How Erdoğan’s discourse has changed during his period in office as an example of populism in power?
Abstract
Erdogan’s success in transforming Turkey from a progressive quasi-democratic dictatorship to an undemocratic one has led to him being labelled as a populist leader in power, especially in a divided society, unstable democratic culture and problematic areas. Populism is a political approach that aims to appeal to the public who think established elite groups have ignored their concerns. The question is whether Erdogan’s discourse will soften his violent populism after he gets another term in office or dominate politics. In recent years, populist leaders, political parties and movements have won national elections, influencing their country’s mainstream policies. At this time, researchers have judged that the media played a significant role in the rise and success of populism. That is why populist leaders seek public support to gain popular support through the media. This study examines the role of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which is an excellent example of how populist leaders use and influence the media. After a failed coup attempt in 2016, Erdogan took over the national media to stifle political speech, leaving his populist message the only version of reality. The main reason and purpose of this essay report are to find out how Erdogan’s new religious populism is causing mass mobilization to dominate the media and offend opposition candidates. Populists often describe the elite as a homogeneous entity, a political, economic, cultural and media institution accused of destroying the interests of other groups such as large corporations, foreign countries, and immigrants to grow. For the needs, wants and interests of the “people”. This report uses leadership skills analysis techniques to build Erdogan’s leadership character through physical analysis of oral documents during his tenure. This report argues that a systematic and thorough description of Erdogan’s personality, one can deepen the understanding of AKP in Turkey and clarify the importance of taking individual-level variables seriously when analyzing foreign policy.
Introduction
Populism refers to various political positions that emphasize the concept of the people and often oppose this grouping against the elite. The term was coined in the late 19th century and has since been used as a derogatory term for many politicians, political parties and their counterparts. Many different definitions of populism are used in political science and other social sciences, and some researchers have suggested eliminating the term altogether. Turkish politics is carried out within the framework of the Presidential Republic as defined by the Turkish Constitution. The President of Turkey is the head of state and head of government. Turkey’s political system is based on power-sharing. President Recep Tayyip’s rule of power and operations in discharging his duties is an example of populism in power (Yılmaz, et al., 2020, p. 134).
This essay report aims to discuss how Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s discourse has changed during his period in office as an example of populism in power. In general, populism is the name of a kind of political movement. Populists often try to differentiate between ordinary people and the elite that is, the upper classes. Populists may see the rich or the educated as elites. This article examines what happened after the 2016 military coup in Turkey and the reaction of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The attempted coup d’état on July 15, 2016 took place in Turkey against state institutions, including the government and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish military carried out the operation which was organized as a peace council from home Wealthy, and well-educated persons may be seen as belonging to an elite class by populists (Yılmaz, İhsan and James Barry. 2020, p. 160). This essay also looks at what transpired in Turkey after the 2016 military coup and how President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted. On July 15, 2016, a coup attempt was staged in Turkey, targeting state institutions such as the government and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. One wing of the Turkish army, which was structured as a home peace council, made an attempt. This essay also discusses how President Recep utilizes the populist political tropes in his administration of the Turkish nation, as well as the application of the conspiracy Theory and his roles in it. This essay gives a clue and the link between the populist and conspiracy theory in the case of Erdoğan. It uses the aspects of war as metaphor and the concepts of the quasi-Religious overtone. It also discusses the populist worlds that Erdoğan uses, how he uses his enemies and who are his enemies, and a show of the psychology thing in his discourse. This report also looks at how Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s discourse uses Islam, his thoughts on the nation, and what he thinks about the history of the country with the ottoman empire. It also explores the populism ideology with respect to Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan being a nationalist or not. This is veered off from his speech after the 2016 military coup. This report concludes that Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s discourse has changed during his period in office as an example of populism in power. He had made various changes in line with his experience as the mayor, prime minister and president of Turkey.
The first section provides a brief history of Turkish populism and provides an overview of Turkish populism from the late 19th century to the present day. The second section focuses on the reflection of the political crisis on Erdogan’s political life and explains how Erdogan has used the political, economic and social crisis. This report also examines how populism ideology worships people in order to mobilize the masses and build their power. The last part shows the symbiotic relationship between politics and the media. Thus, it shows how Erdogan’s media eased crisis by informing the public with the charm of his powerful populists. This report concludes that Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s discourse has changed during his period in office as an example of populism in power. He had made various changes in line with his experience as the mayor, prime minister and president of Turkey.
Background of the personality
Erdoganism today refers to totalitarian populism and radical Islam in Turkey. Erdogan describes the masses as “anxiety, fear, sacrifice, anger, emotion, resentment, credibility, siege, anti-Western sentiment, conspiracy, militarism, jihadist, martyrdom, Islamic nationalism, and ummatizm, (Yılmaz, İhsan and Galib, Bashirov. (2018, p. 1812). Recep Erdogan claims that he is using the knot of religious and civilized animosity between the West and the Islamic world and that Western Christians are dedicated to destroying the Islamic world. This insight into the populism of Muslim civilization is available when he appeals to American and Western allies for the lack of support in the Syrian war. Erdogan is the world’s most popular leader among young Arabs, according to opinion polls by the Arab Barometer Research Network. The survey asked 25,000 young people from the Arab world for opinions on a variety of issues. Recep Tayyip Erdogan is arguably the most controversial figure in Turkey’s recent political history. His political advantage is also important for the situation in Turkey. Erdogan was so powerful that it successfully undermined most of its internal controls, so attempts to explain the consequences of Turkey’s recent foreign policy have failed to account for the influence of his leadership. The major reason why this essay is looking into this case is the populism ideology held by Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his discourse on the rule of the nation. It is also important to look at this case as Turley is one of the biggest nations and links between Asia and Europe and is consequential in its operations.
Erdogan’s verbal remarks were collected from various news sources such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal, especially the Hurriyet Daily News which’s a Turkish daily newspaper printed in English. The profile of the character of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is derived from the 53,629 words spoken by the him. This is well over the 5000 words required for proper analysis. By coding all the words spoken by Erdogan translated into English, the analysis of Erdoğan’s discourse and the various ways it has changed during his period in office as an example of populism in power will have low risks. The advantage of studying Erdogan’s personality using the Leadership trait analysis method is feasible due to the availability of a large pool of personality profiles of many political leaders that can be compared to Erdogan’s results. The reference group for this study consists of a more homogeneous sample of 214 global leaders and 83 Middle East leaders. These comparison groups were also created together to form the basis for measuring Erdogan’s personality.
Literature Review
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been overseeing Turkey’s fundamental transformation since he came to power in 2002. Once a pillar of the Western Union, the country has adopted a militaristic foreign policy, and democracy striving to join the European Union has been replaced by a single rule. The Turkish people belonged to the Ottoman Empire and were introduced by reformers who needed popular sovereignty. Thus, Sultan Abdulaziz II was overthrown by the people and the new regime, the Committee of Union and Progress, also known as Ittihat Terracchi, ruled the empire that marked the first wave of Turkish populism (Yabanci, 2016, p. 591). Then, in 1923, the Republic was founded, and with the support of the Armed Forces and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), a new elite was born based on secular worldviews and republican values.
Despite losing power in the 1950 general election, it retained control of vital state equipment through the judiciary, the diplomatic corps, and the military throughout the 2000s. When the AKP party and its coalition partners came to power in 2002, it sought to maintain good relations with the Turkish elite, but the second phase, which began in 2007, led to a clash between the army and the AKP led by President Erdogan. Finally, in 2011, President Erdogan, given the military threats, showed the rise of the populists and urged them to build “elite man” rhetoric. Since then, he has frequently used populist rhetoric to wield power and intimidate his enemies. The main objective of this study is to highlight the recent appeal of Erdogan’s populist policies and explain his position as a populist leader.
Populist metaphors such as conspiracy theories play an increasingly important role in his politics. Populist and conspiracy theories have many features in common, such as Manichaeism, victimhood and ambiguity about typical politics, and the use of conspiracy theories by populists makes political sense. Targeting sworn elites can help defeat real or fictional enemies and protect populists from enemy attacks.
But the dissenting sentiment of the populist forces in government and, by extension, of the incumbent voters under the control of the political system, this report addresses this question using the example of the president of Turkey, a country where populist forces have been in power for more than a decade. from the analysis of populist attitudes in the Committee of the National Assembly. Therefore, the report shows that when the Populist Party (AKP) is in power, it has fewer voters than others. It also looks at the theories focusing on the abuse of foreign powers. This discovery is also important outside of Turkey. As already noted, populist forces can retain the population’s support and remain in power for a long time, using government propaganda to stir up hostility against foreign powers and conspiracies (Rogenhofer, and Panievsky, 2020 p. 1394).
Populists blame conspiratorial elites for government failures and use these supposed tactics to portray themselves as outsiders (Müller 2016: 42). Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s example is enough to provoke a populist dilemma once rooted in power. Conspiracy theory can help populists distract from “local” status and maintain “foreign” status while in power (Balta et al., 2021). For this reason, conspiracy theories have also been interpreted as a “novelty” by mainstream populists (Türk, 2018, p. 150). Democracy must always be a permanent task, and if the Turkish cause teaches the world something, it allows the world to take our political freedom for granted. One must learn to shake their head over the lies of the traditional conspiracy and talk about them. The truth is not always enough.
In this situation, conspiracy theories offer an opportunity for retribution by targeting scapegoated communities and individuals. For example, in Italy, radical right-wing parties blame immigrants for “creating unholy coalitions to ruin law-abiding citizens”, or Donald Trump was pointing suspicions on Barack Obama’s birth certificate or Turkish president Erdogan has focused on the Western powers’ hidden political plans and has blamed global forces for economic or social problems of Turkey (Balta et al., 2021). The revelation of resentment can encourage people who believe in these conspiracy theories to mobilize for non-normative political action through targeted groups
Erdogan took an important step towards a more authoritarian policy by spreading conspiracy theories about weapons of mass destruction. It represents a new chapter in President Erdogan’s already paranoid thinking, which raises a dangerously rising tone for a conspiracy framework that could lead to an irreversible loss of confidence in Turkey’s democratic system. This social conspiracy theory was used in Turkey by Recep Tayyip Erdogan to seek the purge Turkish citizens and political institutions. Similarly, President Erdogan has cultivated the idea of a so-called “parallel state” to justify the abolition of decades of democratization in Turkey ((Özpek and Tanriverdi Yaşar, 2018, p. 198). In Turkey, President Erdogan has managed to use the conspiracy framework in three different ways. This roughly corresponds to the three phases above.
First, he pointed to opposition and media criticism as evidence of foreign conspiracies against the ruling party. The demonstration in Gezi provided the most obvious context against which all sorts of conspiracy allegations surfaced. President Erdogan made a sensational speech every day, blaming foreign conspirators and claiming that the media had made an alliance with the enemy of the people. Second, President Erdogan turned his gaze inward and pointed out that Gulenists and the so-called “interest lobby” had permeated parliament and civil society. Secondly, the opposition is accused of terrorism because of its affiliation with the Kurdish community. Eventually, after an attempted military coup, President Erdogan destroyed the army, colleges, the media and parliament. All under the aegis of protecting the nation from internal and external conspirators. Thus, the whole conspiracy transformed and took the form of the so-called “main structure” in which almost all politics became a conspiracy. As a result, President Erdogan has presented himself as a strong leader and a leader of democratically elected people. Democracy can fail if politicians use conspiracy theories to distract and allow political purges to be justified (Moffitt, 2020). Finally, as a national crackdown ensued, and Turkey grew to become its return on many years of democratization in an unexpectedly unfolding authoritarian take-over, persevering with the State of Emergency changed into declared, and the humans were requested to vote in a constitutional referendum to beautify Presidential powers. While the Turkish case will not leave us optimistic, the world considers that with the aid of searching how Erdogan used the conspiracy principle as a political weapon, the world will discover ways to be organized for what will probably be available in different countries` politics. As a slow erosion of honest politics worldwide coincides with an expanded famous urge for food for authoritarianism, we cannot have enough money to assume that different countries` democracy is precisely talking awesome and by some means immune from the risk of authoritarianism leadership.
Erdogan’s 2016 coup attempt was his most populist campaign in history. It was a gift in disguise. Following the coup attempt, all criticism to Erdogan and his party was directed at Turkey, a country encircled on all sides by “enemy” (Flinks, 2016). The purge after a failed coup attempt was ruthless. The rest of the opposition was crushed. It is estimated that more than 150,000 police officers have been dismissed, and thousands more have been arrested (Mishra and Pankaj, 2020).
After the failed coup in 2016, Erdogan’s presidency was abolished by referendum and replaced by the president. It empowers President Erdogan to directly appoint senior officials, intervene in the judiciary and declare a state of emergency (BBC, 2020). President Erdogan has “replaced” all potential enemies, including Kemalist institutions, civil society groups and the media. This “other” is a threat to Turkey’s survival. When the coup attempt failed, the clues became very clear. Using anti-Western sentiment, pro-Islamic idealism, Turkish nationalism and populism rooted in conspiracy theories, Erdogan argues, removing institutional checks and balances, establishing himself and his devoted private sector. The representative party that formed the ‘New Elite’ as a base may even employ secular and nationalist opposition (Yilmaz, Kaman, and Beshirov, 2020; Yilmaz, Cibuli, and Demir, 2021). In these circumstances, a referendum should always be held.
As President Erdogan became more militant, especially in the West. The man who wanted to build a bridge between the West, the Middle East and Turkey was always at odds with the West. President Erdogan constantly creates and manages international crises as he combats the “terrorist threat” Turkey faces from Kurdish militias (Tol, 2020). There is no credible opposition. With the loss of power by the Kemalists, the conquest of religious propaganda and the birth of many “enemies”, they have a comfortable hegemony over Turkish politics. Dharma is used to direct and support her “protection”. Erdogan has turned them into Islamic schools since the abolition of thousands of schools and educational institutions linked to the Gülen movement.
The history of populism dates back to the end of the 19th century, beginning with the Narodnik movement in Russia and spreading to other countries. As one might expect, the Ottoman Empire was also influenced by populism, which strongly influenced the political life of the Ottoman Empire. Researchers have made several attempts to investigate the rise of populism in the Ottoman Empire, some of which have been identified through economic debate. The famous historian Zafer Toprak said: “Populism must be found in the concrete objective conditions created by the late encounter with capitalism. Intellectuals play a special social role in these countries. Responsible for. In relatively developing countries where there is no strong bourgeoisie, intellectuals usually have stronger social authority and play an increasingly important role in shaping the country (Toprak, 2013; Karol, 2016, p. 120). Another important debate around the development of populism in the Ottoman Empire concerns the modernization that began in the 19th century. As a result, the so-called intelligentsia was born that demanded a change in the political structure of the old world and replaced it with “popular sovereignty” (Karaomerlioglu, 2006; Lowen, 2017, p. 120). According to Toprak, Ozden and Karaomerlioglu, a nascent intellectual who wants and wants to overthrow the government of Abdulaziz. ‘People’s support’ marked the first wave of populism in the Ottoman Empire.
Quasi-Religious overtone
Religion or the office of religion is also used as a tool that populist leaders use. The carefully chosen Muslim world issued a fatwa supporting the actions of the Erdogan administration after the coup. He came up with a more populist statement than a religion, arguing that we need people to do the right thing (Genc, 2019). Erdogan has often tried to have both. The Turkish government has offered to launch a joint fact-finding mission with Armenia into the genocide at the end of World War 1. Erdogan uses religion as a club to further polarize society and consolidate his power. His beliefs are arguably best represented in his remarks following the contentious 2020 renovation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque: “World War I was conceived as a conflict aimed at conquering and dividing the Ottoman Empire.” We will also disappoint those who dream of a Republic of Turkey if the world order is disturbed to its foundations (Global Village Space, 2020).
The history of populism dates back to the end of the 19th century, beginning with ethnic movements in Russia and spreading to other countries. As expected, the Ottoman Empire was influenced by populism and made a huge difference in the Ottoman Empire’s political life. Scholars have made many attempts to study the emergence of populism in the Ottoman Empire, some of which have been defined using economic arguments. Well-known historian Zafer Toprak said: “Populism must be pursued in the specific objective conditions created by the late encounter with capitalism. In these countries, intellectuals play a particular social role. Responsible for. In relatively developing countries where there is no strong bourgeoisie, intellectuals generally have stronger social authority and play an increasingly important role in shaping the state (Lewis, 2019; Karol, 2016, p.). .120).
Another big debate about the rise of populism in the Ottoman Empire is related to the modernization that began in the 19th century. As a result, the so-called intelligence was born, which demanded that the political structure of the old world be changed and replaced by “people’s sovereignty” (Karaomerlioglu, 2006; Koroglu, 2016, p.120). According to Toprak, Özden, and Karaomelioglu, newborn thinkers who wanted to overthrow Abdul Aziz’s government and needed the “support of the people” demonstrated the first wave of populism in the Ottoman Empire.
Political Crises over Erdogan’s Populist Style
The Justice and Development Party achieved good financial results in its early days in power and is respected both at home and abroad. However, military pressure on political parties continued. On the anniversary of the “postmodern coup” in 2007 and 1997, President Erdogan worked on the coup, stressing that “only the people” can protect the republic, not the system” (Elçi, E., 2019, p. 387; Dincsahin, 2012, p. 627). Also, the following month, former Foreign Minister Abdullahi Guru was nominated in the presidential election. In the presidential election, Nawras was portrayed as a nationalist rather than an elite candidate and was represented by President Erdogan. He believes that Congress wants to represent the people, so it is enough to elect a president in Congress. (Dincsahin, 2012, p.630) Yet Gull’s wife wore a headscarf and threatened to intervene in the Islamic Justice and Development Party (JDP), turning the presidential election into a political crisis. Despite the commitment of the Turkish military to the secular traditions of the country, Gall did not get enough votes in the first round. In fact, it backfired, and the JDP gained widespread support from the media and the public.
In this case, from Erdogan’s point of view, the Turkish political system sought to prevent the people from coming to power, thus helping Erdogan to adopt populist rhetoric. Throughout the presidential process and beyond, anti-establishment rhetoric based on “the elite and the people” became his main political strategy to avoid balancing other state bodies and the opposition, as it did with populist political strategies. Keep appealing to people. Moreover, Erdogan weakened military power in 2011, and in his populist discourse, the military was no longer a threat to the people. But he made new enemies against his people. Since then, academics, NACC, intellectuals and journalists have become the middle class. On that occasion, Erdogan always accused the CHP of serving terrorist organizations and said what kind of man cares if they are an artist or a professor. Erdogan said they could never ignore these people. (Eksi, and Wood, 2019, p. 733; Sabah, 2016; Aitk and Elsie, 2019, p. 99). In his view, ballot boxes are the decisive factor and therefore only receive approval from individuals, not from institutions. Pointing to a deeper interpretation, he said that while the source of our legitimacy is people, their legitimacy is not. They are trying to hinder certain institutions that are justified.
In 2016, President Erdogan expanded his power, showing he had enough power to mobilize people in the face of a failed coup. Then he turned his attention to the international elite. Since then, he has often talked about “masterminds” intervening in the country, which has led to several protests, including the Gezi protests and attempts at economic instability. From time to time, the international elite becomes a member of parliament who accepts the matter. ‘Armenian genocide’ and in the United States will provide military assistance to the Kurdish army in Syria.
However, the exact link between populism and conspiracy theories has yet to be explored. The project revolves around parliamentary elections in many countries, and my team arrives before election day to do ethnographic fieldwork. They attend party meetings and interview people to understand better how conspiracy theories work. This is the aspect that makes the project innovative.
Leader of the Ummah
The Modern Turkey still has a rich Ottoman Empire’s glorious history. The fall of the empire following the Treaty of Sèvres gave rise to the formation of the current republic. Erdogan exploited the division of the empire, the occupation of Turkey by the Western powers, the introduction of Western and secularized Kemalism, anger, discontent, trauma, fear, unrest and the siege of sacrifice. Thus, a wave of reformist nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire was observed in the domestic and foreign policy of President Erdogan. In Turkey, he uses the education system, the media, and holiday plans to shape a common story. Sunni Turkish Muslims should be proud of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. With these movements, he tries to return the country to its former “glory” by instilling in the Turks the idea of “greatness.” Organizations like TURGEV and Ansar are working with Diyanet to help build this story (Ding, et al., 2021, p. 148).
Moreover, President Erdogan not only banned critical media content, but also succeeded in replacing it with more “Islamist” or pro-Ottoman content. For example, the world-famous film Derelish: Ertugrul is a fictional story inspired by a man believed to be the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan’s support for the show is that he visits the set with his family and shows other “Islamic fraternal countries” “against the influence of the West” from a “young heart.” This will come to light when one “give” in good faith (Dinçşahin, and Şakir. (2012), p. 640).
Erdogan’s type of Populism: Mass Mobilization
Populism is a strong word of the 21st century, but the concept is still very vague and difficult to explain. For example, Mudd defines populism as an ideology that ultimately divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “a pure people” versus a corrupt elite, and believes that politics is a common will. Must be the expression of general will of the people. (2004, p.543). Margaret Canovan says that “populism is not just a reaction against the structure of power, but an appeal to a recognized authority.” In addition to these definitions, Lonescu and Gellner point to a deeper and more reliable explanation: “Democracy worships people. Thus, this article argues that the ultimate goal of populism is the embodiment of the people and thus the mobilization of the masses. Turk claims that populism does this by placing itself in the gap between “us” and “them.”
Policies are thus reshaped by the division, offering a variety of opportunities for populist leaders. Populist leaders organize demonstrations, marches and finally mass mobilizations on social networks. Therefore, humans can respond to ‘elite’ and ‘enemy’ through these actions. (Turco, 2018, p. 152153) In a crisis, what is called ‘populist political communication’ abused by populist leaders’ extremist groups attack, expel others and call centers” (Engesser et al., 2017; Turk, 2018, p. 153). At the same time, Mergenthaler explains that the People’s Party’s success in terms of mass mobilization lies in its ability to focus on specific issues and engage the general public. Surprisingly, it is very easy for the Populist Party to do this on social networks with a low “cost of participation”. (Mergenthaler, 2015, p.7) New concerns, including the economic crisis, immigration and the “loss of sovereignty”, have been raised and highlighted by the People’s Party. Since then, the Populist Party has responded to these challenges by claiming to capitalize on public sentiment that the mainstream parties supposedly ignore.
Furthermore, Erdogan who is Turkey’s longtime leader, is a populist leader and loves natural courtship between himself and his people. According to the Turk, he builds this courtyard in three unique forms; Private, sacred and almost sensual. He claims that Erdoan tends to dismiss this temptation as a “legendary love affair” and regularly speaks to people as one among those who are seen as one-on-one in his most famous populist style. (2018, pp. 158-59). During the crises of 2007, 2013 for the Gezi protest and the 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan effectively tested how many victorious personalities he had to mobilize the masses. Many technologies have been launched with the help of Erdogan for mass mobilization. However, he often uses cultural struggle. He recognizes that the imaginary distance does not take all the voices from social classes to strengthen the sporting activities and cultural conflicts between human beings. On the other hand, Erdogan is uniting his massive political dreams for the United States. At the same time, it retains its imagination and observers with humans and continues to influence its citizens in an uncertain future. For example, the goal of 2023, the centenary of the Republic of Turkey, may be very important to him, and he wants to make the United States one of the ten largest economies in the world. Recently, on the centenary of Turkey’s war of independence, he spoke to the gang and said that we are committed to our 2023 dream no matter what happens. We have set up one team in the presidency for this purpose. The wave of security and economic system attacks is not over yet, as every day we move on to a new story.
In addition, President Erdogan is a genius leader and knows how to turn disasters into opportunities. For example, after the 2007 disaster, he called early elections and won a majority. The same triumphant mindset applies to the 2013 Gezi protests and incidents on 25/17. December. He effectively exploits human emotions by using the definition of social and economic security and demonstrating the opportunities prepared in response to these crises, demonstrating that his populist data is “Media for Mass Mobilization” (Turk, 2018, p. 162) In addition, his response to the coup efforts in 2016 was remarkable, proving his ability to mobilize the masses. On the way to Marmaris, the Turkish navy tried to make a coup and occupy key positions in Ankara and Istanbul. Thereafter, Marina fully managed TRT television stations across the country. And one thinks the authorities no longer have a chance to fascinate people. However, Erdogan, along with his ambitious nature, attracts people through networks and FaceTime on phones. He advised people to take to the streets to challenge those who tried to carry out the coup. “There is no power better than human power, and the chains of command have been broken. This is a step towards the best ranks with the help of the superiors (Aytaç, and Elçi, 2019, p. 89) In short, it is easy to say that Erdogan is the mastermind behind mass mobilization, and even under the most specific conditions, he reaches out to the people and consolidates his power.
Public Enemies
Erdogan led the Islamic Democratic Party for a long time before gradually ending the populist dictatorship in 2011. Otherwise, Erdogan eliminated his biggest enemy and favoured further polarization in his direction. His move was justified. Erdogan, who acted between 2008 and 2011, legitimized Erdoğan. The migratory forces were held accountable, and the 2010 constitutional process replaced many members of the farming jurisdiction. This slows down the institutional control of the AKP by the Kemalist faction. This was one of the first examples of Erdoğan. He allowed it to be what was best for the people.
Erdogan’s commitment to democracy was gradually replaced by populism, after which Erdogan returned to Islamism. As part of this transformation, “Black Turks” (conservative Muslims oppressed by “White Turks” Kemalists) are identified as “people,” Kemalists, non-Muslims, and non-Sunni Muslims. it was done. Sunnis and non-Turks are “others” (Yilmaz and Beshirov, 2018). President Erdogan and AKP used classic populist cards to distinguish between the “pure” and “corrupted” elites. Islamism is at the heart of Erdogan’s populist agenda. President Erdogan has lifted the ban on women wearing scarves in government offices and offices. It was celebrated because it gave women the autonomy to choose what they wanted. However, this was not done to give women democratic rights but to strengthen Erdogan’s position as an advocate of “good Muslims” from historically oppressed groups. He increasingly expressed the conservative image of women. For example, three years later, he publicly insisted that “Islamic families should not think about contraception or family planning” (BBC, 2020).
In addition, President Erdogan introduced high taxes and restrictions on alcohol sales in the third legislature (Ozbilgin, 2013). The tax has prevented Turkish Airlines from serving drinks on domestic flights. Shops can no longer sell 22.00 to 06.00 alcoholic beverages. Finally, shops selling alcohol should be at least 100 meters away from churches and educational institutions. Violators should expect severe punishment. President Erdogan rejected the criticism and defended his proposal. “There are such regulations all over the world,” he said. The youth in the country must be protected from bad habits” (Dinçşahin, 201, p. 618). When President Erdogan consolidated his power, he used Islamism to change the social fabric, divide society, and justify his decision on “pure” religious grounds.
Erdogan successfully portrays civil society and important media as the “enemy” of the people. They were “terrorists” backed by “foreign troops” who were said to be jealous of the “progress” Turkey had made in the first decade of the AKP regime. President Erdogan gradually and successfully transformed the media and civil society into ‘Public Enemy No. 1’. After the Gezi protests in 2013, Erdogan caught the attention of everyone who questioned government policy. There was only one person gathered at the posting. Gathered in Ghezi Park and said That President Erdogan played with the existential anxiety of Turkish voters through the protest. Conspiracy against Western or foreign powers trying to destabilize the country. This still alluded to the collective mistakes of the people, dating back to the Treaty of Sèvres, when the Allies split the defeated Ottoman Empire. This permanent trauma is deeply rooted in many Turks.
The Gezi protest culminated in a government plan to build a shopping mall and mosque on the site of Gezi Park, a public space on Istanbul’s Taksim Square. The point of contention was Erdogan’s clientelism: he increasingly dominated the country by buying the support of various people. Most “social” projects focused on the privatization of the public sector, which led to the emergence of a new bourgeoisie that benefited from neoliberal reforms. They were essentially loyal to Erdogan’s support (Yilmaz and Bashirov, 2018; Lowen, 2017).
Erdogan has succeeded in portraying civil society and the big media as “enemies” of the people. They were “terrorists” backed by “foreign troops” who would have been jealous of the “progress” made by Turkey during the first decade of AKP rule. At the same time, he called almost any opposition a “propaganda”. In December 2013, a series of police investigations revealed corruption involving top members of the AKP elite, including Erdoan’s son Bilal and three ministers. The administration refused to continue the investigation. President Erdogan called it a “legal coup” by members of the Gülen movement and launched a total crackdown on the movement. A police officer in charge of the investigation has been arrested. The prosecuting authority in the case was appointed, and the case was withdrawn. In the months that followed, the administration seized media organizations affiliated with the Gulen movement, appointed councilors and turned them into mouthpieces for the AKP. They confiscated other organizations and businesses from the Gulen movement, confiscating thousands of private properties (Sunday 2016).
Erdogan’s Control over Media
In the modern world, politics depends on the politics of the media, which are mutually needed and mutually beneficial. In other words, it is a symbiotic relationship. Manuel Castells, a Spanish sociologist, specializing in communication and information society, says that it should not be adapted to the colour of the tie or the appearance of the face. This is a symbolic embodiment of a message of trust associated with a person and a human person and a projection of the image of this character. (2007, p. 242) In line with this, Matthias Barner, Director of the Media Program for Southeastern Europe at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, notes that “political forces turn to the public to motivate their actions and to campaign for their ideas. To serve people’s trust. Endorgan added that only those who know the rules of media democracy and know how to implement them will remain politicians and win the majority. In the absence of such communication, the image of political institutions is distorted, and prejudice increases (2011, p. 4). Similarly, Jesper Strombach and Frank Esser have pointed out the importance of the media as a source of information for citizens, as well as a channel of communication between politicians and citizens and between different parts of the political system, and the fact that the media have the key to the public sphere and can exert a significant influence on the formation of public opinion, politicians or Institutions ignore the media.
Until the 1980s, Turkish media also had a small number of publishers and the national TV station TRT. However, the economic transformation that was ordered in the 1980s changed the country’s social and economic structure and the relationship between the media and the government. As a result of these economic changes, entrepreneurs with a significant interest in journalism and banking, energy, and construction backgrounds emerged and took over the media.
The media has thus become a playground between the authorities and businesses. The JDP came to power in 2002 after the 2001 economic crisis and took a different turn in media relations. Erdogan, a victim of poetic readings and briefly imprisoned in the 1990s, has not forgotten Hewlett’s most famous headline, “Meftal Bell Oramas” (Hansen, 2019). Therefore, he did not compromise with media owners and instead chose to create his own media in his inner circle. As a result, between 2002 and 2008, the Ciner and Uzan media groups were sold to large state owners, which led to the first transformation of media partnerships. (Often and Hawks, 2012, p. 3078) For example, the Tarkoz Group was founded in 2008 and had its own newspapers such as Sabah, Photomic, Daily Sabah and Takweem, as well as major TV channels such as ATV, A News, A Sport and A There are TV. It was owned for a short time. Europe (T24, 2018) Another big media group, Dogan Media, is the biggest media group.
In addition, in 2007, several journalists allegedly involved in a coup attempt against the government were arrested in a particularly significant case against President Erdogan. The proceedings marked the beginning of mass arrests of journalists and had a creeping effect on freedom of expression. For example, nine journalists and writers were arrested in 2011, which drew sharp criticism from the authorities. Human Rights Watch researcher Emma Sinclair Webb said itself had no credible reason for police to believe Ahmet Shek and Nedim Shenell were responsible for the cheating. He said the end of the year was a disturbing event. `This is a source of concern. What is being investigated is not a coup plan, but an important report” (HRW, 2011). Additionally, power outages and internet bans have become another issue that the AKP has used to suppress dissent since 2009.
Meanwhile, in 2010, the government submitted a number of constitutional amendments that allegedly rejected the junta’s legacy. As a result, 58% of voters supported the government’s proposal, and the AKP won the referendum. In his victory speech, Erdogan told his supporters that he wanted the country to move toward freedom and the rule of law, not the right of rulers. The coup is over (CNN, 2010). During the referendum campaign, the opposition criticized Erdogan for taking control of the judiciary, but Erdogan refused to give the opposition “a military coup” and hoped to remove it. (The Economist, 2010). In short, changes in the economic and political structure that began in the early 1980s led to changes in relations with the media and the media. As a result, businessmen kidnapped several media outlets. Erdogan, a victim of elitist press coverage, has not been out of the headlines, so he has not engaged with the media owners. As a result, the new media chief, elected by his inner circle, owns a large amount of media and creates an atmosphere in which his authoritarian policies are justified. Moreover, during President Erdogan’s long term, the AKP was subject to suspicion and hostility from Turkey’s elite.
The Republic of Turkey was established after the Ottoman Empire. The aftermath of World War I saw Turkey sacrificing most of its state, in addition to the empire, the monarchy, the caliphate, and central Anatolia. This has caused immense trauma, fear and concern among the ruling class elite. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk dreamed of growing a republic from the ashes of the empire. Ataturk, defeated by European armies and some of his supporters, is convinced that the “re-creation” of the state and its “ideal citizen” in the form of European civilization laid the foundation for a modern secular republic. He is doing Some see him as a “new” Turkey, and perhaps the chosen “sultan” or even “caliph” of the Islamic world. Others rightly criticize populist and dictatorial tendencies (Akçay, 2018). But if one looks carefully Erdogan’s political ideology is primarily about change. It guarantees its political survival at all costs, even if these expenditures damage the country’s institutional structure and deepen the deep disintegration of multi-ethnic and religious societies (Genc, 2019).
Evaluation
Currently, Turkey is involved in a conflict between President Erdoganists and anti- Erdoganists. There is little room for people to get up and talk about politics in this situation. The recent collapse of democracy in Turkey is largely due to the ACP-led government’s inclination towards the far-right rather than populism, but this study shows that behind the populist policies lies changes in the ideology of the Erdogan government and shows the proof of the dangers of the principle.
At a young age, Erdogan met politics through Islamic nationalism. Anti-Western and anti-Semitic parties were banned in 1971 for violating the secular values enshrined in Turkey’s constitution, Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party succeeded the National Order party, Necmettin Erbakan’s former party. When analyzing ShapeShifter, Islamism, President Erdogan, one has to start with Erdogan’s childhood to understand his politics and personality. Erdogan’s former political parties helped him identify with Muslim populism and helped him understand his value in Turkish society.
For years, the Kemalists only suppressed several Sunni Islamist parties as part of their secular agenda and escalated their discontent. Linking populism to God with this ideology (in this case, Islam) is an excellent opportunity. Therefore, Erdogan did not shy away from using public sentiment and sentiment toward religious persecution to gain his prominence. At the same time, there were signs of religiously motivated behaviour during that period. First, it imposes symbolic restrictions on the consumption and sale of alcohol (Ozbilgin, 2013). The move was disguised as “public safety” and appealed to both religious voters and interested citizens. He also rebelled by not asking his wife to expose her head, instead of taking the matter to officials and government officials. Erdogan was a party politician after he was arrested. People looked at him with the utmost sympathy and enthusiasm. His humble beginnings increased his credibility as a “people” leader. In addition, his reformist stance and promising development made him during his tenure as Mayor of Istanbul. It has a membership base in most communities. especially in the conservative part of the Anatolia region. President Erdogan needed broad electoral support and reassurance from Turkey’s European allies to maintain his “democratic” image in a country where Kemalist forces were still in power. Thus, his first and second terms focused on transforming Turkey into a “true democracy”.
Rebellious Erdogan with Moderate Views
Erdogan allied with disgruntled conservatives, survived the secular army and judiciary, and attracted large numbers of non-Sunni Muslims, non-Muslims and non-Turks, Erdogan said. I changed the brand Weakened my gaze, especially in the West, to attract voters to national elections (Yilmaz, 2009). This is the first example of its practical and popular transformation. However, the government refuses to recognize the genocide. At the deliberative forum, President Erdogan said: “It is unacceptable for Turkey that the diaspora of some countries promotes a resolution in the parliament of another country because it is an extrajudicial execution (Council of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Populists often use the media and pulpits for political intimidation to become public institutions and connect with the people. This makes them more human and friendly. During the ongoing nationwide protests, Erdogan appeared to “pass out” in his car, causing a deadly storm and an enormous effort to save lives. This episode completes Erdogan’s story as a ‘fake man’ who was betrayed despite what he did for the people and the country (Destradi, and Plagemann, 2019, p. 711; Cenk, 2019; Dincsahin, 2012). Another failed attempt to shut down the AKP in 2008 resulted in the loss of party funding. Nevertheless, President Erdogan’s relatively uneventful first term in office has impressed voters. In 2007, he linked the party’s victory to Turkey’s democratic and secular values. The country was tested in elections. The Republic of Turkey is a democratic and secular welfare state dominated by the rule of law, and in this process, Turkey passed a major democratic test this year and became stronger before Endorgan explained (Diplomatic Council, 2007).
Erdogan’s populist aspect has been strengthened by the recent renaissance of Islamic idealism following protests in Gizi Park in 2013. It includes powerful anti-Western rhetoric full of conspiracy theories, and instead of pursuing democracy-enhancing reforms for EU membership, it follows a populist agenda with the West. He began to reconsider Turkey’s relations with the West as a mediator of civilized rivalries and hostilities. Erdogan is a Muslim. But it is different from other Islamists. He developed a model of Muslim populism for dealing with grievances. Grudge Hope of Turkey’s Conservative Sunni Mass Became prey for western peasants, the ‘evil’ Kemalist aristocrats. In this story, he constructs himself as the only true representative of the people.
Since populists are usually political, economic, cultural and medical vehicles presented as equal entities, they typically represent the “elite” and retain the profits and interests of many groups. Other groups of interests and benefits – large companies, foreign or immigration – people. Interests Populist parties and social movements have garnered rave reviews from charismatic or dominant figures who are considered “the human voice”. Following the same approach, populism is often confused with other ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism and socialism. So the populist is found in different places along the left and right political spectrum and has both finger populism and right-wing laboratory purism. On July 15, 2016, e-CututSch-D-Roll was launched in Turkey, taking action against the government and government organizations, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The attack was carried out by a group of Turkish armed forces organized on behalf of the Peace Council.
Conclusion
In short, Erdogan is not a populist, but even worse as was the case with Erdogan. Populist discourse can get to where social differences merge into a single political identity. The origin of this depends very much on the names of political leaders. President Erdogan has taken a spiral-political path from persecuted Muslim Democrats to authoritarian Muslim populists. With “the people” on his side, President Erdogan has changed the structure of Turkish society. Turkey has evolved from a repressive Kemalist state to an aggressive, dictatorial and vengeful Islamic state. Each opposition was assured as an ‘enemy’, state institutions spread Erdogan’s populist story, and democratic controls and balances were successfully dismantled. The Guardian reported that Erdogan is the only real manager of “very famous”. Depending on the extent of the discourse, he had an artificial idea; all relevant populist leaders were given average popularity ratings. The speech ratings were 02 scales in populist networks during 2007-to 2014. The Aldagan people can summarize ‘Erdognist’ or ‘Erdognism’ (Yilmaz and Bashirov, 2018) and support new national identities based on this. Islam, Islamic nationalism, subjectivism, derivatives, personality, individual worship, nostalgia, Islamic mythology, jihadism, martyr, Islamist, civilization, father swap, father swap, support theory help in lottery and anti-cycle justify his position” (Yilmaz, 2021). Erdogan has created all the tools to create a populist Islamic political scene from which he can rise. Erdogan’s meddling in the media and education means Turkish youth know his story as a populist Turkey President.
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