Corporate espionage is a form of theft carried out from one Company to another. Typically, this activity is associated with corporations based in the continental United States. Industrial espionage, on the other hand, can be carried out internationally (Button ,2020). State-sponsored actors are the source of economic espionage. At the same time, most corporate espionage takes place within our borders and between businesses. The goal of industrial espionage is to collect information. For example, manufacturer information, ideas, processes, recipes, formulas, sketches, and schematics are all examples. Pricing, sales, research and development, bids, plans, and activities are examples of proprietary information. Bribery or other forms of spy fieldcraft could be involved (Button ,2020).
The Libyan economy has risen in various areas, and other countries are stationing whistleblowers in Libya’s major cities in order to learn about the Libyans’ industrial growth techniques. By revealing wrongdoings and plans, these whistleblowers are protected by rules and laws, ensuring integrity and honesty in these companies.
Encourage employees to report misbehavior and protect them when they do is vital to preventing corruption in both the public and private sectors. Employees are frequently the first to notice workplace wrongdoing. Allowing them to speak up without fear of punishment can aid authorities in detecting and preventing violations.
Whistleblower protection in the public sector can aid in the detection of passive bribery, misappropriation of public funds, waste, fraud, and other forms of corruption. It aids authorities in discovering active corruption and other corrupt practices perpetrated by private sector enterprises, as well as businesses in preventing and detecting crime in commercial transactions. Whistleblower protection is essential for safeguarding the public interest and cultivating a culture of public accountability and honesty. The PAK-Libya whistleblower policy is an example of how the country is committed to creating a strong internal control environment that can discover, prevent, or deter illicit behaviour. Without fear of retaliation or negative consequences, Pak-Libya encourages its employees and outside parties such as vendors, customers, and others to report I law violations, including regulator’s laws, accounting irregularities, and any suspected wrongdoing, to the responsible/authorized person(s). Petty grievances are not tolerated in Pakistan-Libya.
Pak-whistleblowing Libyan policy is crucial to sustaining the Company’s integrity. Its purpose is to increase the Company’s openness and reinforce its system for dealing with behaviors that may impair the company’s operations and reputation. Maintaining Pakistan’s integrity All employees are obligated to report incidences of suspected fraud and forgery, financial malpractices, corruption, personal harassment, improper behavior or misconduct, collusion and coercion, and other significant violations of the Company’s rules and procedures in order to protect Libya’s reputation.
It has both beneficial and bad consequences for Libya’s economy, which is a cause for concern. Today’s thesis will focus on industrial espionage in Libya and around the world. Libya has made significant headway toward reuniting in 2021, after a ten-year struggle. It led to significant increases in oil output and economic activity, as well as improved fiscal, trade, and current account balances. Despite this, households are plagued by food insecurity, poverty, and poor public service delivery. The challenges of having national elections in December 2021 enhance the likelihood of a deteriorating political and security environment, undermining progress toward peace and recovery.
If the political process goes well and the security situation remains steady, Libya’s economic recovery will continue (Etelawi et al,2017). If presidential and parliamentary elections are held as planned, and public institutions are reunified, oil production will continue. As a result, trade and current account balances as a percentage of GDP are likely to be in the double digits. The budget balance may also be in the black, given the substantial rebound in oil output and exports, as well as the currency devaluation (which has reduced the cost of financing public sector salaries and goods and services using dollar-denominated oil revenues). However, whether there are any major differences in spending patterns from the first half of the year is a factor.
With 46.4 billion barrels of oil and nearly 55 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa. In Libya, some forty companies have been given permission to explore for hydrocarbons in a 600,000-square-kilometer territory (Etelawi et al,2017). Libyan oil production peaked in the early 1960s at about three million barrels per day. From the 1970s through the late 1990s, Libya had a tumultuous political relationship with the West. Despite the imposition of several economic restrictions, petroleum output remained relatively consistent, ranging between 1.2 and 1.6 million barrels per day, in line with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) general strategy. In 2010, this figure was roughly 1.8 million barrels per day. Due to violence following the February 2011 revolution, Libyan petroleum production was halted for eight months, but by July 2012, output had increased to approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. As a result, Libya is recognized as one of the most important producers of high-quality, low-sulfur oil and gas, with a strategic location to exploit both European and Mediterranean markets. Libya is also one of OPEC’s most powerful members, with a substantial presence in the global oil business (Etelawi et al,2017).
Because of this product, a quick and easily accessible natural resource, the Libyan government was able to avoid relying on revenue and, as a result, court public opinion. As a result, the Libyan government chose a centralized governance model with little transparency and accountability, concentrating natural resource wealth in the dictatorship’s hands.
Many countries and companies want to participate in corporate espionage in Libya, according to research conducted by my whistleblowers and other sources. It’s because the petroleum industry is a vital source of cash for Libya’s social and economic objectives. Libyan oil research began in 1955, with the first oil fields discovered at Amal and Zelten in the Sirte basin in 1959. Despite its vast non-petroleum mineral wealth, which includes gypsum and the world’s largest iron ore reserves, Libya’s economy became reliant on oil as its primary source of revenue following the commercial discovery of oil (Etelawi et al,2017). The mining industry, on the other hand, has been marginalized due to the petroleum industry’s international economic and political significance.
The oil industry accounted for nearly 95 percent of Libya’s export revenues in 2010, according to the International Monetary Fund.In the late 1960s, Libya recognized the importance of non-petroleum mineral wealth, such as iron ore (believed to be the world’s most significant iron ore deposits) and gypsum, and issued the Libyan Mining Code of 1970, which lays out the rules and regulations governing natural resource exploitation. The mining industry, on the other hand, missed the petroleum industry’s international economic and political relevance (Etelawi et al,2017). The lack of an appropriate structure for private sector regulation was one of the major causes of economic and political instability in Libya throughout the pre- and post-revolutionary years. The expanding influence of the private sector is one of the most significant sources of stress today.
Libya’s economic liberalization, membership in the World Trade Organization, expansion of the private sector, and diversification of its economic activities should all be supported by the EU. A free trade deal would help the Libyan economy grow and diversify, as well as expand collaboration in the fields of education and training. However, such an agreement should benefit Libya’s private sector and include conditionality clauses that respect human rights, conflict prevention, and the rule of law, as well as terms that address the deal’s socioeconomic impact on the country’s poorest citizens.
Industrial Espionage Causes
Because of the company’s knowledge, disgruntled employees are the most sought-after asset by a competitor (Button ,2020). Because of the volatile nature of today’s marketplace, many employees lack loyalty to their employers, which may lead to the problem of industrial espionage. Economic and industrial espionage usually takes one of two forms. First, a disgruntled employee misuses information to pursue personal goals or harm the organization. Second, a competitor or a foreign government is looking for information to further its technological or commercial interests.
Industrial espionage frequently involves personnel stealing information from or harming target companies in the course of their day-to-day work duties. Breaking into a company’s office or picking through the trash to find critical information is possible in some cases—and less likely in others. Disclosing classified information to an unauthorized person or utilizing it in a way that is detrimental to the United States or beneficial to a foreign country is a crime.
Corporate spies can operate out of legitimate offices and are frequently employed by businesses to spy on their competitors. If the business is slow, a corporate spy may choose a company without hiring and gathering information to sell to potential buyers. To maximize the odds of early identification, countermeasures for the possibility of sabotage should include detailed personnel processes. If an incident occurs, physical emergency lockdown products can help. Although hacking attacks are the most common cause of data breaches, the vulnerability exploited by the opportunist hacker is often a weak or forgotten password (Button, 2020).
To win, every company strives to be the first to get there. Launching a new product that is a hit could be the goal, as could increasing sales or enhancing customer satisfaction at the end. No matter what the objective is, being the first to cross the finish line is more important than being the fastest. The road to success for businesses is paved with numerous obstacles (Christiansen, 2016). An intelligent racer knows where the dangers are and how to avoid them. Competitive intelligence can help organizations better understand and navigate the competitive environment. Anticipating and preparing for potentially hazardous situations may help keep the company safe. Moral intelligence can be gained in a variety of ways. It’s a different story when it comes to competitive intelligence. Furthermore, it has the potential to be advantageous.
Competitive advantage can be gained by obtaining legitimate information about one’s rivals. Even so, it isn’t always sufficient. There are more spies in the competition than you might think, the press claims (Christiansen, 2016). The illegal and unethical gathering of corporate data in order to gain a competitive edge is known as industrial espionage. This involves the theft of both trade secrets and intellectual property. The theft of financial information by foreign governments is known as economic espionage. It’s done for strategic reasons, not just for financial gain.
Industrial espionage commonly targets:
- Secret information. While “trade secret” varies by country, it generally refers to protected details on existing or developing products. This information could help your competitors improve their outcomes or even bring a similar effect to the market faster than you.
- Customer information Client information, especially financial information, might be utilized to steal business or leaked to harm your Company’s reputation.
- Information about money. Financial data about your business can serve your clients and partners better, win bids, and even make better offers to your most valuable employees.
- Marketing information. It will allow your competitors to promptly respond to your marketing campaigns, potentially rendering them ineffective.
Though espionage can occur everywhere, organizations in areas that rely heavily on research and development, such as the computer, automobile, energy, aerospace, and chemical industries, should be vigilant (Christiansen, 2016). Due to significant competition and a lack of investment in cybersecurity, industrial espionage is also frequent in the retail, financial, and government sectors.
While a few genuinely sensational industrial, economic, and corporate espionage incidents receive global attention, they are only the beginning. Industrial espionage is a common but unlawful technique. It will only be a matter of time until it affects your firm. The mystery is why we do not hear much about it in the news.
Most companies do not report incidences of industrial espionage for numerous reasons:
- Industrial espionage is difficult to establish. Insiders with access to sensitive data are frequently used in industrial espionage. Because espionage activities are nearly indistinguishable from regular activities, they are challenging to detect and even more challenging to establish in court.
- It is challenging to hold criminals accountable. Because trade secret and industrial espionage laws differ from country to country, having international firms and governments responsible may be difficult. Even if the culprit is a domestic criminal, they might drag out court proceedings where your firm can no longer pursue the matter.
- It may have a detrimental impact on your stock. If it becomes public knowledge that your security has been breached, the value of your Company’s shares may drop. It may cause your investors and customers to lose faith in you.
- It could be considered a breach of IT regulations. A business is accountable for the protection of its customers’ sensitive information. The corporation will be penalized if this data is leaked or obtained by industrial spies in particular nations and industries. Yes, espionage can result in financial damages and penalties.
These factors push businesses to keep espionage instances private and undertake internal investigations. It is up to them to develop effective detection and response methods. However, the best way to deal with industrial espionage is to prevent it.
The history of industrial espionage is extensive. In the 1700s, a French Catholic priest penned letters describing the Chinese manufacturing process. France also made a concerted effort to steal British industrial technology trade secrets. Cotton was developed into a textile that could be used for garments during the Industrial Revolution. Richard Arkright, a British inventor, devised several devices to speed up the procedure. He built the foundation of the industrial revolution by combining semi-skilled labour and natural power. The textile business had given the British a great deal of energy.
Espionage in Different Forms
Globalization has created a covert national intelligence community vs national intelligence community, state-sponsored hacker vs multinational corporation. Even on campuses, espionage takes many forms. There are constantly many international students, researchers, and visiting academics. Some are attempting to steal research or individuals. Our FBI and CIA are also pursuing agent recruitment at the same time. Because of its effectiveness and quantity, human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) is the most often used. Technical intelligence, often known as hacking or communications and signals intelligence, can be gathered through the cyberworld. These are incredibly specialized and complicated fields. Espionage can also take the form of fraud, bribery, or economic misinformation.
The cost of industrial espionage is difficult to estimate. It is in the billions or trillions of dollars. When calculating the cost of industrial espionage, we must consider intellectual property theft, financial crime, opportunity costs, the cost of spending more on security due to the elevated risk, insurance and recovery fees, and reputational damage, which is difficult to quantify but potentially enormous. Some businesses are unaware of their losses. When they find out, they have no idea what has been taken. It is still difficult to estimate how much it will cost if they discover it was taken. Some companies aware of this may be hesitant to speak openly about it for fear of incurring further costs. It also has an impact on growth and innovation. Industrial espionage alters investment incentives, affecting change, R&D benefits, and where corporations invest. Military technological losses are difficult to quantify, but they are significant. The vast majority of the billions or trillions of dollars in stolen property comes from small and medium-sized enterprises. When powerful corporations such as Sony or Target are attacked, we hear about it. However, compared to the number of times other businesses have been targeted, this is a minor blip. The cyber realm is one of the key routes to industrial espionage.
Whether it comes from within or without, our businesses are in grave danger of being victims of cybercrime.
Industrial espionage without the appropriate countermeasures
Computer viruses work in the same way as human viruses do. Viruses are often little pieces of code that can combine with other programs and files and only increase when the conditions are favourable. When a virus is activated, it will attempt to replicate itself and propagate, infecting all files and programs in its path. Occasionally, over a network. These virus replicas, like actual viruses, can alter somewhat from the original. Antivirus software has a tough time removing them. Similar to how the chickenpox virus may make you sick, a computer infection can carry a payload that has an effect. It could range from a joke-filled pop-up to irreversibly destroying your essential data. DDOS assaults can now be countered by infecting a large number of computers and causing them to attack simultaneously.
Some attacks are sent as separate applications via email. Rather than entering programs, it sends emails to other computers. It would turn it into a worm rather than a virus. Many modern viruses, ransomware, and adware programs operate independently. The Black hats’ ingenuity only limits viruses’ harmful effects. “The degree of virus and spam entering company portals has surpassed more than 90% of the total volume; that is, greater than 90% of all email arriving at enterprise email servers can be classified as trash,” according to Burgess & Power (2008). (p.57). Theft of financial data by collecting keystrokes and targeting corporate networks as a damaging form of protest is simply the beginning.
Even within our borders and team, business competition and ruthlessness are severe. Due to executives leaving and taking information with them, Volkswagen had to pay General Motors billions of dollars. IBM provided Hitachi with information. Steven Davis defrauded Gillette. Starwood sued Hilton for recruiting executives with excessive expertise. Harold Worden was most likely the most careless. He established a consulting firm and hired as many Kodak employees as he could as if it were a popularity contest.
The majority of Libyans go to work without fear of injury. Their firm, on the other hand, is regularly targeted. Criminals take our intellectual property, proprietary information, and money from our bank accounts, among other things. Nothing is safe nowadays. Individuals can be targeted just as quickly as businesses. Our infrastructure, like other international interests, is vulnerable to attack. It is a matter of national security. The Economy is influenced by industrial espionage. Commercial firms competing with foreign countries are challenging for us to imagine. China has been focused on stealing US intellectual property for a long time. “A wide range of US rights holders cite substantial difficulties to efficient protection and enforcement of all types of IPR in China, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and protection of pharmaceutical test data,” according to Roper (2014). (p. 3). They are attempting to obtain information that will offer them an advantage in terms of intellectual property and defence. Their goal is to destabilize the United States and many other countries. “China is likely exploiting its mature computer network exploitation capacity to facilitate intelligence collection against the US Government and industry by conducting a long-term, sophisticated computer network exploitation campaign,” according to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (p.7). By 2020, China will have surpassed the United States as the global leader in technology, artificial intelligence, stem cell research, and manufacturing.
We have all failed at thievery. China is today’s most significant threat to every American. Physical attacks are significantly less hazardous than the cyber threat they face. How we deal with China will decide the level of wealth enjoyed by our children and grandkids.
We can no longer assume that nothing is safe or that nothing is off the table. As a result, every business should have functional safeguards in place. Cryptography, firewalls, intrusion detection, anti-malware, and behavioural analytics are valuable safeguards. There should also be procedural safeguards built into the business culture. Administrator protocols, policies, and configurations are all available. It makes it easier to limit access to only those who require it. There is always the possibility of an employee defecting to a rival. If such happens, protective intelligence is activated. As a result, having a positive corporate culture is critical. “If a company has a culture that fosters good security procedures, that organization will not be an attractive target for commercial eavesdropping (Masoud ,2016). We should make a deliberate effort not to open that dubious email. Procedures and functional safeguards are both essential. There are policy safeguards as well. It may appear to be a rule that, if broken, will result in a penalty. Our policies have the potential to reduce risk. A business could even transmit information by claiming to have “set virtual traps.” (Easttom ,2016). The system used by the corporation is a “minefield.” It may dissuade some low-level criminals. The goal is to have all of these measures in place and operating together.
Allowing thousands of individuals access while denying 100% access is challenging. It will be tough to establish access control and authentication unless you have something extremely personal and unique that no one can take away. Biometrics is one good topic. There are options for biometrics, retina, facial detection, and voice detection. Only as good as your defence
As tough as the leadership will allow. It must start at the top. There should also be processed for the Company’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) to provide leadership and guidance. Regardless of title, any well-versed person in that position may make a difference. Corporations should place a little more faith in the government as well. Everyone benefits from their aid with attacks and information sharing on cyber-attacks.
Corporate Espionage Prevention
In the security industry, the information era has offered a unique issue. Information is now primarily stored on computers, which has drawn the attention of nefarious persons. Competitive groups target each other’s knowledge, resulting in corporate espionage, and the corporate world is no exception. As a result, counter-espionage rules have been developed, which are derived from general computer security guidelines (Easttom ,2016). The guidelines include many similarities but few differences. The parallels and contrasts between counter-espionage rules and basic computer security recommendations are discussed in this essay (Easttom, 2016). General computer security rules, like counter-espionage guidelines, recognize the involvement of employees in computer security breaches. Both standards include safeguards to prevent employees from disclosing information to a third party or exploiting it for personal advantage. The recommendations focus on limiting employee access to information so that they can only see what they need to see. This is the amount of data that can be shared with an outsider while keeping the most sensitive information private (Masoud ,2016). Employees must develop their own passwords to limit access to information relating to their roles, for example, according to the recommendations. Both sets of computer security rules emphasize the capacity to recover data after an attack.
It is crucial to recover critical functions that allow the firm to continue operating normally after the attack. Both sets of recommendations acknowledge this and stress the importance of backup and recovery methods. Various backup options, such as portable media and cloud backups, are outlined in the guidelines (Masoud ,2016). Backups should be safeguarded, and access to them should be restricted as much as feasible. In both circumstances, remote access to backed-up data is critical. Viruses are used by malicious intruders to get access to an organization’s data. Both guidelines provide techniques for dealing with the complex situations that viruses pose to an organization’s data. The first and most appropriate approach in this circumstance is to use antivirus and firewall protection. The rules emphasize system patching and operating system updates on a regular basis. Any attempt to insert a virus into the computer system is blocked by antivirus and firewall security. Furthermore, they restrict illegal access to information. Rules for counterespionage are a small part of the overall computer security guidelines (Masoud ,2016). As a result, the former concentrates on a single aspect of broader security concerns. Counter-espionage rules, in particular, address the issue of unlawful information leakage from a company. The requirements are more organization-specific than the generic data security principles, which apply to all sectors. Personal information such as addresses, passwords, and names, among other things, may be included.
Finally, both basic computer security and counter-espionage rules have the same goal: to safeguard computer users from privacy breaches (Easttom ,2016). Both sets of guidelines include measures to prevent the loss of personal information due to viruses and physical transfer. It also lays out methods for recovering information after an attack. General guidelines, on the other hand, take a broader view of the security issue, whilst counter-espionage guidelines are more concerned with the protection of company information.
Currently, firms must be vigilant in order to secure their confidential information and trade secrets from internal and external threats. Employees release information about their employers, either knowingly or unintentionally. Employees have an advantage in corporate espionage because they have access to data saved on business laptops, computers, and networks. The document outlines several steps that a business can take to prevent employees from assisting in corporate espionage, whether purposefully or unintentionally. Employee education is the first step in combating corporate espionage. Employees should be made aware of their roles in safeguarding the Company’s data. They should be able to distinguish between information to be shared within and outside the workplace.
They should also be well-versed in the ever-changing types of attack and how to defend against them. After personnel have been educated, it is critical to keep track of their behaviours and how they handle company information. Management should be aware of everything each employee does, including the websites that they frequent. Every employee should have access to data that corresponds to their level of responsibility. Employees with unavoidable access to sensitive information will be required to sign a non-disclosure and non-compete agreement, under which they will be held liable if the information is leaked. Employees should be thoroughly inspected during the recruitment process, with a particular focus on their criminal backgrounds. This will ensure that no inexperienced staff have been involved in espionage instances in the past. Maintaining contact with employees’ referees as well as a former employer is critical (s). During the course of their work, management should keep a closer eye on the recruited employees’ social media, blogs, discussion boards, and chat sites. Employees who engage in behaviour that borders on business espionage should be reprimanded as soon as possible. Management should take steps to avoid the possible gathering and disclosure of secret company information. Non-organizational portable media devices like USB flash drives and CD/DVD writers should be avoided. Additionally, employees entering and departing the firm should be inspected to prevent the entry and exit of portable media devices. Surveillance cameras and audio recording equipment will be helpful for monitoring data flow via mobile media devices. Employees should have the authority to secure company data on a personal level. They must have passwords and change them on a frequent basis. Passwords should be lengthy and comprise at least eight alphanumeric characters.
Employees should keep personal information encrypted, particularly on their hard disks. In conclusion, employees play an essential role in corporate espionage. Organizations can take a variety of steps to deal with employees in order to prevent corporate espionage. Employees are educated, their activities are monitored, information access is limited, and strong passwords are used during information access. It is critical to take into account the provisions of privacy legislation when doing so.
Organizational Asset Identification
Our product design is clearly the most sought-after information based on asset identification. This knowledge holds the key to our product’s market success. Our product’s design concept is so distinctive that malevolent persons want to steal it and imitate it. Due to the great demand for this information, it is vulnerable to internal and external business espionage (Vashisth et al,2013). It is critical to take steps to totally prevent any attempts to gain access to product design knowledge. This essay addresses the essential procedures that must be taken to defend our product design from being targeted. Employees will be made aware of the need to maintain product design confidentiality. Employees must understand that protecting this information is beneficial to both them and the organization. They should be able to recognize that the Company is succeeding because of its original product design and that some unscrupulous individuals are attempting to steal the idea.
Employees that are integrally involved in product design and are constantly updated on new product features should be carefully chosen. The team should be made up of hardworking and trustworthy individuals with clean criminal backgrounds. In addition, the groups should be as small as feasible, with as few rotations as possible. Each member of the team should sign a contract promising to keep all product design knowledge private and secret. If the employee fails to comply with this condition, disciplinary action will be taken in accordance with the law. It is critical to keep valuable information in a backup plan for such a crucial component of production. In addition to external media backups, the concept behind our product design should be kept safe in the Company’s cloud storage. As an extra precaution, backup data should be encrypted if it falls into the hands of predators. Antispyware software should be installed on any computer that has access to this data in order to detect, warn against, and stop malicious invaders and programs. It can be inferred that our product design is critical to our Company’s development and is generating a lot of attention across the board (Vashisth et al,2013). As a result, we now need to increase our security procedures in order to secure the concept underlying our product design. Employees, technology, and recovery techniques should all be at the forefront of security procedures. Employees should understand the importance of safeguarding this idea, and the organization should implement sophisticated antispyware technology to fight against malicious hackers, as well as recovery procedures in the event of an attack.
Industrial espionage has existed for a long time and will continue to live in the future. The total expenses of intelligence are unclear, but even the most conservative estimate is staggering. Criminals have more access to the internet than ever before. Data can be accessed, modified, or destroyed by cyber-attacks. Criminals are continually changing their strategies and are usually one step ahead of the game (Vashisth et al,2013). When this occurs, it jeopardizes our livelihood. Virtual burglary is a common occurrence in American organizations.
China is the most notorious for stealing American and Libya trade secrets. Capital provides energy. New product development and innovation that adds value to society. Commercial firms find it tough to compete against significant thievery. One half is counter-technology, while the other is people and processes (Vashisth et al,2013). Without effective defences, firms in the twenty-first century will become victims of industrial espionage. To be able to defend ourselves, we must first recognize that we are the weakest link. If we are to withstand the constant hacking that occurs, we must fight trust. We can restrict the potential for theft through appropriate training, policies, and practices. We must be concerned about other organizations attempting to get our information both legally and unlawfully, as well as our own employees unintentionally or purposely disclosing information. Governments must also be considerate of stealing our data. In order to thrive, businesses must overcome numerous challenges. They will do it without a diverse security policy; the country will implode.
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