Executive Summary
For several decades, two American allies, South Korea and Japan, have been engaged in a bitter conflict associated with wartime history. However, a potential thaw in the two nations could foster significant dividends, especially for the United States, which has a comprehensive East Asia policy. Notably, Japan and the Republic of Korea normalized their relations in 1965 but still harbor unresolved historical issues like the compensation of ROK workers during world war 2. As the free-market system spread, several issues, including inequality across economic aspects like labor, became prevalent. Such disputes end up undermining bilateral reconciliation and security/economic cooperation. Past and current efforts directly impacting America strive to emphasize a future-oriented strategy linked to common economic and security interests. In this light, America possesses an essential role in incentivizing both sides to ensure that their trilateral relationship is strengthened. This way, the allies can weather North Korea, China, and even non-traditional threats like terrorism and cybersecurity. This piece delves into America’s role and the best policy to adopt in assisting ROK and Japan in settling their historical differences while enhancing East Asia’s stability.
Introduction
Of utmost importance is to assert that South Korean (ROK)-Japan relation has plummeted to historic levels in the last few decades. The tensions between Japan and ROK get associated with significant war history, rivalry, and colonial rule. The past continues to haunt yet shape the national identities of the two Asian nations.[1]. Different governments have yet to fashion permanent solutions to issues linked to historical injustices like forced labor. In this light, trade, territory, and history sensitivities have affected security coordination, cooperation, and, consequently, the trilateral coordination with America. For the United States, cooperation with allies like ROK and Japan is critical in securing the power balance against the significantly expanding Chinese hegemony and reaffirming America’s impact in the Indo-Pacific region, especially regarding the North Korean threat and other non-traditional security issues.[2]. To recalibrate the trilateral coordination and relationships, America’s approach should get based on a respectful partnership that fosters a win-win situation for Japan and ROK. This essay aims to delve into America’s role and policy options regarding the two allies and the welfare of the Indo-pacific region.
Background of the Trilateral Association
East Asia is a dynamic region where contemporary global trade and security intersect[3]. In this light, a fractured Japan-ROK bilateral linkage weakens America’s alliance in the East-Asia region and has significant implications for American trilateral defense cooperation. When juxtaposed with other bilateral linkages, the list of grievances associated with South Korea and Japan is not long. However, it has remained significantly unchanged since the two East Asia nations signed a Treaty on Basic Relations in 1965 and normalized their relationship. In the contemporary world, Seoul and Tokyo still feud over South Korean-controlled islets dubbed the Dokdo by the Koreans and Takeshima by the Japanese. Moreover, the ROK government has constantly argued that the Japanese government never acknowledged adequately and apologized for the colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945[4]. Still, Japan’s handling of the ‘comfort women’ issue, which revolves around women forced to offer sex to Japanese soldiers under comfort stations, has proven fraught. While the acrimony over the matters keeps rising, leaders in the two neighboring nations have been unable to prevent disagreements from reaching other facets of the bilateral linkage. For instance, numerous opinion polls depict that majorities in the two nations view the other negatively. At other times, domestic politics have negatively impacted the bilateral relationship’s strides, consequently negatively impacting the trilateral linkage with the United States. In ROK, for instance, the opposition party (Democratic Party) asserts that Yoon’s deal and talks associated with the forced labor compensation issue is the most humiliating moment for Seoul.[5]. On its part, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party remains skeptical of South Korea and can refuse the bilateral proposals.
Nevertheless, the ROK-Japan linkage has undergone notable integration and expansion since the normalization pact around five decades ago. In this light, Seoul and Tokyo cooperate across multiple fields, including joint disaster management/relief planning, coordination with North Korea, and even regional security. Moreover, the American alliances/linkage between the two nations has also evolved from the 1990s with a unique focus on regional, global, and even non-traditional security problems.[6]. ROK and Japan’s populations also possess more exposure to one another than before the 1960s. Moreover, the current leaders are willing to build on their ties. Conversely, greater cooperation and contact have also facilitated significant suspicion and mistrust between ROK and Japan. For instance, the latest disputes have revolved around the compensation of former ROK-forced employees. These rifts corrode the regional power balance and weaken America’s position as an ally of both (Japan and South Korea). Notably, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2018 that two Japanese entities should compensate the forced laborers. The ruling challenged the Japanese government’s stance that the 1965 agreement (Claims Agreement) thoroughly settled all the claims.[7]. It saw Japan retaliating through the imposition of export controls linked to chemicals essential for ROK’s semi-conductor sector. Seoul and Tokyo’s inability to settle on a lasting solution jeopardizes trilateral coordination and cooperation. This puts Northeast Asia’s stability at risk and contradicts America’s goals of a stable region. Foreign policy is often compared to sequence of moves in a chess game.[8]. In this regard, American foreign policy strives to expend significant efforts at preventing, containing, and settlement of the disputes revolving around the two allies. The chronic friction between ROK and Japan reduces Washington’s impact in the East Asia region by promoting the trilateral linkage to operate less expansively and efficiently than it would otherwise.[9]. Besides, it fosters opportunities for North Korea and China to exploit the prevalent differences between the three players. Nations are almost threatening to challenge others’ unfair trading practices constantly whereby entities like the World Trade Organization come in handy in dispute resolution[10].
Core Issues in the ROK-Japan Relations
Several factors exacerbate the Tokyo-Seoul linkage. These get discussed in the following section.
- Comfort Women-This is a Korean grievance that dates to the last era of Japan’s colonization of the former during World War 2. In this light, the sexual abuse of women from Japan’s occupied nations, including the Philippines, China, Dutch East Indies, and Korea, is an increasingly painful memory, significantly since it got repressed for almost half a century. It was only in 1990 that the first batch of South Korean females lifted this veil of shame. Notably, the Koreans constantly demand a sincere apology from the Japanese government and that Japan should also be open to legal responsibility for the historical harm. Most women in the comfort cohort have often lamented that the Park Chung-hee government underrepresented them in accepting the Japanese reparations and that their grievances remain unmet.[11]. On its part, Japan remains adamant that the San Francisco Treaty (1951) and the normalization treaty (1965) settled all the post-war compensation issues. Moreover, Japan repeatedly asserts that it apologized and acknowledged the historical injustices[12]. The comfort women issue also gained visibility in America due to the strong Korean-American activists. The former secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, even instructed the State Department to refer to comfort women as sex slaves to Japan’s dismay. Liberalism tends to possess a universalistic strand linked to the emphasis on individual rights. Therefore, every individual, including workers, possesses natural rights that should not be violated.
- Territorial Issue-ROK and Japan are also conflicted over the islets in the East Sea (Sea of Japan). These are known as the solitary islands or Dokdo in Koreans and Bamboo Islands or Takeshima in Japan. Notably, Korea stipulates that it discovered the islets first and strives to depict sovereignty and control over them as Ulleungdo’s appendage. It claims it did not repel Tokyo’s annexation of the islets in 1905, which served as part of the Korean conquest. Japan argues that the San Francisco Treaty that outlined how its colonial empire was to get dismantled did not oblige Japan to renounce the islets. It is, therefore, the legal ruler. Control over the islets poses potentially negative economic repercussions. For instance, both nations believe the area is one of the most fertile fishing regions, and gas reserves may lie nearby.[13]. Provocations on both sides continue, with the most recent being Japan’s revision of its curriculum, obliging high school teachers to describe the islets as a facet of its territory.
- Wartime Compensation-The two nations also conflict over the forced labor of the Korean laborers during the colonial era. In 2018, ROK’s Supreme Court ruled that the affected Japanese entities should offer compensation to the victims. It consequently triggered a heated legal-political battle between the two nations. In this regard, the Japanese government perceives the ruling as a challenge to the 1965 treaty deemed the foundation for the post wat relations. The ROK government found itself in a dilemma as it needed to fathom whether to respect the ruling or the 1965 treaty. This diplomatic impasse spilled over into issues of security and the economy. For instance, Japan’s cabinet decided in 2019 to tighten the export control tariffs and delist ROK from its preferred trading partners.[14]. It negatively impacted ROK’s semi-conductor industry. Consequently, Korea retaliated by threatening to exit the bilateral ROK-Japan military intelligence-sharing agreement.
Theoretical Linkages
Contemporary alliance theories assert that states facing a common enemy strive to align to aggregate their resources and capabilities. ROK and Japan have been entangled in quasi-alliances amidst common enemies like China and North Korea. The alliance typically exists under the stewardship of America. The common partner for the two East Asia nations is a significant deterrent against regional security threats and, simultaneously, a cork in both nations’ militarism. For instance, Japan made minimal efforts to craft overseas military/war bases due to its constitutional constraints linked to the anti-militarism rhetoric. Japan, therefore increasingly depended on the American Pacific bases/fleet to secure the sea lines of communications. On the other hand, South Korea had a minimal choice and relied on the United States due to perceived security threats from North Korea. Moreover, internal balancing, for instance, through nuclear weapon development by South Korea, remains thwarted by America. Japan’s and ROK’s security dependence on the United States emerges as a core identity norm of the middle-power nations. According to (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018), global politics oblige new levels of political integration as a response to significantly rising interdependence.
Activism alongside security dependency also serves as an inalienable standard linked to a middle-power nation’s security and diplomatic behavior. Small and middle powers tend to hedge among the great powers during the eras of power shift. In the 21st century, for instance, ROK and Japanese leaders engaged in proactive diplomatic initiatives linked to hedging in the quest to secure leeway from depending on America and, at the same time, socialize China within the multilateral security frameworks.[15]. In addition to sustaining an effective alliance with America, ROK strived to accommodate China’s influences and role in the East Asia region while disseminating a community spirit in the Asian nations. South Korea significantly promoted the East Asia Study Group and the East Asian Vision Group.[16]. On the other hand, Japan has strived to pursue open regionalism. It sought to spearhead the process linked to the ASEAN Plus Six, also dubbed the East Asian summit, by inviting other states like India, New Zealand, and Australia. Moreover, Japan strived to push ahead with regional institution building after the region’s 1997-1998 financial crisis. These actions by ROK and Japan align with the activism norm that tends to get employed by the middle powers to compensate for aspects like the loss of autonomy hence offering multilateral solutions, for instance, to economic and security issues. The liberal international relations theory asserts that the actors in global politics tend to be nations or private groups that organize collective action to foster varying interests under constraints imposed by conflicting values, material scarcity, and societal influence variations.[17].
Impact of the ROK-Japan Relations to America and America’s Role (Objective and Normative)
In the post-world War 2 period, the nation-to-nation linkage between Japan and Korea got delayed until the former gained sovereignty in 1952. On the other hand, Korea gained independence in 1948, fostering a significant American occupation in the region. Only after the end of America’s occupation in South Korea did the nation’s official policy start to form. In this light, the first South Korean president was renowned for promoting an anti-communist agenda and hence anti-Japan rhetoric to gain political mileage domestically. Nevertheless, the bilateral frictions in the formative era did not only result from historical animosity. The reason is that after the Korean War started in the early 1950s, the common threat from the communist neighbors became significantly visible to both ROK and Japan. Consequently, the United States re-engaged in the Korean peninsula by assuming an influential stance. This was bound to foster both positive and negative impacts in the process of the ROK-Japan bilateral reconciliation. For instance, America’s actions were positive in the sense that it pressures both Japan and ROK to start the normalization talks and played a go-between role. On the other hand, a negative aspect emerges from the fact that America entered into a peace treaty with Japan and forty-seven other nations during the Korean War. The occupation of Japan would end in 1952, and Japan, therefore, re-entered the global scene as America’s ally in the region. On its part, ROK wanted America to maintain its earlier role and policy linked to demilitarization and democratization toward Japan.
In the years following the Korean War, however, America has strived to encourage the reconciliation of ROK and Japan. In 2007, for instance, America passed a resolution that urged Japan to formally apologize to ROK for the coercion of numerous women to work as sex slaves during World War 2. While it is symbolic, it depicts that America is willing to address the historical injustices between the two East Asia nations. The strengthening of the alliance in the region remains President Biden’s highest administrative foreign policy. The key to this goal is striving to bridge the gap between Japan and South Korea. While Washington understandably is careful not to appear as a meddler or depict favoritism, it has a rigid role of shaping the course of events within the East Asia region. Notably, Biden has illustrated a positive gesture in America’s role by vising Tokyo and Seoul. It highlighted the allies’ role when it comes to the American Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The partial estrangement by ROK and Japan impacts America in many ways. For instance, closer relations between the two East Asia nations would expand options for dealing with the North Korean threat. This is where the trilateral cooperation is presently occurring, with American, Japanese, and ROK officials frequently meeting to discuss the threat since the 1990s[18]. Conversely, the United States has constantly pushed for greater institutionalization and integration of the three’s efforts. An epitome is that the 2014 agreement among the three to share intelligence data on North Korea is less extensive than the possible types of collaboration that defense analysts can attain. The strength of ROK-Japan also impacts the core aspect of the American and ROK shared strategy on North Korea. It revolves around persuading Chinese leaders that they can gain much by pressuring North Korea rather than supporting it. The implication is that cementing the greater trilateral and bilateral cooperation among Japan, US, and ROK can signal to China that the North’s behavior is prompting the region’s security environment to go towards strategies that counter China’s long-term strategy. Besides, enhanced ties and cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul could improve America’s capability and capacity to deal with regional threats, for instance, by redistributing military responsibilities and roles among its allies.[19].
The ROK, America, and Japan can cooperate in multiple other areas, including countering narcotics, proliferation, and terrorism, engaging in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and even cyberspace security[20]. The United States, nevertheless, has the role of acting as an honest mediator or broker by tamping down varying tensions and facilitating progress. If these preliminary steps emerge fruitful, America can engage in more concerted diplomatic efforts to find a lasting solution to the issues between the two nations. From the 1960s to the present, America has put in numerous efforts to try and foster closer linkages between ROK and Japan with minimal success. At this point, America’s option is to minimize its involvement in the ROK-Japan disputes. The approach gets linked to the belief that the two nations’ common economic and security interests will assist in containing any bilateral issues. Also, there exists a risk of America coming out as a patriarchal power if it asserts itself more directly/dominantly between the disputes. Moreover, America would risk a damaging relationship with one or both allies. A non-interference approach through patient diplomacy is viable. However, it would leave the trilateral linkage more prone to external shock and unlikely to evolve the domestic dynamic in any of the two nations. Contemporary domestic and social tensions make it extremely difficult for both sides to compromise.[21]. Through the patient diplomacy approach, America can only strive to incentivize the partners to move towards more rigid bilateral and trilateral ties.
Another option for the United States is to engage in shuttle diplomacy. Shuttle diplomacy revolves around a mediator acting as the go-between and, therefore, must gather data from all the disputants. The mediator, in this case, serves as a conduit for relaying the questions and answers and offering suggestions to move the conflict toward resolution in private.[22]. In the ROK-Japan conflict, America can act as a referee through the shuttle diplomacy policy strategy. Moreover, it can adopt public or private exhortations. The referee mandate should not be accusatory. However, America can sometimes recognize or even reward certain moves by the allies[23]. The referee role is, therefore, a minimalist approach that strives to prevent and even mitigate words or actions that can worsen bilateral linkages. An epitome of this is that both Japan and South Korea’s previous administrations have strived to engage in restrained stances over the islet.
The third option linked to America’s role in the ROK-Japan issues revolves around quiet diplomacy. According to Banim et al. (2017), quiet diplomacy entails one nation striving to impact the behavior of another through discreet actions or negotiations. In this light, quiet diplomacy operates behind the scenes and often relies on backchanneling instead of public talks. It may also encompass crafting strategic partnerships and deal-making. This shows that quiet diplomacy involves more carrots than sticks or, in Theodore Roosevelt’s words, speaking softly but carrying a big stick. America can enhance the ROK-Japan linkage by expanding or institutionalizing the trilateral relationship. It would make the United States play the role of a commissioner. In this regard, America would have Japan and Korea’s media, elites, and government focus on the areas of common interest like trade, economy, and regional stability instead of the points of tension. The trilateral meetings, for instance, can strive to identify yet publicize how cooperation can advance every nation’s individual global or regional interests.[24]. The quiet diplomacy approach is unique yet beneficial because cooperation continues amid bilateral disputes.
Key Stakeholders and Their Roles in the Policy Process
The core stakeholders include Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States of America. In this light, Korea has in the past adopted a hostile notion towards Japan. For instance, Japan has constantly been framed as an aggressor that should be aware of historical crimes and injustices. On its part, Japan has maintained a relatively low-key strategy in East Asian foreign policy after the end of world war 2 and the Korean War. However, Japan has, in the recent past strives to view South Korea as a partner and not a country to be meddled with. In this regard, South Korea has significantly adopted democracy and developed to become the globe’s 15th-largest economy. Both ROK and Japan have therefore strived to tailor their foreign policies towards cooperation despite a few conflicts and setbacks. For instance, Japan supported ROK financially during the Asian financial crisis and even during the co-hosting of the 2002 world cup. Moreover, K-pop music and Korean TV content are popular in Japan. Focusing on the United States, it has served as a key stakeholder and strong proponent linked to restored ROK-Japa ties. Since the normalization process in 1965, America has strived to work behind the scenes to foster rapprochement. Moreover, America has maintained a symbolic stance of reconciliation whereby it urges both sides to resolve the varying issues of conflict. In addition to President Biden’s visit, the Secretary of State dubbed, Antony Blinken, Deputy Secretary named Wendy Sherman, and the Defense Secretary dubbed, Lloyd Austin, have strived to meet with the Japanese and South Korean counterparts both trilaterally and bilaterally which would foster greater cooperation on mutual economic and security goals. The latest trilateral talks got scheduled for April 14th, 2023, between the American assistant Secretary of Defense linked to the Indo-Pacific Security Affairs named, Ely Ratner, who hosted ROK Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy named, Heo Tae-keun and Japan’s Director General for Defense Policy named Masuda Kazuo.[25]. Under their American host, the three defense officials asserted that they would enhance their trilateral security cooperation and remain vigilant in the quest to deter the North Korean threat. The three also discussed the security issue whereby the importance of stability and peace, especially in the Taiwan Strait, got underscored. Moreover, the three discussed the regularization of the anti-submarine and missile defense exercises, which reinforces the allies’ power against North Korea. At the meeting, America retorted yet expressed its full support for ROK and Japan’s commitments to strengthen collaboration and communication. This includes leveraging GSOMIA (the Bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreements towards stability in the region. Besides, America reiterated its commitment to defend the ROK and Japan, whereby it is backed by a diverse range of defensive capabilities.
In the quest to enhance the bilateral and, consequently, trilateral linkages, the Japanese president should schedule to visit South Korea. It would underscore the point that the recent visit by the South Korean president to Japan was from a point of genuine partnership. Moreover, Japan, ROK, and America should strive to foster more frequent yet formal consultations. The institutionalization would ensure that ROK and Japan never have a chance of shutting down bilateral communication. Besides, Japanese entities should quietly contribute to the voluntary fund geared towards workers’ compensation. All three stakeholders should understand that historical and territorial disputes are complex and therefore oblige long-term commitment. By being aware of the inflammatory nature of the issues, the nations can effectively avoid politicizing them in nationalistic yet antagonistic ways.[26].
Recommended Role and Policy
The best option for the United States regarding ROK-Japan relations is quiet diplomacy. The current Biden regime has strived to articulate the essentiality of enhancing bilateral and trilateral cooperation and relations. In this light, acts like the visit by Biden to Tokyo and Seoul ensure that both understand their role in the overall American Indo-Pacific Strategy. America is understandably cautious to avoid getting perceived as meddling with East Asia affairs. Nevertheless, the quiet diplomacy policy could ensure that Tokyo and Seoul pursue economic and security cooperation while also tackling historical disputes. Both ROK and Japanese governments can commit to having a joint fund in dealing with the wartime workers’ compensation issue. Notably, the current ROK regime is already taking this route by committing to compensate the victims. Japan has chipped in by asserting that its organizations and businesses would voluntarily add to the fund while promoting civil society exchanges among diverse groups like non-governmental entities and cultural, academic, and religious entities in both nations.[27]. America, on its part, is already implementing quiet diplomacy where it hailed both Japan and South Korea for their Indo-pacific strategies and continues to engage the defense officials from both ROK and Japan. The latest meeting hosted by the American assistant Secretary of Defense linked to the Indo-Pacific Security Affairs is the epitome of the active policy steps that America is significantly taking to resolve the East Asia issues between ROK, Japan, and other nations.
In this light, ROK and current Japanese leaders recognize the imperative associated with closer ties. An epitome is that North Korea’s frequent ballistic missile tests, China’s military assertiveness in the East Asia region, and the war in Europe have all fostered security deficits for both nations that oblige heightened coordination and cooperation. The United States can complement this by institutionalizing the trilateral linkage between the three. For instance, after almost no activity during the previous ROK administration, military exercises among the three have already resumed. Moreover, an almost near-constant pace is linked to the trilateral policy meetings. The outcome has been favorable, with all three nations giving a joint statement linked to a shared vision for the Indo-pacific region[28].
Overall, ROK and Japan, in the recent past, have made significant goodwill gestures. An epitome is that ROK has already dropped the demands for Japanese entities to compensate the war laborers, and issues have been debated for many years. On its part, Japan plans to end restrictions placed on technology exports on ROK in 2019. Nevertheless, bilateral and trilateral cooperation, as aided by the United States, for instance, through the quiet diplomacy policy, remains a work in progress. All the leaders face potential domestic political concerns.[29]. For instance, the current administrations’ ratings in ROK and Japan are not strong. Domestic politics, therefore, remain too volatile, and there is the fear of the lack of a lasting solution that can weather future regimes.[30]. Conversely, optimism is linked to the fact that the nations have propagated the ROK-Japan bilateral talks in recent months. It ensures that America is shielded from domestic criticism in both and hence can give every side accountability regarding bilateral linkage success. From May 2022, the three nations have engaged in multiple high-level meetings. Moreover, they have closely coordinated the response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. It has consequently prevented North Korea from leveraging and exploiting potential cracks in the trilateral linkage. The nuclear threats, Chinese hegemony, and the bilateral historical issues continue to be the glue that ensures that the trilateral relations remain intact. Besides, the three are coordinating an economic security and stability dialogue associated with mitigating the issues that link to supply chains, emerging technologies, data transparency, and even regional trade. Japan and South Korea are set to benefit. However, policy divergences and different perceptions regarding China among the three allies could weaken their unity. An epitome is that Japan engages in stronger rhetoric and consequently takes bold steps as a response to the increasing Chinese assertiveness and influence. On its part, South Korea has taken a more conciliatory tone intending to maintain an effective economic linkage with China. Nevertheless, America follows Japan and strives to outcompete rivals like China through different security strategies.
Conclusion
This essay aimed to delve into America’s role in the ROK-Japan bilateral talks linked to regional stability and historical/cultural issues. In this light, the analysis depicts that the United States has several policy options, hence defining its role in fostering a resolution to its allies’ conflicts. Nevertheless, the quiet diplomacy policy is the most viable as it would ensure strengthened bilateral and trilateral linkage. Notably, the three nations should take the opportunity and goodwill from the current regimes to accelerate the trilateral agenda further. While significant levels of work are underway, much remains to get done. Enhancing the trilateral cooperation and resolving the bilateral issues would send a powerful message to players like Russia, China, and North Korea. It would make these understand that the regional web of like-minded partnerships and alliances is already tightening. Institutionalizing yet expanding the trilateral security exercises is critical as it would facilitate deepened data sharing, awareness, and preparedness. Across the diplomatic level, increased cooperation would ensure that Japan and America involve ROK extensively in the regional efforts linked to supporting the rules-based global order. An epitome would be ensuring that ROK participates in discrete decisions and elements revolving around emerging technology, climate, and infrastructure. In summary, the Biden government has ample opportunity to incentivize the partners towards stronger bilateral and trilateral ties.
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[3] Bae, Jeeho. “Reshaping US–South Korea–Japan Trilateral Relations.” From Trump to Biden and Beyond: Reimagining US–China Relations (2021): 91-109. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-4297-5_7
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[6] Manyin, Mark E. Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions. Discussion Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., et al. 2016.“US-South Korea Relations.” CRS Report, April 26. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf
[7] Aum, F. “Mended Ties between Japan and South Korea Would Boost Regional Security.” United States Institute of Peace, July 28, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/mended-ties-between-japan-and-south-korea-would-boost-regional-security.
[8] Vanhoonacker, Sophie, and Patrice Wangen. “Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.” In The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration. OUP Oxford, 2015.
[9] Manyin, Mark E. Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions. Discussion Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., et al. 2016.“US-South Korea Relations.” CRS Report, April 26. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf
[10] A Greenlaw, Steven, and David Shapiro. [eTextbook] Principles of Microeconomics 2e. 2017.http://keep.hcmiu.edu.vn/bitstream/handle/123456789/3579/Principles%20of%20Microeconomics%202e.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[11] Rozman, Gilbert. “Joint US-Korea Academic Studies.” Korea Economic Institute of America 25 (2014). http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/joint_us-korea_academic_studies_volume_24_2013_aas_papers_whole_book.pdf
[12] Ibid et al., 23
[13] Rozman, Gilbert. “Joint US-Korea Academic Studies.” Korea Economic Institute of America 25 (2014). http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/joint_us-korea_academic_studies_volume_24_2013_aas_papers_whole_book.pdf
[14] Ibid et al, 15
[15] Son, Key-Young. “Middle Powers and the Rise of China:‘Identity Norms’ of Dependency and Activism and the Outlook for Japan–South Korea Relations vis-à-vis the Great Powers.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (2014): 91-112. https://www.academia.edu/download/33866668/JJPS_article.pdf
[16] Son, Key-Young. “Middle Powers and the Rise of China:‘Identity Norms’ of Dependency and Activism and the Outlook for Japan–South Korea Relations vis-à-vis the Great Powers.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (2014): 91-112. https://www.academia.edu/download/33866668/JJPS_article.pdf
[17] Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics.” International organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553. http://kaf1.ru/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/03_Moravscik_Taking-preferences-seriously.pdf
[18] Manyin, Mark E. Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions. Discussion Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., et al. 2016.“US-South Korea Relations.” CRS Report, April 26. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf
[19] French, Erik, Jiyoon Kim, and Jihoon Yu. “The US Role in South Korea-Japan Relations: From Johnson to Biden.” The Diplomat, January 14 (2021). https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-us-role-in-south-korea-japan-relations-from-johnson-to-biden/
[20] Rozman, Gilbert. “Joint US-Korea Academic Studies.” Korea Economic Institute of America 25 (2014). http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/joint_us-korea_academic_studies_volume_24_2013_aas_papers_whole_book.pdf
[21] Sakaki, Alexandra. “Japan-South Korea Relations-a downward spiral: More than” just” historical issues.” (2019): 7. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/64095/ssoar-2019-sakaki-Japan-South_Korea_relations_-_a.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-sakaki-Japan-South_Korea_relations_-_a.pdf
[22] Banim, Guy, Eva Pejsova, Bernt Berger, Jakob Bund, Matthieu Burnay, Marta Hermez, Stine Lehmann-Larsen, et al. “better than cure: the EU’s quiet diplomacy in Asia.” (2017). https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/EUISS-Report_33.pdf
[23] Manyin, Mark E. Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions. Discussion Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., et al. 2016.“US-South Korea Relations.” CRS Report, April 26. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf
[24] Banim, Guy, Eva Pejsova, Bernt Berger, Jakob Bund, Matthieu Burnay, Marta Hermez, Stine Lehmann-Larsen, et al. “better than cure: the EU’s quiet diplomacy in Asia.” (2017). https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/EUISS-Report_33.pdf
[25] US Department of Defense. “Joint Statement of the 13th Defense Trilateral Talks.” U.S. Department of Defense, 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3363747/joint-statement-of-the-13th-defense-trilateral-talks/.
[26] Manyin, Mark E. Managing Japan-South Korea Tensions. Discussion Paper. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., et al. 2016.“US-South Korea Relations.” CRS Report, April 26. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/12/Discussion_Paper_Korea_Japan_Manyin.pdf
[27] Yeo, Andrew. “South Korea-Japan Rapprochement Creates New Opportunities in the Indo-Pacific.” Brookings. Brookings, March 17, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/03/17/korea-japan-rapprochement-creates-new-opportunities-in-the-indo-pacific/.
[28] Cha, Victor, and Christopher Johnstone. “Japan and South Korea Turn the Page.” RealClearWorld. CSIS, March 10, 2023. https://www.realclearworld.com/2023/03/10/japan_and_south_korea_turn_the_page_886459.html
[29] Rich, Motoko, and Choe Sang-hun. “Japan and South Korea Make Nice, but Can It Last?” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 17, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/17/world/asia/japn-south-korea-relations.html.
[30] LEE, JI-YOUNG, and ANDY LIM. “JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA AS LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.” Connections 24, no. 3 (2023): 143-154. https://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/12-Japan-Korea-Relations-2.pdf
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