Abstract
This essay analyzes the events leading up to a propane explosion that killed a 68-year-old captain and injured six firefighters in Maine on September 16, 2019. To ascertain the cause of death and contribute to the prevention of similar deaths and injuries, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program looked into the occurrence. The investigation identified several factors that contributed to the incident, including inadequate procedures and protocols for responding to a gas leak, hazardous materials training, safety protocols, safety equipment, communication protocols, and safety procedures (NIOSH, 2019). The incident highlights the importance of proper safety protocols and training for firefighters. Recommendations are offered to help prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future, including developing and implementing comprehensive procedures and protocols for responding to a gas leak, providing extensive hazardous materials training, developing and implementing comprehensive safety protocols, equipping personnel with the necessary safety equipment, and developing and implementing comprehensive communication protocols.
Introduction
The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) looks into explosions and fires to ascertain the cause of death and to assist in preventing similar fatalities and injuries. Six firefighters were hurt, and a 68-year-old captain was killed in a propane explosion on September 16, 2019. The incident took place in a Maine office complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the incident and provide a comprehensive overview of the circumstances surrounding the explosion and the injuries and death sustained by the firefighters.
Background
The fire and rescue department was called to an office building on September 16, 2019, at around 8:08 a.m. for a potential propane leak. The in charge of building maintenance had directly contacted the fire station. The fire chief dialled county dispatch for the call to reach the fire and rescue department by radio. At 08:08, County dispatch received alerts from Car One, Engine Two, and Tower Three.
Upon his arrival, the fire chief greeted the building maintenance supervisor (Car 1). The staff had relocated to the northwest corner of the parking lot, which served as their designated evacuation area. On the scene are firefighters from Engine two and Tower three. A portable multi-gas detector started the air sampling by the officer and firefighter from Tower three. In the vicinity of the propane tank, Tower three personnel took air samples (NIOSH, 2019). Despite the empty gas tank covered in frost on the ground and the bottom half at roughly 08:13, they could not find any signs of a propane leak.
The fire chief gave the order to the firefighters to report to the building’s basement. According to reports, the first storey of the structure was occupied by the fire chief and a captain who responded to Engine two (NIOSH, 2019).. Using a portable multi-gas detector, a firefighter from Tower 3 went to the basement. The captain from Tower three was already in the basement with the building maintenance manager and an Engine two firefighter.
The explosion’s injuries led to the death of the captain of Engine two, who was supposedly on the first floor. Two firefighters were in the parking lot on Side Bravo when the blast happened. They were thrown about 20 to 30 feet away to the dirt road by the power of the explosion. Two of the six firefighters who suffered injuries were the fire chief and the person in charge of building maintenance. A nearby hospital was the first stop for all six injured firefighters (NIOSH, 2019). Before being discharged, one firefighter got medical attention. The state’s other five firefighters were driven or transported by air to other hospitals. At around 8:40 a.m., EMS staff declared the captain of Engine two dead.
Findings
The NIOSH investigation identified several factors that contributed to the incident. First, the fire department needed more procedures and protocols to respond to a gas leak. In particular, the department had no guidelines for identifying the gas leak source, determining the type of gas present, or deciding on the best course of action (NIOSH, 2019). In addition, the department did not have any safety guidelines for responding to a gas leak, such as providing personal protective equipment (PPE) or ensuring that firefighters had the proper training and experience to react to a gas leak safely.
The fire department needed more hazardous materials training. Although the department had a hazardous materials (hazmat) response team, the team had not received any training in identifying, assessing, or responding to gas leaks. In addition, the fire department had yet to provide the members of the hazmat response team with any specialized training in the use of PPE or the proper handling and storage of hazardous materials.
The fire department needed more safety protocols in place. The fire service didn’t have any set protocols at the event to ensure firefighters had the knowledge and experience to react adequately to a gas leak. In addition, the department did not have any safety protocols to ensure that firefighters wore the proper PPE when responding to a gas leak.
The fire department had inadequate safety equipment. At the time of the incident, the fire department did not have any personal gas monitors or other safety equipment that would have enabled firefighters to identify the type of gas leaking in the basement.
The fire department needed more communication protocols in place. At the time of the incident, the fire department had not established protocols for communicating with the gas company or coordinating a joint response (NIOSH, 2019). In addition, the department had not found any protocols for communicating with other first responders, such as police or ambulance personnel.
Finally, the fire department had inadequate safety procedures in place. At the time of the incident, the fire department had not established any procedures for identifying potential hazards, assessing the situation, and deciding on the best course of action.
Analysis
The incidence is an example of several safety concerns that could endanger firefighters’ lives or cause catastrophic injuries. Underground utilities should be identified and marked when digging or excavating to avoid dangerous circumstances. The vertical protection posts (Bollards) placement also exacerbated the catastrophe, which damaged the propane supply line. The propane company neglected to pressure test the empty tank and failed to account for an odorant fade or ethyl mercaptan scrubbing by soil and concrete.
A lack of scene size-up and risk assessment, inadequate incident management, and ignorance of the capabilities of a multi-gas monitor caused the event. The incident was also impacted by faulty gas monitoring, detection, and sampling and a lack of training and certification in handling hazardous compounds.
Conclusion
The NIOSH investigation into the propane explosion in an office building in Maine identified several factors that contributed to the incident, including inadequate procedures and protocols for responding to a gas leak, inadequate hazardous materials training, inadequate safety protocols, inadequate safety equipment, inadequate communication protocols, and inadequate safety procedures.
The tragedy in Maine emphasizes how crucial adequate safety procedures and training for firefighters are. During the initial operations of a hazardous materials incident, fire departments should ensure that a scene size-up and an initial risk assessment are carried out and that incident commanders launch a defensive strategy and communicate the incident action plan. The scrubbing or odorant fade of propane’s ethyl mercaptan should be explained to firefighters during training. Multi-gas detectors are used as part of this training to check for the presence of an explosive atmosphere. The unfortunate event in Maine serves as a reminder of the value of safety procedures and firefighter training. With proper safety protocols and training, similar incidents can be prevented.
Recommendations
Based on the findings of the NIOSH investigation, the following recommendations are offered to help prevent similar incidents from occurring.
Fire departments should develop and implement comprehensive procedures and protocols for responding to a gas leak. These procedures should include protocols for identifying the source of the gas leak, determining the type of gas present, analyzing the risks associated with the leak, and making decisions on the best course of action. In addition, the procedures should include safety guidelines for responding to a gas leak, such as providing personal protective equipment and ensuring that firefighters have the proper training and experience to react to a gas leak safely.
Fire departments should provide comprehensive hazardous materials training for all members of their hazmat response teams. This training should include information on identifying, assessing, and responding to gas leaks(IAFF, 2020). In addition, the training should consist of instruction in using PPE and the proper handling and storage of hazardous materials.
Fire departments should develop and implement comprehensive safety protocols for responding to a gas leak. These protocols should include procedures for ensuring firefighters have the proper training and experience to react to a gas leak safely and for ensuring that firefighters wear the appropriate PPE.
Fire departments should equip their personnel with the necessary safety equipment for responding to a gas leak. This equipment should include personal gas monitors and other safety equipment that will enable firefighters to identify the type of gas leaking.
Fire departments should develop and implement comprehensive communication protocols for responding to a gas leak. These protocols should include procedures for communicating with the gas company and for coordinating a joint response with other first responders, such as police or ambulance personnel.
Fire departments should develop and implement comprehensive safety procedures to ensure the safety of their personnel, the public, and property. Creating an effective system will require the identification of potential hazards, assessing the situation, and making decisions on the best course of action (NFPA, 2020). For example, a fire department responding to a structure fire should identify potential hazards, such as hazardous material or weakened structures. Next, they should assess the situation to determine the best course of action, such as the size of the fire, the amount of personnel and equipment needed, and the potential risks to personnel and the public. Finally, they should decide on the best course of action, such as which direction to attack the fire from, the strategies to use, and the safety measures to put in place to protect personnel and the public. By developing and implementing comprehensive safety procedures, fire departments can ensure the safety of their personnel, people, and property.
References
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). (2020). Firefighter safety: Risk assessment and pre-incident reviews. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/risk_management_practices.pdf\
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). (2020). Firefighter safety and survival. https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1407
National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF). (2020). Firefighter safety: Training and equipment. https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/nfff_2020_health_safety_report.pdf
NIOSH. (2019). Captain Killed and Six Firefighters Injured at a Propane Explosion in an Office Building–Maine. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201916.pdf
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