A person’s freedom and dignity are gravely violated when the state punishes them. Because of this, philosophers have questioned its legitimacy throughout history. They are considering that, if and when it is not. Whether or not it is necessary, punishment is a misuse of power and tyranny. The simple question of whether a state is ever justified in punishing must, of course, be answered in the affirmative. However, this answer presupposes that everyone understands what punishment entails. I agree with Mabbot’s definition, according to which a person is only subject to punishment if they break the law. Other behaviour, such as immorality not covered by the criminal code or non-conforming social or political activities that may be seen negatively by the state’s authorities or the general public, is not punishable. Because of this, neither the state nor anyone else has the right to punish an individual for engaging in such behaviour.
I find it complicated to note that MR. In his article on punishment, Mabbott has more precisely adduced any ethical argument that shows the retributive theories and considerations he presents forward are mainly legal and logical. The logical point is that the exact definition of law includes punishment for its infringement is logically named (Mabbott, 153). There is no risk of questions about punishment since it has already been settled. Mr Mabbott illustrates this directly from his own experiences of the administration of the college rule of the compulsory chapel. This view shows that it is obvious it cannot be suitable to be said to be illogical. Because this is the basis of Hobbes and Kant’s moral theory has held the same conviction very boldly. He maintained the voluntary fact that law-breaking was somehow a disputation of scholars known as an absurdity. It does not indicate that it can never be illogical. I have realized that the forces of the stated opinion must be reduced by the sure fact that I belong to the weaker and notoriously illogical gender (Mabbott, 156).
Nevertheless, yet, the opinion is not confined to my gender. I am informed that my great-aunt, serving on a jury to try a boy for utensils-stealing, refused to give out a verdict and also delayed the jury for an indefinite period until, out of fatigue, they made an agreement with him (Kaufman, 78). However, everybody, including my aunty were totally convinced and satisfied on the boy case of stealing utensils. Because for instance, the punishment was life-imprisonment. It sounds logical to serve on jury instead of suffering whatever the mentioned punishment may be for refusing to serve and also not confirming the juryman’s oath to give in a true verdict. For instance, if its deliberate illogically is the best way to get
Mr. Mabbott contends that the criminal code should only ban actions that put community members or the ability of the government to carry out its tasks in jeopardy, as well as when such prohibitions are required to maintain the welfare and peace of the community. It is fundamentally wrong to utilize the criminal justice system and accompanying sanctions to advance unpopular or unconventional beliefs, stifle individual dissent, or crush political opposition. A powerful example of this injustice is how the criminal code was used to impose apartheid in South Africa. This is a legal view with qualifications, not a political one. This is a legal view with qualifications, not a political one. Such laws cannot be justified by any theory of punishment or criminal law (Kaufman, 80). I believe that these regulations merely demonstrate how the current administration abuses its power to prohibit the lawful and harmless conduct of some groups simply because they are of a different race or color. A controlling government that outlaw singing or dancing or, as in the classic Gulliver’s Travels, one that believes an egg should only be cracked at the big end makes it unlawful for someone to crack their egg at the little end would be a similar situation.
Mr. Mabbott believes that Retribution theory supports the propriety of punishment exclusively on the ground that the law has been infringed. No additional reasoning is necessary, according to this theory. The expense of upholding the law must be paid. It has historically been criticized and condemned for being unjustified and not much more than a means of retaliation through the court system (Mabbott, 158) . In the words he put in Protagoras’ lips in Plat, he wrote, “No one punishes those who have committed injustice only because they have committed injustice, unless indeed he punishes in a cruel and irrational manner. The demand of the criminal law makes punishment both necessary and justifiable. Retribution also represents how the community views punishment. This sense of community is necessary for the criminal law to function effectively as a brake on undesirable behavior and a defender of social order. Retaliation encapsulates the community’s vehement opposition to the offender’s actions as well as, to a certain extent, the desire for vengeance and vindictiveness. I noted an experiment that was conducted in some of the Scandinavian countries to combat drunk driving is a nice illustration of this conclusion. The program in Norway is described by Adenaes, and the courts’ constant practice has been to provide except in cases with incredibly extraordinary circumstances, infractions usually result in prison sentences (Mabbott, 157). Even though the sentences are severe, regardless of whether the driving was unsafe, they are typically not much longer than the minimum 21-day sentence. Moving between Norway and the United States makes it difficult to miss the stark differences in the attitudes regarding drinking and drunk driving, according to Adenaes.
Taking of weaknesses, we often assume that the state has a moral obligation to punish those who break the law. Our hypothesis, however, is unfounded since punishing someone includes intentionally harming her, and it is unethical to intentionally harm someone against their will by definition. Mr. Mabbott critically assesses a number of justifications for the legitimacy of the government’s power to punish offenders in The Weakness of Punishment. In response, he backs abolitionism, the viewpoint that all forms of criminal punishment need to be abolished because they are immoral. He argues that the state might provide the very minimum conditions necessary for just reciprocal links among its citizens by using a system of pure restitution rather than punishment (Flew, Antony 304). Secondly, Mr. Mabbott provides a definition of the idea of legal punishment, whose foundation is under dispute. The issue with punishment is that it does not adequately explain why it is morally permissible for law enforcement to purposefully harm those who disobey just and reasonable laws. He asserts that a solution to a problem must satisfy two conditions in order to be effective. A solution must pass the fundamental test by being wholly based on morally sound concepts. The entailment test states that a solution must explain why it is morally right to punish criminals while punishing non-offenders is morally wrong.
Lastly, However, Mr. Mabbott’s response makes an important contribution to the literature since he anticipates and deftly responds to a remarkable range of critiques of the perspective (Flew, Antony 298). He does, however, fail to consider several very important objections. For example, he never mentions the ban on criminal substitution. No one else has the authority to commute a criminal’s sentence if they have done something to merit it. She will deserve punishment up until the point that she gets punished herself. In contrast to punitive justice, a criminal’s obligation to corrective justice may be fulfilled indirectly by others covering the necessary costs of compensating her victims.
In conclusion, I hope it’s clear that I don’t believe criminal punishment works to deter people from committing crimes in the future. I’ve primarily discussed deterrence in terms of criminal behavior. Based on our experience, I do not believe that punishment has a significant deterrent effect for this behavior. Naturally, it actively discourages the convicted offender because it is very clear that, while he is in jail or prison, he is effectively forbidden from committing any crimes in the community, even though he may still do so behind bars. But as I’ve already said, if the law does not deter criminals, it deters everyone in the public, including me. This all-encompassing discouragement is what makes the social order so important. Since the general population complies with the law out of fear of exposure, exposure to the public, and loss of reputation rather than out of fear of actual punishment, punishment may not be required to maintain this deterrent.
Work Cited
Flew, Antony. “The justification of punishment.” Philosophy 29.111 (1954): 291-307.
Kaufman, Whitley RP. “The Mixed Theory of Punishment.” Honor and Revenge: A Theory of Punishment. Springer, Dordrecht, 2012. 73-92.
Mabbott, John David. “Punishment.” Mind 48.190 (1939): 152-167.
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