Introduction
Since the impeachment in 2016 of former President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil has been in the midst of a political crisis that has been exacerbated by the failure of its government representatives, particularly President Jair Bolsonaro, to deal effectively with the Covid-19 pandemic (Daly, 2019, p. 2). Populism is at the heart of Brazil’s political dilemma, harming the country’s democracy (Teodoro, 2021). The many political identities’ battles for power have played a significant role. Brazil will not be able to free itself from its current predicament. After more than 500 years of being a country, Brazil is still searching for its identity both inside and outside of its borders (Teodoro, 2021). Democracy, populism, and political identity play an important role in the current constitutional period, which was installed following the Brazilian military regime (1964-1984). Brazil’s political deterioration is the subject of this study, which goes into great detail.
The states, which are autonomous subnational entities with their own administrations, make up the Federative Republic of Brazil. For political and administrative reasons, Brazil is currently divided into 27 federal entities, 26 states, and one federal district. A governor elected by the people serves a four-year term in office (Teodoro, 2021). The judiciary’s first and second courts of appeal are dedicated to ensuring that the public is treated fairly. With just one delegate in each state, each legislature is a unicameral legislature (Borges, 2021, p. 170). There are two provisions for direct democracy in Article 14 of the Constitution of Brazil. Executive branch operations are scrutinized by legislative authorities in the states and municipalities. The smallest federal entities of Brazil’s Federative Republic are known as municipalities (Teodoro, 2021). Each municipality’s mayor and legislative body members are chosen by the citizens and serve four-year terms. There are several parties to pick from in Brazil, which provides a wide range of options for political participation. It is common for members of Congress to switch parties, which weakens the parties’ electoral coalitions (Borges, 2021, p. 175). A coalition of diverse political parties, many of which are ideologically dissimilar, must be formed by the Executive in order to push legislation through Congress. The sheer number of political groups makes this an uphill battle.
Part 1: Background of Democracy Erosion in Brazil.
Brazilian indigenous people’s history is linked. During this time, Europeans began arriving from the continent. Brazil was a Portuguese colony from the 16th through the 19th century. Despite its status as a Spanish colony, the region south of the Tordesillas Line, including its coastal and inland rivers about the 46th meridian west (Medeiros, 2019). The country’s boundaries were not set until the early 1900s. Brazil’s independence from Portugal led to the creation of the Empire of Brazil in 1822. After a military coup in 1889, the country became the First Brazilian Republic. During the Vargas Era (1937–45), Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship.
Brazil’s political crisis, which began with the impeachment of former President Dilma in 2016, has been aggravated by the public health system’s inability to respond to the Covid-19 outbreak. Democracy in Brazil is under threat because of the current political turmoil fuelled by populism (Borges, 2021, p. 178). There was a slew of political power struggles at play (Medeiros, 2019). This will be too much for Brazil to bear, and it will not be able to recover from it. Constitutional reforms implemented during the military dictatorship are crucial to democracy’s relationship with populism and its formation of political identity (1964-1984). Bolsonaro’s tremendous popularity in Brazil today has sparked a rift in the country’s politics. Bolsonaro became a household name and won the presidential contest in 2017, but before that, the country was divided. The year 2013 marked a turning point (Medeiros, 2019). For the past ten years, Brazil has been a democratically stable country. From 1995 until 2002, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff led the PSDB and the Workers’ Party (PT), respectively.
Since the 1980s, the number of protests in 2013 was the largest. A rebellion against the ruling PT and other political figures, as well as the poor quality of social services and widespread corruption, swiftly swept throughout the country (Medeiros, 2019). After the PT’s electoral victory in 2014, the purposeful dissemination of false information and attacks made it impossible to restore normalcy (Borges, 2021, p. 187). No legislation was passed during Rousseff’s second term because Congress was unable to focus on the controversial PT argument. Amidst an economic downturn and reports of massive wrongdoing by Petrobras and Odebrecht, Rousseff was impeached in 2016. The process of impeachment revealed the gulf between pro-and anti-establishment factions (Medeiros, 2019). While many Brazilians remain skeptical about the potential of political leaders to change the system, Rousseff’s short second term and the choice of her unpopular vice president, Michel Temer, have reaffirmed their distrust. Brazilian Socialist Party candidate Fernando Haddad, a career right-wing politician with only modest electoral success, was easily defeated by Bolsonaro.
Brazil’s toxic polarization is caused by a variety of factors. Since 2014, opposition groups have sought to destabilize the government rather than communicate with it on a friendly note. The PT ignored repeated instances of improper behavior, which resulted in a political climate that precluded moderates from participation (Medeiros, 2019). The conflict between parties and refusal to allow another left-leaning group to run for president contributed to a toxic environment. In the first round of voting, Ciro Gomes, a center-left politician with similar goals to the PT, voted against it. Not many political leaders are pushing for an alliance to defeat the far-right challenger. With populism, Bolsonaro has governed the country. The anti-authoritarian sentiment is on the rise, according to many who oppose him (Medeiros, 2019). In order to combat Lula’s alleged socialist threat, the Brazilian administration has actively built a “PT versus anti-PT” dichotomy.
In an attempt to divert attention from his country’s looming Ebola outbreak in early 2020, the president questioned societal segregation and the medical system. The “Ostrich Alliance” includes the leaders of Belarus, Nicaragua, and Turkmenistan. His attitude was more radical than Trump’s strategy of denial and avoidance (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). They were fired for rejecting hydroxychloroquine, which he advocated for COVID-19 and said he had taken after contracting the virus. With his unusual answer to the national emergency, Bolsonaro solidified his polarizing views on social issues. According to Bolsonaro, governors, and mayors had enacted secession laws (Borges, 2021, p. 190). By temporarily shifting to their vacation homes and working from there, the wealthy can adapt to limits, says Bolsonaro (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). In the end, his supporters were enraged by his savage attacks on well-established politicians, the media, public health experts, and China. Bolsonaro supporters were angered even further by official conspiracies, such as the claim made by the foreign minister that the virus was part of an internationalist drive to construct communism. Moderate politicians have a harder time coming together as a result.
When Brazil’s coronavirus death toll topped 180,000 in December, only 8% of those polled blamed Bolsonaro for the crisis. Surprisingly, 52% of those surveyed said the president had no influence. Late last year, the economic crisis brought on by the virus boosted Bolsonaro’s popularity. As a result, there has never been a more diversified population in Brazil (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). The Supreme Court of Brazil was ready to be shut down by Bolsonaro months before the start of the revolution. His critics were incensed by Bolsonaro’s denial of calling COVID-19 “the sniffles.” Another example is the president’s deliberate aim to push the boundaries of what is acceptable in the political arena and incite acrimony (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). Those with authoritarian tendencies are forthright about their deceptions. There is a choice for them whether or not to join the movement. Respect for a leader, despite their obvious mistakes. According to officials, Bolsonaro plans to pursue an appeal if he loses the 2022 elections. Generally speaking, people’s reactions were muted.
Both the left and right populisms coexist in Brazil. They do not have a history of democracy. Attempts to undermine the Republic’s longest democratic era in 33 years have been undertaken numerous times (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). His anti-democratic views came to light during the Covid-19 outbreak when he publicly defended his actions and blamed democratic institutions like the Supreme Court and Congress for their role in the outbreak. Trump stokes the flames of opposition. Brazilians are up in arms because he has renounced his complete understanding of public machinery concerns. Despite his unfulfilled desire for Trump, he has a strong emotional bond with the president-elect. With them, there is never a minute of boredom. The Society of the Spectacle, founded by Guy Debord, is interested in politics (Mont’Alverne et al., 2022). He sees this as a chance to show just how “needy” Brazil is of someone like him. It is his own fault for not having the necessary skills. Before he was fired for insubordination after 24 years as a federal deputy, he worked as a federal deputy. Self-control and constraint are lacking in Bolsonaro. Following him, many Brazilians reject public institutions and disregard private persons.
In order to connect with his supporters, Bolsonaro uses social media. His PR is not working for him. In a live broadcast every Thursday at noon, he trains his supporters and slams the media. Protests against neoliberalism and corruption helped him win in 2018. So far, none of these plans have materialized. In order to do so, he cultivates relationships with other corrupt politicians (Lee, 2021, p. 304). The Bolsonaro government was abysmal during Covid-19. Bolsonaro refuses to take effective anti-viral measures despite the fact that the Covid-19 virus has killed over 310 thousand people. Bolsonaro’s populism is anti-corruption and moralistic. The Brazilian government has also liberalized the sale of civilian weapons and abolished popular government bodies in order to support its ideology (Lee, 2021, p. 309). Anti-minority identification has been on the rise in Brazil since the communist parties came to power 16 years ago. An anti-minority conservative counter-movement that considers both race and gender.
In light of Brazil’s apparent democratic decline, a change in the country’s executive branch is not entirely out of the question. President Bolsonaro has authorized the use of military force to monitor Brazilian citizens and the nation’s streets. When a dictatorship begins to take hold, the populace may be deceived by a leader (Lee, 2021, p. 305). While it may appear to President Bolsonaro that increasing the military and police force is the right thing to do, the strategy actually serves to limit and control Brazilian individuals’ rights. Since the restoration of democracy, Bolsonaro has worked around rather than through Congress. Suing Congress and the courts for anything he does not like is part of this strategy (Lee, 2021, p. 308). Politics has given him an air of totalitarianism. In addition, the president’s actions are in line with his words. Among other things, Bolsonaro has outlawed and attacked the Brazilian press, for example. As current democratic norms and limits weaken, his people are effectively in his hands.
Bolsonaro now has a greater chance of gaining power because of the eruption of violence in the country’s democratic institutions. If the pandemic’s economic devastation worsens Brazil’s inequalities, it will be even more difficult to overcome the epidemic. As a result of the commodity boom, millions of Brazilians will be back in poverty by 2020 (Lee, 2021, p. 306). Those who fled poverty during the commodity boom of the 2000s may be targeted by opponents of radical and populist remedies. Democracy advocates from all sides of the political spectrum should join forces to fight President Bolsonaro’s policies.
Part 2: Attributes of Democratic Erosion in Brazil.
Democratic backsliding is derived from six theory families: (1) political leaders, (2) political culture, (3) political institutions, (4) political economy, (5) social structure and political coalitions, and (6) international factors. How has Bolsonaro led to political erosion in Brazil
Looking into a few examples of agentic theories in action, starting with political leadership. In order to explain political outcomes, these theories rely on a feature of political leadership that is independent of external factors (Lee, 2021, p. 304). Other political leaders’ strategies and behavior are the only factors that limit the actions of political leaders. In the backdrop of the deterioration of democracy in Brazil since President Bolsonaro’s unilateral actions, this is relevant.
The political culture theory is the second. In three aspects, political culture theories are structural theories. Political outcomes can be directly or indirectly influenced by cultural preferences over political practices (Lee, 2021, p. 304). As evidenced by President Bolsonaro and his predecessor, the culture of presidents turning dictatorial after gaining power explains a great deal about Brazil’s democratic decline. Political leaders have little influence on cultural shifts because they occur at their own pace.
Thirdly, there are political institutions. Political theorists have long believed that different forms of political institutions impose different constraints on people and produce different outcomes. Different democratic institutions might have an impact on vertical accountability and representativeness (Lee, 2021, p. 307). They may even persuade members of the government to become more autocratic, destabilizing democracy from within. Bolsonaro is an authoritarian president because he can employ disproportionate force by military officers in his administration to punish non-conforming behavior. In Brazil’s political arena, there is an imbalance in power distribution, making it difficult for stable institutions to produce predictable political behavior.
Fourth, degradation is explained by political economy. The study of the reciprocal link between the organization and exercise of power on the one hand, and the production and trade of goods and services on the other, is known as the political economy (Lee, 2021, p. 303). As shown in Brazil, government structures and actions can have a wide range of effects on economic structure and activity, ranging from establishing courts that allow for private property and enforceable contracts to setting tax rates that affect savings and spending rates. Economic variables, ranging from income levels to changes in short-term economic performance, can influence government structure through a variety of routes, as illustrated by Brazil’s rising inflation rate.
Another theory explaining Brazil’s democratic decline is based on socioeconomic structure and political coalitions. Group formation and possibilities for conflict among citizens are examined by this family. Brazil is deeply divided along racial, ethnic, and economic lines. There are also religious, linguistic, ethnic, or other descent-based roots of identity and conflict (Lee, 2021, p. 310). In Brazil, coalition formation has had a significant impact on the country’s political processes and structures. Direct negotiation of crucial political issues may be possible during coalition building. For example, a government’s ability to withstand or avoid a crisis may be affected by the breadth and composition of the winning political alliance.
According to V Dem, the leader’s personality and rational-legal legitimacy are depicted in a graph from 1960 to 2019. The military dictatorship, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, opposed any claims of legitimacy from individuals (Lee, 2021, p. 303). Following Brazil’s democratic transition, these two avenues of legitimacy were divided. His approval rating stood at 87% at the end of Lula’s administration, although his chief of staff had a much lower rating than that. The Lula government, on the other hand, did nothing to aggressively undermine rational-legal institutions. There are hints that Bolsonaro is going to stretch the boundaries of his authority.
Part 3: Theories and Hypotheses of Democratization
Hypothesis: Presidents who want to consolidate their authority without being limited by established institutions or rival power centers begin to regress.
Summary: According to the Fish version of this argument, post-communist leaders are always seeking more authority for themselves (Harig, 2021). Presidents have a unique opportunity to use “super-presidential,” which puts all of the president’s power under his or her control and can be easily exploited (Hirst, 2018, p. 219). The term “backsliding” is used to describe the process of regressing for countries that have had a Freedom House score of 5 or lower since the early 1990s but have recently obtained a score that is higher than their best prior year’s score (Harig, 2021). Even though it appears to be an implicit assumption in African politics, Van de Walle’s version of this hypothesis does not explicitly claim that presidents always strive to appoint greater authority to themselves. In Brazil, the presidential rules the political scene, and the political elite is built on personal ties to the president. That is why it is so simple for presidents to pass laws suppressing criticism and ensuring their authority.
Relevance to backsliding: A direct connection can be shown between the Fish hypothesis and backsliding. According to this theory, many democracies are noncompetitive and illiberal; in light of the current state of Brazil’s democracy, the hypothesis is immediately applicable.
Lessons for intervention: To counteract this inclination for monopolizing power, the hypothesis suggests that presidents should be given incentives. It is possible to think of this idea in terms of the necessity of rebalancing power in order to allow other political forces to counteract the presidents.
Evaluation: Using traditional social-science methodologies, this idea marks a significant step forward in the study of agency Statistics are used to indicate rather than emphasize elite independence from structural issues. However, there are still some issues (Hirst, 2018, p. 214). The first assumption is that leaders constantly seek to consolidate their power and reduce their limitations.
Variables involved in V Dem analysis of hypothesis on democracy are civic and academic space, civil liberty, direct democracy, demography, deliberation, elections, Executive, legitimation, judiciary, legislature, media, political equality, political parties, etc.
Part 4: The future democratic trajectory of Brazil.
New laws and regulations limiting Bolsonaro’s authority can help enhance Brazil’s democratic system. A robust system of checks and balances is critical in a democracy because it allows for the early detection of authoritarian tendencies (Harig, 2021). When it comes to determining whether or not something is ethically acceptable, the courts in the United States are impartial. As a distinct and unrelated body, the court is meant to serve only the interests of the people and country. To keep the country’s administration in check and ultimately move it in the right direction, Brazil’s judiciary has to be strengthened. Despite Bolsonaro’s conduct, it is important to recall that Brazil’s democratic system was severely damaged by the anti-government rallies of 2013 and their immediate aftermath (Harig, 2021). In the event that new political forces succeed in marginalizing both Bolsonaro and the PT, the toxic divisions that have plagued Brazil’s politics will remain.
The ideal strategy may be for people to avoid and moderate polarization rather than attempting to reverse it. Key democratic institutions and procedures in Brazil can be protected by international organizations such as OECD (Organization for Economic Development), OAS (Organisation of American States), WHO (World Health Organization), and WTO (World Trade Organization) (Harig, 2021). To their electoral detriment, populists generally attack or neglect these institutions. These positive traits give democratically-minded political actors a sense of how to behave even when populists break the ideas and pledges that such groups involve.
There must be an effort to restore order, tranquility, and restraint among members of the legal system in order to attain this goal. In order to carry out their part of the task of maintaining democratic order and democratic cohabitation, courts must be allowed to function independently under the rule of law (Harig, 2021). Their independence must be protected against corporate or sectorial political interests, no matter how powerful, in order for this to happen. The theory may be simple to articulate, but putting it into practice is another story (Hirst, 2018, p. 209). At this point, two different organizations are in charge of overseeing its enforcement. As the ultimate guarantor of the legal order, the STF (Federal Supreme Court) must step in to stop the emergence of legal anarchy.
Brazil’s institutions and the streets must now work together to protect the country’s democracy (more difficult in conditions of pandemic crisis). In these times of authoritarian drive and anti-democratic emergency, institutions will be given due priority because policy-making does not take place in the streets. Provocateurs will enter popular organizations and movements, as well as nonviolent demonstrations (Rich, 2019). This form of provocation is currently being utilized in numerous situations to criminalize social dissent, deepen official repression, and declare states of emergency, albeit under a facade of democratic normalcy. This constant watchfulness is required.
As far as election is concerned, Brazilians will have an opportunity to change the course of their country’s democracy by voting in the proper leaders among the current president and Lulu. President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil is polling at a record low, with 60 percent of the people saying he is doing a horrible job as the election date approaches (Rich, 2019). According to experts, Brazil’s poor economic performance has aided Luis Lula da Silva’s surprise comeback. The country’s current leader, Jair Bolsonaro, has made it clear that he supports a return to military rule. He has utilized national security legislation to pursue dissidents and issued a number of contentious presidential decrees. Many of these actions have been deemed illegal by the Supreme Court (Hirst, 2018, p. 205). At 12.6%, the unemployment rate is as tenacious as ever. A quarter of the reais’ value against the dollar has been eroded by inflation since the beginning of 2020. In contrast to Bolsonaro’s upheaval, Lula has presented nothing in the way of a programmatic agenda (Rich, 2019), choosing instead to present himself as a pillar of stability and moderation. To win over right-wing moderates, Lula’s campaign has expressed an interest in selecting a running partner from the center-right. A failure to win would put him in a position where he may call on his followers to reject the outcome.
A referendum is required in Brazil in order to help the country’s democratic space be strengthened. The judiciary needs to be strengthened to help in cultivating its independence. The referendum should also cover crucial components, including encouraging the independence of political institutions (Hirst, 2018, p. 200). Also, the military and police force should be insulated from the influence of the executive authority. International meetings play essential roles in the democratic space of the nation, and Brazil should be part of the greater international community such as WHO. This will assist in keeping the country safe in the eyes of the international community.
Conclusion
For stable institutions in Brazil, political behavior cannot be predicted because of an imbalance in power distribution. This chart from 1960 to 2019 shows the leaders’ personality and rational-legal legitimacy according to V Dem. Individuals’ claims of legitimacy were rebuffed by the military government that reigned from 1964 to 1985. Instead of seeking to undo polarization, it may be preferable for people to avoid or manage it. Brazil’s democratic system will benefit from new rules and regulations that limit Bolsonaro’s power. International organizations can safeguard Brazil’s democratic institutions and procedures. The country’s institutions and citizens alike must now band together to save democracy in Brazil. Popular organizations and movements will be targeted by provocateurs, as will nonviolent protests. STF (Federal Supreme Court) must intervene as the ultimate guardian of the legal order. In Brazil, a referendum is needed to strengthen the country’s democratic environment.
References
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