Abstract
Earnings management refers to the process of altering accounting practices to misrepresent the performance of an organization. Smoothing earnings or meeting targets are achieved by taking hefty one-time charges, shifting revenues across periods and cutting discretionary expenditures. This leads to poor quality, reliability and faithful representation of financial reports and misguiding stakeholders. Academic models allow for discovering possible earnings manipulation based on discretionary accruals, measures of actual activity changes, and statistical distribution analysis. Implementing IFRS reduces flexibility in certain local GAAPs, but management can still misjudge the judgment needed under principle-based IFRS. Good governance and ethical culture reinforce IFRS adoption by discouraging aggressive accounting in firms with oversight bodies, independent monitoring, and a focus on transparency. Regulators ensure IFRS compliance while boards and executives establish integrity values. Nonetheless, sloppy enforcement enables loopholes. Short-term earnings engineering is countered by continuous monitoring and deterrents such as clawbacks.
Earnings management practices lower the comparability between reporting periods and firms, obscure performance variability, and corrupt risk estimates and managerial incentives. High-profile fraud cases have shown how much market cost can be incurred when manipulation is unravelled. Statistics, ratios, and discontinuity analysis allow for identifying anomalies in revenue recognition, write-offs, accruals, and actual operating activities. Global accounting convergence under IFRS facilitates international comparison, but localized applications differ. Governance, internal controls and ethical culture are necessary to eliminate discretionary behaviour. Standards are optimal flexibility; over-prescription has holes, while too many principles allow misjudgment. Finance professionals and whistleblowers support external oversight, but separation from top management remains challenging.
Introduction
Earnings management involves manipulating accounting methods to generate financial statements that overstate the positive nature of a company’s business activities and financial situation. Dechow et al. (2012) stated that to smooth out earnings or achieve specific accounting-based goals; companies use strategies including taking hefty one-time charges, timing the recognition of revenues and expenses over time, eliminating necessary long-term expenditures, and the sale of loss-making assets. These practices pose a significant barrier to quality financial reporting. They undermine vital elements of relevance, faithful representation, neutrality, and comparability that underlie the value of accounting information to investors and stakeholders (Lo, 2018). Therefore, inconsistent earnings figures distort capital allocation, mask risks, corrupt incentives, and ultimately destroy investor confidence in capital markets when discovered.
Earnings Management Concept and how Companies Engage in such Practices
Earnings management is the practice of accounting techniques used to distort financial statements and mislead investors about the actual economic performance of the company (Dechow et al., 2012). Companies practice various activities classified under the earnings management category to accomplish analyst expectations, meet bonus targets, create smooth trending earnings during reporting periods, avoid losses or sharp decreases in net income, and many more short-term financial objectives. Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic (2018) noted that the methods applied for the management of earnings include the taking of large “big bath” charges all at once to reduce the assets and to shift future expenses to the current period, delayed needed expenditures on maintenance, research and development or advertising to future periods to increase current earnings, sale of investments or assets which have built-in gains to realize profits now, shifting revenues and expenses across periods Such actions on earnings management do not uphold the quality, reliability, transparency, and fidelity representation of the company’s underlying financial performance as shown in the financial reports (Bouaziz, 2020). The misreported documents misguide the stakeholders, such as investors, creditors, regulators, and employees, on the actual economic standing and the performance of the company. Earnings management undermines the essential purpose of financial reporting to furnish relevant information for decision-making to these stakeholders regarding a company’s financial situation and performance.
Earnings management involves manipulating short-term earnings using discretionary accounting choices and transaction structuring instead of adjusting to underlying economic business performance. According to Dechow et al. (2012) research, it is usually to meet investor’s expectations and increase stock price. The organization’s managers use flexibility in the accounting standards to manipulate earnings up or down through accrual techniques and the manipulation of actual activities. Accrual techniques are methods of changes in accounting estimates and policies that alter the date of expense recognition. For instance, companies can accelerate the depreciation process to reduce depreciation expense in the current period or shift between LIFO and FIFO inventory accounting to increase or decrease the cost of goods sold (Gerakos, 2012). The manipulation of actual activities means reducing operating business activities such as cutting discretionary expenditures on research and development, advertising or maintenance to meet short-term earnings goals (Efendi et al., 2023). These strategies might only be a short-term positive that will ruin long-term value creation and hide actual economic performance. Regulators want to limit the aggressive methods used in earnings management to enhance the quality of financial reporting.
Various academic models and methods have been developed to identify potential earnings management. Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic (2018) noted that the most popular models among accounting researchers are the Modified Jones and performance-matched discretionary accruals models. The Modified Jones model divides the total accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary components. The discretionary part is viewed as a proxy for earnings management, as managers have more discretion over this portion of accruals. However, performance-matching compares a firm’s accruals in a given period with other firms that have the same operational performance in the same period (Dechow et al., 2012). Divergence in accruals from these matched peers shows possible earnings management.
Along with accruals-based earnings management, researchers have also created models for identifying actual activity manipulation. This may involve abnormally high production cuts, overproduction, and cuts in discretionary spending compared to industry peers in a given period (Gerakos, 2012). The development and refinement of these models has enhanced the capability of researchers, auditors and regulators to identify potential earnings management in all its manifestations. On the other hand, creating design techniques that can conclusively define intent and materiality behind potential manipulation is still a challenge.
Statistical techniques can also reveal possible earnings manipulation. Gorenc (2019) asserted that Bedford’s Law determines whether the distribution of digits in financial statement data is consistent with the expected natural distribution. This is because when humans fabricate data, they create numbers non-randomly; thus, deviations from Bedford’s Law may signify potential manipulation. Gorenc (2019) noted that the probability distribution analysis focuses on the likelihood of meeting vital earnings benchmarks (meeting/beating analyst forecasts or avoiding losses) and determines if there is an abnormally high probability, which could indicate earnings manipulation. Regression analysis links total accruals to other factors on the financial statements, such as cash flows, and identifies outliers or observations that do not conform to the expected relationship. Time series analysis looks at patterns in earnings over time and looks for discontinuities, abnormalities, or other anomalies that may indicate earnings management (Li et al., 2020). Though statistical approaches such as these can call attention to earnings numbers that warrant further investigation, interpretive judgment is still required (Baker et al., 2018). These quantitative methods identify anomalies in the data that may indicate manipulation, but additional analysis is necessary to determine if earnings management has occurred. For the e datasets, statistical tools automate delete detection of vicious numbers.
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has brought a new dynamic in the measurement and surveillance of earnings management techniques. On the other hand, IFRS is less flexible and managers’ discretion than many of the local GAAPs (Li et al., 2020). This limits some conventional ways to manipulate the earnings figures using accruals. Nevertheless, managers can still misuse the subjective estimates and judgments needed under IFRS standards (Efendi et al., 2023). In addition, the more principles-based nature of IFRS may require managers to make more decisions with discretion and a need for clarity in applying standards. This thus enables the continuation of earnings manipulation in most cases even after the transition. Therefore, scholars have observed diverse outcomes of the impacts of IFRS adoption on reducing earnings management practices across different national settings (Priscilla and Siregar, 2020). The effect is mainly on the quality of local enforcement institutions and auditing.
IFRS adoption needs to be complemented by strong corporate governance and ethical culture. Research suggests that IFRS adoption strongly restricts accrual-based earnings management in firms with robust governance systems, disciplinary monitoring, independent boards and audit committees, and a focus on transparency and ethics (Purwaningsih & Kusuma, 2020). More than rules-based standards are required with governance and ethics frameworks. Regulators are vital in facilitating not only IFRS but also enhanced supervision and enforcement to combat aggressive or fraudulent accounting practices. In particular, regulators should pay attention to the fact that companies have board members who are independent and capable of providing oversight of financial reporting and internal controls. Transparency in executive compensation, conflicts of interest, and related party transactions should also be mandated, as well as whistleblower protections, to foster an ethical culture (Lo, 2018). The auditors also need to observe independence and objectivity when evaluating how companies apply IFRS. Good governance and ethics fortified by IFRS will allow firms to engender investor confidence and responsibility.
Nevertheless, sloppy supervision allows businesses to evade the spirit of standards using loopholes or creative accounting. Hence, regulators should monitor compliance, probe abnormalities, and penalize offenders (Jha, 2017). The widespread adoption of both IFRS and accompanying governance mechanisms is essential for proper accounting.
Techniques Used to Detect Earnings Management Practices and How IFRS Influences Such Techniques
Financial reporting quality is hampered by earnings management in several ways. Dechow et al. (2012) noted that aggressive accounting affects profitability, hides the structural changes in the performance, and conceals the risks. This information asymmetry prevents the shareholders and creditors from correctly evaluating the financial condition and prospects of the company (Jha, 2017). This loss in transparency increases the cost of capital for firms since investors demand a higher risk premium and misallocate capital across entities and projects as funds flow to only some productive uses. In addition, Bouaziz (2020) asserted that earnings management distorts executive performance, leading to perverse incentives and distorted bonuses designed to reward managers for illusory accounting gains rather than actual value creation. It thus worsens agency conflict between managers and owners. Misaligned incentives can force executives to make decisions to increase accounting numbers in the short term but destabilize long-term value. Earnings management also destroys investors’ confidence in financial reports (Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic, 2018). After the revelation, aggressive accounting practices destroy the corporate reputation and share prices since markets use more significant uncertainty discounts. In conclusion, earnings management reduces transparency and stewardship, the two cornerstones of effective capital markets and corporate governance.
Earnings management reduces the reliability, faithful representation, verifiability, and objectivity of accounting numbers reflected in financial statements. Braswell and Daniels (2017) noted that earnings management occurs when companies manipulate the numbers to attain specific results instead of the numbers being accurate to represent underlying economics. This degrades the credibility of financial reporting as earnings are manipulated through discretionary decisions regarding accruals or actual operating activities, such as reduction of research and development that diminishes long-term value for the sake of short-term optics. For instance, a firm may attempt to cut R&D spending to boost current-period earnings, making the results appear better than the actual performance justifies Gorenc (2019). They cut down the genuine reflection of actual economics. Earnings management also undermines the similarity of financial statements across reporting periods for a given firm relative to the financial statements of other firms in the same industry that do not engage in such practices (Gerwanski, Kordsachia and Velte, 2019). When a company manipulates its earnings from one quarter to another, it becomes impossible to compare results over time to determine performance patterns—similarly, comparing firms that cook the books to those that do not reduce the effectiveness of accounting ratios and cross-section analysis. As a result, earnings management reduces all the essential attributes – relevance, reliability, comparability, and neutrality – that make accounting numbers valuable for decision-making.
Practices characterized as aggressive earnings management create distrust among the users of financial statements and, consequently, bring about the loss of confidence in capital markets (Gerakos, 2012). This is because if companies are involved in fraud in accounting or manipulations of earnings to meet targets or analysts’ forecasts, it is likely to erode people’s confidence in their financial statements. Such strategies of short-term gains numerically tend to raise stock prices for a while but soon come back to haunt companies as they need to restate results and correct them when inflated revenue or earnings must be reversed. In this stage, investors become more suspicious and risk-averse, leading to elevated demand for transparency and assurances in the firm’s financials. As a result, credit rating agencies lower firms whose earnings manipulation is proven to have been exposed. Thus, the cost of their capital increases as they are now considered risky investments (Gerwanski, Kordsachia and Velte, 2019). The broader market also needs more confidence from the investors as the market liquidity is compromised due to the lower volatility trading and reduced equity valuations. In the end, the shortsightedness of earnings manipulation can increase the cost of financing for companies, given that the short-term focus prevents them from growing long-term profits. This leads to overall weakening trust and confidence in capital markets globally.
Several accounting scams demonstrate how widespread earnings manipulation affects the functioning of financial markets. High-profile examples such as Enron and Worldcom clearly show the enormous risks associated with misleading practices in accounting that are designed to inflate revenues and profits artificially, smooth out fluctuations in earnings over time, disguise losses and liabilities and meet analyst consensus estimates of key financial metrics (Efendi et al., 2023). When fraud revelations are revealed, the enormous costs that shareholders, employees, creditors and other stakeholders must bear after restatements, value destruction and even bankruptcies highlight the need to detect and deter such earnings management machinations across the entire financial market (Revsine, Collins and Johnson, 2021). The key takeaways emphasize that companies must adopt robust governance structures, ethical cultures based on integrity, and hard-hitting enforcement regimes utilizing both internal controls and external oversight to combat best the ubiquitous risks posed by executive-suite and managerial-level accounting fraud committed in pursuit of unrealistic performance goals (Lo, 2018). Executives and regulators must be alert to red flags or early warning signs that indicate the development of systematic earnings manipulation and fraudulent financial reporting cases to protect investors and financial markets’ broader integrity.
How IFRS has Impacted Earnings Management Practices in Companies
The economic consequences of earnings management, which may be defined as manipulating accounting procedures to generate financial reports that have an overly optimistic impression of a firm’s financial situation and activities, are significant for firms, investors, workers, and society. When firms practice earnings management, resource allocation is skewed as capital flows to ventures based on creatively managed earnings rather than based on a judgment of the economic viability of the venture (Revsine, Collins and Johnson, 2021). Through engineered upturns in earnings and revenues, the stock prices are artificially inflated, allowing insider trading by executives who know the actual numbers and encouraging excessive executive compensation based on manipulated financials. In the aftermath, staff are typically laid off as the financial engineering eventually unravels after an acquisition or any other significant corporate action (Priscilla and Siregar, 2020), as a result of restatements, companies that are open to litigation by aggrieved investors, loss of corporate reputation and significantly lower credit ratings. Economics studies have shown that stopping widespread earnings manipulation through strengthened corporate governance reforms, disincentives for financial engineering, and global accounting convergence focused on transparency results in significant social welfare gains regarding correct firm valuation, efficient capital allocation, and fairness.
Many jurisdictions have, therefore, taken a harsh stance on accounting manipulation to punish errant managers. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002 following significant accounting frauds, dictates that CEOs and CFOs must repay bonuses and profits from stock sales if companies must restate earnings due to misconduct during their reigns (Robinson, 2020). These clawback provisions act as a deterrent to short-term earnings management to gain personal gain by forcing executives to return compensation if misconduct is discovered at a later date. In particular, the Act requires that incentive-based payments, including stock sale profits, that were initially awarded on inaccurate financial statements must be returned by executives of public companies (Baker et al., 2018). In addition to clawbacks, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates jail sentences for willful breaches of securities laws connected with accounting fraud and financial statement tampering. Nonetheless, despite the threat of clawbacks and jail time, such enforcement remains uneven across firms, calling for more rigorous regulatory oversight bodies and more extensive whistleblower protections to support compliance with accounting rules and principles (Purwaningsih and Kusuma, 2020). Regulators remain committed to shutting loopholes in which some executives receive compensation from gains made through ephemeral earnings peaks from manipulating financial statements.
The accounting standards setters have a significant role in developing guidelines and principles to minimize loopholes and discretion that facilitate earnings management. If accounting standards are too principles-based with scant implementation guidance, it leaves room for companies and managers to have more flexibility, which can be used to manipulate earnings inappropriately (Robinson, 2020). More prescriptive, rules-based standards can be helpful to limit this discretion because they provide clear definitions, criteria for recognition, and strict measurement criteria. However, there are also disadvantages to overly rigid, rules-based standards. For instance, they may allow firms to organize transactions by the standard in technical terms but avoid the purpose of such transactions. This shows the balance between principles-based and rules-based standards (Rudiawarni an Budianto, 2022). The standard-setters should strive to achieve an ideal balance that limits manipulation and discretion while allowing for a reasonable degree of flexibility and consistency with accounting principles. Both ends provide opportunities for earnings management manipulation or loopholes. It is a crucial buo tricky job for standard-setters to develop guidance, which helpo achieve this delicate balance.
Auditors play a significant role in the analysis of financial statements to identify cases of possible earnings management and to ensure that accounts reflect the actual economic realities. But auditors sometimes face incentives to go along with aggressive accounting practices when corporate managers offer high-paying consulting contracts to their audit firms and have sway over recommending auditor appointments and retention (PWC, 2017). To address this conflict of interest, Gorenc (2019) noted that regulations have set stringent independence rules for auditors, mandatory audit firm rotation, limitations on non-audit services auditors can provide, and the requirement for empowered and competent audit committees to supervise auditors. Moreover, an overarching culture, commitment to audit quality, and professional skepticism can also discourage collusive and negligently poor auditing. Still, no matter how complex, conscientious, independent, and competent the auditors are, they cannot entirely prevent more sophisticated and inventive methods of earnings manipulation and financial statement distortion that technically satisfy reporting standards and accounting rules (Robinson, 2020). Therefore, several complementary approaches through different regulations, corporate governance, professional standards, and education protect the audit integrity, but risks still exist in relying on auditor judgment.
The role of financial analysts and media is complementary to that of auditors by helping to scrutinize earnings quality and point out potential earnings manipulations. Analysts’ reports that unveil tactics like income smoothing, cookie jar accounting, and other tricks force firms to improve their financial reporting procedures and furnish better information to investors (Robinson, 2020). In the same vein, revelations by investigative reporting on aggressive or dubious accounting practices can result in restatements and broader changes in corporate governance management. Nevertheless, financial analysts are not immune from pressures that can compromise their independence in their evaluations of firms – for instance, analysts may be reluctant to publish overly negative reports that may alienate management teams. They may lead to their firms losing valuable investment banking business (OECD, 2015). Therefore, effective measures to ensure the analyst and press independence are necessary. Striking the right balance is challenging but crucial, since analysts and the media may act as watchdogs in addition to auditors and regulators to support better quality financial reporting. Auditors, analysts, press, and other players have complementary but different roles in ensuring earnings quality and transparency for investors and the whole economy.
Firms ‘ internal auditors and audit committees serve as the frontline monitors of earnings management risks. Although external oversight is critical, insiders privy to accounting judgments and top-level communications are best at detecting early signs of potential manipulation. Whistleblower support, internal audit independence, and skilled finance professionals on audit committees helps these gatekeepers (Baker et al., 2018). On the other hand, internal monitors are still dependent on top management for resources, IFRS convergence makes it possible to use cross-country benchmarks and techniques for detecting earnings management internationally. Comparing earnings management behaviors across different accounting regimes under local GAAPs was difficult (Turner, 2020). IFRS provides a uniform baseline for developing globally comparable detection models based on discretionary accruals, actual activities metrics, and statistical tests (Rudiawarni & Budianto, 2022). Regulators and researchers can now better monitor for earnings manipulation and compare relative levels across countries. Nevertheless, localization and incomplete adoption of IFRS in some countries still need to be improved.
The critical complements to IFRS adoption are strong corporate governance and ethical culture. Research reveals that shifts to IFRS curtail accrual-based earnings manipulation best in firms with robust governance mechanisms, disciplinary monitoring, independent boards and audit committees, and emphasis on transparency and ethics (Purwaningsih & Kusuma, 2020). More than rules-based standards are required on their own; they must be supplemented with governance and ethical frameworks to enforce compliance and responsibility. It is the role of the regulators to ensure that not only are IFRS implemented but also enhanced regulatory and enforcement to check aggressive or fraudulent accounting practices (Turner, 2020). Yet governance and ethics cannot be regulated into place- they need acceptance and advocacy from every level of an organization. As such, boards and executives should walk the talk by demonstrating these values through transparency, integrity, and stewardship (Baker et al., 2018). They must create a defined set of policies, controls, and codes of conduct and shape an ethical corporate culture using incentives, messaging, training, and “tone from the top.” Employees should abide by these principles, knowing that misconduct has penalties. Thus, effective governance and ethics help to support IFRS adoption by enabling quality financial reporting throughout the organization. Although rules are the starting point, behaviors are the determinants of outcomes.
Conclusion
In summary, earnings management has become rampant due to flexibility and discretion in accrual accounting and principles-based standards. The statistics and financial statement analysis assists in determining the possible cases to be reviewed. Adopting IFRS limits some options for manipulation due to strict recognition and measurement principles, but other judgment areas remain susceptible to abuse with weak governance. Rules-based guidelines designed to eliminate loopholes must be balanced with principles that prevent over-prescription while allowing the validity of the accounts. Apart from standards, an ethical culture founded on transparency and stewardship dissuades misconduct. Independent directors’ oversight, skepticism-based audit, analysts’ questions regarding inconsistencies, and internal whistleblowing provide such scrutiny of financial reporting that its quality and responsibility to investors are maintained. If monitoring is carried out across regulatory and corporate governance, the integrity of information that reduces information asymmetry and permits efficient capital allocation decisions can be maintained despite the temptations to manage earnings.
Moving forward, standard setters must evaluate new techniques and trends in earnings management because companies’ methods constantly change to evade new regulations. The regulatory guidance has to change with time to address the more contemporary forms of accounting manipulation emerging as precedents grow in the grey areas. Auditing standards and training should also make the practitioners sensitive to red flags and suspicious activity with the help of real-life cases and outliers to enhance professional scepticism. Firms that adopt IFRS should give equal consideration to establishing strict governance systems, internal controls, auditing committees that can independently oversee external auditors, executive compensation clawback, and supported whistleblowing. Tone from the top is crucial, so transparency and ethics must be embedded in leadership messaging, decision frameworks, performance metrics, and code of conduct for employees. Regular monitoring to control earnings management is necessary to maintain the quality of financial reporting.
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