The objective nature of science is often seen in the fact that the acquisition and the pursuit of knowledge are based purely on empirical facts. On the other side, classical philosophers of science such as Kevin C. Elliott claim that values may be a crucial factor in scientific practice, influencing the decision from the interpretation of raw data and substantially affecting other options (Elliott 2022, 20). This discussion focuses on the Gap Argument, one of the fundamental arguments that validate this perspective. It afterwards critically analyzes the shortcomings surrounding it and the extent to which any other factors outside of an individual influence his/her intelligence.
The Gap Argument
“A value is epistemic just in case it is “indicative of truth or knowledge” (Elliott 2022, 4). For example, the hypothesis that the Earth is round is generally thought to exhibit the epistemic value of predictive accuracy. In other words, this hypothesis is likely to be true because it predicts several different phenomena. These phenomena include lunar eclipses, the Moon’s appearance, distant objects’ visibility on Earth’s surface, the observation of certain fixed stars from different locations on Earth, grid distortion near the Equator, weather systems’ behaviour, gravitational phenomena, and satellite data. ”
The Gap Arguments consist of the gap between evidence and theory. Different theories are given which may explain the same set of data, and the Duhem-Quine thesis holds the anchor for the gap arguments. It states that simply the observations do not have the intrinsic force to end the entire performance of the affirmation or remuneration of a given scientific theory (Elliott 2022). On the surface, it might sound like a simple observation. However, each observation becomes meaningful only context-dependent due to the overlapping of the vast infrastructure of auxiliary assumptions, background beliefs, and methodological choices. By referring to these auxiliary hypotheses, as Elliott proposes, they are like a structure dwelling on the bridge connecting the raw data with the theoretical conclusions built up from it. Think about cracking ancient cyphers; the symbols pinned on the wall could be for a forgotten language, the tongue of religion, or a code. As neutrality in itself, the inscription can be interpreted in different ways, which are governed by multiple auxiliary theories emerging from any bridge of hypotheses existing between an inscription and interpreted texts; this gap can become a breeding ground for implicit value interference as a mechanism that creates a path for influencing scientific practice. Elliott details further by looking at the historical case of Alfred Wegener’s Continental Drift idea to support this point. The initial evidence provided by Wegener, the continental fit and fossil distribution, served the new theory with equal competence when compared to counter theories like land bridges. Instead, Elliot argues that Wegener was driven by his belief in Earth’s dynamic crust, which stemmed from his past as a meteorologist and was responsible for his tireless fight to publish his scheme and promote its success.
On the whole, Wegener’s allegiance to non-empirical premises for his hypothesis of continental displacement may be Turning to industrialized countries and thinking of the field of environmental science. Therefore, it is evident that values – sustainability, social justice, and the like- may inspire scientists to pursue investigations of specific environmental issues, thereby propelling research efforts that, without those values, would not have been undertaken. Furthermore, by distinguishing the impact of values, science becomes more transparent, causing the community to evaluate personal incentives and bring more values onboard. According to Elliott (2022), every viable theory is supposed to be able to explain observations, be accurate in predicting, and be in harmony with adopted scientific knowledge.
Challenging The Gap Argument
The underlying thesis in the Gap Argument is the underdetermination thesis, championed by philosophers like Pierre Duhem and Willard Quine. Indeed, proponents of the Gap Argument maintain that several theories may potentially explain the same body of observations; this leaves a “gap” between evidence and theory selection (Duhem 1991). This implies that it is not always the facts on the ground that reveal what theories are acceptable; the selection may inadvertently be made through subjective values such as Elliott expresses this concern succinctly: The gap argument is concerned with the fact that values enable theory choice in science; therefore, objective science does not exist (Elliott 2022, 20). However, the gap argument fails to consider several important aspects of the scientific practice that limit this unspecified “gap” and threaten the absolute rule of values over the theory selection.
Secondly, practically, empirical constraints constitute some boundaries of the theoretical landscape, which confines the most probable selection of explanation (Giere and Laudan 1978). The laws of physics, well-known concepts, and all the accumulated knowledge tend to narrow down the set of theories that can be reconciled with the observed data. For example, the evolution theory must have a firm ground in thermodynamics and genetics, which limits the spectrum of its explanation significantly. This intrinsic structure in science reduces the improbability of random value-driven selection between enormously different explanations.
Thirdly, the Gap Argument assumes that value-driven decision selection choices exist in a vacuum, with scientists making personal selections about what they prefer as a theory because such preference is based on personal likes. On the other hand, scientific communities like the thesis carry out a severe note of review from other senior experts and open forums where the proof gives rise to a central component to evaluate and sharpen theories. Consensus is not brought into existence by values alone but by developing standards for assessing and judging evidence evaluation and critique (Longino 1990). For instance, the plate tectonics theory was raised from collective assessment, not misguided assessments, together with several exercises in detailed data analysis, model verification, and scientific discussion. Recognition of the shortcomings of the Gap Argument is different from joining in with total rejection of the questions it considered. It is understanding some nuances and counterarguments that involve a great differentiating factor.
Spectrum Of Values
Not all values are valued the same. Some of them, for instance, the elegance of simplicity, could be more objective, where people could interpret any openly preferred aspect, depending on their tolerance. Some would be provided with an objective background, such as the internal consistency or coherence with the ‘known body of knowledge.’ Realizing this continuum allows us to see that values do not strictly determine science but shape scientific practice differently at various points of potential bias. On the other hand, appreciating clarity could result in neglecting seemingly unintuitive but ultimately most precise explanations.
Power Dynamics
Individual values are the main focus of the Gap Argument. However, power dynamics between people, state, and society determine the points of scientific praxis. The power of framing questions or setting research agendas may be greater in majority groups while still allowing for the preference of outcomes that favour such groups in interpreting evidence. Taking on these power relationships is essential in having a scientific enterprise that is only partially objective and inclusive. For instance, past bias regarding marginalized groups continued to be excluded in certain spheres has indeed capped the realm of scientific investigation.
Limits of Objectivity
Although the restrictions and measures noted above represent a good starting point for accomplishing absolute objectivity in science, such an ideal, under all circumstances, might be unachievable. Bias still operationalizes on the conscious and unconscious level and influences scientific judgments. These challenges remind us to be humble while prompting the scientific community to engage in more profound critiques. For instance, scientists risk confirmation bias when accepting evidence corroborating their current theories and dismissing conflicting data.
Conclusion
Finally, as the Gap Argument reveals, an oversimplified view is made of the connection between values and evidence in science. While values are influential, they do not dictate an unswerving path, nor are they randomly deployed. Awareness of the dynamics of values, evidence, shared methodological standards, and the constraints in attaining total objectivity would enable a deeper understanding of scientific practice. Awareness of possible biases, efforts toward the culture of inclusion, and persistent optimization of its practice standards can help the scientific community summarize valid, objective, and valuable information for all humankind. Though this knowledge is not absolute, it is essential in discerning the society.
Bibliography
Cartwright, N. 1999. The Talons of the Hawk: Explanation and Inference in Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Duhem, P. 1991. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (P. P. Wiener, Trans.). Princeton University Press.
Elliott, Kevin C. 2022. Values in Science. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009052597.
Giere, R. N. 1999. Explaining Science: People and Data. University of Chicago Press.
Giere, Ronald N., and Larry Laudan. 1978. “Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth.” The American Historical Review 83 (3): 688. https://doi.org/10.2307/1861852.
Longino, H. E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Theory and Practice of Science. Princeton University Press.
Nickles, Thomas. 2013. “In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science,” 497–506.
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