Introduction
In the early 1980s, bold reforms and recalibration of foreign policy are attributed to the pivotal moments in Soviet History during Gorbachev’s era. With the aim of promoting political liberalisation and tackling economic inefficiencies, various concepts such as perestroika, meaning restructuring, and Glasnost, meaning openness, were integrated. Facing the fast-changing new international environment with the declining ideological significance of classical Marxist-Leninist ideology and new types of problems, Gorbachov advocated for reforms domestically as well as abroad. The essay, therefore, shall explore the contribution made by Gorbachev’s reforms on the reshaping of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, revealing the interplay between domestic transformations and diplomatic initiatives.
Economic Collapse and Reassessment of Foreign Commitments
Until the late 20th century, the economic downfall of the Soviet Union was responsible for the major evaluation of Russia’s foreign commitments. The economic downturn was a key factor that determined the course of events in Soviet foreign policy. This forced Soviet leaders to adjust their global interactions, which brought about a long-term change in Soviet foreign policy.However, one of the most significant milestones was the Afghan-Soviet war, which took place between 1979 and 1998. The motives behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were the great power’s considerations and the aspiration to remain influential. Thus, the protracted and costly war turned out to be a devastating drain on the economy, which was already in a state of collapse. War has shown fundamental weaknesses of the Soviet military power and has been a major factor in the domestic disillusionment, as well as the formation of a growing international criticism.
The CPSU-led policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, modelled after the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, further raised questions about Soviet interests abroad. Perestroika aimed at reevaluation and replenishment of the Soviet economy, and the Glasnost tried to expand transparency and civil society. These reforms resonate deeply in Soviet ideology and international communications (Rubinstein,1987). Domestic changes and openness to foreign nations made the Soviets pay attention to their internal reforms and also foreign policy goals.One of the consequences of the economic fallout in the Soviets was the loss of traditional socialist support for the Third World nations. Through these conditions, the finances of the Soviet Union became increasingly strained, which made it harder to continue to subsidise allies and satellite states with financial and political support (Rubinstein,1987). This elimination of the support from other countries weakened the Soviet Union’s hold on the developing countries and provided opportunities for the rival powers, especially the United States, to expand their influence.
As the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its global engagements started, client states realised the US reliance in order to maintain their previous status. However, without the support of the Soviet Union, those who had been used to the Soviet support had to look for alternative suppliers of equipment and sources of aid. The others sought help from the United States and other allies, playing an even more negative role in Soviet influence in key regions of the world. The Soviet Union’s economic implosion, in retrospect, necessitated a major change in the direction of foreign policy, which eventually resulted in the paradigm shift of Soviet foreign policy (Rubinstein, 1987). The issues of the Soviet-Afghan War, Perestroika and Glasnost reforms, and the receding of other left states from the third world were among the most crucial factors that worked out the change of Soviet engagements all over the world in this transition time.
Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” and its Implications
For many years, the Soviet leaders’ stance had been rather firm, and they had been sticking to an openly confrontational approach. With Mikhail Gorbachev taking office as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the world begins to see a noticeable change from this former pattern to the concepts of “New Thinking” in foreign affairs. This change served as a result of a combination of internal and external factors, such as the economic falter experienced within the Soviet Union, which impeded its growth, and the attempt to establish good relations with the West (Golan, 1992). Gorbachev’s strategic ideological moves that were aimed at appeasement of Western interests were not tactical demands but the realisation of the need to change. The Soviet Union’s weakening power during the tenure of Gorbachev put to the test the party’s ideology, further urging the USSR’s passive stance in the Cold War (Vasiliev, 2018). Economic hardships alongside the arms race with the United States provided the Soviet economy with a serious challenge, forcing the Soviet leaders to review their priorities. Gorbachev realised that fighting the West even further could worsen the current situation, as deterrence and weapons control agreements could finally come true.
This Gulf War of 1990-1991 became a severe manifestation of Gorbachev’s authority in the global arena fading away in the background. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s importance decreased to a large extent. Hence, the conflict undoubtedly showed the fading strategic importance of Third World states, the United States, and others exerting their power in the aftermath (Golan, 1992). The failure to enact the desired scenario by Gorbachev was indicative not only of the geopolitical realities of that time but also the capability of the US to play a role outside its zone of interests. As a result of these changes, Gorbachev started to implement diplomatic engagement with Middle-Eastern conservatives such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike the old associations with Iraq and Syrian regimes, these new contracts represent a new stage in the international relations of the region. This change is explained by the changing trend in the region. Through strengthening relationships with the moderate Arab regimes, Gorbachev intended to ensure the presence of the Soviet Union in that area as well as to prevent damaging consequences that were caused by the Soviet Union’s decline.
Gorbachev himself met substantial hindrances in his attempt to reconsider the international environment. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended in a fundamental overhaul of the world order and created Russia as a weaker state (Golan, 1992). The ascent of the United States as the remaining super-state has more or less pushed Moscow to the margins of international affairs, therefore distributing the power to shape events outside of Russia. The most illustrative example is Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking”, which reflected a strategic change of approach towards meeting the West’s interests, mostly prompted by Moscow’s diminishing position and easing of tensions between the divided camps (Golan, 1992). Nevertheless, his reduced presence on the global scene, demonstrated by events such as the Gulf War, underlined the different powers of international relations in the post-Cold War world. Gorbachev’s re-orientation in diplomacy with conservative Gulf States was a reflection of efforts to change the new reality, although it was not powerful enough to stop the decline of the Soviet Union.
Shifts in Alliances and Influences
The story of Soviet alliances with extreme Arab states is a saga filled with passionate ideology, geopolitical games, and a quest for power. The Soviet Union experienced a range of alliances, ideals, and diplomatic choices ranging from pragmatic diplomacy to revolutionary zeal from the initial Cold War days to the end of the Communist leadership under Gorbachev. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, relying on anti-colonialism and socialist ideologies, managed to develop strong bonds with radical Arab states, which were at the core of its geopolitical sphere of interest. The leaders of Arab states such as Egypt and Syria, personified by Nasser and Assad, respectively, viewed the USSR as a useful partner for their resistance against Western domination and Israeli expansionism. Moscow provided arms deals, economic aid, and military help to Cairo and Damascus, which were locked into a geopolitical strategic partnership that gave direction to the politics of the region.
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 20th century, the political ground of the Middle East experienced colossal transformations. The strengthening of the conservatism of the Arab states under the leadership of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies posed a serious threat of overturning the previously existing influence of the Soviet Union in the region (Vasiliev, 2018). These monarchies, sceptical of Soviet assistance for revolutionary movements and leaning towards the West, were unwilling to take sides. Such recovery of Soviet diplomatic relations with the conservative Arab states symbolised the drastic change in Soviet interests against the Soviet’s previous traditional alliances. Owing to the new world order, Gorbachev denounced the traditional approach of the Soviet foreign policy in favour of the new approach. Through efforts to attract the same constituents from the Middle East as adversaries, Gorbachev tried to expand Soviet influence and open doors for new ways of cooperation.
The alignment with the western world was the main pillar of Gorbachev’s strategic policy. Sweeping through the Soviet Union, a wind of change required the reappraisal of traditional alliances and a call for a revision of the global power structure. Aiming at the détente with the United States and to the engagement with Western Europe, Gorbachev wanted to soften the icy grip of the Cold War and to identify new paths of cooperation. This had repercussions that spread beyond even the borders of the USSR. In the Middle East, this realignment of alliances changed the balance of power completely and paved the way towards future conflicts (Vasiliev, 2018). With the decline of Soviet influence in the region, the United States began to flourish as a superpower. This gave wings to conservative Arab countries to reduce their enmity with Israel. However, the Soviet footprint in the Middle East remains, and it influences contemporary geopolitics. From the Syrian civil war to talks with Iran about nuclear deals, echoes of old alliances established by the Soviet Union during the Cold War are still to be found in Moscow, Washington and other capitals.
The Impact of Removing Stalin’s Ban on Jewish Immigration on Soviet-Israeli Diplomatic Relations
1991 was a year when the world saw a historical development – the start of diplomatic negotiations between Israel and the Soviet Union. Through this historical event, the two countries were free from the years of alienation and hostility that had persisted since the war’s end. Consequently, the importance of this reconciliation could not be denied, given the profoundly complicated past that had long characterised their relations. To grasp the significance of Israeli-Soviet Union relations normalisation, it is vital to be aware of the roots of Soviet policy on Jewish immigration. Stalin’s dictatorship was characterised by mass oppression and anti-Semitic discrimination among them. Stalin’s decision to restrict the Jewish immigration movement manifested in a whole bunch of different ways, both for the Jewish Soviet population and for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
Stalin used repressive methods in relation to Jewish people as part of the discriminatory policy of this authoritarian regime. Jewish people witnessed custody, torture, and random prison sentences. Hence, such a life was a living hell for them. The ban on the immigration of Jews was the main reason for the Soviet Union’s isolation from the world, particularly from the countries with big and significant populations of Jews, such as the USA and Israel. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 became a critical factor in the political conflicts that started to transform the Middle East. As a group of nations that had succeeded a short time ago, Israel was striving to form a diplomatic relationship with all the countries of the world, including the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Stalin’s ban on Jewish immigration impeded the relationships between the two nations, and during the initial stage, the Soviet Union was cautious towards the newly emerged Israeli state. The questions of legitimacy, the USSR’s policy of support for Arab nations in that region, and Stalin’s ban on Jewish immigration made the relations with Moscow and Tel Aviv difficult (Fuller, 1991). Cold War times further widened the gap between these two nations.
With the restoration of full diplomatic ties between Israel and the Soviet Union in 1991, the approach to Middle East peace talks also underwent significant change. This decisive moment, however, saw a shift to dialogue and engagement. Having decided to be partners rather than enemies, these two States significantly reduced tensions between them, which undoubtedly laid a foundation for their future mutual peaceful coexistence. It is the Soviet Union which transformed its diplomatic course from a more confrontational one to a friendlier policy, which led to the expansion of the cooperation between Israel and it. This novel interaction evolved into a theme of joint efforts on security and stability matters within the region, whereby multilateral partnerships could now be built more efficaciously. Secondly, this also created a message for the whole community, which was that the outside world and the Middle East are committed collectively to solving conflicts using peaceful means. This new diplomatic breakthrough had a ripple effect on this region, where there was a glimmer of hope amid the prevailing deadlock. It delivered an opportunity for positive engagement and dialogue, not allowing the creation of a hostile context around negotiations and compromise. In the long run, the renewal of ties between Israel and the Soviet Union symbolised an important milestone in seeking the consolidation of permanent peace in the Middle East.
Gorbachev’s era of politics was a big change from Soviet history with the emergence of a doctrine called “new thinking” that broke with the traditional Soviet idea of confrontation and provided a more sophisticated model based on diplomacy and cooperation. This ideological paradigm shift, however, had a profound influence not just on diplomatic relations with the US and its Western allies but also manifested itself in new innovative areas, especially in the field of Israel-Soviet relations. The “new thinking” of Gorbachev came to represent the light of hope in a world torn apart by Cold War enmity. It launched a new era that was no longer governed by those long-standing dogmas of Soviet foreign policy but was more inclined to adopt a sober policy towards the international community. The era of unshakable ideological struggle made way for a culture of finding common grounds and seeking diplomatic ways to solve conflicts.
The paradigm shift, which had occurred within the confines of the Soviet-Israeli relationship, was critical. Historically, the relationship between the two countries is the victim of ideology and geopolitical games, which climaxed in the Cold War hostilities. However, Gorbachev’s arrival in power ushered in a new era. The commitment of Gorbachev to dialogue and reconciliation provided the platform for a renewal of relations when the Soviet Union and Israel founded a bilateral relationship in 1991. Urging to rebuild Soviet foreign policy given growing internal and external systematic gaps, Gorbachev was supposed to differentiate the peace with the old enemy Israel. His endeavour toward creating an environment of international civility paved the way for warming up the once tension-filled air between the countries. For the policymakers of Israel, this diplomatic fashion was greeted with reasonable optimism. The normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union in this context slipped into the legacy of past enmities, being replaced with an opportunity for the formation of new channels of interaction. The opening of the Soviet embassy in Israel, which is considered to be the most symbolic step of the diplomatic re-orientation, symbolises a change from the confrontational posture of the past years towards a constructive tie built on respect and mutual understanding now.
The consequences of this reconciliation were many and far-reaching throughout the peace process, bringing dynamism into the efforts to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the USSR took on the usual role of a neutral facilitator of the negotiations, the stalled talks once again regained their vitality. Soviet policy was perceived as a critical missing bridge between Israel and its Middle East neighbours, helping to repair relations and establish lasting peace instead of dispute. The re-establishment of Soviet-Israeli relations has drastically changed the power play among the involved sides in the peace talks. Particularly, transcending the ideological divides and adopting a more inclusive approach to dealings with conflict resolution both brought much-needed flexibility and pragmatism to the peace processes through which they negotiated with these complexities. Through the efforts of the Soviet Union to mediate this dispute, a framework for a meaningful dialogue was created, which presented the Israeli-Palestinian parties with a chance for productive communication.In addition, the relationships between Moscow and Jerusalem were enhanced by the restoration of wider regional collaboration (Fuller,1991). Essentially, the influence of the USSR proved to be an important factor in as much as it facilitated not just dialogue between Israel and the immediate neighbouring states but also among the wider Arab nations. Through the approach of developing mutual trust and cooperation, the Soviet Union was able to propagate the message of obliterating old hostilities. Thisguaranteedmore secure and rich Middle East.
The Soviet Union’s decision to restore diplomatic ties with Israel is based on pragmatism that confirms the defeat of ideological rigidity in the nation’s foreign policy. A shift to “a new thinking” axis is perceived here as a clear manifestation of a paradigm change, a breakaway from the old-fashioned ideologies, and the move to a new approach characterised by pragmatism and flexibility regarding global interactions. Emphasising diplomacy and conflict settlement to the detriment of their own ideology, the Soviets showed that they were open to building relations based on peaceful intentions and constructive dialogue. By recognising that each interaction should be judged only through the scope of struggle based on ideology, the main goal is now to discover common interests and pursue them jointly. This recognition undoubtedly entails the broadening of the scope of Soviet-Israeli relations but, at the same time, has a considerable geopolitical dimension. It shows a readiness to enter the arena for nations belonging to different ideological flags, beginning the practical cooperation on common challenges. The move for diplomacy, too, provides the USSR with an opportunity to adjust its foreign relations. Russian diplomacy relies not on ideological confrontation but rather on engagement through diplomatic channels. This offers a possibility to build up bridges with erstwhile adversaries and, therefore, opens up a more comfortable environment for dialogue and negotiation.
Conclusion
Gorbachev’s reforms, both domestically and internationally, introduced a kind of paradigm shift in Soviet foreign relations with the Middle East. The slowdown of the economy and political turmoil showed the way for major reforms to enhance the leading position of the USSR in the world. With their famous themes being economic rationality and political openness in perestroika and Glasnost, the Middle Eastern policy of the Soviets had profound implications. Strategic partnership with the West caused the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought great economic and diplomatic benefits to the country. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader after WW2 who highlighted diplomacy over ideological competition and also contributed with an open mind towards the dynamic changes of geopolitics, which was a huge contrast to his predecessors, who hadan aggressive stance. Eventually, Gorbachev’s reforms led to the revamping of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, which is reflected in the current policy of regional diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.
References
Fuller, G.E., 1991. Moscow and the Gulf War. Foreign Affairs, 70(3), pp.55-76.
Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev’s difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly, 107(2), pp.213-230.
Rubinstein, A.Z., 1987. Gorbachev’s Middle East Policy‐An Interim Assessment. Soviet Jewish Affairs, 17(2), pp.3-16.
Vasiliev, A., 2018. Russia’s Middle East Policy. Routledge.
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