Introduction
In today’s digital landscape, industrial control systems (ICS) are critical in various sectors, including manufacturing, energy, transportation, and more. Industrial control systems are used by nuclear power plants, steel factories, petroleum refineries, and most other types of enterprises as automated processing technologies. An industrial control system is probably used whenever an industrial process is computerized. Industrial control systems provide ease and safety essential to today’s lifestyle. Hence, cybersecurity is critical to these systems. The demand for cybersecurity in industrial control systems has grown since the 2010 Stuxnet attack on the Natanz uranium enrichment center, the first known attack on such systems (Baybulatov et al., 2021). This paper outlines recommended practices for enhancing ICS cybersecurity through Defense-in-Depth (DiD) strategies, focusing on isolating and protecting assets within a fictitious sector-based company.
Security Challenges within Industrial Control Systems
Hackers can utilize a variety of controller weaknesses to impede activities and inflict harm. However, most companies do not patch controllers because network stability is a top priority among several ICS technicians. Cyberthreats are forcing businesses in the manufacturing sector to reevaluate their approach to safeguarding industrial control systems (ICS) and, more especially, industrial controllers. The industry can no longer deny the truth that more cyber events are occurring on ICS infrastructure. However, because ICS networks differ from conventional IT networks, they provide particular difficulties for security experts.
Air gapping was how industrial networks isolated themselves from the outside world until recently. An air gap is a wonderful safety precaution, in principle. They isolate the industrial network from the internet and the corporate network to form an impenetrable wall that keeps hackers out. In contrast to today’s networked and integrated world of operational technology (OT) and IT, air gapping is no longer a workable approach. Corporations are compelled by technologies such as Industry 4.0 and IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things) to enhance current procedures and expand operational frameworks to enable greater linkages between offline activities and the Internet (Koay et al., 2022). Cyber threats can now affect working environments that were previously isolated due to this connection.
Various software and hardware issues and flaws in the old architecture of ICS infrastructure cause cyber hazards to industrial operations. Industrial controllers are specialized systems that oversee every phase of business operations and equipment. Examples of these controllers are distributed control system (DCS) controllers, remote terminal units (RTUs), and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) (Baybulatov et al., 2021). When someone tries to enter and change the state of most controllers, they are not required to authenticate. The majority don’t allow for encrypted communication. This implies that the industrial process is freely accessible to any individual with network access, be they an intruder, a hostile insider, or simply a negligent worker. That poses a risk to the company.
Defense-in-Depth Strategies
Securing a company’s IT and OT systems by installing security measures at the network’s external boundaries is called perimeter defense or network perimeter security. Preventing unwanted access, security breaches, and cyber threats from accessing the system is the aim of perimeter protection (Bhamare et al., 2020). Historically, solutions that monitor and regulate information that enters or leaves the network, such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and virtual private networks (VPNs), have been utilized to secure external connections and prevent unauthorized access to the ICS network.
Access control is the initial line of protection against unapproved individuals, especially malevolent actors looking to compromise a system. It guarantees that only authorized users and reliable devices can access the network by implementing strict authorization and identification procedures. By limiting access to this data to authorized personnel and possibly departmental boundaries, access control measures would lower the possibility of insider threats and data breaches (Bhamare et al., 2020). Implementing robust authentication mechanisms such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) and role-based access control (RBAC) ensures that only authorized personnel can access critical ICS assets.
Recommendations and Countermeasures
The goal of the vulnerability evaluation procedure is to determine the hazards and the risks they create. Usually, this is done through automated testing devices, like network security scanners, the outcomes of which are provided in a vulnerability assessment report. Vulnerability evaluation is most beneficial to big businesses and other kinds of companies vulnerable to current assaults, but it may also help companies of any size (Lou & Asmaa Tellabi, 2019). By lowering the likelihood that a hacker will gain access to a company’s IT infrastructure, vulnerability evaluation helps to enhance knowledge about resources, weaknesses, and the general risk to a company. Conducting regular vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate security vulnerabilities in ICS components and implementing a robust patch management process to ensure timely updates and fixes.
Workers who receive cyber security awareness training are better able to comprehend the dangers and hazards related to cyberattacks. Companies can drastically lower the chance of being the target of an assault by arming themselves with the information and abilities to recognize possible cyber threats (Koay et al., 2022). Providing comprehensive cybersecurity training and awareness programs to employees, contractors, and third-party vendors involved in implementing ICS assets to educate them about potential threats and best risk mitigation practices.
Conclusion
The phrase “industrial control system” (ICS) refers to a broad range of control system designs, including programmable logic controllers (PLC), distributed control systems (DCS), and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The essential infrastructure and businesses, including distribution networks, heavy manufacturing, nuclear and thermal power plants, water treatment premises, and electricity generation, are common locations for ICSs. By implementing a combination of perimeter security, network segmentation, endpoint protection, access control, encryption, continuous monitoring, and other recommended practices, our fictitious sector-based company can strengthen its cybersecurity posture and mitigate the evolving threat landscape targeting industrial control systems.
References
Baybulatov, A. A., Promyslov, V. G., & Jharko, E. Ph. (2021). On ICS Cybersecurity Assessment with the Help of Delay Calculation. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 54(1), 971–975. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2021.08.116
Bhamare, D., Zolanvari, M., Erbad, A., Jain, R., Khan, K., & Meskin, N. (2020). Cybersecurity for industrial control systems: A survey. Computers & Security, 89, 101677. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101677
Koay, A. M. Y., Ko, R. K. L., Hettema, H., & Radke, K. (2022). Machine learning in industrial control system (ICS) security: current landscape, opportunities and challenges. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10844-022-00753-1
Lou, X., & Asmaa Tellabi. (2019). Cybersecurity Threats, Vulnerability and Analysis in Safety Critical Industrial Control System (ICS). Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, 75–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31328-9_4
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