Craig Whitlock’s book, “The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War,” is a detailed account of the United States’ involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The book includes interviews with key figures in the war and previously unreleased documents. The book paints a picture of a mismanaged war and reveals the extent to which the American public got misled about the war’s progress. “But the Bush administration suppressed the internal warnings and put a shine on the war in public” (Whitlock 66). The Afghanistan Papers are a damning indictment of the US war in Afghanistan and a must-read for anyone interested in understanding what went wrong. This response paper explores the reasons for America’s failure and the relationship between the United States and the Afghans.
One of the main reasons America failed in Afghanistan was that the original objective was unclear. “…the war’s goals and objectives soon veered off into directions that had little to do with 9/11” (Whitlock 19). The objective shifted from defeating the Taliban to finding and defeating al Qaeda and then to nation-building. These different objectives required different strategies, but America never had a clear strategy. The military mission became muddled, and the country became embroiled in a long and costly war with no clear exit strategy. In addition, the Afghan people are a complex tapestry of different ethnic groups and tribes, which made it difficult to form a coherent national government. The central government was always weak, and the war further destabilized the country (Malkasian 10). The war also took a heavy toll on the civilian population, causing many to flee the country.
The war also highlighted the problems with Pakistan as a regional partner. Pakistan was not interested in stability in Afghanistan and instead supported the Taliban to maintain its influence in the region. This made it difficult for America to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. The book shows many problems with the American effort in Afghanistan. The geographical and ethnic complexity of Afghanistan made it difficult for the American forces to gain the trust and support of the Afghan people. The different ethnic groups in Afghanistan have their traditions and customs, which the American forces were not familiar with. This made it difficult for the American forces to build relationships with the Afghan people and gain their trust.
Additionally, the rugged terrain of Afghanistan made it difficult for the American forces to carry out military operations effectively. The American forces were not used to the terrain, and as a result, they made many mistakes that allowed the Taliban to regroup and become stronger. “The altitude and terrain made maneuvering difficult….” (Whitlock 32).
Another reason the American-led forces failed to eliminate the Taliban was that the American forces were not experienced in counter-insurgency operations. As a result, they made many mistakes that allowed the Taliban to regroup and become stronger. The American forces were also unfamiliar with the local customs and traditions, making it difficult for them to build relationships with the Afghan people and gain their trust. The forces also failed because of the many economic problems the country faced. Corruption was rampant in Afghanistan, and the American forces could not effectively combat it. “…corruption coursed through the Afghan army and police from top to bottom” (Whitlock 66).
The American forces were unfamiliar with the local customs and traditions, making it difficult for them to build relationships with the Afghan people and gain their trust. Additionally, the opium trade was a major source of income for the Taliban, and it was difficult for the American forces to disrupt this funding source. The Taliban used the opium trade to fund their operations, making it difficult for the American forces to make progress.
The forces’ failure was also because of the challenges of Pakistan as a regional partner in rebuilding Afghanistan. “Obama said he would be more diplomacy with Pakistan…” (Whitlock 131). Pakistan was reluctant to help the American forces in their efforts to eliminate the Taliban, making it difficult for them to make progress. Pakistan was concerned that if the Taliban got eliminated, there would be no one to stop the spread of extremism in Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistan was worried that if the Taliban got eliminated, then Afghanistan would become a haven for terrorists. As a result, Pakistan was reluctant to help the American forces in their efforts to eliminate the Taliban.
The United States never really understood what Afghans wanted. The United States focused on its objectives and goals, which did not always align with what the Afghan people wanted or needed. The United States also did not always partner successfully with the Afghan people. There were times when the United States acted unilaterally without consulting with or involving the Afghan people in decision-making (Malkasian 49). This created resentment and mistrust, further eroding the relationship between the United States and Afghanistan. This led to tension and conflict between the United States and Afghanistan, ultimately contributing to the Taliban’s resurgence (King and Anthony 13).
The war in Afghanistan was a costly mistake that got mismanaged from the start. The original objective was unclear, and the mission became muddled as the objectives changed. This led to a long and costly war with no clear exit strategy. The Afghan people are a complex tapestry of different ethnic groups and tribes, which made it difficult to form a coherent national government. The central government was always weak, and the war further destabilized the country (Ali and Tariq 9). The war also took a heavy toll on the civilian population, causing many to flee the country. America’s failure in Afghanistan is a cautionary tale of the difficulties of nation-building and the importance of having a clear strategy.
Works Cited
Ali, Tariq. The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold. Verso Books, 2021.
King, Anthony. “Why Did the Taliban Win?.” Armed Forces & Society (2022): 0095327X221096702.
Malkasian, Carter. “How the Good War Went Bad: America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan.” Foreign Aff. 99 (2020): 77.
Malkasian, Carter. The American war in Afghanistan: A history. Oxford University Press, 2021.
Whitlock, Craig. The Afghanistan papers: a secret history of the war. Simon and Schuster, 2021.
write