Introduction
Personal identity has historically intrigued philosophers and thinkers. It asks what makes a person the same throughout time despite their changes. Various theories of personal identity, such as the body view, soul view, and psychological perspective, have been developed to solve this subject. The body view, also known as the somatic view, holds that personal identity is anchored in physical continuity. We stay the same person since we have the same body throughout our life. However, this perspective is challenged by our bodies replacing all their cells every seven years.
According to the soul theory, personal identity is based on an immaterial soul that remains unchanging throughout life. This position presents the issue of establishing the soul’s existence and the potential circumstance of having all new memories with the same soul. Regarding psychological concepts, personal identity is based on mind, psychology, or consciousness continuity. The memory theory holds that we are the same over time because we can access our memories. In circumstances of lost memories or misleading or implanted recollections, objections arise. In metaphysics, Derek Parfit’s article “Personal Identity,” published in The Philosophical Review in 1971, holds significant relevance. Personal identity and survival are examined by Parfit as he challenges established views of personal identity by proposing that psychological connectivity and continuity are more important than consciousness or memory.
Summary
In his article “Personal Identity,” Derek Parfit conducted an extensive investigation into the nature of one’s own identity. Parfit took an extremely systematic approach, probing our intuitions about identification with examples that sometimes seemed like science fiction. According to Parfit’s reductionist view, personal identity cannot be effectively defined, and people do not exist independently of their parts. He argued that psychological connectivity and continuity are more important for long-term success than individual identity. Parfit argues that while minds and bodies make up the bulk of a person, they are insufficient to define that person alone.
Parfit argues that consciousness or memory determines personal identity. He proposes defining identity as psychological connectivity and continuity. Parfit believes survival depends on maintaining psychological traits and relationships rather than self-identity. He gives an example. He introduces Wiggins, who divides into two people with psychological continuity. Parfit disagrees that division equals death, ‘‘I have argued this for those who think that there must, in Wiggins’ case, be a true answer to the question about identity. For them, “Perhaps the original person does lose his identity (Parfit 10).’’ He claims that survival depends on the relationship between the original person and each of the offspring. Thus, psychological links and continuities determine personal identity rather than self-identification. Psychological continuity can be a requirement for identification, even if not one-to-one. According to Parfit, two people are the same if they are psychologically continuous and there is no other contemporaneous and psychologically continuous person.
Parfit argues that psychological continuity and connectivity are more important than personal identity for survival. He proposes that our concept of self is a shifting combination of psychological qualities, memories, and relationships, ‘‘This is that unless the question about identity has an answer, we cannot answer certain important questions (questions about such matters as survival, memory, and responsibility (Parfit 4).’’ He believes that psychological traits, not identities, are essential to survival. His rejection of a strict self-concept changed him. He compares narrow self-identity to a glass tube, which limits our perspective and prevents us from truly engaging with the world. By breaking these restrictions, he believes we might adopt a more expansive and interconnected picture of ourselves and others. Their identity reflects their humility and compassion for others. He believes our relationships define us. He urges us to consider how our activities affect others and the globe.
Defense
Objection:
To counter Parfit’s view on personal identity, fellow reductionist Mark Johnston offers an “Argument from Above.” Johnston argues that being a person may be significant even if the details that make up that identification have no such significance. Johnston argues that the components of personhood should have derived relevance if the higher-level fact of personhood is substantial. Johnston’s criticism of Parfit’s reductionist view is to protect the value of persons. Johnston argues that the higher-level fact of personhood has intrinsic relevance, while Parfit argues that it is not personhood that matters but rather the facts that compose personhood. He argues that the facts at a lower level are significant because they make up the reality at a higher level which is a person’s existence.
Parfit uses the analogy of a brain-damaged patient who has been permanently unconscious to demonstrate the disparity between his perspective and his own. Parfit agrees that the patient is alive because his heart and other organs are beating. He claims that the patient’s survival results from other facts, not a reality in itself. From this “Argument from Below,” Parfit argues that we can assess the worth of the working organs without imputing derived meaning to them, as Johnston argues we must do. The objection that Johnston presents makes us think deeply about the importance of the higher-level reality in our sense of who we are as individuals. Johnston emphasizes the concept of personhood more than Parfit, who emphasizes psychological connectivity and continuity as important to personal identity. He argues that we should not ignore the significance of the higher-level fact that the lower-level facts constitute.
This objection to reductionism argues that the higher-level fact of personhood has inherent value, which gives the lower-level facts greater relevance. It draws attention to apparent flaws in Parfit’s emphasis on psychological connectivity and continuity and urges a more comprehensive examination of the essence of individual identity. Parfit’s reductionist position is challenged, and the reductionist concept of individual identity is questioned if Johnston’s point holds water. It hints that the concept of personhood plays a fundamental role in comprehending personal identity and may involve more than just the interconnection of psychological states.
Author’s Response
To respond to Mark Johnston, Parfit uses thought exercises and examples to challenge the standard idea of personal identity. He illustrates a teletransportation scenario. He claims that teletransportation does not affect human identity. Despite destroying the original body and generating a replica, people do not consider teletransportation death. Instead, mental continuity and connection matter. Parfit believes teletransportation is just a fast way to go. Parfit adds another scenario where the teletransportation technique does not harm the body to underline his thesis. The Mars replica has the individual’s memories, personality, and intentions. Parfit wonders if the original body’s heart failure should bother the person. If psychological continuity and closeness matter, the Mars duplicate could be “you.”
Parfit agrees that human identity is singular and that physical continuity with the original body is important. He contradicts this impression by arguing that the person who entered the tele-transporter has the same psychological continuity as the Mars duplicate. He presents these thought experiments to challenge the idea that physical continuity defines human identity. He wants to show that psychological continuity and connectivity can also define personal identity. Parfit’s remark supports his personal identity reductionist stance. He uses thought experiments to test intuitions and personal identity assumptions. He questions physical continuity by emphasizing psychological elements.
Analysis of Defense
Parfit’s personal identity defense has many strengths and weaknesses. His use of thought experiments to question common intuitions and prompt personal identity exploration is a strength. Teletransportation, for example, shows how physical continuity and personal identity can be separated, contradicting the traditional view. His reasoning also follows logic. He provides a clear alternate perspective and a clear and well-structured line of reasoning. Parfit’s reductionist approach emphasizes psychological continuity and connectivity to explain personal identity without invoking metaphysical entities like souls or relying exclusively on physical continuity.
However, Parfit’s defense needs to address Mark Johnston’s point properly. Parfit does not address Johnston’s claim that personhood has inherent value. Parfit’s emphasis on psychological variables questions the necessity of bodily continuity, but it does not answer whether personhood has intrinsic value. The reductionist stance also needs more explanation. His account challenges the standard view of human identity but may leave some details unanswered. It needs to adequately address the subjective experience of personal identity and how it affects consciousness and self-awareness. His defense is reasonable and enlightening about identity. His response might be strengthened by directly addressing criticisms and offering more explanatory power for subjective personal identity experiences.
Conclusion
The article by Derek Parfit challenges standard ideas of personal identity. Psychological continuity and connectedness define personal identity, while physical continuity and metaphysical entities like souls are less important in Parfit’s reductionist approach. His thought experiments, like the teletransportation scenario, challenge our intuitions and make us think about personal identity. His explanation of personal identity needs to address Mark Johnston’s criticism properly. Parfit’s focus on psychological elements does not answer whether personhood is important. His reductionist position might benefit from additional explanation and study of the subjective experience of personal identity and its effects on consciousness and self-awareness.
The article introduces new insights and raises fundamental problems about personal identity. It challenges our preconceived concepts of identity and emphasizes the importance of psychological links and continuity in defining human identity. Thus, Parfit’s work contributes to the current philosophical conversation on personal identity and inspires future research and debate. It develops a more nuanced understanding of what it means to be a person across time and questions long-held ideas.
Work Cited
Partif, Derek. “Personal Identity.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1. (Jan. 1971), Pp. 3-27.,
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00318108%28197101%2980%3A1%3C3%3API%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R
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