The Extent of Judicial Freedom in Articulating and Developing Human Rights Law in the UK

Introduction

Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has transcended the UK’s legal framework in human rights protection, vastly incorporating it into the law of the ECHR. The main controversy after the enforced HRA, discussed in this essay, pertains to how UK courts can formulate and elaborate on newly created human rights law. This work is intended to cover this particular point through judicial interpretation; key cases highlight the effect and limits placed on judicial freedom.

Interpretation and Application of the HRA

To a large extent, the UK court’s interpretive approach has had a big impact on creating the legal landscape for the country’s human rights law. According to Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), judges must develop legislation consistent with the Convention rights whenever viable. . Under this act, judges get the chance to be creative in implementing human rights considerations into local laws, hence shaping the new standards of legality. For instance, turning to the case of Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 1), the decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it was said that the UK’s permanent ban on prisoner voting violated the right to free elections under Protocol 1, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ((2005)). Also, the decision in the Toonen v. Australia case (1994) established the principle that, domestically, judicial interpretation has a role to play in advancing human rights protections, and this is the underlying principle that ensured the alignment of domestic legislation with existing international human rights norms.

Additionally, the judicial interpretation role of the UK courts in the Supreme Court case R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice (2012) is another clear case of how the courts shape the evolving body of rights jurisprudence. By proclaiming that the UK’s rule of serving prisoners’ voting rights is incompatible with the ECHR constitution, the Supreme Court was strengthening its rights to authority over the human rights process via the order of HRA (R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice, 2012)3. This decision is evidence that the courts of the UK can appropriate and further articulate human rights standards by ensuring proper adjudication through their jurisdiction function, which in turn helps to build human rights protections in the UK.

It has been a decisive characteristic for the UK courts and the ECtHR to debate after the pronouncement of cases, e.g., Hirst v. UK (II). 2) and R (Chester) v Secretary of Strasbourg; however, they complicate the relationship between Strasbourg and the United Kingdom, interfering with the collective approach of human rights adjudication. Again, This conversation demonstrates that these two norms are part of an interrelated concept and illustrates the significance of judicial interpretation in codifying these norms within UK law. The judicial interface between the UK courts and the ECHR substantiates the development of human rights law in that no domestic law violates human rights standards recognition.

Judicial Discretion and Development of Human Rights Law

Discretion, coined by the judiciary, leads to modifying legal principles to adjust to changes in our society’s viewpoint on rights. The situation of judicial deliberation in action is seen in the case of Moohan v Lord Advocate (2014), where judges have extreme levels of choice. The Scottish independence referendum voting rights for sentenced prisoners on temporary release are now contradictory because of the UK Supreme Court’s discretionary powers to exercise the right to vote. Through this process, the court not only showed its aptitude for interpreting and implementing human rights principles in a way fit for the changing social context of rights but also reinforced the power and autonomy of the legal system as a whole. With this ruling, courts demonstrate the evolution in human rights practice, and their role is to breathe life into the norm that is still relevant in our modern society.

The fact, though, is that in providing justice and safeguarding human rights, the judiciary is supposed to yield some discretion; it, too, is not free from its limitations. The statement made by the Lord Chancellor in Parliament on November 2, (2017) suggests the existence of a range of sophisticated mechanisms that need to be employed skillfully to ensure the mutuality of judicial autonomy and parliamentary sovereignty in human rights tools.The courts have some degree of autonomy or independence to define either and even expand human rights laws, but they remain ultimately constrained by delegated legal rules by the Parliament. This principle clearly states that democratic governance is based on the understanding of human rights issues between the judiciary and the legislature.

Additionally, law judges usually operate within the confines of the application of precedents set to statutory interpretation and principle law. Yet, judges have wide powers, though these are still determined by legal norms and doctrines that consider the decisions made. It brings consistency and certainty into existence as the end outcome of the judicial process so that stances are upheld just, ice in all. Judicial discretion is to be exercised within the context of the requirements of legality certainty and, thus, respect for the rule of law.

The preceding demonstrates that judicial discretion plays a central role in developing human rights law in the UK; it lets courts alter the legal principles to accommodate varied social dynamics. Nevertheless, such a broad discretion is bounded with concrete limitations, namely respecting parliamentary supremacy and using pre-established legal principles. Through the legal principle of judicial autonomy and legal constraints, the judiciary plays an essential role in preserving democracy, fairness, and, hence, the rule of law in the country.

Constraints on Judicial Freedom

The British judiciary plays a dominant part in the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, judicial freedom is faced with many constraints within the United Kingdom. Firstly, there are two main bottlenecks: the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the political considerations that impede the country’s limited role in innovation about human rights adjudiregardingn6. This dilemma of judicial activism and deference to legislative authority is a powerful force that overpowers the judiciary’s unfettered discretion concerning the interpretation and implementation of human rights law. A debate on weak-form review concerns this delicate balance between judicial independence and the politicians’ legislative will, which was also discussed by Kavanagh (2015).

Parliamentary supremacy, the UK’s fundamental lawmaking principle, states that Parliament is the supreme legislative authority and cannot be amended or reviewed by the judiciary. This rule handicaps the judiciary’s ability to strike down legislation that violates human rights. Even if the bill violates human rights, the judiciary cannot annul it. While the European Convention on Human Rights is also part of the Human Rights Act 1998, thereby supplanting into the domestic law, parliamentary sovereignty is the core principle; therefore, the courts only have the power to nullify a law on human rights grounds if Parliament has not set any policy on the human rights1. In this way, judges are exploring the difficult situation where human rights calls are confronted with legislative interference, and most of the time, they opt to be restraining towards conflicting enacted laws.

Besides, on political matters, judicial freedom is also limited in human rights judging. Judges have to function within the context of a broader social-political environment where public opinion, the political agenda of a government, and partisan interests can impact the outcome of a judicial process3. Political pressure may come in judicial appointments, public remarks against judicial decisions, and legislative attacks on judicial powers. Then judges might, in such a situation, experience implicit or explicit bias and may be more careful about interpreting and applying human rights law, especially in politically raw cases. This fact demonstrates the complicated interaction between law and politics in establishing the judiciary and justifying human rights.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the United Kingdom judiciary holds considerable scope and freedom to pronounce and craft human rights law as presented by its interpretative function, use of judicial discretion, and role in defining standards. While not unconditional, judicial independence must be balanced with political authority and other limitations. In the future, achieving an equilibrium between judicial innovation and supremacy of democratic processes will give the UK an upper hand in protecting human rights.

Bibliography

1. Human Rights Act 1998.
2. Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2), 74025/01 [2005] ECHR 681 (October 6 2005).
3. R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice, [2012] UKSC 63 [25]-[35]; [120]-[124].
4. Moohan v Lord Advocate, [2014] UKSC 67, [103]-[106].
5. Statement of the Lord Chancellor in Parliament, HC Deb 2nd Nov 2017, vol 630, cols 1007-1008. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/1680763233
6. Kavanagh, A. (2015). What’s so weak about “weak-form review”? The case of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13(4), 1008–1039. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov062