Sovereignty is a political ideology that advocates for a nation’s or region’s right to self-determination and independence. Libertarianism and transnational organizations are opposed, and federalism or unilateralism are preferred instead, and it may be linked to various secessionist movements. “Europeanization” refers to the process through which a non-European person absorbs some of the characteristics of European culture (Olsen & McCormick, 2018). The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy aspire to maintain peace and enhance global safety in conformity with the UN Charter’s ideals. Such political initiatives in Europe aim to create a “Europe of the nations” where each country’s independence and distinctions are acknowledged. A confederal European Union is advocated by proponents of the theory, who see themselves as the antithesis of Euro-federalism and as Euro-realists. While federalism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive, France’s parties tend to favour sovereignism. This paper will focus on the role of sovereignty and Europeanisation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.
Sovereignty as a notion predates the modern state-centric understanding of it. Essentially, sovereignty is a relationship between the notion of supreme power and a particular area of jurisdiction. Discussions regarding the concept began in the mid-17th century after early experiments in classical times. Europe required a new means to structure political power – inside and across political entities – after two long-running European conflicts – one lasting 80 years, the other 30 years – between medieval empires and many smaller state-seeking political organizations. According to Jean Bodin, widely regarded as the father of sovereignty theory, Europe’s complex medieval feudal system, which included a plethora of independent principalities, guilds, cities and trading unions all formally united under the Church and Emperor, was a major cause of European unrest and war (Badie, 2004). When it came to the government’s legitimacy, the idea that it had to fulfil a set of standards of ‘justice and reason’ was central to his argument.
Nation-state sovereignty has been ascribed to the 17th-century Treaties of Westphalia. Under the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, each state should be competent to govern its territory and internal affairs. States must abide by international law if it is widely recognized. It is in the interests of all states to abide by international law. Consequently, the state is the most powerful. A nation that is self-governing and free of outside interference might be considered independent. The term “effective control” refers to a government’s ability to exert influence over the region it claims (Johansson-Nogués et al., 2020). A king or queen must be in charge of a sovereign country. States must “mutually acknowledge” their different cultures to extend their jurisdiction beyond their borders. International legal or judicial sovereignty is established. Being in charge means not caring about the internal affairs of other nations and focusing only on one’s own.
Sovereign governments may freely ratify international agreements. State sovereignty is becoming more relevant for “border movements,” such as the movement of commodities and persons, due to the rising importance of international trade. Transnational institutions and practices influence sovereignty in a country. Governments at all levels are increasingly delegating authority to foreign and transnational organizations. Human rights, the “duty to protect,” and the “responsibility to act” of governments in other sovereign states have violated Westphalian sovereignty rules. Foreign organizations trying to impose their will on their nation are rebuffed by sovereignists.
Two important characteristics characterize sovereignty in an international setting. In the first place, sovereignists say that a legally bound state established based on popular sovereignty “must make defending and advancing its people’s interests its top foreign policy priority.” International organizations are often criticized as overreaching by sovereignism. Critics often point to the United Nations as an example of an international institution that is too “restrained”. Nevertheless, most organizations with broad legislative and executive powers, such as the European Union, are the target of this critique (E.U.). In the view of sovereignists, any transfer of national authority to supranational bodies should be rejected or limited.
Populism is a nebulous term that has been misused and misunderstood. It is not easy to agree on a clear definition of this phrase because of its widespread usage in politics and media, where it is arbitrarily defined, diagnosed, and applied to political parties, organizations, and individuals with whom one disagrees (Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020). Is the accusation of populism itself populist? Princeton’s Jan-Werner Müller posed this fascinating question. The only thing that political experts and academics can agree on when defining populism is that it sets “the people” against “the elite.” Promises to reflect “the will of the people” in opposition to the caprices of a “corrupt elite” are at the heart of populism’s legitimacy. However, who is considered a member of ‘the people’ varies according to the particular political movement.
Populist sovereignism is a contemporary term. Some components have been studied in isolation, making the phenomena difficult to grasp. European populist sovereignist parties are called “insurgents” or “Euroskeptics” When focused on the E.U., 77 sovereign parties’ foreign and security agendas remain buried because of Euroskepticism (Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020). Seven populist sovereignist parties have reigned for decades; therefore, ‘insurgents’ is a misnomer. Populist sovereignty is studied by right-wing populism. Research on populist sovereignism in these areas is significant, but it does not include all contemporary movements in the U.S. and internationally. Populism and sovereignism are not right-wing because People’s Parties lean left. Some populist sovereignists transcend right-left categorization, such as Italy’s Five Star Movement. Anti-immigrant rhetoric makes populist sovereignist parties right-wing. ‘Populist sovereignist’ transcends left-right and does not focus on one institution while expressing their motive. Nationalist emotion and policy-making are tied to populist sovereignist concepts of ‘the people’ as indigenous, ethnocultural groupings and the state as their sovereign vehicle.
According to populist sovereignty, an imagined community bound by common history, culture, and ethnicity does exist. To do this, it restricts immigration or the rights of foreigners and minorities, for example (De Spiegeleire, Skinner & Sweijs, 2017). Since today’s movements say that no external power, organization, or institution can circumscribe state authority, partly because doing so would also circumscribe “the people’s will” inside the state, this is the underlying premise. There are several ways to do this, such as separating a new state from a bigger one like that of the United Provinces in the 17th century or South Sudan in this decade. For example, German unification in 1871 and reunification in 1990 were examples of merging smaller organizations into bigger ones. Even more surprisingly, it may involve creating new states by combining components of many prior ones. There are now 206 independent states in the globe, up from 23 in 181681 when the United States was founded. As long as there are numerous unrealized statehood ambitions across the globe, the international system will continue to be divided into distinct constituent parts.
Current social and political groups sometimes use the terms “sovereignism” and “populism” interchangeably. Populist sovereignists think that the only way to restore public sovereignty is to regain control of the country and elevate a nation’s sovereignty above all others on the world stage. When “the people” designate the “in-group,” it is founded on populism and sovereignism. Even if populist sovereignists do not consider immigrants and non-natives who have gained control of the nation’s institutions and resources as “foreigners,” those who oppose these takeovers are. Nations are being eroded from the inside by a small group of powerful elites, including international and transnational bureaucracies and long-established local political parties and politicians. To the indigenous peoples of the United States, “the people” refers rather than ethnic groups. People and ideas not native to a country are seen as threats to national unity if permitted to dwell there. In the context of this essay, “nativism” refers to this ideology. A “we against them” mindset, appeals to “the people,” and anti-elitist sentiments are all part of the populist sovereignist language of the state (De Spiegeleire, Skinner & Sweijs, 2017). “The people” is a term that is used in a nativist context by populist sovereignists. As a political theory, nationalism may be thought of as a system.
Everything that constitutes foreign and security policy is included in the CFSP, including creating a common defence plan that might lead to a common defence should the European Council decide to do so in the future. CFSP members can change their goals over time as they better understand what the CFSP can accomplish. Since the Community institutions are bound by treaty to function within certain boundaries, there may be legal and competence difficulties. Having the CFSP in place also allows Europe to speak with a single voice on foreign policy and security issues. One of Article 17’s primary goals is ensuring the United States is safe and secure. Members of the Treaty were originally divided on how much of it should be dedicated to security (Baldini, Bressanelli & Gianfreda, 2020). When implementing a workable foreign policy, the final phrase falls short. When it comes to the common defence, the European Council has the power to declare that the “progressive framework” “may develop to a single defence,” according to Article 17. European countries would have to abide by their constitutions to accept and ratify this resolution, which is time-consuming and politically contentious.
In the European Parliament, populist sovereignists have a larger share of seats than at the national level. Only 12.65% of British voters supported the U.K. Independence Party, compared to 13.66% for France’s National Front in France’s most recent E.U. Parliament election. As previously indicated, 11 populist sovereignist parties have more than 10% of European Parliament seats (Baldini, Bressanelli & Gianfreda, 2020). There are populist sovereignist parties in groups like the European Conservatives, Reformists, and the European Union for Freedom. Members of the European Council include Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Beata Szydlo of Poland. Efforts on the national and European levels are so linked to restricting the political space available to each.
Securing the country while advancing ‘the people’s rule’ is what populist sovereignism entails in the nation-state. To return authority to “the people,” populist sovereignism’s “populist” component advocates more participation in direct democracy (Heinisch, Werner & Habersack, 2020). As the remark from the Sweden Democrats at the beginning of this section illustrates, populist sovereignist notions of democracy and the nation-state are based on an exclusive, nativist understanding of “the people. “ Immigration and foreigners are often seen as a threat to the ethnocultural defined country, while multiculturalism is considered a threat to national unity and democracy. As a result, defending the nation-state also entails defending the country’s culture. Almost all political parties agree that safeguarding the American way of life should be a top concern. Border restrictions and border security are an essential aspect of this wider effort to safeguard the nation-state and the national culture from outsiders, even while some parties admit restricted numbers of immigrants or refugees under particular situations.
Liberal order and globalization are blamed for populism. The “people vs elite” dichotomy is a populist anti-globalization theme. “A confidence in strong leaders and an antipathy to constraints on sovereignty and powerful institutions” is how Colgan and Keohane define populism. This movement’s ideas identify populism’s aversion to constitutional limits, setting it apart from other sovereignist movements (Heinisch, Werner & Habersack, 2020). Increasing economic competition, cultural diversity, and political antagonism between national governments and supranational institutions are globalization’s biggest effects on populism. Insecurity, cultural anger, elite consensus, and ideological convergence are valid factors. Through travel, people’s attitudes on diversity and alternative lifestyles have altered. Multinational firms are relocating their manufacturing operations, forcing low-skilled workers out of work. The convergence of economic and political leaders has supported a liberal international order. Globalization has fueled cross-cultural partnerships. According to HCSS’s analysis of OECD statistics, immigrants make up roughly 6% of the western population. Countries with populist sovereignist parties have a consistent proportion of foreign-born citizens. The number of people born outside a nation has grown considerably in several countries. More than half as many Swiss were born abroad in 2013 as in 1994. Refugees brought more individuals to the U.S. in 2015. Unfortunately, no OECD data are available. The economic slump has fuelled the rise of populist, pro-sovereignty parties, say many.
Populist sovereignism often criticizes globalization-related problems, such as immigration and the rising influence of supranational organizations. It is likely that increased mobility of businesses and money, as well as the influx of more immigrants than a community can handle, would lead to greater economic insecurity due to globalization. Globalization and liberal policies, and other variables, such as economic instability and cultural change, may enhance populism’s desire for people’s sovereignty (Heinisch, Werner & Habersack, 2020). Even though they share certain worries about globalization, anti-globalization and populist sovereignist movements are not the same, despite their common concerns. The anti-globalization movement often targets neoliberalism, international financial institutions, and multinational corporations. Populist sovereignists may make similar objections. In contrast to this, populist sovereignists place a high priority on the government. Reaffirming “the people’s sovereignty” requires a strong national identity, which can only be accomplished by regaining the national-sovereignty.
Europe’s foreign policy was largely ignored prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, which shifted the emphasis of Europeanization research from “first pillar” programs to concerns of European foreign policy. For this reason, the E.U.’s effect on member states’ foreign policy should not surprise, given its sensitivity. European foreign policy has been plagued by the paradox of member states’ desire for the E.U. to become a more important role in international events and their great reluctance to share foreign and security policy duties.
The foreign and security policy is unique since it handles various issues rather than just one. Politics of the world As Europe expands and deepens, nations find it increasingly difficult to sustain a sense of national identity. This is particularly relevant now that E.U. members have decided to relinquish their currency. The executive branch traditionally handles foreign policy and national security, symbolizing a country’s sovereignty. This is, however, changing (Maccaferri & Newth, 2022). Foreign and security policy seems to have been more influenced by national opportunity frameworks than international limitations. Consequently, the CFSP, transatlantic alliances, and varied country strategic cultures make European integration and, by extension, national adaptations difficult. European foreign and security policy coordination was originally established without European treaties via direct contact between member countries’ foreign ministries.
Intergovernmental treaties regulate Maastricht’s CFSP, not legislation. Because CFSP is intergovernmental, member states are the key players. Due to the lack of legislation in the second pillar, it is harder to assess E.U.’s impacts on national policy. Compared to the first pillar of integration, E.U. funding and local transformation are poorly coordinated. In national foreign and security policy assessments, Europeanization may be overestimated, and other endogenous or external components disregarded. Members’ foreign and defence policies. Europeanization is not one of the crises afflicting the nation-state today. Even in approach, “E.U. impact” is hard to disentangle from national and global aspects (Maccaferri & Newth, 2022). External elements like administrative reform or political developments might affect domestic policy. Local procedures may have been “overtaken or contributed to.” Globalization’s effects on economic cooperation and international politics may affect other organizations, including the E.U.
Europeanization of foreign and security policy will go beyond the bounds of CFSP to other E.U. institutions due to its intergovernmental character. To establish EU-level incentives, there is a “missing connection” between what is occurring at the state and E.U. levels. By painting a hazy picture of Europeanization, foreign and security policy obscures specific events and their long-term impact (Basile & Mazzoleni, 2020). Methodological flaws must be addressed as a consequence. Alternatively, examine the development of communication techniques across time. There may be several other factors at play, and understanding them is crucial if the change is to be a reality. The causal chain may be traced backwards to find a causal connection or a chronological sequence can be constructed. Because it does not clarify what components or procedures are utilized to draw causal explanations, some academics argue that “process tracing” cannot replace an evaluation of whether E.U. engagement was fundamentally significant. So it is a good idea to mix things up a little.
A second technique to analyze validity and causation is to compare trends across nations and time. With this comparison, researchers may spot European migrations more easily. Comparing national data from various nations may show you how much has changed. In this publication, E.U. foreign and security policy tasks are contrasted to those of individual states. According to some scholars, counterfactual reasoning may be used to prove the E.U.’s effectiveness. This experiment examines how E.U. member states’ foreign and security policies might have evolved if EU/CFSP did not exist (Basile & Mazzoleni, 2020). Despite their advantages, counterfactual critiques are vital. Many factors are out of our control because it is hard to create a counterfactual with multiple causes and effects. The methodological aspects of these studies are fascinating but not always readily justified. To fully understand the effects of European integration on states, internal and external factors must be considered. As a result, internal and foreign factors constantly influence national policy, polity, and politics. “Europeanization” cannot be put in one gear, say some. An ethnographic study found that European norms are being absorbed in designing and executing professional obligations.
E.U. agencies and organizations help E.U. institutions and authorities. These authorities and institutions convert policy into reality. Belonging to the Common Foreign and Security Policy imposes many institutional duties on all member states since it covers many policy areas and issues. Each state must make continuous policy contributions (Smith & Smith, 2004). Their needs are represented most clearly in terms of the time, personnel, and expertise they must devote domestically and at the E.U. level and how they create their different foreign policy administrations to deploy them effectively. The processes and structures created to manage international collaboration in capitals worldwide and Brussels show national participation in the CFSP. Since its founding in 1970 under European Political Co-operation, foreign policy coordination between member states has shown a sustained trend of official and informal institutionalization (Hodson et al., 2021). This has resulted in a dense and intricate institutional framework, whose impacts on its players indicate a clear and forceful form of Europeanization from the mechanism for limited joint foreign policy-making in an intergovernmental negotiating arena.
Normalizing power Peace, liberty, democracy, the supranational rule of law, and human rights are central to E.U. foreign and security policy. Other requirements include social solidarity, anti-discrimination, long-term development, and outstanding leadership. The E.U.’s history, hybrid polity, and political-legal structure are highlighted. E.U. members agree on these principles legally. Manners believes the E.U. will remain a normative power. Contagion and other information and procedural diffusion are major ways the E.U. exerts normative influence (Manners, 2006). The E.U. sets a global norm instead of employing force to enforce its regulations. Human rights, which are connected to E.U. conflict prevention, are a major EU standard. E.U. conditionality laws oblige foreign governments to uphold ethical human rights as outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights. E.U. economic partners must also respect human rights. Transference dispersion highlights the E.U.’s attempts to enhance human rights via the conditionality clause by diffusing its standards through trade or technical help. Manners believes that how the E.U. promotes its standards is as important as what it promotes, showing how its non-military distribution strategies are unique (Manners, 2008). The E.U. has become a normative power by codifying its laws into enforceable agreements. This may be determined using international standards.
To conclude, this paper will focus on the role of sovereignty and Europeanisation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Sovereignism, Europeanism, institutionalism, and the Normative Power of Europe theory played an important role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Sovereignism helped implement economic, cultural, and physical policies, bridging economic insecurity and cultural backlash. Institutionalization helped in translating policies into realities on the ground. Lastly, the Normative Power of E.U. helps preserve security, freedom, justice, international legal system, civil rights, community cohesion, anti-discrimination, environmental sustainability, and effective governance.
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