Introduction
The Russo-Ukrainian War, which originated with Russia’s takeover of Crimea in February 2014 and intensified with a complete invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has evolved into a multifaceted and prolonged battle. Notwithstanding strategic moves, the operation has failed to accomplish its stated objectives over a span of eighteen months. This essay seeks to elucidate the complexities of Russia’s deficiencies by analyzing fundamental theories of warfare, principles of military strategy, the evolving dynamics in the strategic environment.
Identification and Evolution of Key Theories
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014, offers an ideal opportunity to examine fundamental conceptions of warfare, conflict, and military strategy, particularly in terms of their historical development. Moscow neglected one of the key principles outlined by Clausewitz, which states that war is a “collision of two living forces,” a competition in which both adversaries strive to topple one another. Regardless of the distribution of forces, every participant has a certain probability of emerging victorious (U.S Naval Institute, 2022 Para. 9).
Figure 1: Political Violence in Eastern Ukraine (Gurcov, 2023).
Learning and adapting throughout a conflict is seen to be essential to preventing loss and even ensuring survival, as the enemy is also learning at the same time (van der Vorm, 2021 Para. 2). Ukraine has maintained its strategic emphasis on the same region but has altered its methods, shifting from a mechanized assault aimed at breaching Russia’s fortified defensive lines to a more attritional approach.
Figure 2: Taking Verbove remains Ukraine’s immediate objective (Miller , 2023).
Application of Key Principles to Operational Challenges
An important idea is the concept of concentrating force, which highlights the strategic deployment of military might to target a particular opponent or purpose (Bowdish, 2013 p.65). The 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia demonstrates an effort to amass military might in a mostly land-based operation, indicating a dedication to superior force. The ineptitude to adjust to the hybrid character of the conflict causes skepticism over the effectiveness of implementing this concept in the modern operational environment (Zabrodskyi et al., 2022). Another crucial criterion is the precise delineation of goals. Russia’s primary goals, as seen by the invasion of Crimea and backing of rebels, were quite clear-cut. Nevertheless, as the battle progressed, the goals grew less clear, indicating the shifting political dynamics and reactions from the global community. The absence of clear goals may have had a role in the overall lack of success in the operation.
Development of Military Theory in Changing Environments
Freedman’s elucidation of these limitations, particularly those that are voluntarily imposed, provides an important aspect. The battle, which began in 2014 and intensified in 2022, highlights the urgent need for military theorists to modify their frameworks to include new aspects of warfare, developing technology, and non-traditional threats. Russian soldiers attempted to take control of Chornobaivka a few days after invading Ukraine, but the operation did not proceed as planned (Freedman, 2022 Para 1). The evolution of the warfare has been characterized by a transition towards hybrid tactics, cyber warfare, and information operations.
Figure 3: Ukrainian sinking of the Russian Moskva (Sadler, 2023).
Figure 4: The direction of war: Ukrainian and Russian troop movements (Miller , 2023).
Logical Arguments on Continuity and Change
From 2014 to date, the Ukrainian war provides a complicated and diverse set of historical and contemporary events that allow for an in-depth study of these developments. Balcaen (2023) captures this idea because he develops on the argument made earlier that military force can also be used by parties seeking political gains. This is consistent with previous cases of conflicts where power has been utilized as a means towards political objectives. However, this shift was attributed to complexity in operating environment. Initial seizure of Crimea, which was conventional military strategy was followed by hybrid warfare showing some deviation from patterns formed earlier. Thus, Russia had not considered this change as one that could be adapted strategically. The inability to effectively manage this intricate equilibrium between continuity and change greatly adds to the overall lack of success in Russia’s military operation. Together with other defense force troops, the Ukrainian marines were able to establish a foothold on many bridgeheads. (Financial Times, 2022 Para. 3).
Figure 5: Ukraine gains a foothold on the east side of the Dnipro River (Financial Times, 2022).
Conclusion
The Russo-Ukrainian War provides a comprehensive analysis that intimately connects historical and present aspects of combat, strategy, and emerging conflicts. The failure of Russia’s operation to fulfill its objectives after eighteen months is a complex problem, stemming from a deficient adherence to both ancient and current ideas, a rigid implementation of crucial principles, and an inability to adjust to the evolving strategic landscape.
References
Balcaen, M. P., Pieter. (2023, June 5). What is Russia’s Strategy in Ukraine? Modern War Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/
Bowdish, R. (2013). Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1026&context=poliscitheses
Financial Times. (2022, March 1). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in maps — latest updates. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/4351d5b0-0888-4b47-9368-6bc4dfbccbf5
Freedman, L. (2022, June 14). Why War Fails. Www.foreignaffairs.com. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails
Gurcov, N. (2023, March 1). War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe. ACLED. https://acleddata.com/2023/03/01/war-in-ukraine-one-year-on-nowhere-safe/
Miller , C. (2023). The hard lessons from Ukraine’s summer offensive. Www.ft.com. https://www.ft.com/content/e83bd6fe-43b8-4adf-9bea-07609bc223d0
Sadler, B. (2023). Applying Lessons of the Naval War in Ukraine for a Potential War with China. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/applying-lessons-the-naval-war-ukraine-potential-war-china
U.S Naval Institute. (2022, March 22). What Would Clausewitz Say about Putin’s War on Ukraine? U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/what-would-clausewitz-say-about-putins-war-ukraine
van der Vorm, M. (2021). The Crucible of War: What Do We Know about Military Adaptation? Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 12(1), 197–209. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/797091
Zabrodskyi, M., Watling, J., & Reynolds, N. (2022). Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022 Special Report. https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
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