Introduction
Between October 29, 2018, and March 10, 2019, two Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft crashed within minutes after takeoff, killing a combined 338 passengers and crew onboard. Both aircraft had crashed after experiencing the same technical malfunction with relatively new flight-control software. For Boeing, whose brand name is synonymous with aircraft, this software malfunction held the potential to damage its reputation as a leading aircraft manufacturer severely. However, it was not the product flaw that affected Boeing’s reputation after the crashes. Instead, Boeing’s mishandling of its crisis response triggered the ensuing reputational fallout fueled by public outcry and reputation-damaging articles published in major newspapers.
As such, this paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of crisis communication theory and its application in the context of public relations and reputation management. To accomplish its stated purpose, this paper will conduct a qualitative content analysis of a finite number of newspaper articles and examine Boeing’s crisis communication response within the theoretical framework of situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). This paper will argue that Boeing could have mitigated the extensive damage done to its reputation if its crisis communication practitioners had adhered to and implemented SCCT guidelines in handling this crisis. To conclude, this paper will summarize lessons learned and recommend to crisis communication practitioners how to effect positive outcomes by applying SCCT’s guiding principles in the context of the Boeing crisis.
Preview.
The report goes into the critical issue involving Boeing’s 737 Max 8 aircraft, which witnessed two disastrous crashes in a short period, killing 338 people. This research examines Boeing’s crisis communication response during this period and its subsequent impact on its reputation. Using Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) as the theoretical framework, the research provides a deeper understanding of how crisis communication principles were applied and whether they fit academic literature recommendations.
The case study is divided into several significant portions. The article begins with a summary of the Boeing 737 Max 8 situation, emphasizing how it has the potential to tarnish Boeing’s reputation as a leading aircraft manufacturer. This section establishes the context for the case study by emphasizing the investigation’s primary goal, objectives, and significance.
The report then surveys and summarizes relevant scholarly literature, focusing on crisis communication theory, public relations, and reputation management. This part provides the theoretical framework for the research and emphasizes the role of crisis communication in preserving corporate reputation.
The paper discusses the chosen technique in the methodology section, which incorporates a qualitative content study of media coverage connected to the crisis within a specific timeframe. The methodology section explains why the media content was chosen and how data was analyzed.
The media evaluation, which evaluates how Boeing’s crisis communication evolved in the media, is at the heart of the case study. Boeing’s responses are classified and assessed using the SCCT framework to determine whether their strategies adhered to the theory’s standards. This section offers evidence from media reports and quotes to support the study.
The study explores the significance of the findings in the discussion and conclusion section, comparing and contrasting Boeing’s crisis response with the academic literature on crisis communication and reputation management. Practical lessons learned, and ideas for crisis communication practitioners to improve their reactions in similar situations are provided. The conclusion summarizes the case study’s essential insights and highlights its contribution to understanding crisis communication in reputation management.
Throughout this case study, the paper aims to provide insights into how firms can effectively handle crises by adopting suitable crisis communication techniques, thereby maintaining their reputation and limiting reputational damage. The analysis of Boeing’s crisis response serves as a practical example of how crisis communication theory may be applied in real-world circumstances, and it provides valuable insights for academics and practitioners in the area.
Literature Review
This literary review examines extant research on Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) to understand further the framework and its value to Public Relations (PR) and crisis communication practitioners. This goal will be accomplished by first defining what a crisis is, then showing the connection between crisis communication and Public Relations, and finally providing an in-depth examination of SCCT from the originator’s perspective and through the lens of other scholars in this field.
What Constitutes a Crisis?
Defining “crisis” is essential to differentiate between crisis and non-crisis situations. W.T. Coombs, the originator of SCCT, defines a crisis as “a sudden and unexpected event that threatens to disrupt an organization’s operations and poses both a financial and reputational threat” (Coombs, 2007, p. 162). Other scholars, such as Wilcox and Cameron (2006), describe a crisis as an event hurting “the integrity of the product, the reputation or financial stability of the organization or the public at large” (Wilcox & Cameron, 2006. p. 258). In the case of Boeing’s 737 Max 8 crisis in 2019, all the characteristics above were present.
Crisis Communication and Public Relations Synergy
Crisis communication is the communication between an organization and its public that conveys “what the company is doing to support and protect all those involved and to give them a clear understanding of the issues” (Ozanne et al., 2020, p. 382). Scholars agree that how an organization responds to victims is crucial to the success of its communication efforts and the ability to protect its reputation in a crisis (Ozanne et al., 2020). Benoit (1997) posits that “how stakeholders interpret a crisis has ramifications for a reputational threat” (Benoit, 1997. p. 180), while Coombs (2010) postulates that “crises have long been viewed as threats to reputations” (Coombs, 2010. p. 478). Thus, crisis communication has two primary functions: (1) managing information, which is the collection and dissemination of knowledge, and (2) managing meaning, which is “accomplished through efforts to shape how people perceive the crisis” (Coombs, 2010, p. 479). In this regard, public relations is an appropriate tool that can significantly limit or even eliminate reputational damage (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Lyon & Cameron, 2004). Therefore, public relations practitioners and crisis communicators are responsible for synergistically managing an organization’s reputation during a crisis (Kaplan et al., 2019).
Given what we learn from these scholars, analyzing Boeing’s response to the Max 8 crisis should reveal attempts to communicate clearly with stakeholders about what caused the software malfunction and what efforts the company initiated to correct the problem and prevent further loss of life. This way, Boeing would be intentionally managing the information its public receives and managing and shaping meaning regarding its attitude towards the crisis.
Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is an evidence-based framework that “projects how people will react to the crisis response strategies used to manage a crisis,” and it guides practitioners on “how to maximize the reputational protection afforded by post-crisis communication” (Coombs, 2007, p.1). Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) has been backed by empirical research highlighting its relevance in crisis management, its foundation in Attribution Theory, and the prediction of stakeholders’ emotional reactions (Johnsson et al., 2019). For example, Reynolds &Seeger (2005) have emphasized the importance of crisis communication in addressing stakeholder perceptions and emotional responses, which aligns with SCCT’s emphasis on managing meaning during a crisis (Reynolds &Seeger, 2005). Furthermore, Sisco’s (2012) research on applying SCCT to nonprofit organizations demonstrates how organizations can effectively modify their crisis response methods based on perceived levels of culpability (Sisco, 2012). SCCT posits that while organizations should proactively prepare for crises, the variables of each crisis should inform the response strategy that practitioners implement. Furthermore, organizations should align their strategy with anticipated stakeholder attributions of cause and the level of reputational threat posed by the crisis (Goldstein et al., 2019).
Unsurprisingly, SCCT has its roots in Attribution Theory, which posits that “people search for the causes of events, especially those that are negative and unexpected.” Through this process, stakeholders experience an emotional reaction to an event and attribute responsibility for it (Coombs, 2007, p. 164). If an organization expects to be deemed responsible for an event that might trigger intense anger from stakeholders, this emotional response must be factored into the crisis response strategy. As a result, stakeholders experience emotional reactions and assign blame for the crisis based on their perceptions. This is consistent with Lyon and Cameron’s (2004) relational approach, which highlights the interaction between an organization’s prior reputation and its immediate response to a crisis, highlighting the significance of stakeholders’ attributions in influencing crisis outcomes (Lyon & Cameron, 2004).
Furthermore, Coombs (2010) suggests that “the greater the stakeholder attributions of organizational responsibility for the crisis, the greater the threat posed by the crisis” (Coombs, 2010. p. 483). These guidelines set the expectation that Boeing’s crisis response should demonstrate an anticipation of stakeholders’ anger and intense emotional response to the 338 deaths. This is consistent with the findings of Reynolds and Seeger (2005), who advocate for crisis and emergency risk communication as an integrated paradigm, highlighting the importance of stakeholder perceptions in crisis management (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). That is, the response should address stakeholders’ emotional needs and assuage intense anger given the significant loss of life in this crisis and the fact that both Boeing Max 8 aircraft crashed after experiencing the same software malfunction.
Evaluating Crisis Situations Using SCCT
SCCT suggests that crises should be first evaluated to ascertain the degree of responsibility stakeholders might attribute to an organization for causing the crisis. Since crises vary in strength of attribution, practitioners should choose a response strategy that matches the level of responsibility attributed or anticipated. The severity of a crisis and the level of responsibility assigned to an organization influence the correct response (Lyon & Cameron, 2004). Conducting this analysis also helps determine the level of reputational threat posed based on the severity of the damage caused and devise a response that mitigates reputational fallout (Coombs, 2010). To achieve this goal, practitioners must also establish the appropriate “crisis type” to ascertain how a crisis should be framed and what “cues” will be presented to stakeholders to shape or influence perception (Coombs, 2007). As Lyon and Cameron (2004) note, understanding the connection between an organization’s historical reputation and immediate response is critical in crisis appraisal (Lyon & Cameron, 2004). This emphasizes the need to examine the crisis itself and the context in which it happens. That is, cues should speak to “whether or not some external agent or force caused the crisis,” whether it was accidental or negligence involved (Coombs, 2007, p. 166).
Therefore, when formulating a crisis response, SCCT proposes three clusters or categories within which organizations can frame a crisis based on the degree of attribution of responsibility: victim, accidental, and preventable (Newkirk et al., 2019). The victim cluster produces minimal attributions of responsibility and is appropriate for crises resulting from natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. Furthermore, Ozanne, Ballantine, and Mitchell’s (2020) research dig into crisis communication strategies and efficacy, illumining how companies might traverse the hurdles of different crises (Ozanne et al., 2020). The accidental cluster produces low attributions and is appropriate for crises resulting from unintentional or uncontrollable events on the organization’s part. For example, a company’s customer database with sensitive information is being hacked by malware despite the company having robust security precautions. The preventable cluster produces the strongest attributions of responsibility and is best for preventable crises that place stakeholders at risk of harm or that cause harm.
Given what we learn from these studies, an analysis of Boeing’s crisis communication
The response should reveal an expectation of solid attributions of crisis responsibility, given that their product caused the loss of hundreds of lives. Evidence could have surfaced that Boeing had prior knowledge of the software problem but chose to withhold this information.
Strategizing a Crisis Response Using SCCT
Crisis communication scholars agree that the primary goal of an organization’s crisis response is to protect, repair, and restore organizational reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Wilcox & Cameron, 2006; Bell, 2010). To achieve this goal, SCCT provides three primary crisis response strategies: denial, diminish, and rebuild, and suggests that practitioners should utilize these “with the requisite level of accepting crisis responsibility” (Coombs, 2007, p. 172). Using Lyon and Cameron’s (2004) relational approach, it is clear that an organization’s prior reputation and quick response substantially impact the effectiveness of various crisis response tactics (Lyon & Cameron, 2004). Boeing’s initial defensive response, as recounted by MacMillan and Gregg (2019), followed by a more humble attitude, shows the changing nature of crisis communication tactics (MacMillan & Gregg, 2019). This emphasizes the significance of adaptation and strategy alignment in a dynamic crisis. Denial strategies attempt to negate the connection between an organization and a crisis, and with this strategy, practitioners intend to spare the organization reputational harm. For example, a company’s crisis response might include discrediting claims against it while presenting itself as a victim. Diminish strategies aim to deflect focus from the organization and mitigate attributions of responsibility for a crisis. Given the gravity of the Boeing 737 Max disaster and the possibility for significant attributions of blame Provan & Samson, (2019), the study should point to implementing a rebuild strategy (Provan & Samson, 2019). For example, an organization might suggest that some aspects of a crisis event were accidental or outside its control. Rebuilding strategies are aimed at repairing and restoring an organization’s reputation and are appropriate for crises that present “severe reputational threats” or are deemed preventable (Coombs, 2007, p. 172). This response might include actions to offset the crisis, such as a full apology or compensation to victims of the event.
These studies indicate that Boeing should have anticipated a severe reputational threat from a preventable product failure resulting in life loss. Its crisis response should not include attempts to deny or diminish responsibility (Tangel et al., 2019). Instead, the analysis should show evidence of a rebuild strategy to mitigate reputational threats while repairing/restoring reputation.
Empirical Evidence on the Applicability of SCCT
Furthering this perspective, Sisco (2012) tested the effects of SCCT’s recommended response strategies through experimental means to determine whether stakeholders respond favorably towards organizations that implement them (Sisco, 2012). Three hundred five undergraduate students, with a mean age of 20.4 years, were allocated to one of three groups facing a given crisis scenario, with the appropriate level of crisis responsibility and two crisis response strategies matching the most appropriate and second most appropriate according to SCCT. Results of this study showed that stakeholders attribute the most crisis responsibility to organizations facing a crisis deemed preventable and the least to organizations deemed victims of a crisis (Sisco, 2012). These results reinforce Coombs’ (2007) premise that practitioners’ “understanding of how stakeholders will respond to a crisis informs the post-crisis communication” (Coombs, 2007. p.1). This study’s findings provide another example of the strategy that should be evident in Boeing’s crisis response and reinforce the rebuild crisis response strategy for preventable crises.
Methodology
Research suggests that during times of crisis, public perception is formed based on reactions to news media coverage (Combs & Holladay, 2009). As such, a qualitative content analysis methodology was adopted in this paper to examine articles from select newspapers after the second Max 8 crashed. The rationale is that this crisis peaked after the second crash when it became known that both aircraft had experienced the same software malfunction just before crashing. Articles for analysis were selected from Business Insider, Bloomberg, Financial Times, Forbes, Fortune, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal between March 11, 2020 and April 30, 2019.
These publications were selected because their audiences comprise Boeing’s primary stakeholders, such as shareholders, business travelers, and investors. Articles were analyzed within the framework of SCCT and categorized by theme (denial, diminish, and rebuild) and cluster (victim, accidental, and preventable). Volume of articles was the metric used to indicate which crisis type, cluster, and strategy Boeing’s response aligned with. This method was used to ascertain whether Boeing had adopted the deny and diminish strategies during the initial crisis response phase and then pivoted to a rebuild strategy in the latter part of its crisis response.
Media Review
Before researching the media coverage surrounding the Boeing 737 Max 8 disaster using Situational disaster Communication Theory (SCCT), the paper must first identify the period for the news stories. The paper will concentrate on news stories published in news media articles between January 11, 2019, and April 30, 2022. This period coincides with the peak of the Boeing 737 Max 8 crisis following the second crash, allowing us to examine Boeing’s crisis communication efforts during the crisis’s most crucial phase. Through an analysis of newspaper articles and within the parameters of SCCT, this media review seeks to (1) illuminate whether Boeing purposefully managed information and meaning for the Max 8 crisis, (2) determine which crisis cluster Boeing’s response aligns with, and (3) determine which SCCT response strategies Boeing implemented during the Max 8 crisis.
Analysis of Boeing’s information dissemination after the second Max 8 crash reveals a lack of purposeful efforts to manage information and meaning—an approach that contradicts SCCT’s guidelines. According to media reports, Boeing initially refused to comment on the second accident, and its then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg eventually apologized publicly via a pre-recorded video 26 days after the crash (Baker, 2019; Tangel et al., 2019). Moreover,
Business Insider reported, “Delayed apologies and confusing messages marked Boeing’s response to the crashes” (Baker, 2019). As such, instead of purposefully managing information and meaning, Boeing’s initial silence created an information vacuum that the media filled with narratives that shaped the public’s perception of this crisis and the meaning that they derived.
In addition, most of the media coverage analyzed points to Boeing aligning the crisis with the accidental cluster, which reflects a mismatch of the company’s degree of involvement in causing this crisis. Media coverage shows that Boeing initially implied the accidents resulted from pilot error. For example, The Washington Post reported Boeing’s CEO claiming, “There were actions—or actions not taken—that contributed to the outcome” (Macmillan & Gregg, 2019), which alludes to pilot error. An article by Business Insider reported that Muilenburg suggested the pilots in the second crash did not “completely” follow Boeing’s emergency procedures to shift the focus to pilot error (Baker, 2019).
As such, it is unsurprising that media analysis also revealed Boeing’s initial crisis response strategy aligned with SCCT’s diminish strategy, which aims to deflect and mitigate responsibility. This strategy is evidenced in Boeing’s initial responses after the second crash when the company maintained and reiterated that the Max 8 aircraft was safe. For instance, Boeing’s CEO said the company was working on software enhancements designed “to make an already safe aircraft even safer” (Newkirk, 2019). Reports from The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Bloomberg indicated Boeing’s vigorous defense of the aircraft’s safety features. For example, The Washington Post reported, “the manufacturer defended the plane’s safety features and publicly resisted calls to make changes to its system and pilot training procedures (MacMillan & Gregg, 2019). Moreover, even after a global grounding of the Max 8, The New York Times reported Boeing’s CEO saying, “We are supporting this proactive step out of an abundance of caution” (Kaplan et al., 2019). This statement implies that grounding the Max 8 was an unnecessary step, and some external agent caused the accidents; this message was also a cue to stakeholders and was perhaps intended to diminish the degree of attribution for the crisis to Boeing. However, media review analysis shows that while Boeing used the diminished strategy, stakeholder anger intensified, and public relations firms even spoke out on Boeing’s missteps in handling the crisis. For instance, Forbes interviewed the public relations firm 5WPR for their analysis and quoted its responses, which included, “Boeing is a case study of what not to do” in a crisis” (Goldstein, 2019).
Eventually, nearly three weeks after the second crash, Boeing appears to have pivoted to SCCT’s rebuild strategy. The company changed its tone from “arrogant and defensive,” resorted to more accommodating language, and attempted to take responsibility for its role in the crashes. At this point, Boeing began to fare better in this crisis. For example, Business Insider reported on Boeing, describing it as “humbled” by the crisis (MacMillan & Gregg, 2019). To augment this view, The Washington Post reported that Boeing began to successfully repair its reputation only when it “took a different tack—a tack they should have taken in the first place,” which is an accommodative approach while holding itself accountable (MacMillan & Gregg, 2019).
Discussion and Conclusion
Crisis response strategies involve intentional actions that crisis communicators devise and implement when a crisis presents to reduce the negative impact on the organization while affecting reputational repair and restoration. SCCT posits that an organization facing a crisis with high attribution of responsibility also faces a higher risk of reputational damage and should align its response strategy with the demands and context of the crisis. As such, in the Max 8 crisis, Boeing should have promptly managed information and meaning by addressing its stakeholders about its steps to rectify the problem and prevent further loss of life while demonstrating accountability in this crisis. To further manage the narrative, Boeing should have issued timely information on the software malfunction and explained its steps to rectify the problem and prevent further loss of life—instead of going on the defensive. Such an unequivocal approach might have positively managed meaning regarding Boeing’s ability to contain the situation, its concern for public safety, and its regard for passengers’ lives. However, as illustrated in the media review section of this paper, confusing messages and a dearth of information from Boeing negatively shaped the meaning that stakeholders derived.
Furthermore, Boeing’s initial crisis response strategy should have aligned with this crisis’ high attributions of responsibility, the severe level of threat posed to its reputation, and the fact that this crisis was preventable since Boeing knew about the software malfunction before the Max 8 model was released into the market. In addition, according to media reports, after the second crash, victims’ families staged public protests and displayed intense anger toward the company, and Boeing’s stock price plummeted. The Max 8 was being grounded worldwide — all indications that Boeing’s diminished crisis response strategy was misaligned with the nature of the crisis and was ineffective at alleviating reputational threat. Furthermore, these outcomes augment the premise that “how stakeholders interpret a crisis has ramifications for reputational threat (Benoit, 1997, p. 180). They also illustrate the extent of the negative impact of an organization failing to manage stakeholders’ perception of a crisis.
Furthermore, this paper’s findings demonstrate the practical value of the SCCT framework and its relevance and applicability in real-world crises. The Boeing case also validates Coombs’ (2010) premise that crises differ and require different treatment based on the degree of organization responsibility, extent of damage and harm caused, and stakeholders’ perception. As such, organizations might experience more positive outcomes from their public.
Relations and crisis response efforts if practitioners implement SCCT guidelines. As illustrated above, when Boeing pivoted to the appropriate rebuild strategy, the company was able to begin repairing its reputation and, as such, could have mitigated the extensive damage done to its reputation had it chosen the appropriate strategy from the outset. As such, practitioners may better serve their organizations by first evaluating a crisis based on the variables above and then devising and implementing a strategy that aligns with the demands of the crisis. Further, the media review analysis in this paper illustrates that organizations can do more harm to their reputation following a crisis if an inappropriate crisis response strategy is implemented. This examination of the Boeing Max 8 crisis reiterates SCCT’s premise that misalignment of crisis type with response strategy can result in a crisis within a crisis.
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