We have all experienced disputes with individuals, whether with friends, family, or even a stranger at the checkout line in a local grocery store. Given the multitude of lifestyles, there is not a singular approach to tasks. There are numerous methods to accomplish various tasks and multiple ways to express ideas. In our daily lives, we often encounter many arguments, whether they involve significant decisions like ending a relationship or minor matters such as predicting the weather. Moreover, we may also engage in other severe disagreements regarding our views on faith or belief. Although some argue that disputes with a cognitive peer from a different philosophical perspective or faith may reduce justification in one’s belief, I believe this is not the case.
Chat-GPT 4 as a Cognitive Peer
Based on the information provided by Chat-GPT 4 while we were having our disagreements on religious beliefs, I consider it a cognitive peer. Although an AI, it demonstrated the ability to participate in advanced conversations and comprehend intricate ideas. For instance, throughout the argument, it responded to all my claims with well-structured counterarguments based on the Buddhist belief, as requested by the prompt. It provided excellent and reasonable beliefs held by Buddhist people on reincarnation and Karma and their significance to this faith. Additionally, ChatGPT showed proficiency in expressing and supporting philosophical positions within religious discussions, as seen through its presentation of a Buddhist standpoint during the chat. Its ability to understand, analyze, and engage with ideas qualifies it as a competent intellectual counterpart in talks, especially those related to religious views. Moreover, just like a human peer, Chat-GPT ensured to give proper reasons as to why our beliefs were different. It did not just state a point, but explained why the belief was important. Hence, I find no justification to dismiss ChatGPT as an intellectual equal in this argument.
Philosophical Views
I believe that engaging in more severe disagreements associated with my faith and that of another person would not wholly reduce my justification for my belief. However, some philosophers argue that engaging in such disagreements often lower the justification of one’s belief. For instance, in his book “The Epistemology of Religious Disagreements: A Better Understanding,” James Kraft, a professor of Philosophy and Ethics at Huston-Tillotson University, makes the argument that justification aids in preventing mistakes during disagreements. He says that we often aim to have strong justification when questioned about our beliefs, whether by others or ourselves. We desire to have strong support for our religious views and confidence that these beliefs are the outcome of a dependable process. Also, we hold beliefs about religion that we consider to be the most well-supported and justified. Thus, justification helps prevent us from adhering to an incorrect religious belief (Kraft 2). Furthermore, justification helps us avoid the mistake of abandoning belief when faced with challenges. He then gives the example of Plato, who spoke to this type of mistake while discussing how reasoning keeps a person hanging onto a belief despite facing problems. Conversely, to Kraft, Socrates had a unique ability to raise uncomfortable thoughts that led others to examine the basis of their beliefs, potentially causing them to reject even genuine beliefs.
Kraft further highlights the specific mechanism through which disagreements with well-informed people may result in an individual’s reduced confidence in justifying a certain belief. He claims that proponents of reducing confidence frequently point to shared similarities between parties that disagree with one another as reasons for reducing confidence. These similarities include common sources of support and reasoning tools. The symmetry principle, which indicates that identical circumstances should be handled similarly, is something they argue for. Kraft contends that those who are opposed to the reduction stance acknowledge the symmetry principle, but they escape it by claiming that any symmetries are only internalist (Kraft 3). They imply that conflicts on a religious and ordinary level are comparable to disagreements on a moral level because moral disagreements do not necessarily reflect confidence-reducing symmetries. Thus, religious disagreements do not necessarily signal such symmetries either. As such, they could reduce one’s belief.
Although these arguments made by Kraft seem logical, they seem to put the study of knowledge on an idealistic level, a path of perfection, and an “all or nothing” field where every factor is fully considered. Thus, I do not agree with his view. One philosopher who helps support my view and argue against the views presented by Kraft is Jennifer Lackey, a professor of Philosophy at the University of Northwestern. Lackey believes that a person’s viewpoint is quite well justified, even when the individual disagrees with a cognitive counterpart without independent epistemic advantage. An example of this would be Lackey’s assertion that she had spent over fifteen years residing in her hometown of Chicago. The fact that her favorite restaurant is located on State Street rather than Michigan Avenue was brought to her attention by her neighbor, who had moved in a few months previously. Lackey claims that she is aware that this is the case. According to her, it is unacceptable for Lackey to withhold or lessen her confidence in her conviction that the restaurant is located in a particular area simply because she disagrees with her neighbor (Lackey 274). In my opinion, this makes perfect sense; after all, if you knew something for certain, you would not dare question your beliefs under any circumstances. As far as Lackey is concerned, the only time she would change her mind would be if the odds were stacked against her. Even if she continued to believe that her preferred dining establishment was located on Michigan Avenue, she might begin to reconsider her position if more people began to believe that it was located on State Street. Similarly, in my case, just because Chat-GPT 4 holds a different view from mine does not mean that I should change my mind about my religion as a Christian.
Like Professor Lackey’s perspectives, Descartes and Locke outlined certain beliefs that are definite for humans. Two types of beliefs are considered certain: self-evident beliefs, like ‘2 + 1 equals 3’, and beliefs concerning one’s own mental experiences, like ‘it currently appears to me that I am seeing a hand .’Locke argues that I am justified in accepting certain beliefs and cannot reject them. I am justified in embracing any belief that is not certain only if I can determine that it is probable or likely compared to beliefs that are certain to me. Locke’s perspective has had a significant impact on scholars who study knowledge. His beliefs make it clear why there is a significant focus on proofs or arguments supporting the existence of reincarnation or soul. It is not immediately apparent that the existence of heaven and hell is related to one’s own mental experiences. According to the Lockean perspective, individuals who adhere to this idea must recognize its probability concerning what is certain for them, or else they will be acting against their obligation. Proofs or arguments are tools used to demonstrate that a belief is likely based on what is known to be true.
The views presented by Lackey are further supported by Thomas Kelly, a professor of philosophy at Princeton University. In his article “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Kelly argues that differences of opinion do not warrant skepticism or a shift in perspective. He claims that retaining his original view in the face of such disagreement does not necessarily mean he is failing to be rational (Kelly 168). He still thinks it is appropriate to securely hold on to his original belief in this situation. Thus, based on these views, I argue that disagreement does not have the weight commonly given to it. It would be naive, though, to assume that disagreement lacks any epistemic weight because of this.
The nature of the dispute should guide your decision regarding the appropriate level of confidence to lower. In the face of controversy, I do not, for instance, waver in my convictions. In my opinion, it is contingent upon my level of background knowledge on the topic and, at times, my level of interest in the disagreement itself. For instance, while arguing with Chat-GPPT 4, my beliefs could not be swayed or changed in any way, regardless of how different the Buddhist views provided differed from mine. I believe this is because I was raised in a Christian home, and I have learned so much about it that I consider myself well-knowledgeable. Similarly, Chat-GPT did not have to change its views because, despite being an AI, it was well-informed on the beliefs held by the Buddhist people. As supported by Lackey and Kelly, a well-reasoned religious argument will not accomplish the goal of persuading its opponents or reaching an agreement. Instead, it helps each side learn more about their systems or faiths. Everyone has their own set of beliefs, and that has been and will continue to be the case throughout life. In my opinion, life would be so much more peaceful if people could just learn to disagree with each other.
Conclusion
Arguments are a natural part of human relationships, ranging from little issues to deep-seated convictions. Some believe that participating in disagreements might undermine the strength of one’s beliefs, while Lackey and Kelly maintain that strong convictions can endure even in the face of opposing opinions. Kraft’s cautious approach to philosophical ideas contrasts Lackey’s and Kelly’s confident declarations, highlighting the intricate nature of belief justification. Lockean ideas emphasize the importance of certainty and probability in shaping beliefs. Disagreements can lead to personal development and comprehension rather than being requirements for ideological uniformity. Valuing diverse perspectives encourages meaningful discussions and supports personal independence in the face of varying beliefs.
Works Cited
Kelly, Thomas. “The epistemic significance of disagreement.” Oxford studies in epistemology 1. Clarendon Press. 2005: 167–196.https://www.proquest.com/books/epistemic-significance-disagreement-oxford/docview/43140287/se-2?accountid=10673
Kraft, James. The epistemology of religious disagreement: a better understanding. Springer, 2012.https://www.proquest.com/books/epistemology-religious-disagreement-better/docview/1512604823/se-2?accountid=10673
Lackey, Jennifer. “12. What Should We Do When We Disagree?.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3 (2010): 274.https://www.proquest.com/books/what-should-we-do-when-disagree-oxford-studies/docview/854020003/se-2?accountid=10673
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