Introduction
Since the study of politics began, the argument over how to conceive and organise regimes into separate categories has been ongoing. Some authors, such as Przeworski et al., Gandhi, and Svolik, have used dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy in recent years. In contrast, others, such as Levitsky, Way, and Schedler, have argued for the inclusion of a third regime type, competitive authoritarianism, which they argue cannot be accurately captured by dichotomous definitions (Qin & He, 2022, pp 617). This essay will investigate the controversy surrounding this topic by analysing how Jennifer Gandhi and Milan Svolik might reply to those who suggest that competitive authoritarianism should be coded individually. The section will begin by quickly describing either side of the argument and how Gandhi and Svolik would classify competitive authoritarian regimes. The section will then examine arguments for and against the inclusion of competitive authoritarianism as a distinct regime type. The essay will conclude by analysing the merits and downsides of having additional categories for academics to classify regimes and explaining which side of the issue I agree with the most and why.
Dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy
Przeworski et al. (2000) conceptualise democracy in two dimensions: electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Electoral democracy is the selection of representatives through regular, fair, and competitive elections. In contrast, liberal democracy protects citizens’ civil and political rights, the rule of law, and checks and balances. Przeworski et al. (2000) believe that a democracy is only “minimally” successful if it consists simply of electoral democracy and that liberal democracy is necessary for its success.
Gandhi (2008) follows a similar approach, albeit with a greater emphasis on the “formal” and “informal” parts of democracy. Formal democracy is defined by Gandhi (2008) as “the norms, institutions, and procedures that organise and structure how political decisions are made in a given society.” Informal democracy, on the other hand, is defined as “the informal social factors, conventions, beliefs, and attitudes that impact the conduct of individuals, lawmakers, and institutions.” Gandhi (2008) contends that democracy can only be successful if both formal and informal factors are included.
Slovik (2012) adopts a different approach, concentrating on “democratic institutions” and “democratic culture” largely. Slovik (2012) defines democratic institutions as “the required legal, political, economic, and social structures for a democracy to function effectively.” In contrast, democratic culture is defined as “the attitudes and beliefs that citizens hold about democracy, including their adherence to democratic norms such as the rule of law and respect for human rights.” Slovik (2012) contends that both of these aspects are essential for the success of a democracy and that a democracy can only be deemed “strong” if both are present.
Overall, the authors above employ dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy to examine the nature of democracy and its benefits and drawbacks. Gandhi (2008) focuses on the distinction between formal and informal features of democracy, whereas Przeworski et al. (2000) emphasise the distinction between electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Slovik (2012) concludes with a discussion of the distinction between democratic institutions and democratic culture. All of these scholars contend that democracy can only be deemed “robust” or “minimally successful” if both elements of the dichotomy are examined (Knowles et al., 2003).
Levitsky and Way (2010) and Schedler (2002) thought on dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy.
Political scientists and political philosophers have persistently argued over the categorisation of regimes. Two distinguished researchers, Levitsky and Way (2010) and Schedler (2002), contend that not all regimes can be adequately categorised as dichotomous conceptions of democracy. The concept of “hybrid regimes,” according to Levitsky and Way (2010), is useful for comprehending the complexity of current political systems. Combining aspects of electoral democracy and authoritarianism, hybrid regimes are difficult to classify as either democratic or authoritarian.
Levitsky and Way (2010) contend that hybrid regimes are the product of a process known as “competitive authoritarianism,” in which opposition parties are permitted to compete in elections but have little capacity to affect the political system. This form of competitive authoritarianism has led to the establishment of a new type of state that is neither completely democratic nor completely authoritarian. These regimes, which they refer to as “electoral authoritarianism,” are characterised by democratic elements, such as the right to vote and the existence of a competitive electoral system, as well as authoritarian elements, such as restrictions on opposition parties and the use of electoral fraud and intimidation.
Schedler (2002) presents an alternative taxonomy of regimes. He contends that the dichotomous definition of regimes as “democratic” and “authoritarian” fails to represent the intricacies of modern political systems. He contends that other regime types cannot be adequately categorised as democratic or authoritarian, including “limited democracies” and “illiberal democracies.” Limited democracies are marked by a limited type of democracy, such as the absence of political freedoms or a flawed electoral system. Illiberal democracies are defined by the presence of democratic aspects, such as a competitive electoral system and frequent elections, as well as authoritarian elements, such as restrictions on political liberties and a strong executive.
Schedler (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2010) concur that the dichotomous classification of regimes into “democratic” and “authoritarian” fails to convey the intricacies of current political systems. Both claim that numerous regime types cannot be adequately classified as democratic or authoritarian, such as hybrid regimes, restricted democracies, and illiberal democracies. This has significant ramifications.
Explaining the Debate
Gandhi and Svolik’s View on Competitive Authoritarianism
Proponents of dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy, such as Przeworski et al. (2000), (Gandhi, 2008), and Svolik (2012), contend that governments can be accurately categorised as either democracies or autocracies. Democracies are regimes in which citizens enjoy certain political rights and liberties, including the right to vote and to organise and engage in political activities (Qin & He, 2022, pp 618). In contrast, autocracies are regimes in which citizens lack fundamental rights and liberties, and the government is not accountable to the people.
In contrast, authors like Levitsky and Way (2010) and Schedler (2002) contend that certain regimes cannot be adequately categorised as either democratic or autocratic. They assert that these regimes belong to the third type of “competitive authoritarianism,” which they describe as regimes in which there is some competition between political parties. However, the government is not accountable to the people (Balderacchi, 2022, pp 1444). They suggest that these regimes should be categorised independently from democracies and autocracies to reflect the political system’s complexities accurately.
Jennifer Gandhi and Milan Svolik are two authors who have authored numerous works on competitive authoritarianism. Gandhi (2008) contends, for example, that competitive authoritarian regimes should be categorised separately from democracies and autocracies since they reflect a distinct form of regime. She asserts that these regimes are characterised by a lack of democratic accountability, albeit with some political party competition (Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020, pp 38). Therefore, she proposes that they should be categorised independently to reflect the regime’s subtleties accurately.
Likewise, Svolik (2012) believes that competitive authoritarian regimes should be categorised independently from democracies and autocracies. According to him, these regimes are characterised by a lack of democratic accountability and a degree of political party competitiveness (Bjrnskov & Rode, 2020, p. 538). In addition, he proposes that each regime should be classified separately to reflect the regime’s complexities accurately.
Arguments For and Against the Separate Coding of Competitive Authoritarianism
The grounds for the independent coding of competitive authoritarianism fall into two primary categories: first, it is vital to capture the intricacies of the regime type precisely, and second, it is advantageous for research purposes (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022).
Separately, proponents of competitive coding authoritarianism say that it is vital to record the regime type’s peculiarities accurately. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that binary definitions cannot fully represent competitive authoritarian regimes. A lack of democratic accountability and competition between political parties characterises them. Consequently, they believe each regime should be categorised independently to reflect its subtleties accurately.
Additionally, proponents of competitive coding authoritarianism independently assert that it is advantageous for research purposes. Schedler (2002), for instance, contends that independently categorising different regimes would give researchers more accurate and relevant data, allowing for a more precise classification and analysis of regimes. In addition, he says that individually classifying these regimes would enable academics to compare and evaluate different regime types more efficiently and better comprehend the processes of regime transition.
On the other hand, there are considerations against specifically codifying competitive authoritarianism. Gandhi (2008), for example, argues that coding these regimes individually could contribute to confusion and inconsistency in the coding of regimes since it would establish a different category of regimes that may be difficult to distinguish from democracies and autocracies. Moreover, she argues that classifying different regimes separately could lead to an oversimplification of the dynamics of regime transition, as it could cause researchers to focus primarily on the struggle between political parties and neglect other factors that influence regime change.
Levitsky and Way’s Response
Levitsky and Way (2010) approach the classification of competitive authoritarian regimes differently. They suggest that competitive authoritarian regimes should be distinguished from fully democratic and authoritarian regimes, as they differ significantly. They note that the absence of meaningful elections, the limitation of certain civil liberties, and the consolidation of power in the hands of a few persons define competitive authoritarian regimes.
In addition, Levitsky and Way suggest that competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguishable from other non-democratic regimes, such as autocracies and monarchies, due to various distinguishing traits. They note, for instance, that competing authoritarian governments are frequently legalistic, with elections held and some opposition permitted (Sirotkina & Zavadskaya, 2020, pp 54). In addition, they say that these regimes are marked by a high degree of election manipulation, with the ruling party able to keep power through vote-rigging and gerrymandering.
Which Side of the Debate Do I Agree With Most, and Why
Based on my consideration of the reasons for and against separately codifying competitive authoritarianism, I concur with the proponents. Independently classifying different regimes is vital to capture the intricacies of each type precisely, and it is advantageous for research reasons. In addition, independently classifying these regimes would offer researchers more accurate and usable data and allow them to compare and contrast regime types more effectively.
Benefits and Detriments of Having More Categories for Researchers to Sort Regime
Having more categories for academics to categorise regimes has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, having more categories can be advantageous because it allows researchers to identify regimes precisely. This enables more precise comparisons between regimes, as different regimes may be categorised according to their characteristics. On the other side, having a greater number of categories might be negative, as it can lead to confusion and dispute among academics over the classification of regimes (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022). Therefore, when evaluating whether or not a separate category should be developed for competitive authoritarian regimes, it is vital to evaluate both the benefits and drawbacks of having more categories.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the discussion on how to conceptualise and categorise regimes continues. The proponents of dichotomous conceptualisations of democracy, such as Przeworski et al., Gandhi, and Svolik, contend that regimes may be accurately categorised into two groups: democracies and autocracies. In contrast, scholars such as Levitsky, Way, and Schedler argue for introducing a third regime type, competitive authoritarianism, which they contend cannot be reflected effectively by dichotomous categories. This essay explores the discussion on this topic by examining how Jennifer Gandhi and Milan Svolik might reply to those who believe that competitive authoritarianism should be classified individually. The essay has suggested that it is vital to code different regimes independently to capture the intricacies of each regime type accurately and that it is advantageous for research reasons. In addition, the essay has proposed that individually classifying these regimes would offer researchers more accurate and usable data and allow them to compare and evaluate regime types more effectively.
References
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Bjørnskov, C., & Rode, M. (2020). Regime types and regime change: A new dataset on democracy, coups, and political institutions. The Review of International Organizations, 15(2), 531–551. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09345-1
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Przeworski, A., Alvarez, R.M., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A., Limongi, F. and Neto, F.P.L., 2000. Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990 (No. 3). Cambridge University Press.
Qin, X., & He, B. (2022). The politics of authoritarian empowerment: Participatory pricing in China. International Political Science Review, 43(5), 613–628. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120985511
Repucci, S., & Slipowitz, A. (2022). The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1639386
Sirotkina, E., & Zavadskaya, M. (2020). When the party is over: Political blame attribution under an authoritarian electoral regime. Post-Soviet Affairs, 36(1), 37–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1639386
Svolik, M.W., 2012. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. https://rl.talis.com/3/essex/lists/1A986996-9D9B-997E-F862-A58001BC4F0E.html?lang=en
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