Introduction
The human mind occupies a special place in the world. Right here is where our morality and sense of reason are kept. In this paper, I’ll look at functionalism and anomalous monism, two opposing theories that try to explain the mind-body problem. According to functionalists, a person’s mental condition is not based on their inherent nature but on the function they serve in a specific situation. To counter the functionalist position, I will argue from the perspective of anomalous monism, a form of property dualism that admits the prospect that not all happenings are mental while maintaining the view that all events are physical but admits the potential of a metaphysical bias. To add to the empirical explanation of anomalous monism, I will discuss the Principle of Causal Interaction (The interaction principle), which states that some mental processes are causally involved in certain physical events (Davidson 137). Not only will I highlight the differences between the two, but I’ll also provide criticism and rebuttal. In my conclusion paragraph, I will summarize the major points while contrasting and comparing functionalism and anomalous monism.
Functionalism
Many contemporary philosophers of mind endorse some functionalism. Despite recognizing the understanding that the mental is critically tied to behavioral output or performance, this perspective is often credited for saving the “reality” of the mind from the “eliminativist” and “fictionalist” inclinations of behaviorism. From a philosophical standpoint, Jerry Fodor argues that breakthroughs in AI, semantics, bioengineering, and psychology have led to functionalism that is neither dualist nor materialist (Block 64). This admits the possibility that systems as diverse as groups of humans, robotics, and disembodied spirits could all have cognitive processes and necessitates a philosophical explanation of this degree of abstraction. According to functionalist theory, a system’s psyche is determined not by its constituent parts but by the system as a whole (Fodor 2). With just the programmer’s input determining the computer’s capacities, functionalism seems to be a definitive philosophy that articulates an objective cognitive perspective, one that hypothesizes the series of potential properties and activities of a computer.
As proposed by functionalism, mental experiences may be understood in terms of the functions they serve. According to this view, the essence of a particular mental state consists only of the performance of a specific process. As Thomas Polger sees it, that mental condition must be any state that can fulfill that function under the right circumstances. Instead, if data storage is memory’s primary function, then any device that can do so may be considered memory (Davidson 139). The essence of functionalism, then, is to give an item a purpose beyond the sum of its parts, a meaning that goes beyond its physical characteristics and serves as an explanatory item that can be used to establish norms for how it is to be understood and how it is to be defined in terms of, among other things, one’s state of mind.
In addition, Thomas Polger has claimed that functionalism is an “ontological” or “metaphysical” stance. According to functionalists, earthly creatures and plants aren’t the only ones with the capacity for mental states. According to their reasoning, it is not appropriate to explain mental states on the basis of humanistic or known biological inputs and outputs (Fodor 3). The functionalist approach attempts to give a more generalized account of mental states than is currently available from brain sciences. The information processing theory requires no strict equating of mental states, such as “memories” or “beliefs” with informative conditions. Thus, functionalism implies more than just the view that brain functions are computational models or that cognition is an information-processing process. A reasonable inference from Polger’s ideas is that the constitutional position of the systems stated inside mental processes is not fixed but modified in its subjective viewpoint, basically not being limited to a certain attitude.
Anomalous Monism
In the view of Donald Davidson, “anomalous theory” is “just like materialism” in that it assumes that everything that happens can be reduced to a material cause. In contrast to materialism, anomalous monism rejects the idea that mental processes can be described in simple physical terms. Without any rules of correlation or cognitive economics to back it up, such an anomalous monism would be immune to the nothing-but reaction (Davidson 141). This indicates that functionalism is more popular in the modern day than monism, and it also says that the person who coined the term “anomalous monism” now has concerns about his idea.
The combination of Anomalous Monism and supervenience has been criticized for leading to epiphenomenalism, but it may give Davidson what he seeks: a strong token-identity brand of physicalism (Fodor 2). It was also pointed out that the assertion that the mind is not assigned a causative role in Anomalous Monism amounts to an allegation of epiphenomenalism. Since laws underlie causal relationships, yet there are no psychophysical principles, Davidson claims that mental activities may only cause physical processes by implication of other physical events and are predictable and explainable using exclusively physical principles.
On the other hand, Block argues that functionalism merely “tacks down” mental processes in a peripheral way, such as via the physical or, at the most, non-mental definition of outputs and inputs. While behaviorism cannot be changed to avoid communism, functionalism may, as Block points out, if only at the expense of another shameful error (Davidson 138). Functionalism demonstrates that physicalism is flawed in the way he describes it. Since animals without brains may realize the same computational approach as animals with brains, in Block’s view, pain cannot be a mental state but a functional condition (Block 64). Block also admits that if functionalism is to be upheld, it must be interpreted as implementing only a subcategory of mental states, namely, those “narrow” intellectual states such that reality conditions for their implementation are in some context inside the individual. However, even presuming that a concept of narrowness of mental condition can be adequately framed, functionalism could be reduced by this limitation. So he must consider functionalism a theory applicable to all “limited” mental processes (Block 70).
Conclusion
Despite their distinct improvements, clarifications, and criticisms of physicalism, anomalous monism and functionalism strongly object to it. Anomalous monism and functionalism share the characteristic of physicalism, which is the concept that all is physical or, as some contemporary philosophers characterize it, that all supervenes are physical. Still, each has its own benefits and drawbacks. At the same time, such reflective memory is seen as a philosophical idea for re-creating the mind’s possible relationship to the ‘physical’ world. This new starting point for potential linkages can lead to yet another “groundbreaking” suggestion in the direction of a new philosophy of the mind.
References
Block, Ned, Troubles with Functionalism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1978, pp. 64-70.
Davidson, Donald.” Mental Events” Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, 1970, pp. 137- 141.
Fodor, Jerry. The Mind-Body Problem. Scientific American, Inc., 1981, p.1-4.
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