John Roberts made a famous comparison between judges and umpires in 2005 when he said, “Judges are like umpires.” This statement was made during his confirmation hearings. The umpires do not create the regulations; rather, they are enforced by them” (Greenhouse 36). The parallel argues that excellent Supreme Court Justices should be unbiased arbitrators of the Constitution, objectively administering the law rather than imposing their ideological agendas on the Court. On the other hand, is the ability to act as an impartial umpire the sole trait that is necessary to be a competent Justice? Even if impartiality is of the utmost importance, excellence also needs knowledge, legal competence, and a determination to safeguard constitutional ideals, as is shown by an examination of the history of the Supreme Court.
For the purpose of evaluating Roberts’ comparison of the umpire, it is necessary to investigate the specific duties that Supreme Court Justices perform. Constitutional justices are typically presented with broad ideas subject to interpretation, unlike umpires who impartially call balls and strikes. Greenhouse explains that “the Constitution’s great generalities…leave ample scope for disagreement” (10). Cases that deal with subjects such as abortion rights or religious liberty can entail complicated ideas that conflict with one another, and there is no conclusively “correct” reading of the Constitution. Therefore, rather than being mechanical rule-followers, justices must use reasoned judgment to evaluate which principles are most effective in upholding American ideals. Greenhouse observes that the founders provided “ample scope for disagreement” in matters about the “division of powers” and “individual rights,” which the Supreme Court is obligated to address (10).
Does the use of this authority prevent the Justices from acting as impartial umpires? It is not always the case. Even though it may be hard for justices to read confusing constitutional articles with complete objectivity, they may nonetheless strive for fairness by exercising impartiality in their decisions and rejecting party influences. According to the statement made by Chief Justice Roberts, “a certain humility should characterize the judicial role” (Greenhouse 36). Because no justice has complete knowledge, it is important to maintain humility concerning one’s preconceptions to avoid making biased decisions that impose subjective moral beliefs rather than objectively preserving constitutional liberties. With that being said, Greenhouse observes instances in which Justices such as Stevens and O’Connor showed “not Calculation humility but raw partisanship” (88) when they aligned themselves with party ideology rather than legal standards. The difficulties of impartiality, notwithstanding its ideal, are shown by this.
With that being said, even the most modest and unbiased Justices need to draw upon their own particular experience to interpret the Constitution’s expansive commands successfully. They are distinguished from baseball umpires because they are required to use educated judgment. Unlike situations involving balls and strikes, issues before the Supreme Court typically include intricate technicalities that call for specialized legal and historical research beyond the average person’s comprehension. In adopting legislation about technology, for instance, the Justices depend upon their technical understanding of complex policy concerns. Greenhouse observes that recent nominees like Roberts and Alito had “expertise honed over decades of working in the vineyards of complex regulatory law” (87), enabling them to handle issues that were difficult to understand. Justices’ constitutional advice is strengthened by developing such specialized expertise over long careers.
A cultivated knowledge established through considerable job experience is also required for expert judgment in Supreme Court Justices. Despite the undeniable brilliance of their legal brains, relatively inexperienced judges like Thomas lack the perspective that may be obtained via years of applying constitutional theory to various case situations. When justices are exposed to such a wide range of conditions, they can better recognize lasting principles rather than base their judgments on individual events. Greenhouse criticizes Justice Blackman’s weak understanding of national complexity early on in his appointment, pointing out that his experience in the Midwest, which was more provincial, created “gaps that time had not yet filled in” (64). Legal decisions that maintain national constitutional norms can only be made by justices who have a comprehensive knowledge of the social fabric of the United States. This perspective goes beyond simple technical competence, putting the Justices in a position that is more like that of elderly referees of the intricate game that democracy plays. In Blackman’s early judicial constraints, Greenhouse emphasizes the need for justices to possess a range of understanding that can only be acquired via wide exposure to various social challenges throughout their careers (64).
Of course, seasoned knowledge is insufficient to ensure that justices will rule ethically or consistently. In addition, they are required to exhibit bravery by suppressing their personal convictions to defend constitutional rights, which may sometimes require them to safeguard ideals that oppose their political affiliations. By way of illustration, the liberal Justice Brennan’s defense of demonstrators burning the American flag in 1989 infuriated conservative activists, yet he maintained that the First Amendment permitted such unpleasant communication (Greenhouse 75). Although politically undesirable, this judgment adhered to liberties entrenched in the Constitution above Brennan’s personal views. Similarly, Justice Kennedy, who is known for his moral conservatism, confirmed the right to abortion in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). He said that he must prioritize the integrity of the Court above ideological interests, which Greenhouse referred to as “an inspiring example of Justice’s duty” (88). Despite divisive agendas, This non-partisan dedication to the United States of America’s founding Constitution is an example of nobility that goes beyond simple neutrality. Greenhouse asserts that the choice that Brennan made regarding the burning of the flag and the decision that Kennedy made following abortion showed “fidelity to principle over partisanship,” which is a necessary attribute for brilliance (88).
Lastly, to achieve greatness in the Supreme Court, it is necessary to be aware of the Court’s central role in maintaining constitutional dominance over political disagreements. In contrast to the other institutions of government, which receive their legitimacy from the agreement of the governed, the authority of the Supreme Court is based on the protection of individual liberty against “the tyranny of the majority” (Greenhouse 107). Therefore, to maintain democracy’s lasting ideals, justices must give rulings resistant to immediate popular demands. Brown v. Board of Education, which was decided in 1954 and was a catalyst for contentious integration despite existing racism, is an example of a controversial countercultural decision that Greenhouse observes is sometimes necessary (56). These options, even though they first cause division, have the potential to catalyze moral and social progress, therefore strengthening constitutional guarantees. The case of Brown v. Board, which challenged the politically popular segregation policy, is used by Greenhouse to illustrate the responsibility of the Supreme Court to check the majority view with constitutional principles (56). Because of this, outstanding justices are usually unpopular, but they are no less important. More regular judgments must be made to match legislation and policies with constitutional limitations to sustain the founding vision of the United States of America. In his discussion of recent decisions on reproductive rights that have been handed down since the Casey case, Greenhouse observes that “the Court’s defense of constitutional principle is often no more dramatic than making sure that a state’s bureaucratic workings are tolerably rational and fair” (95). Every day, unglamorous administrative monitoring guarantees that the government is efficient and accountable to constitutional objectives. This requires bravery to oppose populism that seeks to take shortcuts around protected liberties.
In conclusion, throughout American history, prominent Supreme Court Justices have demonstrated that while impartiality is essential, it is also necessary to have wisdom, expertise, and courage to tackle complex legal and societal challenges. This is because it is essential to align rulings with constitutional values rather than personal interests or popularity. Recognizing that “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty” (Greenhouse 108), it is necessary to exercise vigilance to accomplish this. The pursuit of such a virtuous constitutional guardianship makes exceptional justices something that is far more influential than indifferent umpires. Their decisions have a significant impact on the formation of national identity, contribute to the advancement of society, and ultimately decide whether the fundamental values of the United States of America continue to serve as guiding beacons or if they have become relics reduced by the eroding forces of time. Exceptional Justices accept this huge task with humility, moral conviction, and visionary leadership into the future of democracy.
Work Cited
Greenhouse, Linda. The U.S. Supreme Court: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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