The article by John Mearsheimer, titled “The False Promise of International Institutions,” primarily examines the role of international institutions in maintaining global security. Mearsheimer commences his discourse by confidently asserting that Western nations’ policymakers have endeavored to establish security arrangements in Europe and other global regions, relying on international institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 5). The author emphasizes that this transition, which took place following the conclusion of the Cold War, explicitly dismisses the balance of power as a fundamental framework for organizing the global order in the post-Cold War era (p. 5). Mearsheimer emphasizes the significance of institutionalism, highlighting its foundation in the robustness of the diverse institutions present in Europe that have demonstrated effectiveness and advocating for their expansion to other global regions.
In the realm of international relations (IR), the absence of a universally accepted definition for institutions prompts Mearsheimer to characterize them as “a collection of regulations that prescribe how states ought to engage in cooperation and competition” (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 8). Significantly, the collection of regulations is subject to negotiation among numerous states and necessitates consensus through international agreements. Furthermore, Mearsheimer critiques realists’ understanding of international politics, arguing that a perpetual state of warfare does not characterize the field of International Relations. According to Mearsheimer (1994, p. 9), In this regard, Mearsheimer emphasizes that realists’ perspective of a perpetually competitive global landscape overlooks the existence of state cooperation, which can be challenging to attain and even more challenging to maintain (Mearsheimer, p. 12). The constraint in international relations primarily arises from the deliberation surrounding the equitable distribution of profits or gains among the participating states. Furthermore, according to the realist school of thought, Mearsheimer emphasizes that states occasionally engage with institutions. Still, their actions are fundamentally driven by self-interest calculations rooted in the global power dynamics (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 13).
Additionally, Mearsheimer identifies three distinct institutionalist theories: liberal institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory. These theories explain how institutions discourage states from engaging in war and promote stability. According to Mearsheimer, liberal institutionalists believe that cheating represents the primary obstacle to international cooperation, and institutions play a crucial role in surmounting this challenge. One limitation of this argument is its failure to provide a comprehensive explanation regarding the part of international cooperation in reducing the occurrence of war (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 14). The concept of collective security directly addresses the challenge of war prevention by adopting the realist assumption that the use of force will remain significant in international politics. In contrast, critical theory challenges the prevailing realist perspective that posits states as primarily driven by their self-interests. It is worth mentioning that critical theorists extensively draw upon the concept of ideas in the context of international politics, emphasizing the potential for a transformative impact on global political dynamics through a fundamental shift in individuals’ cognitive and discursive frameworks regarding world politics (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 15). Mearsheimer asserts that the significance of international institutions in international security will be limited, as he highlights the inherent flaws within the three prevailing institutional theories.
In their seminal article titled “The Promise of Intuitionalist Theory,” published in 1995, Keohane and Martin engage with Mearsheimer’s scholarship on the significance of institutions in international politics. Their contribution involves a critical examination of certain inaccuracies present in Mearsheimer’s work. As previously stated, John Mearsheimer posited that institutions exert limited influence on the behavior of states, thereby suggesting that their capacity to foster stability is limited. The authors emphasize that Mearsheimer’s claims heavily rely on his alignment of institutionalism and realism; however, there are several significant differences between the two (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 41). According to Keohane and Martin (p. 44), the significance of relative gains in international cooperation is emphasized. However, they also highlight the importance of considering the conditions under which relative gains hold value and the role of institutions in addressing distributional concerns. The importance of relative gains in international cooperation is heavily influenced by factors such as the number of significant actors involved in the system and the extent to which military advantage favors offensive or defensive capabilities. In addition to the issue of cheating, coordinating states’ actions toward achieving a mutually beneficial and sustainable cooperative outcome poses a significant challenge for states engaged in cooperative efforts (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 45). While Keohane and Martin acknowledge specific points made by Mearsheimer regarding the significance of institutions in international politics, they emphasize that due to the constant presence of force, according to realist theory, international institutions play a crucial role in upholding global peace. For international institutions to exert significant influence in preserving global stability, Keohane and Martin contend that they must function according to the principle of reciprocity (p. 50). Therefore, these institutions will play a crucial role in mitigating the influence of state power and addressing the conflicting interests that characterize the realm of international politics.
In contrast, Charles and Clifford Kupchan critique John Mearsheimer’s assertions regarding collective security. The authors comprehensively define collective security as achieving stability through cooperative efforts (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995, p. 53). The authors argue that Mearsheimer’s analysis of collective security is limited because it primarily emphasizes ideal security while disregarding alternative institutional frameworks. Additionally, Kupchan and Kupchan assert that collective security holds considerable importance as it can be categorized into two aspects: enhancing the effectiveness of balancing against aggressors and fostering trust and cooperation. Mearsheimer’s arguments are inadequate in elucidating the importance of international institutions in upholding global stability and averting conflicts due to their exclusive focus on realism.
Alexander Wendt supports John Mearsheimer’s assertions by emphasizing the significance of critical theory and its emphasis on the construction of international politics. Collective understandings, expectations, or knowledge partially determine social structures. These elements encompass the individuals involved in a given scenario and the characteristics of their interactions, which can range from collaborative to adversarial. A security dilemma refers to a social construct consisting of shared understandings among states, characterized by a pervasive lack of trust leading to the adoption of pessimistic assumptions regarding each other’s intentions (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Consequently, states tend to prioritize their interests by adopting a self-reliant approach. Wendt posits that Mearsheimer’s assertions are flawed, for they regard realism as a theory of war and critical theory as a theory of peace (p. 76).
Even though Mearsheimer belittles the significance of international institutions in preventing war, his assertions have been criticized. The articles reviewed highlight that Mearsheimer’s assertions are significant but based on theories rather than empirical evidence. International institutions play a critical role in preventing war as they facilitate state cooperation in a world where countries are driven by their self-interests, as realists stress.
Bibliography
Keohane, R.O. and Martin, L.L., 1995. The promise of institutionalist theory. International security, 20(1), pp.39-51.
Kupchan, C.A. and Kupchan, C.A., 1995. The promise of collective security. International security, 20(1), pp.52-61.
Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), pp.5–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078.
Wendt, A., 1995. Constructing international politics. International security, 20(1), pp.71-81.
write