign policy and international politics. Despite having various theoretical flaws (logical issues, restrictive focus, prediction ability and empirical validity problems), the theory cannot be ignored since it offers a new and consequential perspective on the state’s behaviour within the international political arena.
Analysis
Realism
John Mearsheimer first laid out the whole tenets of offensive realism in his groundbreaking work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Since then, offensive realism has been widely studied as a highly influential strand of the realist tradition. From its conception, realism construes international politics as a highly competitive and conflictual enterprise. The theoretical perspective usually contrasts with liberalism or idealism, which tends to stress cooperation (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2006). Realists generally regard states (considered the principal actors within the international political arena) as primarily concerned with their security and survival. Thus, states perpetually pursue their own national interests while struggling for power (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Realists regard power as the international politics’ currency and that great powers, the main actors in the account of realism, must carefully weigh in on how much economic and military power they have vis-à-vis their competitors. Great powers must strive to amass substantial levels of power while ensuring that no other state sharply drifts the power’s balance in their power. Realism’s scepticism or pessimism about the ethical norms’ relevance to states’ relations is the primary downside to its emphasis on self-interest and power (Mearsheimer, 2001, 2006). Realists like EH Carr usually hold that whereas national politics is the province of law and authority, international politics is the realm of injustice and potential or active inter-state conflicts.
However, there exist substantial differences among realists. For instance, not all realists refute the existence of ethics within the international political arena. For example, while classical realism significantly focuses on the national interest concept, radical or extreme realist accounts like the Machiavellian principles emphasise the importance of the “reason of state” (Bull, 1995, p.189) and the glorification of conflict or war. Furthermore, unlike radical realism, classical realism is only critical of moralism rather than being opposed to the inevitability of moral judgement within international relations. Classical realists also emphasise prudence as the basis of successful political action within international relations. The 20TH-century classical realism is increasingly being replaced by neorealism, which emphasises the application of empiricism and scientific approaches in IR studies.
Similarly, stark differences exist amongst realists regarding the answers to critical questions. For instance, although realists regard international politics as synonymous with power politics, they are divided on why states want power. Unlike classical realists like Hans Morgenthau, who considers human nature to be why states wish to amass power, structural realists attribute the quest to the architecture or structure of the international system(Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Structural realism, on which this essay principally focuses, holds that it is justifiable that each state strives to become powerful enough to protect itself against any actual or potential invasions by other states in an anarchical system that lacks any higher authority sitting above the great powers and which does not guarantee that one of the great powers will not attack another, even though all of them always have some measure of offensive military offensive capability (Mearsheimer, 2006). Consequently, structural realism construes great powers as having been trapped within an iron cage inside which they have the limited choice of competing with one another for power as the only guarantee for their survival.
Defensive versus offensive realism
However, structural realists are significantly divided over various intricate issues. For instance, for defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), states should not maximise their world power’s share since the international political system will punish them should they amass excessive power relative to others. Thus, defensive realists deem unwise the pursuit of hegemony. Comparatively, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2001) hold that a state’s quest to maximise its power to even the hegemony level is strategically sensible, depending on the circumstances. Offensive realists hold that great powers should pursue to maximise their share of power to ensure their own survival rather than conquer or dominate others (Johnson and Thayer, 2016). Consequently, structural realists view power as a means to an end (i.e. survival), whereas classical realists perceive power as an end in itself.
Structural realists differ in their preferred mode of action in pursuit of power. While defensive realists argue that great powers are primed for defence, offensive realists hold that they are primed for an offence. According to Mearsheimer (2001), great powers will seize any opportunities to maximise their powers at another’s expense if they have the necessary capability, including by trying to thwart competitors trying to acquire power at their cost. Consequently, great powers will always act to defend the status quo when any looming shift favours its rivals and to frustrate the status quo when the direction of change is in its own favour. The reason for such a behaviour is that “…the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.3). Thus, states recognise that the more powerful they become relative to their competitors, the better their survival chances. Ultimately, hegemony is the best guarantee for a great power’s survival. Thus, depending on the presenting circumstances, offensive realists encourage great powers to attain hegemony since other states can seldom attack them.
Contributions of offensive realism and Implication
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism perspective has had a significant theoretical contribution to realism and international relations but also has numerous shortcomings.
Shortcomings:
Offensive realism has gained significant criticism, which has diluted its practical credibility and validity. Regarding the theory’s numerous logical flaws, Snyder (2002) has criticised offensive realism’s security dilemma view by charging that such a conceptualisation is “…a synoptic statement of offensive realism” (Snyder, 2002, p.155; Mearsheimer, 2001, p.35-36). Instead, Snyder posits that by viewing all states as revisionists, offensive realism erroneously shifts the central focus of the security dilemma concept (i.e. uncertainty about another state’s intentions) to another unnecessary one founded on hypothetical threats. For Snyder (2005), it is the aggressive state’s strategic measure to enhance their security, rather than their need for survival, that threatens other states; hence the latter’s actually justifiable measure to maximise their security. Such a move ultimately leads to security competition amongst actors within the international system. Toft (2005) and Christopher Layne (2003) have further indicated flaws in the theory’s level of analysis, especially concerning its geographic level, which implies that it has left critical room for scholarly disapproval. Scholars have also noted significant flaws with the theory’s restrictive focus (Hendrickson, 2003; Snyder,2002; Kagan, 2012; Lake, 2010; Toft,2002) and prediction ability and empirical validity (Elman, 2004; Kagan, 2012; Layne, 2003; Snyder, 2002; Toft, 2005; Kirshner, 2010). For instance, some of the scholars have criticised the theory’s inability to predict the future behaviours of the USA and China clearly.
Instead, these theorists have usually simultaneously applied defensive and offensive realism to predict a state’s behaviour structurally. Rather than encourage great powers to act offensively to maximise their power, Waltz contends that the anarchic international system allows and enables states to act defensively and to protect, instead of upset, the existing status quo. The offensive-defence balance postulated by Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Stephen van Evera seemingly supported the Waltzian idea that balancing will ultimately checkmate offence when a great power acts offensively to gain power (Mearsheimer, 2001). Finally, defensive realists have authoritatively argued that the balance is often heavily shifted toward the favour of defence, which, coupled with efficient balancing, would discourage great powers from acting aggressively towards others. Instead, they would pursue defence actively but only seek offence when chances are clear that they would emerge victorious. Such findings could significantly jeopardise the defensive realist’s claims.
Strengths/ Rebuttal:
However, there are various points to rebut such criticisms. The theory offers an alternative complement to the defensive realist tradition, especially by supporting that the international system’s structure significantly constrains a state’s behaviour. Defensive realists encourage great powers to maximise their defence to guarantee their survival. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz (1979), unlike Morgenthau, refuted that great powers are innately aggressive due to their inherent will to power and self-interest, but that their actions, principality the pursuit of security, are aimed to guarantee their survival. Consequently, as cited in Mearsheimer (2001), Kenneth N. Waltz “…maintains that the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power…[and that]…anarchy forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power because power is the best means to survival” (p.11-12). However, offensive realism offers a robust theoretical basis to rectify the status quo bias inherent in Waltz’s defensive realism. By principally recognising that the anarchical international political system can also generate sufficient incentives for great powers to strive for hegemony, offensive realism has solved an inherent theoretical flaw in defensive realism.
Another critical area of contribution regards the behaviour of revisionist states in international politics, hence explaining the amount of inter-state conflicts. Offensive realism has expanded “…the scope of neorealist theory by providing a theoretical rationale for the behaviour of revisionist states” (Snyder, 2002, p.158). Structural realism makes various assumptions regarding the international system when explaining the utility of power for states: (1) that great powers are the main actors in the anarchic international political system; (2) that all states have some offensive military capability; (3) that states are perpetually uncertain about others’ intentions; (4) that survival is the main goal of each state; and (5) that although states make miscalculations at times in their pursuit for maximum power, they are rational actors(Mearsheimer, 2001, 2006). Although none of these assumptions individually states that states should maximise their power at another’s expense, they depict an international political realm marred with perpetual security competition when amalgamated. The behaviour of revisionist states, vis-à-vis status quo states, derives from the third assumption.
Revisionist states want to know whether or not other rival states wish to use force to shift the power balance. However, status quo states encompass those who are satisfied with the existing balance of power and are disinterested in using aggression or force to change it (Mearsheimer, 2006). While defensive realists could not account for the action of revisionist states, offensive realism has been able to contend that the phenomenon is due to the inherent security competition problem within the international system, which has meant that it is nearly impossible for a state to know another’s intention with a higher degree of accuracy and certainty. Herz (1951), Jervis (1978) and Glaser (1994, 1997) have also supported similar structural imperatives. Similarly, in his “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” Jervis (1978) contends that anarchy permits wars and hinders cooperation even when states are satisfied by the existing status quo. Usually, a neighbouring state might sound and look like a status quo power but be a revisionist one in reality, and vice versa. Consequently, Mearsheimer (2001) posits that the tragedy of great power politics is that the actors must always assume the worst about other states’ intentions and compete for power as their only guarantee for survival in an anarchic system.
By complementing defensive realism, offensive realism has also helped to enrich structural realism by rectifying its various theoretical flaws. The theoretical interrelations within the two perspectives mean the possibility of them alternating in providing valid explanations for state behaviours. Thus, their complementarity has allowed greater prospects for a “more complete structural realist theory that can more accurately account for both defensive and offensive state behaviour” (Toft, 2005, p.403). Furthermore, offensive realism has significantly contributed to the scholarship around alliance theory and foreign policy. As Mearsheimer (2006) has pointed out, the great powers’ past behaviours (Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany and the USA versus the Soviet Union during the Cold War) corroborate the offensive realists’ predictions that great powers will always seek to maximise their powers and attain regional or global hegemony status more often than defensive realist’s predictions.
Defensive realists have generally acknowledged that great powers usually behave in ways contrary to their theory (i.e. irrationally). Waltz (1979, 1990, 1996) also generally pointed out that his theory was insufficient in explaining international politics, hence the need to supplement it with a different foreign policy theory capable of explaining irrational state behaviour. Defensive realists like Stephen van Evera (1999), Jacky Snyder (1991) and Barry Posen (1984) each proposed foreign policy theories to explain state behaviour. Their decision implies that defensive realists are often forced to go further beyond structural realism (by amalgamating domestic-level and system-level theories) when explaining states’ behaviour within international politics. However, offensive realism has been able to seal this theoretical insufficiency in structural realism, based on its tendency to solely apply structural propositions in explaining states’ behaviour within the international system.
The theory claims superiority over defensive realism as it can usually successfully theorise foreign policy, alliance theory and international politics using purely structural ideas without falling back to distinct foreign policy theories as defensive realists would. Offensive realism can explain global processes and outcomes of states’ behaviour at both the domestic and systemic levels of analysis (Toft, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2001) as opposed to Waltz’s claim that defensive realism could not explain foreign policy and international politics (Waltz, 1996). Furthermore, Toft (2005) demonstrates how including new variables like geography and power distribution improves the potential of offensive realism to make specific assumptions about the states’ pursuit of aggressive eventualities to maximise their power and to resort to balancing actions and buck-passing behaviours. Consequently, taken together, these capabilities enhance the ability of Mearsheimer’s claims to complement defensive realism.
Implication:
The discussion in this essay implies that Mearsheimer’s statement and theory are relatively [largely] agreeable, albeit with various theoretical flaws. From the preceding, the approach is acceptable as a consequential addition to the realist tradition of structurally explaining states’ behaviour within an inherently anarchist international political system. Although the various theoretical flaws may be construed to adversely stain the theory’s prescriptions for and predictions about states’ behaviour within the international political system, offensive realists’ contributions to IR and the humanities, in general, are indispensable. Thus, defensive and offensive realism must be construed as complementary structural realism theories with valuable input in international relations studies.
Conclusion
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer proposed that “[t]he structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other” (p.3). Based on this statement, Mearsheimer inadvertently laid down the groundbreaking claims for his theory: offensive realism. The essay has demonstrated that the statement, and the theory it supports, are highly agreeable, even with its few theoretical flaws. The theory offers highly consequential tenets that accurately explain states’ behaviour within the international political system. Yet, considering the highly unpredictable nature of the state’s behaviour within a remarkably dynamic, complex and anarchic international system, the theory’s applicability is sometimes jeopardised. Thus, it should complement the defensive realist tradition to get the most out of the theory. Ultimately, offensive realism is highly consequential as it has been able to explain various phenomena that defensive realism could not reliably explain using purely structural principles.
Reference list
Bull, H. (2001). The Theory of International Politics 1919–1969. In: J. der Derian and J. Watson, eds., International Theory: Critical Investigations. London: Palgrave, pp.181–211.
Edward Hallett Carr (1939). The Twenty Years’ crisis, 1919-1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Macmillan Press.
Elman, C. (2004). Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony. The American Political Science Review, [online] 98(4), pp.563–576. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4145325 [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Glaser, C.L. (1994). Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as SelfHelp. International Security, [online] 19(3), pp.50–90. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2539079.
Glaser, C.L. (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited. World Politics, 50(01), pp.171–201. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100014763.
Glaser, C.L. and Kaufmann, C. (1998). What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it? International Security, 22(4), p.44. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2539240.
Hendrickson, D.C. (2003). The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered. World Policy Journal, [online] 20(1), pp.93–102. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209851 [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Herz, J.H. (1951). Political Realism and Political Idealism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, [online] 30(2), pp.167–214. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958.
Johnson, D.D.P. and Thayer, B.A. (2016). The Evolution of Offensive Realism. Politics and the Life Sciences, [online] 35(1), pp.1–26. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/pls.2016.6.
Kaplan, R.D. (2012). Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right. The Atlantic. [online] Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/why-john-j-mearsheimer-is-right-about-some-things/308839/ [Accessed 15 April 2023]. January/February 2012 Issue.
Kirshner, J. (2010). The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China. European Journal of International Relations, [online] 18(1), pp.53–75. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110373949.
Korab-Karpowicz, J. (2010). Political Realism in International Relations. In: EN Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [online] Department of Philosophy, Stanford University: The Metaphysics Research Lab. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Lake, DA (2010). Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. International Security, [online] 35(3), pp.7–52. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40981251 [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Layne, C. (2003). The ‘Poster Child for Offensive realism’: America as a Global Hegemon. Security Studies, [online] 12(2), pp.120–164. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636410212120011 [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Mearsheimer, J. (2006). Structural Realism. In: T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith, eds., International Relations theories: Discipline and Diversity. [online] Oxford University Press, pp.77–94. Available at: https://www.commackschools.org/Downloads/8_mearsheimer-_structural_realism.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), pp.5–49.
Morgenthau, H.J. (1952). American Foreign Policy; a Critical Examination. London, Methuen.
Morgenthau, H.J. (1967). Politics among nations: the Struggle for Power and peace, etc. Fourth edition, Revised and Reset … Third printing.) ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Morgenthau, H.J. (1974). Scientific Man versus Power Politics. University Of Chicago Press.
Posen, B. (1990). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Snyder, G.H. (2002). Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: a Review Essay. International Security, [online] 27(1), pp.149–173. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802320231253.
Snyder, J. (2018). Myths of Empire Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Toft, P. (2005). John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power. Journal of International Relations and Development, 8(4), pp.381–408. doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065.
van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Structures of Power and the Roots of International Conflict. Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts, USA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Waltz, K.N. (1990). Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. Journal of International Affairs, [online] 44(1), pp.21–37. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357222 [Accessed 15 April 2023].
Waltz, K.N. (1996). International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy. Security Studies, [online] 6(1), pp.54–57. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429298.
write