Masto, Meghan. “Empathy and its role in morality.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 74-96.
In this article, Meghan Masto suggests that empathy is necessary for molarity which contradicts other literature that empathy is unnecessary for molar conduct, moral development, and moral judgment. It distinguishes empathy into two species; basic empathy and lower-level empathy. Basic empathy is the cumulative empathy where one tends to feel the same as others do, the lower-level empathy is whereby is generally a sort of emotional contagion. Although empathy is a crucial aspect to investigate, it also possesses some challenges and setbacks. For instance, empathy can cause distress or victimize an individual in certain cases. Empathy can cause a sense of self-centeredness and cause bias as one can act partially favoring the individual in action. Nevertheless, empathy is at times epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action and can act as a motivator in performing the right action and creating a sense of molar uprightness for any action.
Generally, the relationship between empathy and morality is foreseen with the provision of the ability to make the right move or choice. For instance, empathy can enable an individual to act morally in multiple cases, precisely when the decision is hard to make. One might contend that empathy coincides with sympathy in cases where feelings and emotions influence a particular choice. When empathy is high, the choice favors the undermined party and vice versa. The relationship between the two is one’s influence on the other. Empathy can influence the decisive factor and shift the favor towards one side. Empathy is more of a referencing point that gives one the intuition of whether they are doing the right thing or not.
Prinz, Jesse. “Against empathy.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 214-233.
In this article, the author argues that empathy can be characterized as a vicious emotion that one individual experiences on emotions to another. Hence, empathy can be ascertained as a precondition to a particular event. The author denotes that empathy should not be used as a guide to moral judgment as it creates biases limiting one’s actions into making the right obligations. The author later adds that empathy is a subject of admiration, guilt, disgust, and anger and should not be used as a sentiment for moral guidance. An argument must be derived concerning whether empathy is a valuable aspect of the moral domain. The argument that empathy is rational for moral judgment can be challenged in multiple ways, one in which it can be a liability.
From this argument, one might put the jurisdiction that empathy is only a physique of another person’s state of mind and hence should not be used as a guide to moral jurisdictions. In this case, the relationship between empathy and morality is undeniably realistic but in an opposing manner. For instance, one might make a decision based on the magnitude of empathy or say ‘sympathy’ that they have for a particular person. Hence their relationship coincides from an emotional perspective rather than a formal judgmental jurisdiction. The forthcoming notion relates to the humane rationale of self-centeredness and making the right decision based on the rights and wrongs we perceive as human beings.
Isserow, Jessica. “Empathy and morality.” (2015): 597-608.
In this article, the author suggests that intuition is the link between how others think and feel and the ability to care for and attend to their needs. However, the linkage can be hard to connect as one might misunderstand how empathy enables morality. Others might get stuck on whether empathy drives the likelihood of conducting a moral jurisdiction or censoring a praiseworthy behavior. In the disclaimer that is empathy morality’s foe or friend, the author explains the contradictory perspective of the notion. One is that empathy can provide a framework for moral actions and thoughts; on the contrary, it can be a subject of bias and vulnerability. Hence, empathy can act as a tool of intimidation and manipulation.
From this assumption, the relationship between empathy and morality is displayed. It showcases that empathy can be used both as a morally oriented direction and as a source of bias and fragility. In one case, thinking from another individual’s perspective helps one to think rationally and make the right decision based on the current state of the victim. However, in contrast, empathy can create a sense of fragility as one might consider acting in a manner the victim subjects them to be. One might act in the victim’s favor which in some cases might be against the moral judgment or jurisdiction. These two notions complicate whether empathy drives moral judgment or creates grounds for redemption and passive favors.
Decety, Jean, and Jason M. Cowell. “The complex relation between morality and empathy.” Trends in cognitive sciences 18.7 (2014): 337-339.
In this article, the author suggests that empathy and molarity are fundamental components of human nature across cultures. The author denotes that empathy is not always a direct assurance of moral behavior. This is generally because the ability to empathize is defined differently, conveying different meanings and assumptions. The contradiction creates a deviation of which mental state should be used as the bases of its significant contribution. The complex idea of the human physique, which reinstates how humans should act towards one another, is hardcoded into our biology. The unique nature of humans is their ability to share emotions and adapt to different perspectives, which on the other hand, leads to acting distinctively. This perspective-taking can be elicited implicitly or explicitly.
This discussion delaminated the complex nature of empathy and morality and how the two coincide. However, there is no need to perceive morality and empathy as either inevitably complimentary or systematically opposed to one another. Although the two relate in a complex manner, one’s perspective determines how one contributes and reinstates their judgment. The contemporary feeling attained from another person hugely coincides with how the person relates with the victim. For instance, a mother will behave differently when dealing with their child than a stranger. As humans, although we share feelings and emotions, the magnitude of emotions depends on how someone likes or knows the victim. Similarly, while dealing with different groups, a particular group might be vulnerable depending on how one feels about them. Hence it is right to state that empathy and morality should not be taken lightly.
Works Cited
Decety, Jean, and Jason M. Cowell. “The complex relation between morality and empathy.” Trends in cognitive sciences 18.7 (2014): 337-339.
Isserow, Jessica. “Empathy and morality.” (2015): 597-608.
Masto, Meghan. “Empathy and its role in morality.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 53.1 (2015): 74-96.
Prinz, Jesse. “Against empathy.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 214-233.
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