In his philosophical piece “Death,” Nagel Thomas contends that the situation is bad for the person who dies, even when three differing arguments oppose his claims. This paper focuses on one possible responsive approach to the problem, analyzing its underlying strengths and weaknesses.
Objection: This objection thus provokes the central dispute about the very nature of evil in inner experience. This goes against Nagal’s arguments that death is always the worst thing for the individual who dies, as it questions whether it is wrong for this person when he does not experience bad things (Hatami & Akhavan, 2022). The opposition believes that defying the application of moral or evaluative rules on states of nonexistence. It disputes that simply a lack of experience is equivalent to an undesirability or negativity, ultimately leading to the refutation of Nagel’s premise that death is terrible.
Nagel’s Reply: Nagel may oppose this objection by giving examples of experiences where people do not have knowledge but still have their lives affected by these aspects. He gives the examples of Bob, who gets betrayed and mocked without knowing it, and Dave, who has to deal with the impacts of his own life’s decisions(Fischer, 2022). Nevertheless, Nagel contends that just because Bob does not know that his existence is inferior, that alone does not make his life better than Dave’s, which points to negative factors beyond one’s awareness even if one does not acknowledge them.
Evaluation: Nagel’s response proves to be an effective way of demonstrating the unevenness between the awareness of subjective experience and the objective good life. He employs specific instances showing that an experience will remain bad irrespective of subjective experiences. On the other hand, some people would deliberate Nagel’s idea as controversial. The example of Bob and Dave does not precisely reflect the actual sense of death as it is possible. Conceptually, mortality implies an end to all the experiences, while Bob’s obliviousness is confined to the particular events that occurred in his life. Detractors might perceive that importance and meaning must be more profound to refute the opposing statement.
Furthermore, Nagel suggests that objective standards should be assumed for evaluating quality of life. On the one hand, correlation comes naturally to one’s mind; this unwillingness can be a matter of critique regarding the universality of such criteria. Every individual can set their focus mainly on certain aspects of existence, so it becomes hard to robe to universal criteria when talking about leveling the effect of death.
Besides these criticisms, Nagel showed us that the existence of subjective experience is not the only component of happiness but also guessed us to reflect on the many-faced approaches to our lives. Nagel does that by introducing the objective factors into the consideration of well-being and warns one to think about a broader perspective than one’s poor or happy assessment (Hatami Shafagh & Akhavan, 2022). This extension understands the subjective nature of the death of people, and the external factors only facilitate its impact on human life. Consequently, Nagel’s concern is incorporated into a broader outlook that considers the two aspects of the objective and subjective as playing complementary roles in our human experiential fabric.
In conclusion, in assessing Nagel’s argument, one is impressed that his answer to the objection is quite effective; however, it does have its shortcomings. In emphasizing the objective experience, Nagel presents a solid counter-position for the subjective element of the objection. Nevertheless, the example described in the text might not wholly represent the reality of death, and the presumption for acceptance of objective measures for rating well-being has to be critically thought about. Consequently, Nagel’s dialect delivers precious time of contemplation on the complexity of death and its impact on human survival.
References
Fischer, J. M. (2022). Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life: Precis and Further Reflections. The Journal of Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-022-09392-8
Hatami Shafagh, P., & Akhavan, M. (2022). Ethics and Meaning of Life in the Philosophy of Thomas Nagel. Western Philosophy, 1(2), 19-36.https://wp.journals.ikiu.ac.ir/article_2757_en.html?lang=fa