Introduction
The idea of free will as a source of self-determination, an inherent ability to make decisions, is subconsciously embodied by human minds and is the foundation of establishments built on moral principles of responsibility and accountability. Nevertheless, the supposition of putting faith in inner guidance deeply opposed the scientific worldview, which instead regards the universe as in the possession of unchangeable physical laws. Taking an example of Sabine Hossenfelder in her video “You Don’t Have Free Will, But Don’t Worry,” we can feel the powerful stand against the principle of free will which, according to Hossenfelder, has no scientific meaning (Hossenfelder). This paper intends to closely analyze the position of Hossenfelder and I assert that regardless of the conflict of free will and determinism is valid as she has pointed out, as a materialistic and deterministic physicist, her postulate of the rejection of free will as a consequence is problematic.
Hossenfelder’s Critique of Free Will
Hossenfelder argues that free will holds no space in the framework, and it implies that human decisions cannot outperform the scientifically provided processes: the deterministic mechanism. Hossenfelder´s position is that the will is not free anymore – if you take the universe this way as seen by modern science, it includes no agents and their decisions but rather functions as a mechanism regulated by physical laws. She stated that the environment, where almost all the events, such as human choices and actions, are the consequence of mechanical occurrences of previous events determined by the physical laws was a deterministic and frozen world. She makes the point that there is no margin, if she used the term, for some non-physical “free will” to contradict determinism. A similar position is held by soft determinists who denounce the apparent tight causal connection between mental events and physical processes in the brain reassuring them as a nature of the world. Also, Hossenfelder is right to highlight the evident contradiction between the fact that one’s free will is supposed to be exercised freely and the point that the laws of classical physics are predetermined. If our choices all fall off dominoes in agreement with antecedent causes that are determined by mean-physical laws, what then occurs is that the idea of unfinished willingness adds no value to the thesis.
Philosophical Responses to Determinism
Her assumption of the strict correlation between physical determinism with the non-existence of free will is very ludicrous. According to this logic, even if we accept that whatever we do is bound by physical laws, it does not mean that we pursue an exact kind of freedom of will. The philosophical tradition has puzzled and debated about freedom and determinism for a long time, and then only, the theme later has been put forward with the subtle and intricate perspectives which Hossenfelder does not delve into. Conceptualists argue that it is the nature of human acts to be partly caused, having free will has nothing to do with having a will that is ‘uncaused causa sui’ (meaning: chooses itself), but about acting according to one’s motivations and character without external compulsions. Hence, according to this viewpoint, we can be freed from a deterministic system provided that our actions are derived from our inner self and not from any outside force like pressure and influence. In this respect, Hossenfelder does not deal with any denials of volitional freedom to act by one’s motivational conditions in a different manner.
Indeterminism and Meaningfulness of Free Will
Moreover, Hossenfelder’s argument relies on the delusion that the universe is nothing but a structure that is fatefully governed by only strict physical laws as known from classical physics. However, contemporary physics with its discovery of the limits of cold-blood determinism and the unpredictability of quantum indeterminacy at a fundamental level opposes this view. If a non-deterministic, probabilistic and quite simple quantum attribute is so, then it can lead the way to a way of non-deterministic free will, even in the physical universe. Hossenfelder makes an important point that sometimes the real concept of the phenomenon is shadowed by diverse interpretations.
Furthermore, in addition to Hossenfelder’s argument that free will is, in her words, “pointless,” the argument can be considered erroneous. Though our decisions are governed by various mediating factors pulling us one way or another, nevertheless, we feel the process of being deliberate, of being able to sort through the various options, weigh them up and eventually make a choice to go this way or that way in itself is surely a meaningful psychological, ethical and cognitive act. A person who neglects free will in this way by confirming that it is senseless relegates the practical advantage that this notion has to human beings in recognizing themselves and in establishing a system that is based on moral responsibility and types of punishment/praises is disregarded.
Conclusion
Hossenfelder has a shortcoming whereby she bravely claims the irreducibility of free will, as classical mechanics posits that every occurrence is entirely dictated by the unchangeable play of natural laws, and therefore, conserves the total energy which cannot be diminished or increased. She reduces the meaning of freedom taking into consideration the subtleties of redefinition, its preservation in the light of determinism or its connection with the interpretation that allows it to be uncertain. Opponents of free will may say that the way Hossenfelder presents it is too narrow and philosophically physicalist (in the old sense of the term). They can suggest a point that even in a determinist world free will is an emergent phenomenon at the higher level arising from the combination of causal components at physical levels, just as reasoning and consciousness all in a way are not fully captured by the deterministic arguments of physicalism. However, agreeing with Hossenfelder on free will redefines compatibilism and could be a compatibilist concept consistent with determinism with free will being defined as the power to act according to motivations without external coercion. Such interpretation still saves ontological freedom even when motivational states can be defined by physical laws only as results of other events. Hossenfelder articulates a detrimental judgment from the perspective of physics and glosses over great philosophical concerns that indicate that an intrinsic factor prevents free will from being brushed aside. Environmental protection is a way to achieve the main objective – a better and healthier life for current and future generations. On the other hand, the matter is not that simple. Although Hossenfelder raises the view that determinism has an inextricable tension with libertarian free will, a distinctly more elaborated argumentation and analysis is needed to do the very not-so-common job of putting the idea of free will to an end.
Work Cited
Hossenfelder, S. (2021). You don’t have free will but don’t worry [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpU_e3jh_FY&pp=ygVVSG9zc2VuZmVsZGVyLCBTLiAoMjAyMSkuIFlvdSBkb24ndCBoYXZlIGZyZWUgd2lsbCwgYnV0IGRvbid0IHdvcnJ5IFtWaWRlb10uIFlvdVR1YmUuIA%3D%3D
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