Over the course of these past few weeks of inquiry of moral relativism, my grasp of this philosophical conjecture has developed to a remarkable degree. What I have learned is that moral relativism is not just one idea having all non-variance, but a bunch of different perspective with many ‘different meaning’. It should be highlighted that the distinction I’ve noticed in my reasoning is between the descriptive and meta-ethical relativism. Descriptive relativism which is concerned with a simple fact that there are different moral beliefs in different cultures is far from meta-ethical relativism which gives a reason that there is no objective truth in morality, and the moral judgments are right only relative to specific standpoint (Funmilola & Aina, 2020). Indeed, this particularity has been instrumental in my reconsideration of moral relativism, for it has served me to grasp that the mere recognition of cultural diversity doesn’t mean moral objectivity can be rejected. Moreover I understood that the moral relativism does not logically lead to the moral nihilism as was in my previous opinion. Although the most radical kinds of relativism could hence destroy the idea of moral truth, the more moderate versions can go well with a conviction that there exists at least some moral absolutes (Hobbes, 2024). For example, he could say that moral truths universally apply to all people, but also that other truths are relative to contexts.
Such an understanding is a crucial step in my new converting view regarding moral relativism, as it pinpoints the possibility of a compromise between all-embracing moral objectivity and radical moral subjectivity. In addition, my studies have shown that moral conversations play a vital part in handling cultural differences. Instead of merely accepting or rejecting the ethical norms of different cultures, engaging in an open and careful discussion we can bring the way these norms function and are based on (Funmilola & Aina, 2020). This method allows all parties recognise similarities and to settle moral conflicts in the right way. In addition, moral relativism has been found to possess attributes that may assist in criticizing one’s own cultural norms. Doing so gives us an opportunity to realize that our ethical thinking process is molded by the cultural world surrounding us as well, thus enabling us to be more conscious of possible biases and assumptions, and more open to reconsidering our own opinion.
Even with these recent discoveries, however, I am still convinced that some of the moral absolutes remain. Nonetheless, I have been progressively enlightened concerning these absolutes. I now think that moral absolutes are not absolute from the perspective of being universally recognized, but from the point of view of being universally applicable after being accepted by all. For example, the respect of the person principle, is the baseline of many human rights norms and thus a moral landmark. This principle although universally accepted is nonetheless universal in that it can be evenly applied to different cultural orientations. Moreover as well as I have learned the significance of empathy in moral reasoning (Funmilola & Aina, 2020). The act of stepping into the shoes of another person, in turn, can greatly benefit our understanding of their perspective and values, helping us make more compassionate and well-informed moral decisions. This empathetic orientation is exactly what is compatible to both moral relativism and moral absolutism, since it views the process of moral reasoning and not the content of moral beliefs.
Moreover, I have come to understand that moral relativism and absolutism are not, in fact, mutually exclusive. They can be both perceived as two different systems that underline a particular branch of ethical reality. Although moral relativism accentuates the narrowness and contextual nature of moral manners, moral absolutism emphasizes the universality and objectivity of certain moral principles. Ultimately, my perception on moral relativism matured to a more welcoming and balanced position (Hobbes, 2024). I perceive it now as a standpoint, which, despite its flaws, might be a good reference point in moral reason and therefore can lead to mutual understanding as well as respect among various cultures and individuals. Along the process of uncovering this intricate idea, I look further into its implications for practical ethics as well as always seeking more comprehensive and emphatic approach to moral matters.
In conclusion, the consideration of social consequences of moral relativism also brings to mind its importance in working in different cultural contexts and forging cultural exchanges. However, I agree that the integrity and diversity of cultures must not be taken without due consideration; in addition, the ethical views that transcend cultural barriers and establish common principles of human dignity and justice should be adopted. With this understanding, my potential path in life, be it professionally or personally, is greatly impacted. The program through which I have passed made my interest in moral questions and philosophical research grow even greater. I am looking forward to further explore what moral relativism entails and how it relates with other philosophical constructions. Stepping into the ocean of continued development and improvement, I solemnly pledge to engage ethics disputes with modesty, empathy, and firmness to ethically sound integrity.
References
Funmilola, O. F., & Aina, J. O. (2020). Assessment of Nurses’ Knowledge of Ethical Principles and their Application to Practice in a Selected Federal Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital in Nigeria. African Journal of Health, Nursing and Midwifery, 3(5), 112-152. https://abjournals.org/african-journal-of-health-nursing-and-midwifery-ajhnm/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/journal/published_paper/volume-3/issue-5/AJHNM_XAZ6YMBU.pdf
Hobbes, T. (2024). Leviathan (pp. 1-3).
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