The Taliban finally gained control of Afghanistan following a Soviet invasion. Several significant issues remain unresolved after this incident: Was the Taliban’s rise to power inevitable? The assumption that the Taliban’s ascension to power was inevitable will be discussed in this article. The political and financial circumstances that contributed to establishing the Taliban will be examined, along with why other possible outcomes did not occur. The argument that the Taliban’s ascension to authority was not inevitable will also be covered in this article, along with supporting data. The basic claim of this argument revolves around the notion that the Taliban’s ascension to power was the outcome of a chain of circumstances that happened years before the Taliban was ever founded, and with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a period of unrest favored the emergence of extreme ideologies. The civil conflict which preceded the Soviet exit in 1989 only made this instability worse. A power vacuum developed during this time allowed the Taliban to establish a footing and take control in 1996. The assumption that alternative conceivable outcomes were feasible supports the claim that the Taliban’s ascension to power was not inevitable. According to this view, the Taliban were unlikely to have taken possession of Afghanistan if the Soviet invasion had never occurred or if a single administration could hold onto power. This article will counter this claim by demonstrating that the chaos caused by the Soviet invasion and the ensuing civil war was a major factor in the Taliban’s ascent to power. This article will also demonstrate how other possible outcomes could have been more realistic given the political and financial climate of the time. The notion that the Taliban’s ascension to power was inevitable will be the main aim of this article. Also, the article will examine the elements that contributed to Afghanistan’s downfall and offer proof that the Taliban’s ascent to power was a foregone conclusion.
This essay’s opening thesis statement asserts that extremism thrived in war-torn Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the nation has been in anarchy (Rubin, pg 6). While competing factions struggled for control after the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, tensions increased. Extremist organizations might easily flourish in a weak and unsteady environment (Abbas, pg 1-10). Through reaping the benefits of Afghanistan’s unpredictability and offering certainty to the Afghan people, the Taliban, a hardline Islamist organization, came to power. (Rubin, pg 6-10). As a result, they were able to win the public’s broad support. Throughout the turmoil, the Taliban tried to instill a sense of safety. They imposed an extreme Sharia law, bringing the long-missing feeling of justice and order to Afghanistan(Abbas, pg 1-10). As a result, the populace, which yearned for stability, gave them even greater support. The turmoil and instability brought on by decades of conflict and warfare made the advent of the Taliban inevitable.
The Supporting proof of this claim is that the Soviet attack on Afghanistan in 1979 made a turbulent scene ready for the ascent of radical gatherings (Afsar, Chris, and Thomas pg 58- 60). The Taliban exploited the precariousness to acquire far and wide help from the conflict-fatigued populace. They carried out a severe type of Sharia regulation, which gave a feeling of request and equity that had been deficient in Afghanistan for quite a long time(Abbas, pg 1-10). With these claims and supporting evidence, this fact assertion has merits and weaknesses. This recounts how the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan(Rubin, pg 10). It demonstrates that the Taliban’s ascension to power resulted from years of insecurity and disarray in the region. The drawback of this fact is that it neglects to examine other reasons which could have added to the Taliban’s ascent to power, such as foreign powers’ engagement in the region or the influence of tribal rivalries.
As demonstrated, the facts back up the allegation. The truth that Afghanistan was indeed a war-torn nation full of turmoil and anarchy lends credence to the Taliban’s ascension to power(Rubin, pg 10). The Taliban exploited the disarray and instability to seek considerable public support (Ghufran, pg 463-466). This first claim’s closing sentence is that the turmoil and instability generated by decades of conflict and warfare in Afghanistan rendered the Taliban’s ascension to power unavoidable.
Based on the first claim, because of the spread of extremism inside the conflicted military country, the Taliban’s takeover of control in Afghanistan was unavoidable. The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 left massive devastation and displaced thousands of people, creating a power vacuum that radicals could exploit (Akhtar, pg 41-51; Afsar, Chris, and Thomas, pg 58- 60). In the aftermath of the US invasion, the Taliban would quickly recover and consolidate control. The war in Afghanistan produced a climate in which extremism thrived, lending credence to this theory(Akhtar, pg 41-64). The Taliban were able to build a considerable following in Afghanistan by capitalizing on the instability and misery of the Afghan people.
Due to the overwhelming need for employment and a feeling of purpose among many Afghans, the Taliban also had access to a sizable pool of recruits(Ghufran, pg 463-466). As a result, the Taliban was able to take control of the nation and dramatically enlarge its power. The shortcoming of this fact is that it needs to consider the wider geopolitical environment in which the Taliban successfully seized power. The Taliban took advantage of the Afghan government’s weakness due to the US invasion to establish themselves in the country. Also, the Afghan government’s position was weakened, and the Taliban was given more authority since the US and its allies needed to back it up adequately(Rubin, pg 1-6).
Ultimately, the escalation of extremism brought on by the American invasion of Afghanistan made the Taliban’s ascent to power inevitable (Khalilzad, pg 38-43). The Taliban rapidly increased its influence and gained a foothold in the country by capitalizing on the unrest and misery of the Afghan people along with the geopolitical environment(Rubin, pg 10-12). Because of this, the Taliban’s ascension to power in Afghanistan was inevitable (Dobbins and James, pg 2-3). Hence, the evidence supports the assertion that extremism flourished in Afghanistan’s war-torn country.
Based on my research regarding the Afghanistan fall, I argue that the assertion that the emergence of extremism in the country’s war-torn country made the Taliban’s takeover of power inevitable is mistaken (Ghufran, pg 463-466). Although extremism contributed to the development of the Taliban, it was by no means the sole driver. Afghanistan was embroiled in a civil conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s. The hardline Islamist Taliban, progressing in the area, received additional help from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia(Rubin, pg 10-12: Akhtar, pg 51-55). The Taliban had also taken advantage of the unrest and insecurity in the area. They increased their authority by exploiting the nation’s infrastructure, poverty, and religion (Khan, pg 142). The United States foreign policies also contributed to the Taliban’s ascension to power(Akhtar, pg 41-52). The US backed the Northern Alliance in their conflict with the Taliban while the Clinton administration was in office; however, by the time the Bush administration took office, the US had reversed its position and opted to back the Taliban (Akhtar, pg 41-52). This change in strategy gave the Taliban the overwhelming advantage in the battle, setting up their ultimate takeover of power.
In conclusion, its evident that the Taliban’s ascension to power was inevitable in Afghanistan due to conflicts, both internal and external, which had a significant role in this occurrence. With several nations fighting for control of its resources and political system, the war-torn nation of Afghanistan endured decades of upheaval. As a result of the upheaval, violent organizations could recruit local and international supporters, creating the ideal setting for extremism to flourish. With their radical ideologies and strict restrictions, the Taliban could take advantage of this circumstance and consolidate their authority. War had ravaged the nation for decades, destroying its infrastructure and leaving its citizens in abject poverty. Because of this, radical ideas found the perfect environment to flourish, which the Taliban could take advantage of. By establishing a perception of security and order amid the upheaval, the Taliban could take hold of the nation. However, the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islam and its assurances of a better life struck a chord with a segment of the populace. In the end, Afghanistan’s collapse was primarily caused by the unrest and instability that persisted for years. The Taliban’s success was based on Very strict religious rules, the repression of female issues and a lack of civil liberties were characteristics of this administration. Due to the Taliban’s ability to utilize Afghanistan as a refuge for terrorist activities, the country was insecure under its authority. This worsened the Afghan people’s already precarious situation. The Taliban’s achievement was a result of their persistent presence in the area and their aptitude for utilizing the power vacuum that was already present. While other organizations could have had the same goals, the Taliban was the only organization with the means and backing to make their plans a reality. Moreover, it should be noted that while extremism played a role in the Taliban’s ascent to power, it wasn’t the only factor at play. The Taliban was able to profit from the unrest and instability in the area and US foreign policy choices. Hence, it is untrue to say that the emergence of extremism in the country’s war-torn country made the Taliban’s takeover of power inevitable. Other nations facing internal and foreign dangers should take note of Afghanistan’s demise. Extremism may spread and harm greatly if there isn’t coordinated action to tackle the underlying reasons for conflict and instability. Governments must be prepared to cooperate with other nations and take proactive measures to protect the safety and security of their populations.
Work Cited
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Rubin, Michael. “Who is responsible for the Taliban.” Middle East review of international affairs 6.1 (2002): 1-16.
Akhtar, Nasreen. “PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE TALIBAN.” International Journal on World Peace, vol. 25, no. 4, 2008, pp. 49–73. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20752859. Accessed 14 Mar. 2023.
Ghufran, Nasreen. “The Taliban and the civil war entanglement in Afghanistan.” Asian Survey 41.3 (2001): 462-487. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.3.462
Khan, Ijaz Ahmad. “Understanding Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Afghan Policy.” Pakistan Horizon, vol. 60, no. 2, 2007, pp. 141–57. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41500068. Accessed 14 Mar. 2023. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41500068
Khalilzad, Zalmay. “Anarchy in Afghanistan.” Journal of International Affairs (1997): 37-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357465
Dobbins, James F., and James Dobbins. After the Taliban: nation-building in Afghanistan. Potomac Books, Inc., 2008.
Afsar, Shahid, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood. The Taliban: an organizational analysis. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, 2008.
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