Introduction
At the peak of the Korean War in April 1951, Harry Truman rocked the political system in the United States and amazed the world by dismissing General Douglas MacArthur. Most people outside the United States didn’t know that the president could fire a five-star general, and many Americans didn’t think Truman had the guts to do it. However, Truman did dismiss MacArthur, whose criticism of the president had become increasingly public. After China joined the hostilities in Korea in late 1950, MacArthur intended to escalate the conflict. MacArthur felt the president was restricting his options by banning the bombing of China, which he saw as a waste of lives and a threat to freedom for the United States.
President Harry S. Truman removes General Douglas MacArthur from command of U.S. forces in Korea in what is arguably the most legendary civilian-military confrontation in American history. Truman was still determined to maintain the struggle in Korea as a “limited war,” despite the momentary outcry that the dismissal of MacArthur caused.
Months of tension between the troops and the flashy and self-centred General MacArthur they had built up. South Korea was saved from the communist North Korean invasion in the early stages of the war (which began in June 1950) because of the General’s clever strategies and tactical maneuvers. MacArthur advocated for advancing into North Korea to utterly defeat the communist forces when U.S. and U.N. forces turned the tide of combat in Korea. Truman agreed with the proposal but was concerned that the People’s Republic of China’s communist government would view the invasion as an act of hostility and intervene. MacArthur spoke with Truman in October 1950, reassuring him that China’s intervention chances were low. Then, in November and December of 1950, thousands of Chinese soldiers invaded North Korea and threw themselves against American lines, forcing the Americans to retreat to South Korea. To counter the communist People’s Republic of China, MacArthur requested permission to bomb their country and deploy Nationalist Chinese forces from Taiwan. Truman categorically rejected these demands, and an extremely public battle ensued. Truman dismissed MacArthur and substituted him with General Matthew Ridgway in April 1951. Is it possible that Truman and MacArthur disagreed on approaching the Korean War, leading to MacArthur’s dismissal? This essay supports the claims. Ultimately, Truman and General MacArthur had different strategies for the Korean War, but that wasn’t the only reason for MacArthur’s departure.
Thesis Statement
Historical Background
The world was still nursing its wounds from World War II in 1945. The prospect of being involved in World War Three was terrifying. The Cold War erupted just two short years after WWII had ended. The Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 57 other countries were all founding members of the United Nations, which was established as a forum to avert future hostilities. The United States took a hard line in response to the Soviet Union’s strong promotion of communism.
Hostilities broke out when the NKPA crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korean territory. Although the United States was committed to its containment policy, it could not turn a blind eye to the communist menace in Asia. However, neither the president nor the American people wanted a protracted conflict. President Truman chose General Douglas MacArthur to lead American forces in South Korea. MacArthur was a military hero when he arrived at his command in 1945 because of the many troops he had led to victory. After leading the Allies to victory over Japan in World War II, he was promoted to Supreme Commander. MacArthur enjoyed widespread admiration and respect in the United States.
The general promised the president that American forces in Korea would be home for Christmas. Initially, MacArthur pushed North Korean soldiers back beyond the 38th Parallel. However, he made a controversial step when he advised striking Chinese cities, allegedly assisting the North Korean army and continued pushing the North Koreans further north. While advocating for a broader fight, MacArthur minimized the potential for starting a major war in Asia.
Signing a ceasefire along the 38th Parallel was not President Truman’s first choice, but preserving lives was his priority. A ceasefire was not an option in General MacArthur’s eyes. There was an altercation between the two males. For Truman, the war was a chance to halt the development of communism in South Korea. MacArthur saw the conflict as a chance to free the North from communist domination and took an uncompromising stance to achieve this goal.
Findings
The President vs. The General:
Centanni N.G’s article talks about President Harry S. Truman versus General Douglas MacArthur and what led to MacArthur’s firing. On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman declared that General Douglas MacArthur’s service would be terminated. He was widely believed to be let go because of his outspoken criticism of Truman’s approach to the Korean War. MacArthur served for over 50 years before being named the Commander in Chief of U.N. Forces in July 1950. Upon his return home, he was greeted by grateful people and a record-breaking parade.
Priority Based on Location
Dennis Wainstock (1999) finds that Truman and MacArthur had different opinions regarding geographic concerns. The Korean War, in Truman’s eyes, was a lower priority than the fight against communism in Europe, and he worried that diverting too many resources there would leave Europe vulnerable to a Soviet invasion. On the other hand, MacArthur thought that the Korean War should take precedence over everything else. As previously discussed, he thought the communism problem would be solved in Asia.
Disobedience, Skepticism, and News Articles
According to John Wiltz (1978), Chiang Kai-shek proposed a force of 25,000 soldiers to keep the communist Chinese at bay. MacArthur went to Formosa and met with Kai-shek despite Truman’s warnings that doing so would worsen matters. He then waited nearly a week before reporting back to the United States. This, combined with Kai-insinuation she’s of a secret agreement with the General, contributed to the Truman administration’s mistrust of MacArthur. Truman saw this as yet another instance of subversion.
Gilbert’s 2000 research agrees about MacArthur’s Insubordination; without permission from the Truman administration, MacArthur had the Air Forces destroy the Yalu River bridges on November 6, 1950. Truman authorized the airstrikes after the order was made, which further fueled suspicion.
Truman’s frustration with MacArthur largely stemmed from the General’s habit of publicly criticizing the president. He was forthright in his mistrust of Truman’s strategic judgment regarding Korea. He claimed to the press that Truman harmed him by preventing him from attacking China. MacArthur wrote a letter in June 1950 that was read at a yearly Veterans of Foreign Wars event (VFW). He criticized the Truman administration’s Formosa policy in the letter. Truman responded defensively, insisting that the United States had no plans to build a base on Formosa. Truman insisted that MacArthur take back his statement, and the General complied, but the damage had already been done. Truman then insisted that MacArthur checks with Washington before making public statements, but MacArthur refused.
Military Tactics in the Korean Conflict
Allen Potter (1972) said MacArthur and Truman’s strategies diverged significantly during the Korean War. MacArthur advocated a “victory” strategy for the war, while Truman favoured a “limited war” approach. When it came to communist aggression in Korea, Truman’s goal was containment rather than punishment of the perpetrators. To demonstrate American might and put an end to communism in the Far East, MacArthur proposed an attack on China and the use of nuclear weapons against China and North Korea.
The Truman administration was on the fence about supporting MacArthur’s plan to land at Inchon, codenamed Operation CHROMITE. The North Koreans’ supply lines were successfully cut, and their forces were scattered due to this manoeuvre. Then, with no one guarding the centre, the X Corps and the 8th Army pushed up the left and right coasts. Chinese forces quickly engulfed a large portion of both forces after they crossed the border despite warnings from Chinese authorities that the United States does not send troops to the border. A violent conflict broke out between communist Chinese forces and U.N. and Korean allies. MacArthur considered the attack from communist China a new war and thought Truman should use all of America’s military might against the Chinese. But Truman sought to negotiate a truce with China. James, D. Clayton agrees on this point.
Last Resort
The PRC first extended peace overtures in January 1951. China requested a conference of the seven major powers to discuss the future of Korea, Formosa, and China’s place in the United Nations. John Spanier (2013) writes Despite the PRC’s offer of peace; the United States refused to accept it because it believed the Chinese nationalists on Formosa to be the legitimate government of China. Instead, the United Nations condemned the PRC for aggression at Truman’s insistence.
MacArthur made the independent decision to irritate the Chinese further. His decision to issue a request to the PRC in March came after he still needed to consult with Washington. The Chinese were ordered to pull back their troops by MacArthur’s orders. In the alternative, he threatened to bring China to its knees. MacArthur’s attempt to unilaterally define and influence U.S. policy infuriated Truman, and the president ultimately decided to fire MacArthur. But Truman waited, and Congress approved NATO in early April of 1951, showing they were on board with Truman’s Europe-first policy. The ultimatum incident had grown stale, and Truman needed a new pretext to dismiss MacArthur.
According to Gilbert 2014, A congressman learned within a few months of MacArthur’s plan to use Chinese Nationalist forces from Formosa in the Korean War because of a leak from MacArthur. It goes against Truman’s diplomatic policies and would only inflame the PRC further. Truman began discussing MacArthur’s dismissal with the JCS after Representative Joseph W. Martin read the General’s message to Congress (Joint Chiefs of Staff). The Truman Administration first proposed negotiating a truce with China in March 1951. After hearing about this plan, on March 24, 1951, General MacArthur issued an ultimatum to China. He wrote that China’s military might be exaggerated and that he would negotiate a peace settlement with them if they shared the same goals as the United Nations in Korea. Truman was outraged, and it was clear that the Chinese felt insulted. He knew he couldn’t put up with MacArthur’s behaviour and, with the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided to fire him.
Meanwhile, according to Pearlman 2008, General Matthew Ridgway was enforcing the Eighth Army’s position in a good area about 20 miles north of the 38th Parallel as part of Operation Rugged. Many U.S. military officials were expecting another PRC offensive, and Ridgway was preparing for it. The JCS was concerned that MacArthur’s lack of diplomacy in the face of such an attack could escalate the situation and bring about World War III. Truman fired MacArthur on April 11, 1951, after receiving unanimous support for the decision from the JCS.
Conclusion
By early 1951, Truman was eager to end the Korean War, which had grown tiresome for Americans. Truman was infuriated by MacArthur’s threat to the PRC because it only strengthened China’s resolve to continue fighting. MacArthur’s unreliability grew as he increasingly made decisions without first consulting Washington, even though his prediction that Stalin and the USSR would avoid a war with the United States was correct. It’s unclear what prompted MacArthur’s erratic behaviour, but sensing the end of his career, he sought martyrdom. Some might say he was trying to get fired to become a Republican hero and run for president. Regardless, MacArthur disregarded direct orders to exercise restraint and diplomacy from the President at Wake Island. It’s strange that MacArthur, charged with protecting the country, would disobey his constitutional duty to serve his commander-in-chief. American politics are heavily based on upholding the constitutional order.
Truman made a brilliant move by allying himself with the JCS in their fight against MacArthur. MacArthur, a Republican Party hero and an enormously popular figure in American politics, was immune to arbitrary dismissal. After MacArthur’s firing, many Republican members of Congress began suggesting they could remove Truman through impeachment, so it was very smart of Truman to consult with the JCS. Truman was spared impeachment thanks to the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the highest military authority in the United States. While prudent personally, Truman’s actions had far-reaching political consequences. The JCS became a political force it hadn’t been before because of its support for Truman, which may have prevented his impeachment. In the following decades, presidents sought the JCS’s counsel on military decisions to limit political fallout in the event of a failed operation.
MacArthur’s backers were justified in feeling betrayed by his firing. MacArthur was an indispensable leader in the Pacific theatre of World War II and the architect of the successful landing at Inchon that helped end the Korean War. They had a right to be upset with the fairly rude way Truman, thanks to his botched transmission, had dismissed this General who had dedicated so much of his life to fighting for the U.S., even if they acknowledged that some of his recent decisions, such as crossing the 38th Parallel or making unilateral threats against the PRC, were not well thought out. After being fired, MacArthur returned to the United States to extravagant parades and celebrations in San Francisco and New York. Historians need help reconciling MacArthur’s contradictory actions and legacy. He was a military genius who did great work for America and a narcissist who disobeyed superiors and led the country into unnecessary conflicts.
Bibliography
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Gilbert, Robert. “Douglas MacArthur: Disordered Narcissist.” Constructing the Past 15, no. 1 (2014): 5.
James, D. Clayton. Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War. No. 24. United States Air Force Academy, 1982.
Patterson, Amy, Wynell Schamel, and LEE ANN POTTER. “Truman’s firing of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War.” Social Education 64, no. 7 (2000): 441-441.
Pearlman, Michael D. Truman, and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. Indiana University Press, 2008.
Pollard, James E. “President Truman and the Press.” Journalism Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1951): 457–468.
Potter, Allen R. The Truman-MacArthur controversy, a study in political-military relations. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1972.
Spanier, John W. “The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War.” In The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. Harvard University Press, 2013.
Weinstock, Dennis. Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War. No. 176. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999.
Wiltz, John Edward. “Truman and MacArthur: The Wake Island Meeting.” The Journal of Military History 42, no. 4 (1978): 169.
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