Cognition refers to the brain’s ability to acquire, process, store, and retrieve information (Khera & Rangasamy, 2021). Cognition was thought to have been an exclusive human brain function. However, through animal research, scientists discovered that cognition is not limited to humans alone and that animals like the bearded capuchin monkeys could also possess cognition. The ability to demonstrate aspects of learning through experiences and senses are some of the cognitive functions that worked to dispute the myth that cognition is solely a human function. Also, the inverse of the statement that cognition is present exclusively in animals is incorrect.
All living things have some form of cognition. Stemming from the reading by Seed and Mayer (2017), it is evident that cognition is species-specific. The chapter’s authors seek to understand why problem-solving skills differ over generations, with a keen interest in determining why problem-solving skills evolve and the mechanism of such evolutionary partners in cognition (Seed & Mayer, 2017). Their research is informed by observation of the difference between bearded capuchin monkeys’ and hyacinth macaws’ access to the piassava nuts. The monkeys use hard rocks that are 77% of their body weight to crash the nuts. However, the birds’ beaks are strong enough to crack the nuts (Seed & Mayer, 2017). The difference in the problem-solving approach shown by these two species is evidence of evolution in cognition. The same applies to all species on the planet. Each species has devised a specific mechanism for evading predators, such as camouflaging for the chameleon and rolling down its leaves for the fern plant. Other species release toxic chemicals in the presence of foes or when they feel threatened, while others flee from their predators. The ability to learn what defence mechanism works best for the species and when to apply the survival tactic is proof of cognition based on the definition of cognition as an ability of the brain to gain knowledge and understanding.
A second factor that influences my belief about the presence of cognition in all planetary species is the ability to sense and respond appropriately to stimuli. A crustacean-like snail is notorious for retracting into its shell when exposed to touch stimuli. The same is seen with the tortoise, which also moves back into its shell whenever it feels threatened. The same can be seen in training animals and fish alike, like the dolphin using positive reinforcement. For such a stimuli-response relationship to occur, there must be a cognitive function in the creature that recognizes the stimuli, processes it, and effect an appropriate response. In the case of trained dolphins, the creatures assess their jump cues, process them, and then act by jumping, thus demonstrating relevant thought processes that help them to analyze and understand the types of stimuli it is receiving. The same processes are seen with the smallest living units, such as unicellular bacteria. For living creatures like bacteria, their cognition is devoid of well-developed complex structures like the brain, resulting in whether cognition is merely a brain function or can be present without well-developed brain neuronal connection. The roots
Therefore, to sum up, the cleverness seen in other species aside from humans and animals disputes the belief that cognition is only present in animals. Like other species, humans also possess cognitive functions that allow for environmental survival. The presence of cognitive attributes seen in basic living things like bacteria should be the focus of research to determine the mechanism of cognition in the absence of well-developed neuronal structures or brains. Future research should also investigate the aspects of cognition in plants to determine if these species also have cognitive functions, as seen in animals and humans.
The ultimate problem with cognition is that it is intangible. The best a researcher can do is to infer the presence of cognitive functions from observed behavioural patterns or brain neuronal connections seen as an activity in imaging studies. The vastness or lack thereof of cognition inspires research in the field to determine the attributes of cognition in planetary species. The million-dollar question regarding cognition is whether all species on the planet possess some form of cognition. The most troubling aspect of this research question is determining if the most primitive animals have cognition and how cognition develops throughout generations as a function of evolution and genetic variability. Therefore, to answer this research enigma, appropriate studies are indicated. The study would aim to determine if primitive animals have cognition and when it appeared in the evolutionary tree of animals.
The guiding research question inspired by the course material about animal cognition is, do primitive animals have cognition, and if not, when did it first appear in the animal evolutionary tree? The appropriate null hypothesis about this question would be that primitive animals have no cognition. The research idea would be to test this hypothesis to accept or refute the claims it makes. The prediction that would follow from the theory is that the most primitive animals alive today do not bear any form of cognitive function. Secondly, cognition would be expected to develop over the years due to evolution, allowing each animal species to achieve its species-specific mental attributes. Further, the level in the evolution tree at which cognition first appeared would be expected to be much higher to allow enough evolutionary effects to spearhead the development of the first clever or cognitively enhanced species that would ensure the survival of the animal species on the planet to date.
The predictions I would explore further to assess for the presence or absence of cognition in primitive animals would be the first prediction proposing that the most primitive animals alive today lack cognition. The type of study that I would suggest to test the prediction is an observational study of the most primitive animals in their natural habitats. I would use the Trichoplax adherents of the phylum Placozoa, the species considered the most primitive animal alive today, for my study. I would locate their natural habitats and conduct two concurrent, mixed-methods studies to assess the presence of cognition in these animals. I would observe their behaviour in their environment, looking for cues that prove cognition, such as predator escape mechanisms and the timeliness of deployment of this predator evasive mechanism. The second study would be an interventional study where I introduce stimuli to the animal, such as pain, and watch how they react to the stimuli and their environment after the experiment. The second study will apply the principles of classical conditioning to assess the primitive animal’s ability to learn through experiences and senses, a key determinant of cognition.
The preposition informs the choice of the Placozoa species that they might be the most primitive animals alive today. The measures of cognition by assessing the animal’s behaviour can be justified by the lack of direct measures to assess cognitive functions in animals, especially those unable to follow commands like the unicellular organisms. Lastly, using classical conditioning will help evaluate if the animals can learn and apply what they learn in a controlled environment to their natural environment. Of cos, the data collection process needs to proceed promptly ahead of the termination of the learnt response that occurs in the absence of reinforcement. The researcher assumes that learnt behaviour correctly infers the presence of cognitive function through the ability of experiences to shape mental models and, hence, demonstrate cognitive skills for the implicated species. Also, the research assumes that the sampled species represents the ancestor from which other animal species originated in their phylogenic tree. Lastly, the research would require high-definition microscopic visualization equipment to ensure accurate data collection and completion of the proposed study.
The ability of the creature to retract and move away from the direction in which the cutting stimuli originated points to the fact that the beast can perceive pain. Further evidence to suggest the sensation of pain can be inferred from the behavioural reaction of the creature to stony surfaces in its environment. After experiencing the cutting stimulus while the creature was placed on a stony surface, it subsequently avoided all stony surfaces in its environment. There is an aspect of perception of the pain from the cut, which makes the creature associate all stony surfaces in its environment with the pain, resulting in its aversion to such surfaces. Such learning from experiences and senses indicates that the creature can feel pain. The movement away from the uncomfortable stimuli suggests a mechanism by the creature to perceive, process, and act on stimuli received from its environment.
The biological approach to cognition would support the claims that the creature feels pain. The biologists argue that pain elicits an aversive response that is protective to the affected creature, which makes the individual avoid the cause of the pain stimulus. The best example is a human reaction to contact with a hot surface. The innate response to such contact is to quickly retract the hand that is in contact with the hot surface to avoid further injury. The same is seen with the creature’s reaction to the cutting stimuli. The creature quickly moved away from the stimuli to prevent further injury. Also, it is seen as being afraid of stony surfaces in its environment, where the creature receives the cutting stimuli eliciting pain. Avoiding an object associated with unpleasant stimuli biologically supports the claims that the creature felt pain.
Theoretically, it is uncertain if the creature moved away because it felt pain or did not what the uncomfortable or new stimuli experienced through the cutting process. It is impossible to demonstrate how the pain stimuli were generated and communicated to the organism to cause the response seen since the creature needs a sophisticated system of neurons to detect, interpret, and act on the stimuli as painful stimuli. The lack of evidential, tangible data to back up claims of the sensation of pain rules out the claims that the organism felt pain with certainty. The inability to test the sensation of pain in the creature through objective measures makes the claims of feeling pain unjustifiable. Therefore, reliance on scientific methods to prove theoretical claims, which cannot be applied in this creature’s scenario, makes the claims of the beast experiencing pain null and void from a theoretical approach.
From an epistemological approach to pain, claiming that the creature felt pain is logical. The principles of living things make response to the environment a requisite for all living things. Epistemologically, all creatures are aware of their environment and hence would be expected to be mindful of pain (Dretske, n.d.). The presence of pain that an organism is unaware of creates an epistemological problem (Dretske, n.d.). Therefore, an epistemological approach would claim that the creatures felt pain because they were aware and conscious of their environment. Consequently, to resolve the issue of whether the creature felt pain, it is crucial to conduct research that would prove beyond reasonable doubt and objectively that the creature felt pain and demonstrate the mechanism of pain sensation in the organism.
Therefore, the experiment that I propose to provide the most relevant empirical information on whether the creature can feel pain is a neurological study to examine the types and functions of chemicals and electrical impulses produced by the creature on exposure to pain stimuli. Functional imaging studies can help deduce the pathway assumed by the chemicals and the electrical impulses released by the creature to map out a pain sensation pathway for the organism as it is done for human subjects. The result would be a qualitative description of if and how the creature perceives pain.
References
Dretske, F. (n.d.). The epistemology of pain. Stanford University. https://web.stanford.edu/~paulsko/papers/DEP.pdf
Khera, T., & Rangasamy, V. (2021). Cognition and pain: A review. Frontiers in Psychology, 21. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.673962
Seed, A., & Mayer, C. (2017). Chapter 27: Problem Solving. In, Call, J. (ed.), APA Handbook of Comparative Psychology: Perception, Learning, and Cognition. Vol.2, pp. 601-625.
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