The process of Americans overcoming the rule of monarchy decisively brought debates over executive authority to the verge of the Constitutional Convention in 1787. While going through these deliberations, delegates of the new republic had to overcome the dread of echoing the monarchic tyranny. In his convention reports, James Madison pinpoints executive power as a matter of grave concern, as delegates admitted their bewilderment of power concentration and subsequent abuses of power similar to those of a monarch. The most evident trend was uncertainty about who should hold the highest power in a highly centralized government, as it may lead to the development of a monarchy (James, 2014. pp 1-2). This conclusion was implied in particular by Mr. Pinckney, who expressed apprehension about the power of the existing Congress one day reaching peace and war and transforming the country into a “worst kind of elective monarchy.” In the same vein, Mr. Randolph had to oppose any single executive office clinging to the belief that this monarchical office was the “fetus of monarchy,” referring to
Another issue debated by the delegates was whether the executive branch and all its appointees should serve for life or not, a notion that reflected the general distrust of British rule. It aims for ten years and mechanisms of accountability, including rotation and regular elections, to prevent the resemblance of monarchies and their long-term power grabs. For example, Mr. Mason favored seven years in office term without re-eligibility to stop the executive from achieving undue authority or secretly involving the legislature (B & Farrand, 2023. pp 551). These worries about establishing a long-term power center are consistent with the origin of the issue in monarchies, as one of their main features is the succession of rule by dynastic means.
As for that, the regulations related to appointing the executive emphasized the need to avoid the rulers’ influences. Among the founding fathers, the differences in opinion did not end with putting the president’s election by the citizens against executive independence but also touched upon the president’s responsibility to the legislature as a way to give some degree of mitigation against tyranny. It is from this struggle, which is a fight for independence and accountability, which are the delicate balancing that, to some extent, is the desire not to have monarchical structures reoccur, but at the same time, a need for a mechanism of a competent government. Amid this double objective, some fundamental and intricate questions arose concerning the new government. There was a tension between avoiding the replication of monarchical examples and ensuring the smooth functioning and stability of the state (Dennis et al., 2023. pp 1-17).
In the same way, the debates at the Convention sought to address the frightening issues of government through an authoritarian ruler, considering the case of the delegates who lived under a monarchical system. The framers instituted several mechanisms, for instance, by introducing term limits, ways of appointing politicians, and means of holding them accountable. These were to enable tyranny prevention and effective governance at the same time. However, this intricate exercise of balance captures the thoughtful nature of the Revolutionary Founders in designing the government according to the principles which underpinned the Revolution and to the necessities of government.
Conclusion
In sum, the British monarchy’s influence on forming this fear overshadowed the executive power at the Constitutional Convention of December 17, 1787. The deputies who were traumatized by the prospect of monarchic dictatorship focused on the problems of erecting office as one person’s apex, controlling by term limits and modes of appointments, and incurring checks and balances by the legislature. The public discourse that finally embraced the architecture of an executive branch that was different from the monarchical prototypes but upheld the values of the republican government was finally achieved through that process.
References
Dennis, J., Brannon, V., Hickey, K., Lampe, J., Murrill, B., Shen, W., Sykes, J., Gkoulgkountina, G., Norwood, S., Young, J., Ryu, Z., & Totten, M. (n.d.). The Constitution of the United States of America ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 30, 2022 PREPARED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2022/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2022.pdf
B, C. A., & Farrand, M. (1911). The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Political Science Quarterly, 26(3), 551–551. https://doi.org/10.2307/2140977
James Madison (2014). Convention of 1787
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