Introduction
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is one of the cornerstones of the world of ethical thoughts, but at the same time, it is not perfect. One particular problem Kant surfaces with is the idea of freedom, which he connects with morality and reason, which question the origination of moral evil. Allen Wood contends a pragmatic approach, saying that freedom is self-determining. Nonetheless, the response to this criticism has yet to be accepted; for example, DeWitt maintains that more is needed as it does not explain how such capacities can be exercised without the person being said to be immorally irrational. To remedy this issue, we turn to the insights of a late medieval theologian and philosopher named Anselm, who had the same problem as Kant in his conceptualization of morality and freedom. This work scrutinizes Anselm’s model to see if this model has a more comprehensive solution to moral evil in Kant’s philosophizing.
Problem Identification
The problematic part of Kant’s philosophy is his equating freedom with morality and rationality, especially concerning evil in morality. In “Definitions of Freedom,” Kant argues that freedom implies following an ethical law, leading to how an individual can deviate from the law without losing their freedom and rationality (Kant, n.d.). This view ignores the complexity and fact that rational agents can disobey moral norms. It has been alleged that Kant’s theory will result in practical irrationality because it is impossible to act morally without freedom. This issue raised concern regarding the system of Kant’s moral theory and its adequacy for ethical evil.
Anselm’s Perspective
Anselm’s sophisticated perspective scrutinizes the concepts of freedom and moral responsibility, which can be done to resolve the problems in Kant’s theory. Anselm, a monk in the medieval era and one of the pioneers in theology and philosophy, is known for his ontological argument and intellectual thoughts regarding God. In Anselm’s “The Freedom Of Choice,” freedom is the possibility for man to choose between good and godliness (the image of God) in men In opposition to Kant, who thinks that moral laws are an application of reason (DeWitt, n.d.), Anselm indeed assumes that free individuals can go astray as a result of having a choice. He has reasons to think that freedom does not merely consist of moral action according to the law but also of the freedom to do moral transgression. Within this broader conception of freedom, there is even a sense of moral evil that yields no eroding of autonomy.
Furthermore, Anselm’s account in “On Truth” states that the deep logic behind moral choices is the basis even for decisions not guided by morality (Anselm, n.d.). Besides, Kant, in his “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” says that people can violate ethical laws because of ignorance, weakness, and temptation, but humans are still rational beings. Without denying the rationality of Wood’s argument, Anselm recognizes the complexity of moral options and the possibility that rational beings make mistakes. Anselm’s view provides an insightful perspective on the tension between freedom and moral duty. This standpoint could unify Kant’s focus on moral duty with the presence of moral evil, thus giving rise to a more integrated view of human morality and rationality (DeWitt, n.d.). Through acknowledging the latent facet of moral depravity and freedom, Anselm develops a model that complies with the reality of human moral agency.
Anselm’s Solution
Anselm’s solution to the issue of moral evil is mainly based on the conviction of the justice of God and the redemption by Christ. As a medieval theologian and philosopher, Anselm analyzed moral problems from a theological perspective. At the same time, he was trying to resolve the paradox of the presence of evil while professing God to be good and omnipotent. Divine justice is the central element of Anselm’s solution. It allows individuals to take responsibility for their actions and will enable them to mend their actions and improve. Anselm asserts that evil in moral matters comes into being when rational beings misuse the freedom of will that God has vested in them. Centuries later, despite the human race’s affinity to moral faults, Anselm still believes in divine justice by which such transgressions cannot be passed unscathed. Besides, Anselm adds that through God’s love and forgiveness, there is an answer to the issue of moral evil (Anselm, n.d.). He emphasizes the critical element of Christ’s atonement, which bridges the gulf between a penitent sinner and a forgiving God. For Anselm, the death of Christ in the form of atonement for the sins of humans would be the reparation needed for moral revival and reconciliation of being with spirit.
Anselm’s approach is based on the judgment of moral duty and the prerequisite of divine intervention to compensate for the effect of the evil moral. Through his analysis, Anselm demonstrated that divine justice and the redemptive purpose of Christ exist not only to explain the existence of moral evil but also to form the basis of understanding God’s providential plan for humanity. However, while Kant emphasizes moral duty and rational autonomy, Anselm’s solution covers theological notions about sin and salvation. While Kantian ethics give more weight to moral agency and the rational pursuit of morality, Anselm’s perspective draws attention to the topological implications of human moral experience. Thus, the moral problem of evil gets a fuller understanding within a theological setting.
Differences Between Anselm and Wood
Anselm and Woods suggest different viewpoints on freedom and how it relates to moral evil. Both moralists see a significant role in freedom, but they significantly differ in the sense of its influence and restrictions. Anselm focuses on the theological aspect of freedom, which means that freedom is a gift from God in return for moral responsibility. He contends that men have the potential to be moral, but this is restricted by divine law and the actions of sin. Anselm’s point of view concentrates on the matter of divine justice and the role of Christ in the redemption of moral evil.
Wood adopts a more pragmatic perspective, emphasizing a secular interpretation of freedom as a pragmatic factor of self-determination (Wood, n.d.). He claims that liberty gives people a chance to decide right or wrong, but he needs to explain why people sometimes fail to use this capacity properly. Wood proposes the pragmatic approach that concentrates on the rationality of moral decisions, but unlike Anselm’s perspective, the theological depth needs to be present. Besides, Anselm’s theological framework provides a broader interpretation of moral evil by including the ideas about justice and the redemption of God. However, the secular understanding Wood advocates may need help explaining the transcendence of moral evil and the chance for redemption that resolves solely within a practical frame of reference (Wood, n.d.). In conclusion, even though Anselm and Wood deal with the problem of moral evil, their views demonstrate their different philosophical positions and theological systems.
Conclusion
In conclusion, comparing Anselm’s and Wood’s views exposes the problematic nature of freedom and shows its role in moral evil. The theology of Anselm takes the divine origin of freedom as the starting point and shows the close link between moral responsibility and divine justice. He provides a sophisticated view of moral agency and the role of divinity in resolving the paradox of evil. On the other hand, the secularism of Wood’s view entails freedom as a fact of independent self-determinism produced by our rational choice. Although Wood’s approach provides valuable perspectives on the rationality of moral decisions, it fails to deal comprehensively with the theological dimensions of moral evil and redemption. Finally, combining the ideas of both perspectives can provide a better way of looking at freedom and moral evil by considering theological insights from Anselm and the practical considerations brought up by Wood. Scholars and theologians can still understand the relationship between freedom, morality, and divine justice regarding the problem of evil by a fusion of views.
References
Anselm. The Freedom of the Choice. p. 145-165
Anselm. On Truth. p. 117-141
DeWitt. Review of Kant on Evil Self Deception and Moral Reform. P. 651-656
Kant. Definitions of Freedom.
Kant. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. p. 43-93
Wood A. Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil. p. 144-172