Introduction
The fall of the USSR in 1991 came not only as a change in the geopolitical landscape but also as a period of reform within the might and power of the Russian Army. With the collapse of Russian armed forces and the creation of a newly independent state, Russia has faced a whole panoply of problems. The most well-known events people have continued to experience are economic turmoil and strategic uncertainty. The collapse of the USSR led to a severe shortage of military spending, which made the Russian Armed Forces slack in the competencies necessary for the changed environment, the end of the Cold War. Against this backdrop of the proceedings of reorganizing one’s Budget and a tidal wave of institutional changes, the certainty of the requirement for the massive reformation of the military is evident. The years following the Soviet catastrophe they have turned into the low water mark and the culmination of the Russians’ defence spending, which aggravated other issues, such as structural deficiencies within the military. The most significant annual defence spending in the history of the Republic (1991 – 1997) was slashed drastically, leaving the essential infrastructure and soldiers’ morale in shambles.[1]. By 1998, the situation in the Russian Army was not good: most elderly and high-ranking officers were underpaid, and some artillery weapons refused to work. An era of crisis has emphasized the need for Russia to abolish the old Soviet military machine and retool it to correspond to the actualities of today’s new world.
The first nine years of a new millennium were marked by leadership change in Russia under Vladimir Putin, who intended to reenergize the Army and expand the country’s geopolitical role in the world. Putin’s rule in the military part saw the transfer to a new reformed doctrine of modernization, deterrence, and power projection as the key elements. Adopting a fresh national military strategy in the early 2000s was equivalent to a change in paradigm from the previous defensive posture to a proactive one, which was keener on tackling various challenges in the international arena.[2]. In terms of this, the essay explores the changing lines from the chaotic breakup of the Soviet Union to the present policies shaping Russian armed forces. When we track the development of Russia’s defence policy and strategic doctrine, we consequently understand what goals were set and achieved and what actions were initiated to bring the Soviet armed forces to the modern level.
The Putin Era: New Directions in Military Doctrine
The following year, 1991, saw the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse, a great challenge for the Russian military. The Soviet people faced enormous economic difficulties as the country was experiencing a complex transformation from the collapse of the old regime to the formation of a new one, and they allocated a Budget that did not decrease satisfactorily to the Russian Army. It reduced by 1/8 of the prices in the actual term during even a 7-year interval between 1991 and 1997. A trend spanning the length of the entirety of the decade[3]. In 1998, Russian armed forces faced new realities but weren’t ready for them because of the haphazard post-Soviet reorganization. The force faced the problem of paying its police officers; its procuring of new equipment had stopped and was almost at the level where only 30% of its equipment could be state-of-the-art, while others were analyzed and were thought to collapse the next moment.[4]. The topical issue of reform of the Russian military at the end of the twentieth century raised urgent questions that were still important, and, of course, it was among the most heated debates within Russia. At the early age of the millennium and Vladimir Putin, the new Russian President, the new military doctrine under the governorship of Vladimir Putin, in addition to the former doctrine, depended heavily on reducing the number of forces rather than on the needed reforms of 1993[5]. Putting forward a new paradigm, the new doctrine thoroughly discussed several aspects, including the redefinition of security threats, setting a conceptual basis for comprehensive modernization of the Army, and a step to increase the scope of the military doctrine significantly. According to the new doctrine, deterrence and nuclear capability are also priorities. In addition, using military force against direct threats to Russia’s sovereignty is allowed.
The Eight-day Russian–Gridgian War in August 2008, otherwise known as the Russian invasion of Georgia, was a nail in the coffin as regards the Russian military doctrines. The war in Ossetia was Russia’s first military engagement after the actualization of the general reform of the Russian Army, which President Vladimir Putin had launched at the beginning of the decade.[6]. Despite that numerical superiority assured victory, the war showed weaknesses and gaps in the practical operation of the state’s military machinery, leading to reconsidering its policies and battlefield tactics. The category of technology was heavily emphasized among the identified areas for improvement. The Russo-Georgian War blinds sight of the necessity of much more advanced technicalities like communication systems and modernized equipment is inevitable. Russia needed to be more assertive in electronic warfare, which hindered its performance in cyber operations required nowadays by information warfare. Organizationally, the war brought out the vulnerability of falling in line between military units and divisions. Considering this, the rendezvous drill was pivotal for air-to-ground contact, and this was viewed as fundamental to running combat operations smoothly. The utilization of UAIVs was the second noticeable difference between Russia and the other countries. The conflict emphasizes the tendency of UAVs to be useful for surveillance and reconnaissance, consequently increasing funds and effort in developing this field. [7]. Exactly eight years ago, the power took on a new challenge due to the analysis of the abovementioned war. One of the fundamental objectives of the reforms was the transformation of the armed forces, which still bore a close resemblance to the Soviet massive “on call” Army, into a modern and supply-ready force with full combat capability.
III. The Post-Soviet Era: Crisis and Reform
The epoch of Perestroika brought about a time of turmoil and transformation for the Russian Army, marked by financial difficulties, structural inadequacies, and the necessity of military equipment upgrades. In the year of 1991 was the moment when the Soviet Union was dissolute, and Russia had to deal with the militarization mechanism which preserved the legacies of years of a centralized system, ineffective and over-extension[8]. The Soviet economy became a ghost of itself after the collapse of the USSR. Due to that, the Army’s funds and forces dramatically decreased, marking the beginning of their fall. Economically, during the switch of an economy from a command to a market orientation, Russia was fighting high hyperinflation, Budget deficits, and a comprehensive poverty line. Even though there were such constraints, the defense expenditure became more unfavorable; that’s why the military budgets have been severely reduced. Over that period, from 1991 to 1997, the defence costs fell by more than eight times under the actual value terms, and practically no one could ever think that the military equipment, personnel, and arms could be maintained. Therefore, the armed forces showed a cocktail of cases that included delayed payment, inferior training, and weaponry and technology.
Though structurally, it was relatively adapted to the new realities of the post-Soviet era, the Russian military was inadequate to face the new geopolitical reality. Soviet military doctrine based upon the principles of mass mobilization and the defending of territories became of no use compared to the new kinds of threats, like terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and interstate conflicts. Also, the outdated and bloated presence of the Soviet military machine, which involved troublesome command structures, ineffective bureaucracy, and oversized personnel, made the efforts to streamline and modernize the military processes look almost impossible. In this way, the Russian government set about the reforms it hoped would have been rebuilding and breathing new life into the armed forces. The reform program in the mid-1990s had the competitive goal of reorganizing the command system, which would ensure operational effectiveness and that the armed forces were ready for current and future military threats. The main steps included tailoring the staff officers’ size, decreasing the number of military districts, and upgrading weapons and equipment.
Though the Maoist Leadership did introduce innovative political reforms, these were impeded by limitations such as limited financial resources, administrative lethargy, and political opportunism. Although rectification measures have yielded some strides toward goal attainment in certain areas, like the officer corps’ professionalization and routine training materials’ being updated, the overall reform effect has been and remains insignificant. While the genuinely systematic weakening of its military lasted through to the early 2000s, the fact that the Russian armed forces continued having significant deficiencies undermined the long-term ability of the military to fulfill its defense obligations satisfactorily.
The Russo-Georgian War: Catalyst for Change
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War had far-reaching implications for Russian military strategy as it revealed everything the Army did right and some of its weaknesses. Finally, it came to the realities of a hot war between the joint troops of Russia and Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were the bases for Georgia’s undesired security. The war continued from 7 August to 12 August 2008[9]. This issue had impacted (shown to be a problem for them) Russian attitude towards army reorganization and modernization. At the start of the battle, Russia’s influence had the military capacity to rapidly deploy personnel and impose the demands in the region. Exploiting a blend of conventional ground troops, air power, and naval assets, the Russians moved swiftly, engulfed the Georgian forces, and implemented their strategic goals in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A swift and decisive concentrated attack and military success showed Russia’s ability to act decisively for its political ambitions.
Yet, while the Army achieved the primary goal of the war and pushed the Ukrainian military out of the Russian borders, it has also demonstrated the existence of some military defects. One of their most glaring deficiencies was that they needed to keep up on the technology side, mainly in communication systems, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Of course, the lack of current technologies and routines shows that military modernization and investment in advanced military technologies must be implemented.[10]. Moreover, it was realized that the military organ structure suffered from the weak linkage between different units as the intra-branche military collaboration was complex. Lack of coordination between ground and air control and inadequate integration between combat ground forces and air support significantly affected the effectiveness of the forefront actions. Nowadays, interoperability improvement and the creation of new chief commands are essential features of military reforms.
There have been reforms and modernization initiatives.
The Russian army change began after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, and to a great extent, this process has been strengthening. Russia was able to draw priceless lessons from the conflict and understand that the new generation of threats is various and should be met by modern, flexible, and technologically advanced troops. Therefore, the Armed Forces of Russia, headed by the President, began to realize the ambitious program of their transformation into a modern, mobile, and advanced high-tech fighting force. Aby one of the main priorities of the 2020 Strategic Armaments Program (SAP) was started in 2011 by the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev. The SAP 2020 program 2020 was a lengthy and complete modernization concept focused on renovating Russia’s defense facilities and raising the military capabilities to the utmost standards across all the forces of the armed services. The program comprised three main areas – acquiring cutting-edge equipment, developing state-of-the-art weapon systems, and enhancing maintenance, logistics, and operational aspects.
Overboard the SAP 2020 program, substantial allocations were used to advance the Russian defense industry and strengthen the domestic manufacturing system. The contenders emphasized researching and testing hi-tech weapons and technology, among which the systems of sophisticated and modernized missiles, novel pilotless aircraft, and modern armed ground forces appeared.[11]. Furthermore, in addition to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of defence procurement processes, it was emphasized to guarantee that military equipment and resources are delivered soundly and on time. A central aspect of the modernization agenda included upgrading the country’s strategic nuclear potential. Understanding the role of nuclear deterrence in securing national security, nuclear weapons did receive the lion’s share of the Budget; hence, the nuclear arsenal has been updated and expanded. The improvements to the already existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bomber aircraft, which were outfitted with the latest and most powerful nuclear weapons, formed the basis for the development of the arms race.
The Conflict in Ukraine: Assessing Military Performance
The events in Ukraine, which include the Russian crackdown in Crimea and the eastern Ukrainian part, are the ones to be used to check Russia’s military consistency to discover where its strengths and weaknesses are. Evaluating the military’s performance in this campaign may uncover the progress made by the Russian reforms and modernization directed at the military. One significant case of Russia’s martial professionalism in Ukraine was its quickness in disposing of forces and using irregular warfare capabilities, which was an execution of agility and adaptability.[12]. In Crimea, Russian Special Forces, or in this case, so-called “little green men”, helped to speed up the seizure of the central infrastructure and government facilities, which proved to be sufficient to establish the facts of control of this area ahead of the formal annexing. Surprisingly, Russia managed to deploy its forces quickly, which was a warning sign to many that Russia must be ready for other strategic, more subversive operations.
Also, unlike before, Russia skillfully used hybrid warfare methods, mixing in a conventional military campaign with information warfare, cyberattacks, and support for various proxy forces and using disgruntled Ukrainians and synchronized structural breakups inside the country to effectively accomplish the objectives without raising a hand with evidence and in a deniable mode. Russia could play the game without getting involved in outright combat by employing irregular forces and proxies. This again demonstrated Russia’s potential to achieve its strategic goals indirectly through asymmetric approaches. At first, the Russian military achieved some success in the country, but its weaknesses and flaws started to show as time passed. Logistical problems against the Russian troops, such as disruption in the supply chain and the inadequate or absence of appropriate infrastructure, can impede their efficient operations. The average duration of the campaign, exacerbated by the shortage of forces fueling deficiencies of air support, introduction of fresh troops, and repair of hardware in east Ukraine, bounds Russia’s logistics abilities.
The problem of equipment deficiency also appeared. The consequences were a noticeable use of old and somehow neglected by enemy troops’ hardware. Though Russia was actively modernizing its military hardware with particular attention to upgrading the weapon systems and complexes, the results of the war in Ukraine have shown the deficits in the capabilities and preparedness of the Russian Army. Maintaining problems and reliance on legacy systems are among the most vital factors contributing significantly to the military’s ineffectiveness in war fastness.[13]. Moreover, Russia had to work hard at keeping the Ukrainian public on its side, primarily as the number of casualties from the conflict mounted and economic sanctions on the country were fully functioning. The Crimea annexation was the one that had the most excellent support at home and abroad, while the conflict in eastern Ukraine was the one that put a strain on the resources and tested the patience of the public. The criticism of the government’s non-governmental intervention in the conflict and the concerns about the human and financial costs of intervention point out the extent of the issues that affect the maintenance of the social backing for military operations.
VII. Conclusion
The dynamics of Russian military reforms over the past years, from the Soviet collapse to the present, have gone through quite tortuous internal and external factors like the Soviet system itself and the world order. While progress has taken place in a military transformation and modernization, the disarray in Ukraine looks like what could be the next global “cold war.” It has the power to remind us all about the limitations and obstacles still facing the Russian military. At first, despite internal problems and financial constraints, Russia has shown to utilize its resilience and aptitude as it has tried toward military reform in the post-Soviet era. The emergence of new ideas under the direction of Putin’s Presidency and pertinent changes in response to international political fluctuations prove that the Russian government has become more robust and more independent from external forces.
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[1] Arbatov, Alexei G. “Military reform in Russia: dilemmas, obstacles, and prospects.” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 83-134.
[2] Beehner, Lionel, Liam Collins, Steve Ferenzi, Robert Person, and Aaron F. Brantly. “Analyzing the Russian way of war: Evidence from the 2008 conflict with Georgia.” Analyzing The Russian War Of War: Evidence From The 2008 Conflict With Georgia (2018).
[3] Bryce-Rogers, Athena. “Russian military reform in the aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.” Demokratizatsiya 21, no. 3 (2013): 339.
[4] Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “The Russian interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea compared: Military performance, legitimacy and goals.” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 3 (2014): 400-420.
[5] Pallin, Carolina Vendil, and Fredrik Westerlund. “Russia’s war in Georgia: lessons and consequences.” In Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, Georgia, and the West, pp. 150-174. Routledge, 2013.
[6] Thomas, Timothy. “The evolution of Russian military thought: Integrating hybrid, new-generation, and new-type thinking.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 554-575.
[7] Dugas, Mari Elisa. “Between Georgia and Crimea: the Social Dimensions of War for the Russian Military.” (2016).
[8] Pashentsev, Evgeny. “Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare.” In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ICCWS 2016, pp. 269-275. 2016.
[9] Thomas, Timothy. “The evolution of Russian military thought: Integrating hybrid, new-generation, and new-type thinking.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 554-575.
[10] Colby, Elbridge, and Jonathan Solomon. “Facing Russia: conventional defense and deterrence in Europe.” Survival 57, no. 6 (2015): 21-50.
[11] Kerr, Jaclyn A. “U) Assessing Russian Cyber and Information Warfare in Ukraine: Expectations, Realities, and Lessons.” (2023).
[12] Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, Jeffrey Edmonds, and Julian Waller. Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts. CNA, 2021.
[13] Duong, Don M., and US Army School for Advanced Military Studies. “Russian Military Strategy Development from 1991 to 2019.” (2020): 51.
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