Across the globe, North Korea has the fourth-largest military, with more than 1.2 million warfare men and biological and chemical weapons. Additionally, it has the world’s largest conventional military armies, nuclear tests, and missiles (Kristensen et al., 2018: 47). Despite being among the poorest countries in the world, North Korea has dramatically invested in its military. On its military alone, North Korea allocates approximately a quarter of its annual gross domestic product (GDP). So far, North Korea has carried out seven nuclear test programs, with its first launch in October 2006 and 2nd being in May 2009. After Kim Jong-un assumed office, he dramatically accelerated the rate of the nuclear test program. He oversaw 160 ballistic missiles and four nuclear tests, more than his father and the founding father of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, ever did.
On September 9, North Korea marked the 74th anniversary of its founding. To commemorates the anniversary, North Korea held 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, during which Kim Jong-un openly stated that his country would never give up its nuclear weapons, sparking concerns that it would carry out its seventh nuclear test. Amid the celebration, the North Korean government established several new laws that further secured its status as a nuclear power. They specified the five circumstances under which the nation would launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike and expressly stated in their statutes that they would never, ever, ever share their nuclear weapons or technology with any other nations (Park, 2021:2). Through their leader Kim Jong-un, they further pledged to oppose any sanctions attempts to compel them into surrendering their nuclear weapons. The approved legislation demonstrates North Korea’s efforts to build the legal framework necessary to firmly seal its identity as a nuclear state, making future negotiations over the country’s denuclearization unachievable and non-negotiable. Their action opposes Seoul’s and Washington’s CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization) strategy toward North Korea. The conduct by North Korea demonstrates its unwavering commitment to maintaining its nuclear weapons development. The question is, are they prudent in sustaining their nuclear weapons program? This essay assesses whether North Korea is innovative in keeping up its nuclear weapons development widely and critically.
Firstly, having nuclear weapons allows North Korea to act more independently of allies, engage in aggression, consolidate and enlarge its influence and position, and defend its existing quo. The U.S. and S. Korea both pose significant military threats to North Korea. With the backing of the most potent state in the world, such as the United States, South Korea is significantly stronger economically than North Korea. Without being restrained by the absence of a rival competitor, the United States has repeatedly indicated a desire to bring about political change throughout the world. Designating North Korea as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” the United States enhanced harsh sanctions on North Korea, stationing tens of thousands of its military personnel in the area. Therefore, keeping nuclear weapons programs gives North Korea the capacity to resist coercion, keep South Korea and the United States away from their territory, improve their ability to tolerate more significant degrees of crisis escalation, and retain their ability to threaten them as well (Mastro, 2018:105). This increased their independence while allowing them to withstand the threats from their main rivals, South Korea and the U.S. By highlighting the potential for escalation, North Korea hopes to stoke worries of decoupling, that is, to build a rift between the U.S. and South Korea and make it more dangerous for the U.S. to conduct airstrikes or engage militarily on the Korean peninsula. Additionally, North Korea has repeatedly dared the U.S. to try to shoot them down by maintaining its nuclear weapons development, refusing to back down when pressed, and maybe conducting additional provocative nuclear tests. Because they serve the goals of North Korea’s government, these activities are expected.
Several nations, like Pakistan, Britain, and the United States, have effectively used the power of militarization and weaponization to increase their independence from their allies while also boosting their influence and position, similar to North Korea’s potential aims. Taking Britain’s situation as an illustration. Before Britain first got nuclear weapons, its reliance on the United States for security grew, making its obligations to friends less and less genuine; this forced them to deal with mounting threats to its position as the dominant power in the Middle East. Because it could not afford to commit to conventional military operations, Britain utilized its nuclear weapons program to reassure allies who were beginning to doubt its capacity to help them (Almlid, 2020:71). Similarly, Britain’s nuclear arsenal lessened the dangers of acting independently of the United States and employing force to defend its position in the Middle East.
Similarly, despite being more powerful than India both militarily and economically, Pakistan has leveraged the force of its nuclear weapons to strengthen its position against threats from that India. According to Hangeland et al. (2022:135), Pakistan has been able to restore its position and influence in protecting the status quo by pursuing its long-held revisionist ambitions while remaining steadfast in the face of difficulties and dangers. What is good for the goose is unquestionably also good for the gander. Similarly, to this, North Korea wants to be able to prevent American military flights over its land, notably the B-1B Lancer flights out of Guam, which will be a significant step in weakening the U.S.-South Korean alliance (Page II, 2021:4). It wants to prove that Washington’s military intervention or destabilization threats on the Korean peninsula are just rhetoric and to show that the U.S. cannot shoot down its missiles. North Korea could also want to be able to threaten South Korea with military action with more credibility. These are wise strategic moves for North Korea to make as it works to lessen threats and fortify its position on the Korean peninsula in the face of the enormous conventional military United States supremacy.
North Korea may enhance its economic growth by firmly maintaining its nuclear weapons development and exerting its position in the global economy. Due to military retaliations and the existing aspiration to build more nuclear weapons, the Pyongyang government has become increasingly isolated in international trade since the conclusion of the Korean War. (Yanagisawa, 2019:360). In the North, some 25 million impoverished people are becoming increasingly cut off from the global economy and have few choices for getting the necessary hard cash. Kim Jong-un is nonetheless committed to a strategic policy of strengthening Pyongyang’s economy and nuclear weapons despite its status as a pariah state. Therefore, building asymmetric military capabilities to oppose its possible danger may only guarantee North Korea’s national life. After having trouble keeping his economic promises, Kim Jong-un attempts to maintain his position of authority by demonstrating his unquestionable military force. Thus, the nuclear program has two goals: to defend Kim’s leadership and the country against external threats. Since Kim Jong-un took office, the government has stopped using ambiguous language to describe the progress of its nuclear and missile systems. It recently pledged to perform testing whenever it saw fit. Kim’s desire to develop the military appears to have been boosted by the punitive sanctions imposed on Pyongyang. Additionally, previous diplomatic initiatives to prohibit North Korea from conducting nuclear tests have only marginally decreased their frequency.
After North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, accompanied by its first nuclear test in 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously enacted various resolutions condemning the country’s actions and imposing sanctions on it. To change Pyongyang’s conduct, the United Nations Security Council, through unanimous subsequent resolutions, has incrementally increased sanctions (Lee, 2022:3). The sale of weapons, money, goods, and technologies that may be used to create nuclear or ballistic missiles to North Korea is prohibited under these additional measures. The regulations impose inspection requirements on all shipments to North Korea, restricting select luxury goods and other forms of international trade. While the present restrictions have restricted the North’s access to resources, controlling all global container shipments is challenging. A resolution from the Security Council in May 2022 that called for harsher sanctions were blocked by Russia and China, forming the first veto in favor of North Korea and creating further obstacles. The nations asserted that prior restrictions had had little effect on North Korea’s behavior and charged that the U.S. plan had only served to irritate the country further. Every individual or government opts to protect itself from past challenges. Therefore, based on the past difficulties North Korea faced, such as trading and shipping restrictions, among other sanctions, North Korea may opt to use the program for maintaining nuclear weapons to threaten their rivals from imposing such restrictions on them in the future.
Finally, North Korea keeps up its nuclear weapons program to increase the legitimacy of its government. More than his predecessors, Kim Jong-un has underlined the significance of the country’s nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Kim welcomes the initiatives and advancements of recent years as his contribution to achieving long-standing regime goals and safeguarding the nation despite the lack of extensive political experience of his predecessors (Lee, 2019:102455). Kim Jong Un is frequently shown in official North Korean media imagery; hence he can convey an air of infallibility and invincibility that helps him hold onto his position of authority. Additionally, Kim brags about being the only person whose desk has a nuclear button and is uniquely able to protect his throne and his country. This demonstrates how keeping the nuclear weapons program in place can be seen as a hereditary goal similar to that of the nation’s top leadership (Gurtov, 2020:7). Therefore, it is the responsibility of every leader to continue the work of their forefathers. It is a significant way to increase the legitimacy of the nation’s leadership, which is essential for ensuring its leadership is stable and secure. The most direct way to accelerate denuclearization is for North Korea’s rivals to overthrow the country’s leaders, which would be a more extraordinary trial. As a result, the North Korean government upgrades its missiles to maintain its nuclear weapons program.
In conclusion, despite the negative drawbacks of maintaining nuclear weapons, such as frequent threats and sanctions, the program is quite significant to North Korea. Just as discussed, maintaining a nuclear weapons program is associated with various advantages, which include; enhancing the country’s independence, enhancing the country’s ability to enlarge its influence and position, enhancing the country’s economic growth as well as improving the country’s leadership legitimacy which is significant in maintaining it status quo. Hence, North Korea is prudent in its action to support its nuclear weapon program. However, although North Korea’s weapons restrict the United States and its regional foreign policy, this does not obligate the United States to succumb to every North Korean provocation. It ought to be noted that while nuclear weapons may be helpful, they do not grant freedom from punishment.
Reference
Allied, G.K., 2020. Fighting Supranationalism, 1950–1959. In Britain and Norway in Europe Since 1945 (pp. 43-75). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Gurtov, M., 2020. America in retreat: Foreign policy under Donald Trump. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Kristensen, H.M. and Norris, R.S., 2018. North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(1), pp.41-51.
Kristensen, H.M. and Norris, R.S., 2018. North Korean nuclear capabilities, 2018. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(1), pp.41-51.
Lee, D. and Seo, Y., 2019. Alternative futures for North Korea economy: From the North Korean perspectives. Futures, 114, p.102455.
Lee, H. and Kim, S., 2022. FROM A WILLING GOOD COP TO A RELUCTANT BAD COP: THE (D) EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA. International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 18(1).
Mastro, O.S., 2018. Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military Help Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons? International Security, 43(2), pp.84-116.
Page II, J.T., 2021. Ellsworth Air Force Base. Arcadia Publishing.
Park, Y.J., 2021. Analyses and Prospects of the 5th Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in North Korea.
Yanagisawa, K., 2019. The North Korea–United States Summit and Possibilities for New Security-Oriented Thinking. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2(1), pp.357-369.
Hangeland, H., & Tarapore, A. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program. In Routledge Handbook of the International Relations of South Asia (pp. 130-141). Routledge.
write