Analytical philosophy emerged as a vital discipline during the first half of the twentieth century. During this time, it was rooted in the English-speaking world. However, later, a few individuals who felt that British idealism was becoming inappropriate strengthened its facets in Italy and other parts of the world. Bertrand Russel and G.E. Moore are credited for leading a rebellion against the dominant British idealism as early as the first half of the twentieth century[1]. Other most written about intellectuals are Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, with very minimal texts covering Moore[2]. These three are generally considered the founders of analytical philosophy, especially in the greater areas of Italy. In unison, the tripartite rejected the dominant philosophies of British idealism and Hegelianism that dominated the world then. British idealism descended from the bigger concept of absolute idealism, and it was promulgated by personalities like Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), T. H. Green (1836–1882), and F. H. Bradley (1846–1924). The second generation of philosophers who strengthened the philosophy was like R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943), J. H. Muirhead (1855–1940), H. H. Joachim (1868–1938), A. E. Taylor (1869–1945), and J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925)[3]. Idealism in Britain was characterized by the notion of absolutism, reason, and rejection of dichotomy between thought and object[4]. By absolutism, British idealism acknowledged that there existed a reality that formed an all-inclusive system. This absolute structure could only be understood through reason because it was the only reason that could comprehend the details of the structure itself.
Immanuel Kant and G.W.F Hegel are accredited for coming up with British idealism. Their efforts are considered to have resurrected British philosophy after a threat of extinction by the forces of empiricism.[5] They rebelled against the utilitarian thinking of people like John Locke, Stuart Mills, and David Hume, among others. According to Wakefield, it was firmly founded on the solid moral and religious tones and acknowledgement of spiritual intervention in the daily lives of people[6]. Hegel and Kant were the first people to rebel against utilitarianism, ultimately challenging the dominant ideology of common-sense and empiricism[7]. British idealism did not reign long, as its ground started to weaken by the beginning of the 1900s. the philosophy differs from analytic philosophy in that it encompasses broader reasoning that is different from the narrow views of analytical philosophy[8]. Even idealist’s principles could be applied in many other fields rather than philosophy alone. It was unique and held in high esteem because it strengthened the understanding of the world through the lens of mind, world, and God. The three have impacts in the conception of metaphysics, logic, ethics and aesthetics, as well[9].
Metaphysics was seen as the central point of idealist philosophy. Philosophers at this time never left anything for chance when it came to questions of nature; hence, metaphysical reasoning came in handy to answer some questions that could not properly be comprehended within the physical realm. It was from this metaphysical conception that the question of appearance and reality emerged. This was the basic foundation upon which one could reflect on self. Idealists held that selfhood provided the framework for making sense of reality. It questions the relationship between experience and the object of experience itself. Idealists step in to claim that experience being seen as an embodiment of all realities is still questionable. Appearance, on the other hand, depends on knowledge of oneself.
British idealism, to a great extent, paid much attention to the concept of religion. Idealists came in to redefine the idea of God, not as distinct from the world but as being imminent in nature and finite self. The divine principles work in the background to define what makes our ‘selves,’ which works behind what we always think we are. A.C Bradley claims that “the string of religion is the feeling that my only true self in the end is God.[10]” This confession alludes to Hegel’s ideas as enshrined in his doctrine of the true infinite. The baseline is that the finite can only successfully be interpreted in the infinite and vice versa. Hence, the finite life so human beings can only be interpreted successfully from the standpoint of God’s infinite existence. Hegel’s logic is, therefore, pegged to the doctrine of truth.
Having understood a few areas of British idealism, which was the driving force behind Italian analytical philosophy, it is imperative to consider the intricacies of events that led to the departure of the latter from the former. Bertrand Russel stands out as the most known figure in defining reality and appearance under modern philosophy. He challenges the former definitions founded on metaphysics and claims that there is an alternative to the metaphysical world. At their time of disgruntlement with British idealism, they felt that the real foundation of reason, which was logic, was being overshadowed by unfathomable metaphysical reasoning. Mathematics, to them, could therefore be used to solve many of the challenges that befell man. In his lamentation titled “My Philosophical Development,” Russel complains that “logic, being considered to be a branch of philosophy and having been treated by Aristotle, has been considered to be a subject only to be treated by those who are proficient in Greek.[11]”By this, he decried the use of mathematics by those who do not know any logic. The question of logic was a critical intellectual topic at the onset of the growth of analytical philosophy. For people like Aristotle and Euclid, logic was considered a paramount thing that informs reasoning. The embracing of religion and idealist principles in greater Britain was constantly blurring logic, making him and like-minded intellectuals to lead a mass walkout. As early as 1900, at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris, he was aware that logical aspect of mathematics was of the essence in any reasoning. Russel admits that his awareness of the role of logic in reasoning emanated from the discussion between Peano of Turin and other great thinkers of that time. He praises Peano for showing rigor and more robust reasoning than the predecessors. Having read Peano’s works, Russel grew more steadfast with mathematics than with idealism.
The mathematical problems that analytical philosophy sought to answer related to very simple experiences that Europeans were going through every day. For instance, Russel began by exposing the proposition of the form ‘x is mortal’ from all the propositions that ‘all Europeans are mortal.’ Such questions emanate from the earlier postulations of Peano which Russel took years of studies to understand. Frege had also raised similar problems, even if Peano would later come to elaborate on them. On the question of mortality, Russel asserts that the presumption that there is no much difference between the two propositions could be dissected logical and a conclusion reached. This, from a metaphysical angle, could not have been so easy because idealists had already accepted the two to be more or less the same. The introduction of logic or arithmetic in such kinds of problems reveals that there has been a lot that had never been exposed by the previous regimes. Hence, Russel dissects the propositions logically by claiming that ‘all Europeans are mortal’ means that all individuals in Europe are mortal. However, for Europeans is mortal, it means that only a single European is mortal. Hence, it can be argued that if a, or, b or c are in Europe, they are definitely mortal. The interlocution between Peano and Russel is just the tip of the iceberg: the growth of logical philosophy.
Peano stands as an authoritative figure in the development of Italian analytical philosophy. Nearly every analytical philosopher seemed to draw reference from either interacting with him or reading his works. Ludovico Geymonat, in his work titled “The Work of Peano in the Face of Italian Culture (1986)” claims that he attended many lectures by Peano, even if Italian institutions would later try to thwart his efforts of being heard[12]. The years ending the 19th century, Geymonat claims, were crowded with positivist philosophy as informed by Darwinism and evolution. Europe was witnessing a surge in the bourgeoise class, which was enthusiastic about humanity’s values as strengthened by technology and science. Unfortunately, Italy was paying more attention to specific sciences of biology and psychology instead of considering all the sciences as essential building blocks of humanity.[13]. These sciences are, however, not reliable in entirety because they are “liable to easy generalizations not devoid of analogies with the philosophical systems of the past.[14]” Positivists constantly pointed to the metaphysical reasoning to explain nature, a fact that did not occur well with the new regime of analytical philosophers. In this text, Geymonat faults the leader of Italian positivism, Roberto Ardigo, for having done the same during the renaissance era. This situation led to the crowding out effect on geometrical theories, which were more scientifically engaging and nuanced as promulgated by scholars like Beltrami, Veronese, Corrado Segre, and others. He lauds Peano for growing cold feet in joining the bandwagon of positivist philosophy and charting a way for the new era of logical reasoning.
Giovanni Vailati is a known disciple of Peano, but who was also linked to pragmatism. His premature death caused problems in linking of Peano’s philosophy with Italian ideologies. Unfortunately, idealism took center stage in Italy, its winds sweeping away all the attempts to introduce logic to reasoning at that time. This idealism was centred in Croce and Gentile, who were both opposed to Peano and Vailati[15].Peano was not a philosopher from the onset, but more of a mathematician it was hard to bridge his ideas with the dominant Italian ideologies because he believed this could be better done by philosophers. The Italian philosophical culture was sidelining him because he seemed to hold a different position than the metaphysical grounds on which many philosophers based their reasoning. Croce nullified Peanian logic and cast doubts on its scientific usefulness. Following this, many other mathematicians started distancing themselves from Peano, leaving him in a desolate state. His logic was basically discredited because they were not easy to make sense of, prompting him to simply them into languages which were easier to understand. This was seen as Peano validating the doubts and trying to appeal to the forces that be.
From the reading of different scholars on the reception of Peanian logic, it is understandable that it merged at a time when Italy was not so ready for such reasoning. This one is seen in the amount of caution taken by Peano to put forward his postulations for public consumption. According to Barone “the caution was perhaps closely linked to an innate distrust of speculative audacity which is a characteristic, and even a limit, of the mindset of the Piedmontese mathematician.[16]” His call to allow mathematical concepts in a rigorous language did not make sense to many who exercised extreme caution while dealing with him. Many viewed him as one who is obsessed with disdained silence and a kind of eccentric compulsion.
The eventual acceptance and growth of symbolic logic, for which Peabo was clamouring meant that scholars had to renounce Croce’s prophecy. The tension furthered in Italy as mathematical science kept drifting further away from philosophy. Surprisingly, even Russel would later come to denounce Peano in many aspects. The bone of contention was on Peano’s five axioms of arithmetic which were then suggested to define zero and natural numbers[17]. According to Vailati et al., neoidealist that dominated most parts of Italy during the 20th century were to blame for the drifting relationship between science and philosophy[18]. It is remembered that at this same time, Vailati had pleaded that the two cultures did not need to be polarized since they sought to answer nearly similar questions. At the onset of the fall of fascism and the consequent quelling of World War II, people considered reading Vailati’s works gains. By 1959, the acknowledgement of his works gained momentum, and the University of Milan’s Department of philosophy accepted some of his manuscripts for readership.
Bertrand Russel and Moore walked the dark path for analytical philosophy when the world was faced with the two world wars. After WWII, he took an active role in the Cambridge, where he advanced his analytic skills through several writings[19]. He hinged his analytical philosophy on the political liberalism and intellectual rigor that were common in Britain in the 19th century. Russel even wrote that “British invented common sense.[20]”However, analysts suffered another setback related to their involvement in politics, terming themselves as liberal. This made them face backlash from many people soon after WWII. Specifically, society accused them of being subjective with values, and this was a detrimental step in preserving morality. Moreover, their analysis was accused of neglecting the political philosophy, which eventually died at the hands of analytics. What came out strong, however, was that this group of people stood for liberality, which was gaining momentum years after WWII. Unfortunately, the philosophy further suffered an attack for what people considered lackluster position to firmly hold moral principles. According to the critics, analytic philosophy was not genuinely liberal and was losing moral and political grounds. This happened even if it was known that G.E Moore fought hard to inscribe ethical subjectivism in his philosophy. A specific case of accusation of Ayer in 1948 for succoring fascism and confusing the readers who were somewhat interested in fundamental human values[21]. on the other hand, Russel was accused of taking a political position which could not stand the test of meta-ethical principles, which he postulated himself. Most philosophers were interested in explaining how evil fascism was, but logical philosophy lacked the merit to put this into context. Hence, in his accusation of analytical philosophers, Mr Dunham expressed that “if there is no objective right or wrong… one cannot demonstrate that fascist practices are evil; one cannot express dislike of them.[22]”Russel and Ayer were seen as being too subjective of emotivists.
Ethical philosophy was a strong foundation of the early 19th century that many did not want to let go. The fact that analytic philosophers paid not much attention to ethical aspect of life, only focusing on logic and methods of reaching conclusion was becoming worrisome. The same concerns were raised about political philosophy. For example, Russel was accused of confusing the philosophers into neglecting what was most important and focusing on the pursuit of logic. The analysts were seen as being hostile to theory and forcing people to test of facts in ways they could not easily relate to.
Pragmatism grew in Italy at the time that many were getting fed up with Catholicism. The tradition-bound Catholicism in Italy appeared to give people sterile formulas and mechanical methods for answering logical questions. Papini and other traditional logicians were considered embodiments of the reason that challenged myths. Papini was a good mathematician who did a good work in geometry and was determined to spread the message of reason across Italy through philosophy. He, most often, tried to make use of Peano’s works, simplifying them and complementing them at the same time. He was a pragmatist who also embodied strong command of mathematics. He tried to bring together pragmatism and logic by claiming that
“pragmatism and logic are agreed that the value and meaning (significato) of an assertion is intimately related to the use which can be made, … for the deduction and construction of determinant consequences or groups of consequences.[23]”
This statement implies that postulates could be proved mathematically instead of attaching mythical reasoning to them. With mathematics, a postulate can be reasoned from the end, going backwards to the roots. The coming together of pragmatism and mathematics further paved the way for embracing actual scientific research in formulating scientific theories. These theories are considered to be based on evidence and empiricism. The main aspiration of analytical philosophy was to popularize empiricism and discourage guesswork that seemed to inform most of the idealist notions of the past.
In conclusion, Italian analytical philosophy developed as a breakaway from the dominant British idealism, which analysts thought did not pay much attention to systematic reasoning and logic. Russel, Moore, Peano and Ayer, among other scholars, chatted the new path for logical philosophy. Idealism was basically a system of thinking that relied heavily on metaphysical reasoning and the love for religion. It also embraced the act of solid communication of ethics and morality. Analytic philosophy was criticized for its rubbishing of morality and the very foundation of faith that Europe rested on. It intertwined with pragmatism, mathematics and scientific methods and denounced any method of reasoning that was not empirical. This occurrence placed people like Peano on the hot soup since they were the promulgators of the new philosophy amid several contentions.
Bibliography
” Idealism (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy) “. 2022. Plato.Stanford.Edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/#IdeaEarlModeBritPhil.
“Chapter 6. Logical Techniques in Mathematics.” In My philosophical development. Russell, Bertrand. Pp 53-60.
Akehurst, Thomas L. The cultural politics of analytic philosophy: Britishness and the spectre of Europe. A&C Black, 2010.
Arrighi, Claudia, Paola Cantu, Mauro De Zan, and Patrick Suppes. “Logic and pragmatism: Selected essays by Giovanni Vailati.” Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford (2010).
Barone, Francesco. “A Philosophical Opening of Peano’s Symbolic Logic.” (1955), pp1-10
Geymonat, Ludovico. “The Work of Peano in the Face of Italian Culture” (1986), pp.1-14
Mander W. J and Stamatoula Panagakou. 2016. British Idealism and the Concept of the Self. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK :Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46671-6.
Preti, Consuelo. The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics: GE Moore and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
Sorell, Tom, and Graham Alan John Rogers, eds. Analytic philosophy and history of philosophy. Clarendon Press, 2005.
Thayer. Italian pragmatism
[1] Preti, Consuelo. The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics: GE Moore and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022, p.vi
[2] ibid
[3] Mander W. J and Stamatoula Panagakou. 2016. British Idealism and the Concept of the Self. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK :Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46671-6. P3
[4] ” Idealism (Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy) “. 2022. Plato.Stanford.Edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/#IdeaEarlModeBritPhil.
[5] Sorell, Tom, and Graham Alan John Rogers, eds. Analytic philosophy and history of philosophy. Clarendon Press, 2005. p.183.
[6] Mander W. J and Stamatoula Panagakou. 2016. British Idealism and the Concept of the Self. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK :Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46671-6, p2
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid. p3
[9] Ibid. p3
[10] Ibid, p6
[11] “Chapter 6. Logical Techniques in Mathematics.” In My philosophical development. Russell, Bertrand, p53
[12] Geymonat, Ludovico. “The Work of Peano in the Face of Italian Culture” (1986), pp.3
[13] ibid
[14] Ibid, p3
[15] Ibid p 4
[16] Barone, Francesco. “A Philosophical Opening of Peano’s Symbolic Logic.” (1955), pp1
[17] Ibid, pp11
[18] Arrighi, Claudia, Paola Cantu, Mauro De Zan, and Patrick Suppes. “Logic and pragmatism: Selected essays by Giovanni Vailati.” Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford (2010). Pp.ix
[19] Akehurst Thomas L. The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy : Britishness and the Spectre of Europe. London: Continuum.2020. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10372189.
[20] Ibid, pp5.
[21] Ibid, pp127.
[22] Ibid, pp128.
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