Military intelligence refers to the art of finding out information about one’s military opponent in a variety of ways to thwart their plans and strategically plan subsequent military actions. The phenomenon of military intelligence originated in biblical times and continued to develop with the advent of new technologies and methods of warfare. To date, military intelligence has developed considerably, now there are various systems of information collection and distribution, which allows for faster strategic decision-making and a greater probability of accurate information collection, even without exposing intelligence personnel to danger.[1] The world’s most advanced militaries have at their disposal satellites, high-precision cameras, and other electronic devices that have unlimited amounts of memory. Therefore, this paper will analyze the nature and functions of military intelligence at the five levels of analysis in warfare, as well as evaluate the effects of the evolution of such an important part of warfare.
Background
The war in Ukraine began with the attack of Russia on February 24, 2022. Then the attacking country shelled military strategic objects of Ukraine and also began capturing cities in the eastern and southern parts of the country. From the beginning of the invasion, the Ukrainian foreign intelligence service used all available methods of intelligence, which were not disclosed, to prevent the leakage of information and its use by the enemy. The intelligence process in Ukraine, however, is and remains the standard accepted in the theory of conducting military operations. It consists of the preliminary collection of information using various methods, such as wiretapping, interrogations, etc. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, it could be characterized more as a war of the fourth generation, which is characterized by decentralized forms of war, a combination of war and politics, and the widespread involvement in the actions of partisan intelligence groups of various types, and paramilitary organizations. The classification of the generations of war according to Lind also emphasizes that the 4th generation war is a classic type of war known to us today, with the involvement of various wax techniques, and has strategic, operational, and tactical processes.[2], [3] However, with the involvement of foreign aid in the form of financial support and the provision of important technical support for a new model, as well as the training of the Ukrainian military by the world’s leading armies, they helped bring the features of the 5th generation into the war. Generation 5 warfare is distinguished by the involvement of non-kinetic military data and a focus also on cyberattacks. [4]This demonstrates the evolution of the conduct of military operations and suggests that its future development should also take place.
Analysis
There are five levels of conducting a military operation and they include technical, tactical, operational, as well as strategic and grand strategic.[5] However, intelligence is only conducted at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic intelligence deals with the collection of all useful information to form plans and strategies at the global and national levels. It affects such broad concepts as the economy and the military capabilities and intentions of other countries. Strategic intelligence also has different types, such as scientific, tactical, or diplomatic, but the main factor in their analysis is facts about demography and geography. [6]Strategic intelligence is also defined as the level of warfare at which the nation as a subject determines the world’s strategic goals and uses all available methods to achieve this.
As for the war in Ukraine, it can be considered strategic intelligence that the countries of the European Union and the United States made decisions that affected the world economy and carried out a series of political coups, namely that they cut off the supply of Russian gas to the countries of Europe as a sign of protest against the war that she started. [7]Although such a decision harmed the economy of many countries, it was strategic, because it was taken based on the results of satellite intelligence, and was intended to reveal a deterrent effect on the Russian military forces.
Operational intelligence is also one of the levels of its conduct and refers to actions that should support or deny intelligence at operational levels. This level of intelligence is lower than the strategic level and is aimed at planning and implementing actions to achieve strategic goals. [8]Operational intelligence is part of the operational level of warfare, which is conducted to achieve strategic goals immediately at the site of hostilities. Operational intelligence can also be long-term because its operations are often carried out for years and are aimed at identifying one particular thing. Participants of such intelligence intervene in any groups that aim to spoil the plan of implementation of the strategy.
During the war, many cases of operational intelligence were used in Ukraine, which was sent by Ukrainian military specialists to identify and destroy enemy intelligence groups that aimed to harm the country’s strategic goals from the inside. Also, Kammer et al.[9] narrate that Ukrainian operational intelligence agents declassified people who forwarded data to an enemy country, as well as those who engaged in self-enrichment and criminal activities against the background of the deployment of military operations in the country, using various methods. Such actions of operational intelligence are extremely important during military operations because even the slightest violation in the implementation of the strategic plan can negatively affect the result.
The third type of intelligence, tactical, is mainly engaged in supporting operations at the tactical level and works closely with the battle group. this type of intelligence is also involved in briefing patrols on the topic of real threats and priorities. In this way, reporting chains are organized to transfer information for further analysis. [10]Tactical intelligence provides intelligence that is used as a basis for planning and conducting operations and is responsible for the successful implementation of military objectives. So, in general, information collected by tactical intelligence forces is used by commanders directly on the battlefield, but it must constantly be combined with strategic intelligence data.
The war in Ukraine showed good examples of tactical intelligence, which in one way or another influenced the course of hostilities. For example, the Ministry of Intelligence of Ukraine made great efforts to investigate and reveal the methodical of rocket attacks in cities and the most popular targets of the enemy. [11]The commanders-in-chief clearly understood the technique used by the enemy and the timing of the attacks, which made it possible to bring the anti-aircraft defense into combat readiness and prevent casualties and material losses. Thus, if in the period March-June 2022 Ukrainian anti-aircraft defense shot down 10% of missiles, then with the improvement of tactical intelligence for the period July 2022-December 2023, already 60-70% of the missiles fired are shot down. [12]From this, we can conclude that tactical intelligence is necessary for making quick decisions on the battlefield itself and helps to avoid civilian casualties.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the war in Ukraine is a significant example to demonstrate how the way war is being waged is evolving and how it has changed with the help of new technologies and ideas. Also, the war in Ukraine has features strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence. Each of these types of intelligence works at different levels, including the global level, the country level, and precisely at the place of combat. Strategic intelligence consists in making decisions of global impact based on information received from intelligence, operational intelligence helps to combat disruptive factors in the country, and tactical intelligence affects security forecasting and the introduction of combat readiness on the ground.
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[1] Pecht, Eyal, and Asher Tishler. “The value of military intelligence.” Defence and Peace Economics 26, no. 2 (2015): 180.
[2] van der Klaauw, Cornelis. “Generations of Warfare: An Outdated Concept.” The Three Swords Magazine 37 (2021): 73.
[3] Varnava, Andrekos. “British military intelligence in Cyprus during the Great War.” War in History 19, no.3 (2012): 360.
[4] Beskow, David M., and Kathleen M. Carley. “Social cybersecurity: an emerging national security requirement”. Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh United States (2019).
[5] Gentry, John A. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?.” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 6 (2019): 833.
[6] Adams, Jefferson. “Strategic intelligence in the cold war and beyond”. Routledge (2014).
[7] Kammer, Alfred, et al. “How war in Ukraine is reverberating across world’s regions.” Washington: IMF, March 15 (2022): 2022.
[8] Gentry, John A. “Intelligence in war: how important is it? How do we know?.” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 6 (2019): 838.
[9] Kammer, Alfred, et al. “How war in Ukraine is reverberating across world’s regions.” Washington: IMF, March 15 (2022): 2022.
[10] Granhag, Pär Anders, et al. “The Scharff technique: training military intelligence officers to elicit information from small cells of sources.” Psychology, Crime & Law 26, no. 5 (2020): 454.
[11] Mbah, Ruth Endam, and Divine Forcha Wasum. “Russian-Ukraine 2022 War: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe.” Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 9, no. 3 (2022): 144.
[12] Ibid, 152
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