The Commerce Clause

Introduction

Traditionally, the commerce clause has been interpreted as a grant of approving authority to Congress and as an implied prohibition of state laws and regulations that usually interfere with interstate commerce. The “dormant” commerce clause is based on the later interpretation of implied prohibition. The commerce clause, when interpreted positively, provides the legal basis for much of the government’s regulatory power. It is commonly acknowledged that the federal government has final authority and sole authority over matters relating to trade with foreign countries. Courts have often blocked attempts by state or municipal governments to intervene in areas of foreign policy traditionally handled by the federal government. Although individual states do have some limited taxing authority over international trade, the federal government is the people’s sole agent in its dealings with foreign states (Seidleck, 2018).

In the case of the United States Vs. Lopez, the Supreme Court rules against the Gun-Free School Zone Act. This is because Congress had gone beyond its authority as forth in the commerce clause of the American Constitution. The Claus article gives Congress the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes some of the Indian Tribes’ states. An unnamed San Antonio, Texas, high school senior named Alfonso Lopez, Jr. brought a.38-caliber revolver and five bullets to school in March 1992. Upon being challenged by school authorities, Lopez admitted to having a firearm after they received an anonymous tip. Lopez was arrested for allegedly breaking Texas law that forbids bringing firearms into school property. The United States Congress had gone beyond its jurisdiction while implementing the law. The government contended that the gun might lead to a violent crime, hurting the economy if committed in a school zone. The government also argued that the high insurance premiums linked to violent crime affect the economy because everyone shares their cost. The Court declined this appeal because Congress violated the commerce clause (Smothernman, 2022).

Congress has broad authority over trade channels because it controls how commodities and people flow between states. To emphasize, the CourtCourt has never demanded a connection between crossing a state line and participating in a Congressionally-prohibited action. In United States v. Sullivan (1948), the Supreme Court ruled that Section 301k of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which banned the misbranding of pharmaceutical drugs transported in interstate commerce, did not go beyond the congressional commerce power. This allowed Congress to stop transporting illegal or harmful items through the channels of such commerce. The Supreme Court also ruled that Congress has the power to stop the transportation of illegal or harmful items through the channels of such commerce. The use of explosives, mailing or shipping things across state lines, and crimes where the criminal crossed state lines are all covered here. Under the instrumentalities category, Congress has the power to make rules about “the safety, efficiency, and accessibility of the nation’s transportation and communications networks.” It is a big part of Congress’s power to make laws, but Congress has not been making the most of it (Natelson, 2010).

As a result of imposing civil culpability for the commission of a gender-based violent crime without any jurisdictional requirement of a nexus to interstate commerce or commercial activity, Section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case United States vs. Morrison. This decision was made because the section imposed civil culpability for committing a crime. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated once more that it was presented with an effort by Congress to criminalize conventional forms of criminality at the state and local levels of government. This statement was made in response to oral arguments that were given. It is not true that state legislation is incapable of providing enough protection against the accumulated impacts of local violence, as was the case in Lopez. The Supreme Court justified its conclusion in both Lopez and Morrison by declaring that “the noneconomic, criminal nature of the behavior at issue was crucial to our thinking.” This statement was made in both cases. In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that neither of the instances had an “express jurisdictional component which would limit its reach have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.” In both instances, Congress criminalized conduct that did not appear to have any obvious link to interstate trade, despite the absence of the required jurisdictional requirement. Although Congress lacked the jurisdiction to do so, this was carried out (Maddex, 2000).

Conclusion

In the middle of the twentieth century, Congress began basing the passage of many new types of laws on the Commerce Clause to govern commerce and the conditions of economic and social life. To a large extent, the expansion of federal authority can be traced back to the Commerce Clause. In the eyes of most experts, his proposal was only a political ploy to advance his bill. As one justice began casting votes in favor of the New Deal, tensions in the political sphere subsided somewhat. When another justice retired, a New Deal ally took his place. Congress could now pass laws regulating, prohibiting, or endorsing a wide variety of actions, and it did just that. If the CourtCourt finds that the regulated activities have a “close and substantial relationship” to interstate commerce, then it will uphold the law. Over fifty years, the federal government’s authority grew considerably.

References

Seidleck, W. J. (2018). Originalism and the General Concurrence: How Originalists Can Accommodate Entrenched Precedents While Reining in Commerce Clause Doctrine. U. Pa. JL & Pub. Aff., 3, 263.

Maddex Jr, J. L. (2000). Criminal Justice Decisions of the United States Supreme Court: 1999 Term. Criminal Justice Review, 25(2), 285–296.

Natelson, R. G., & Kopel, D. (2010). Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin. Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions, 109, 55.

Smotherman, T. (2022). Troubleshooting the Gun-Free School Zones Act: A Call for Amendment in the Age of Constitutional Carry. Available at SSRN 4025545.