Modern democracies are facing severe difficulties from trends toward more technocratic decision-making and the emergence of populist movements and parties. Accompanying occurrences point to problems with representative democratic institutions that democratic theories must recognize and fix. Both populist and epistemic conceptions of democracy, as we have argued in this paper, are incompatible with the profound heterogeneity of secular, heterogeneous societies and so cannot provide accurate, institutional remedies for democracy’s seeming ills. Democratic legitimacy originates from objectively “correct” or “true” decisions in both epistemic and technical conceptions.
Thinkers who subscribe to populist ideologies limit legitimacy to accurately depicting the majority’s decisions and preferences as the “will of the people.” Populist and epistemic conceptions of democracy have structural ramifications that amount to what Lafont refers to as “shortcuts” to democratic managerial, demanding unquestioning submission to the opinion of either an expert or a contingent majority. However, the fundamental tenet of democratic autonomy states that only decisions that have (however indirectly) influenced people’s opinions, which they can challenge and may thus accept, can be reconciled with this mindless subservience. However, democratic processes are eventually reduced to tools in the technocratic and populist viewpoints, enacting the “will of the people” and necessitating the blind devotion of dissident individuals to achieve the higher purposes of truth, respectively. Therefore, rather than viewing them as a preliminary result of an ongoing process of social self-examination, these points of view strive for definitive and final democratic judgments.
The main goal of this study is to refute the accusation that deliberative democracy is an absolutist philosophy that supports technocratic authority and has inadvertently encouraged the populist reaction against liberal institutions. Instead, we have tried to show that the deliberative democracy theory offers a convincing solution to contemporary democratic problems. Its potential is found in how it recognizes the epistemic and egalitarian possibilities of democracy. It does this by explaining how decisions made with equal participation and individual and collective autonomy are rational because they are less likely to be regretted later on than decisions made with less thought.
The socioeconomic uncertainty that characterized postwar Europe provided fertile ground for the political phenomena of populism. Leaders who could capitalize on the general dissatisfaction of the populace found fertile ground in grievances arising from reconstruction efforts, economic disparities, and social disruptions. Populist movements frequently used oversimplified language to build political narratives, placing “the people” against imaginary enemies or perceived elites. In post-World War II Europe, populism has followed a flexible course, shifting with the times. Populist movements have profited from unhappiness throughout history, from the anti-establishment emotions of the 1960s to the nationalist surges of the 21st. To uncover recurring themes and varied paths that have influenced political environments, this section will examine the development of populism in several European countries.
It is hoped that it is now evident that the theories and ideas surrounding democratic interpretations and institutional solutions do not solve the problems with democracy; instead, they weaken democratic reflexivity. Populist and technocratic tendencies may emerge due to the democratic institutions of today failing to satisfy equitable and epistemic goals. Only by considering the fundamental parameters of our democratic political engagement and collaboration can we hope to meet the formidable challenges to the current democratic systems that arise from processes of social transformation. We have maintained that the best theory to direct this meta-deliberative project and uphold plurality and mediation is still the theory of deliberative democracy. Simultaneously, it is evident that the necessary degree of reflexivity can only arise in the presence of comprehensive participation that protects the equivalent chance for all those impacted to impact policy decisions meaningfully.
Crucially, though, the democratic ethos of the ruling class inside the political system determines whether democratic “meta deliberation” (Landwehr, 2015) is possible and thriving rather than the capacities of citizens and the planned and democratic qualities. Can citizens only accept democratic judgments if they believe the democratic political system operates under equitable and epistemic procedural logic? However, their faith in this logic’s ability to work may be different from or reliant on their faith in their fellow citizens’ ability to reason. The philosophy of deliberative democracy releases citizens from the demands of virtue and reason, in contrast to a widespread belief in the argument, and allows them to express their unfiltered thoughts and preferences in elections, casual conversations, petitions, and protests. The institutionalized processes of decision-making and will formation in the political system and the players within it serve as the deliberative filter.
According to this essay, populism, and technolibertarianism, two existent discourses, intersect to generate technopopulism, a discursive construction. Though these discourses are historically separate, the political conditions for their confluence and hybridization have been accelerated by the financial crisis 2008 and the surge of conflicts of 2011. This kind of confluence creates opportunities as well as tensions. On the one hand, technopolis creates a highly participative democratic paradigm that is inherently anti-institutional since it allows people to collaborate and make complex decisions without the assistance of paid politicians. Conversely, the more successful techno-populist parties—at least in the electoral sphere—are all headed by charismatic figures who combine the viewpoints that surface from the grassroots to galvanize support against the establishment. The Global Justice Movement’s early experiments in networked self-government and the open source mode of governance give rise to two seemingly contradictory aspects of technopolis: a leaderless-technocratic variant that is derived from these two sources and a leader-populist variant that is more narrowly focused on the electoral competition as an inherently hegemonic practice. Reflecting on the rhetorical complementarity of these two variations and the political conflicts and difficulties technopopulism faces.
New trends have evolved in this setting, including the relationship between populism and technology, and the classic study paradigms, which are frequently challenging to operationalize, need to be revised. There is a close relationship between the digital media landscape and the political sphere’s development. Research on the new communication forms should continue if they are the cause or the result of processes like the presidentialization of political parties, the personalization of leadership, the verticalization of political organizations, or the social delegitimization of the traditional “intermediate bodies.” Simultaneously, a too-straightforward narrative attempts to reconcile the emergence of neo-populist parties with their utilization of communication technologies.
A feature shared by all of the various populist movements is an emphasis on using direct democracy to empower the people. It is sometimes said that populism and direct democracy are practically interchangeable. Populists, on the other hand, use direct democracy as a means of criticizing representative democracy for being too passive and calling for greater engagement. From this angle, technology is seen as a tool (as well as a plot device) that helps make direct democracy a reality and helps give rise to a new kind of “hyper-representation.” Meanwhile, technocracy élites, neo-liberal political leaders, and populist leaders effectively employ terms like efficiency, privatization, short-termism, newism, and meritocracy. Put differently, and we can draw attention to an odd intersection between technocracy myths and technological narratives about direct democracy. Technopopulists seem to represent an important category even among the new populist parties, whose characteristics are easily verifiable using various empirical approaches (like content analysis.
The key to practical policy deliberation and democratic decision-making is political actors’ willingness and ability for deliberative preference development. However, political system players’ deliberations must be methodically and institutionally linked to the general public’s will formation and opinion processes among regular individuals. However, there are many areas for improvement in today’s political discourses. Populist actors, for example, divide discourses by opposing the need for mutual justification and deliberative preference formation. At the same time, political elites’ technocratic tendencies isolate their decision-making and opinion formation from the general public and civil society. To enable democracy to fulfill its deliberative and participatory promises and to revitalize the procedural consensus upon which it is founded, these shortcomings must be critically addressed via meta-deliberative collective learning procedures.
Similarly, the growth of populism can benefit career civil servants since proponents of pure technocracy and pure populism throw away the idea that political parties should act as go-betweens for people in mixed society. A populist believes that they alone can represent the “will of the people” and that the “corrupt elite” is represented by any political opponent. Proponents of pure technocracy would contend that independent bureaucracies with the impartial ability to identify areas of social consensus, rather than a dynamic procedure of democratic discourse amongst rival political parties, are the source of the “will of the people. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of neopopulist politicians in Latin America. These politicians embraced ideas akin to those of “neoliberal” economists, who favored fewer politicized and extra technical tactic to developing economic policies. Specifically, the use of neoliberal structural adjustment tactics by neopopopulists destroyed mass organizations such as labor unions and political parties, which neoliberal economists perceived as potentially rent-seeking entities that harmed market efficiency.
Deliberative democracy, therefore, faces two obstacles in the face of populism and technocracy: The theory must, on the one hand, demonstrate how current liberal and representative institutions support democratic deliberation and learning processes in order to justify them. However, it must also recognize the weaknesses and biases in the current system and any potential negative societal changes that could impair the ability of liberal representative democracy’s procedural normative logic to function, such as the consequences of transnationalization or the impact of economic disparity on equality in politics. Thus, by modifying the democratic system to fit new social realities, the theory can require and educate extensive meta-deliberative procedures that revitalize the procedural normative logic. One of the theory’s inherent flaws in this regard has been its tendency to overlook the distributive implications of current institutional regimes. However, each unique collection of rules and practices has outcome consequences that benefit some interests and groups more than others. Adding deliberative forums, or mini-publics, to already-existing institutional structures has been the all-too-common institutional cure-all proposed by deliberative theorists for democracy’s ills. Conversely, the theory ought to take a more daring approach to addressing issues with the current institutional arrangements and provide guidance for conversations about more significant changes at the level of democracy as a deliberative system.
A pursuit for (impossible) consensus that unnecessarily delays decisions and, consequently, ineffective group action is not implied by democratic debate. Instead, in modern democracies, majoritarian decision-making and general elections are necessary for the deliberative system to function well in two ways. One reason is that the ability to make majoritarian decisions—as opposed to unanimous, consensual ones—secures the system’s ability to take prompt collective action. In addition, the constant need to secure a majority serves as an institutional anchor for democratic discourse, creating a continuous feedback loop that permeates all spheres of political discourse. In this sense, it transforms democracies into self-examining communities with the institutionalized capacity for change and creativity. Offering explanations based on the worries and opinions of (at least a group of) citizens motivates all political players to do so. Political minorities are also encouraged to openly disagree with the views and decisions of the majority in politics. Even from the viewpoint of a citizen who strongly disagrees, political decisions can be justified due to the consensus over the prescriptive logic underlying the egalitarian-deliberative democratic process.
In a political system, technocracy is everywhere, albeit to varying degrees. According to behavioral analysis, it is a component of people’s preferences and attitudes connected with specific socioeconomic characteristics like occupation and level of education. Voters who have socioeconomic “predispositions” and technocratic preferences may support political parties that promote technocratic government or, at the very least, are less skeptical of it. They have a more positive orientation towards supranational integration and international accords that detach problem solutions from party politics and election rivalry. Technocratic cabinet appointments may be less contentious—or not—in nations with electorates that are oriented in this way.
The idea that governance institutions, authorities, regulatory bodies, think tanks, rating agencies, etc., are becoming more numerous and independent has given rise to the technocraticization concept in recent years. Empirically documenting such an increase is extremely difficult, and here is where the majority of qualitative (case study) evaluations on decision-making processes and the shift of competencies outside politically representative checks can be found. The relocation of “authority” has been observed in policy, supervision, and public administration domains at the national level (Fischer, 1990). However, it is particularly noticeable in the transfer of political responsibilities from national to depoliticized supranational organizations.
The growing significance of the connection between technocracy and populism also brings up significant normative issues. The normative argument that techno-populist politics is not democratically preferable to the rivalry and conflict between technocracy and populism can be made even when these problems cannot be fully addressed. The death toll from a worldwide pandemic illustrates quite vividly the price of populist denial and the breakdown of techno-populist consensus. Since inaction on climate change threatens the earth and the human species, the stakes are much higher. This would imply that the main issue during crises is to fortify technocracy and steer clear of extreme confrontation with populism, which makes a techno-populist compromise a desirable solution. Nevertheless, even if techno-populist concessions are justified as being better than hostility by citing a higher normative principle, like survival, they have some chance of being democratically defendable.
The populist instrumentalization of the crisis is not the only issue here. More technocracy or techno-populist compromises cannot solve populism’s drive toward democratic backsliding; rather, the authoritarian inclinations of populism demand close attention. The latter is not so much a response to this problem as it is a consolidation of democratic backsliding. Ultimately, technocracy and populism are democratically dubious, if not wholly anti-democratic. Even though the former is given legitimacy more frequently than the latter, technocracy and democracy are nonetheless fundamentally at odds. Technocracy may have other justifications, so we can accept that the primary concern is quelling populist opposition. However, regardless of how complicated the situation becomes due to a pandemic, an impending economic crisis, or climate change, we should exercise prudence when implementing technocracy instead of democracy.
The relationship between the expansion of populist movements and parties and the increased socioeconomic, cultural, and political fragmentation that most countries have recently witnessed is controversial. Technocracy in governmental institutions and decision-making processes is growing along with populism in many situations, eroding accountability and leading, among other things, to the autocratization and reaction against contemporary liberal democracies. These developments are showing up in public opinion as more populist views proliferate, and there is a call for more capable administrations and more decisive leadership. Populism and technocratic leadership threaten the concept of liberal democracy applied in European democracies. The larger catch-all parties have declined due to these views and related demands, which have altered party systems and political competitiveness in many nations and are associated with a rise in cynicism and mistrust toward the so-called political elites and establishment.
Furthermore, it becomes evident what proceduralism—which acknowledges the true importance of democratic processes rather than just their instrumental usefulness—we must protect against populist and technocratic currents. This proceduralism remains achieved in institutions of representative democracy. Nevertheless, it is also realized in a broader sense by establishing a deliberative-democratic framework for forming will and decision-making by linking formal and informal coordination, mediation, and communicative conflict resolution practices to democratic institutions’ collective decision-making processes. To comprehend the inclusive and deliberative nature of democratic processes, as well as their capacity to be modified and restructured in response to significant societal changes and the obstacles presented by populism and technocracy, a comprehensive grasp of the theory and its objectives is essential.
Throughout the crisis, there have been substantial changes in the political concerns around democratic legitimacy to forming the European Union. The persistence of the Eurozone has harmed democratic ideals. Economic integration’s demands have undermined national representative democracy. The reach of the technocratic components of European integration—binding regulations on economic issues independent agencies—has significantly increased. Previously, the technocratic dimension was limited to policies that improved efficiency; however, during the crisis, it was expanded to include concerns that had apparent ramifications for distribution (e.g., the adjustment burden between debtor and creditor countries). The ensuing contradiction is that, despite the increasing “politicization” of European affairs, economic problems have become less politicized due to the technocratic leaning of the European Union.
It contends that modern arguments for technocracy pose a severe threat to the democratic ideal of communal self-rule, even despite the frequently asserted complementarity. Technocracy is seen as a utopian ideal in the Platonian argument, and it can serve as the foundation for a partisan political endeavor inside a democratic political system. The arena where a public debate about the relative virtues of technocracy and democracy could occur is undermined by modern arguments for technocracy, which establish the objective limits of each system’s legitimate domains from the outset. If only implicitly, the normative importance of the democratic ideal of collective self-government can be demonstrated in the formal but symbolic deference to democracy displayed by proponents of technocracy in modern discussions. The aim is to replace democratic self-rule with an expert-run system of governance in Plato’s classic case for technocracy.
This volume covers the “democratic deficit” of technocratic regimes and issues with technocratic neutrality, politicization, counterweight to populism, and responsive and accountable representation in democratic systems. Though the topic of technocratic politics is brought up in public discourse when technocratic forces are seen in action, it is now evident that the issues it raises have their roots in the fundamentals of our governing structures and will only intensify over the coming decades. The conflict between responsible and responsive government will worsen as political institutions become more complicated due to globalization, technological advancements, and citizen aspirations for effective results. Although the present populist backlash is sometimes attributed to the “technocratization” of politics—the transfer of decision-making authority to unresponsive, unelected elites—technocracy can also serve as a corrective measure for democratic institutions that veer too far toward reckless governance.
Conclusion
In summary, the idea of a common good or aim that must be carried out in the face of opposition or competing interests binds technocracy and populism together. Institutions and procedures related to interest reconciliation, representation, and mediation have become less valuable. Populism and technocracy are not suitable to be compared when considering the antipluralist drive behind both. Furthermore, it becomes more apparent what we need to stand up to in opposition to populist and technocratic currents: a proceduralism that values democratic processes for their own sake rather than just as a means to an end. Representational democracy institutions and, more broadly, deliberative-democratic systems of will formation and decision-making are how this proceduralism is realized. These systems are linked to formal and informal mediation practices, coordination, and communicative conflict management. It is crucial to understand the theory of deliberative democracy and its goals in order to be able to justify the inclusive and deliberative aspects of democratic processes and to guide their adaptation and reform in the face of populism and technocracy, as well as significant societal changes.
However, there are three significant benefits to our emphasis on political institutions and our attempt to reintegrate intergovernmental decision-making into transnationalized forms of collective opinion and will formation: Rather than a drawn-out and challenging transfer of competencies and identities from the national to the inter- or supranational level. It initially relies on domestic democratic structures and procedures that have firmly established themselves as the central sites of opinion formation and decision-making. Second, a horizontal extension of representational democracy might improve the efficiency and legitimacy of (joint and formally independent) rulemaking among democracies. Despite this, our focus on political institutions and our efforts to reintegrate intergovernmental decision-making into transnationalized forms of collective opinion and will formation have three significant advantages: It first depends on domestic democratic structures and procedures that have firmly established themselves as the central sites of opinion formation and decision-making, rather than a gradual and challenging transfer of competencies and identities from the national to the inter- or supranational level. Second, a horizontal extension of representational democracy could strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of formal, cooperative, and independent rulemaking across democracies.
It is critical to comprehend the effects of technocracy and populism to shape representative democracy’s future as Europe grapples with the challenges of the twenty-first century. Essential factors include strengthening civic education to combat populist and technocratic problems, proposing reforms to fortify democratic institutions, and fostering trust between the general public, political elites, and technocrat experts. The global backdrop is also covered in this section, along with a comparison of Europe’s experience with populism and technocracy to other areas and an analysis of the possibility of cross-national cooperation to address shared problems. Recognizing the shifting dynamics of technocracy and populism in a world that is changing quickly, the need for flexible and robust democratic institutions is emphasized.
Ultimately, the foundation of technocracy is the superiority of knowledge and the scientific study of society. It comprises the conviction that a fundamentally positivist “best solution” or “truth” can be determined independently and scientifically for society as a whole. Hence, expertise is a vital counterbalance to the elitist and anti-political aspects outlined above, highlighting the importance of logical conjecture. Technocracy sees society as a highly complicated machine with moving components that must function properly, prioritizing output, efficiency, and ideal results more than compromise. The concept that specialists who are impartial and not ideologically motivated can solve governance issues by accessing data and facts is known as the technocratic mentality.
References
Bertsou, E., & Caramani, D. (2020). Measuring technocracy. The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 91–109.
Bickerton, C. J., & Accetti, C. I. (2021). Technopopulism: The new logic of democratic politics. Oxford University Press, USA.
Bickerton, C., & Accetti, C. I. (2020). Technocracy and political theory. In The technocratic challenge to democracy (pp. 29-43). Routledge.
Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs. reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political representation and their critique of party government. American Political Science Review, 111(1), 54–67.
De Blasio, E., & Sorice, M. (2018). Populism between direct democracy and the technological myth. Palgrave Communications, 4(1). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0067-y
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