Changes in Hellenistic Kingship

Macedonian kingship increasingly changed in the period after Alexander the Great’s death, throughout the course of this essay Macedonian kingship under Philip II and Alexander will be discussed. Subsequently, an analysis will occur regarding the Diadochi and their heirs drawing comparisons and differences throughout the period. Particular attention will be paid to Ptolemy of Egypt, primarily due to his moves in becoming the first Diadochi to realise the future of the empire lay in smaller kingdoms.[1] This essay will also analyse the Macedonian army, its role in the stability of monarchical rule, as well as, its development into a body able to exert power even over Alexander.[2] The argument that will be shown throughout the course of this paper will be that; initially the Diadochi struggled to muster up power or authority able to resemble Alexander or Philip, however, throughout their reigns steps were taken to impose not only absolutism, but also divine rule. With further changes resulting from the abandonment of one ‘sown success upholding loyalty in the military a nd instead creating links to those proceeding in a bid to obtain legitimacy.

Philip and Alexander

The reigns of Philip and Alexander were exemplary, both not only expanded Macedonian holdings and wealth, but they improved and used their armies in a manner so efficient that they gained hegemony in the Hellenistic and Asian worlds respectfully. However, the two reigns although complimentary are quite different. Philip’s aims, and successes were modest, “his use of the League of Corinth was successful, basing it on the military force of the Macedonian kingdom, as well as on Greek diplomatic practices and inter-state agreements, which were familiar and acceptable to the Greeks.” Which in turn allowed Alexander to retain control after his father’s death.[3] This shows not only Philip’s ability to exert force as efficiently as his son, but also the diplomatic skills that Alexander seldom used. Philip’s aims are somewhat contested, Historians have limited them to mere Greek subordination to prevent Athenian naval attacks, whilst others have attributed the release of occupied Greek polis in Asia Minor as his goal prior to his death.[4] Whilst an answer to this cannot be definitively stated one can agree he achieved a substantial amount whilst on the throne, arguably being the cause for Alexander’s capture of Asia, without the developments of Philip Alexander would have struggled financially and militarily in Persia. Philip unified Macedonia, which for centuries had been divided, he inflicted defeats on the Illyrian and Paeonian tribesmen to the west and north. Furthermore, he captured the Greek fortress of Amphipolis, which meant control of gold-rich Mt. Pangaeus. Philip’s objectives through this were threefold: Protection from Macedonia’s external enemies, increase wealth, and to give experience to Philip’s reorganized army, having established the first heavy infantry phalanx[5]

Alexander appeared to be continuing his fathers’ work, however, when Darius was killed and the Persian Empire seemingly in Alexander’s possession, his decision to continue Eastward appeared to be conquest for conquests sake, an opinion expressed by his men in their refusal to march further. This was to be the first time the Macedonian army challenged their king, but by no means the last.[6] Alexander’s death followed not long after this battle of wills, it is this situation that the Diadochi inherited their positions. In a period of unprecedented Macedonian success, but also in a time when army moral was low, and their opinion meant everything. Whilst Philip, similar to Alexander, did not leave a clear heir he at least had sons able to vie for the throne. Alexander, knowing the position of king rested on the army’s acceptance was able to invoke their support and remove potential threats to his position, including brothers.[7]

The Diadochi however were unable to adhere to the model of kingship illustrated by Alexander and Philip, with none able to present themselves as a dominant enough figure to claim the empire nor coerce their contemporary’s loyalty to them.[8] What was left then was an empire in turmoil, an army facing an identity crisis and a plethora of potential heirs both familial and not hoping to lay claim to the conquest of Alexander. The situation was made worse by Alexander’s inability to leave an idea of who he wished to rule, his unborn child was a possibility, however, it may have been born a girl. Although it was not, I would still need a regent until it matured. His brother, later to be Philip III was mentally defect, whereas Antipater had a substantial support base in Macedonia, Craterus had 10,000 veterans on their way home, as well as the army’s loyalty, whilst Perdiccas possessed alexander’s signet ring.[9] What is being shown here is the confusion and nearly insolvable problem of inheritance in 323BC.

What this culminated in was a generations worth of fighting and an eventual seventeen years before any of the Diadochi would proclaim themselves king, of which Antigonus was first, with the rest following suit. Before this occurred, however, Alexander’s empire had been divided and his family killed leading to a new period of Hellenistic monarchies which despite numerous geographical changes were similar to Alexander’s model of kingship.[10]

The Macedonian Army

Regarding the army, after Alexander’s death they imposed their rule over the successors gaining a dual monarchy between Alexander IV and Philip III, of which the army supported the latter. Furthermore, despite Perdiccas’ favourable position in 323, by the end of his disastrous campaign in Egypt he was killed by his own troops. What is interesting to note is not only Ptolemy’s use of financial incentives to win over Perdiccas’ troops loyalty but also that this event marked the culmination of army discontent into a developed mutiny ultimately changing the balance of power in the Hellenistic world.[11] The model of Macedonian kingship under Philip and Alexander was based on military support, this too was true for the Diadochi, what changed however was the army’s perception of itself. During the reign of Philip, the army was a national body, intensely loyal to king and country. [12]However, throughout the conquest of the Persian Empire this changed, the troops were far away from home with most never to return. Furthermore, many had married Asian wives or were Asian mercenaries themselves, this led to growing individualistic, not nationalistic, views among the troops, without the personal charm of Alexander nor his impressive feats to remind the troops why they follow him Perdiccas was unable to retain control and paid for it.[13] A fate Eumenes would also suffer due to the military changes throughout the 4^th century B.C.E. Further exacerbated by his failure to protect his troops baggage train, leading to the Silver shields, a battalion of Macedonian veterans to lose faith in his command, eventually capturing him and handing him over to Antigonus. Therefore, as Edward’s notes “by Triparadeisus the army assembly had evolved from its traditional role as a means for the monarch to disseminate information to a body choosing kings, condemning traitors, appointing regents, and even on occasion making policy decisions”[14]

What can be concluded thus far is that the Diadochi similar to Alexander and Philip needed the support of the military to ascend to the throne, what is different however, and which is something the Diadochi could not control is that the army’s perception on its role changed, they were not only willing to remove support, but they were willing to kill those who fell from favour, intensifying the already difficult position in the Diadochi’s attempts at power snatching. Where they failed in regard to Philip and Alexander was to unify a region or achieve feats that were astonishing or beneficial enough to the troops to command their respect in the way Philip and to a less successful extent, Alexander was able to do.[15]

Limited Aims

As noted, the differences between the Diadochi and Alexander’s kingships were cemented when each successor realised they would not rule over the entire empire of Alexander, although the Seleucids did certainly attempt it. Ptolemy was the first to establish limited aims, contenting himself with Egypt, perhaps the wealthiest and most self-contained region in the Empire. Furthermore, in choosing Egypt Ptolemy placed himself in a region were royalty and divinity was intertwined, whether he travelled to Egypt with Alexander is uncertain, although likely, regardless it is probable that Ptolemy’s acquisition of this region was to cement the view he was semi-divine, a goal he arguably obtained from Alexander and Philip, this, however, will be discussed in depth later.[16]

Evidence for Ptolemy’s limited aims, and in turn his divergence from the model of kingship developed by Phillip and Alexander, was in his reluctance to take Perdiccas’ position after his death. Instead at Triparadeisus he merely sought total control over Egypt.[17] Furthermore, any action taken to expand his holdings was for the betterment of his kingdom, not the reunification of the Empire, with Syria and Cyprus being his two areas of contention throughout the period before Roman annexation of the peninsula.

This limited position was somewhat unanimous after 306BC with each successor actualising themselves as kings it was no longer an attempt to regain the lands of Alexander but simply a bid to gain internal support and expand lands and wealth when available, with no figure emulating the skill or conquests of either Alexander or Philip. Rather, each Diadochi contented themselves with their holdings after Ipsus, and the Epigoni continuing this tend and cementing their fathers, as well as their own, claims to the new Macedonian kingdoms.[18]

Concluding this segment, it was intelligent of Ptolemy and his contemporaries to focus on smaller regional kingdoms, the price of admission to the throne, indeed any throne, is success. By limiting one’s concern to a smaller region, particularly one as self-contained as Egypt allowed Ptolemy to streamline his internal affairs, increase the grandeur of his capital city and conquer modestly when he could. Indeed, Ptolemy’s reluctance to enter combat frequently is perhaps a key component to the longevity of his dynasty. What this means, however, is that the expansive and aggressive policies in Philip and Alexander’s kingships was not continued by the Diadochi nor the Epigoni marking a decisive end to the model set forth by the formers actions.[19]

Divinity

The analysis of divinity will concern Alexander, Philip and the Ptolemaic dynasty with each figure taking controversial as well as public steps to connect themselves to the Gods, if not presenting themselves as one entirely. Whilst Philip was somewhat subtler in his portrayal of his divinity, he most certainly took steps to denote his connection to the Gods.[20] Prior to his death Philip’s ceremony seen him stand among the twelve Gods of Olympus, with the sacrifice given to them in turn being given to him. This desire for divinity also fuelled alexander, believing himself to be a descendant of Hercules, and later accepting the title of son from the oracle of Zeus Ammon. Whether throughout his intensely successful campaign Alexander believed this or not is difficult to distinguish, he did, however, introduced the practice of Proskynesis, a custom which to Greeks symbolised divinity, but to the Persians merely showed the prostrating individual’s lower rank. Whether this was Alexanders attempt to actualise his divinity is questionable with him refusing to enforce it upon his peers due to the negative reception it received.[21]

What is certain is that after Alexander’s death whether divine or not his body was symbolically important enough to illicit conflict between Perdiccas and Ptolemy. Where Alexander sought to be buried is unknown and to a large extent irrelevant. He was buried in Egypt and through this the Ptolemaic dynasty was able to associate and legitimise itself with Alexander’s remains, legitimately obtained or not, the army and followers of Alexander were aware he rested in Alexandria and that gave Ptolemy credibility. Taking steps to convert Alexandria to the capital (moving it from Memphis) further cemented the ties between the two dynasties. Furthermore, being the first Diadochi to place Alexander’s head on a coin, a place typically reserved for Gods, enhanced the position of Alexander and with it the son of Lagos.[22]

Regarding Ptolemy’s divinity, this cannot be attributed to himself, rather his son and grandson. The Egyptian Epigoni took great steps to convey Alexander and Ptolemy as Gods. What is important to note, however, is Ptolemy’s divine standing amongst his Egyptian subjects, the actions taken by Ptolemy II and III were for the benefit of their Greek subjects. In 280 BC Ptolemy II instituted an official worship of his father as a God and established the notion that the king became a God after death. “Ptolemy had now established the final principle that the king was during his life officially the god of all his subjects, both Greek and Egyptian; after this each succeeding Ptolemy was officially a god during life, and each royal pair became incorporated in the State worship, with Alexander at its head.” What occurred then was the actualisation of Alexander’s goal, divinity actualised, and the connection of Ptolemy and Alexander. [23]

What this meant for the Epigoni in Egypt was that they had somewhat abandoned the model of Macedonian kingship of Philip, Alexander and even the Diadochi. Whilst the former two reigned and obtained based solely on their own success, the Diadochi, particularly Ptolemy relied on Alexander as well as his limited success at expansion to reign and succeed in legitimising his reign.[24] Where the Epigoni diverge is the removal of their own personal successes and limited expansion abroad, relying on the leaders of old and connecting their rule to the will of the Gods not on the success that was essential for the people and the army in particular to follow Alexander and to a lesser extent the Diadochi.[25]

What is interesting is that this practice was not ubiquitous. In294 BCE when Demetrius seized the Macedonian throne he did not invoke the memory of Alexander but rather Antipater who had served the Macedonian people loyalty whilst Alexander sought personal glory in Asia. What is essential to note is that Alexander left Macedonia at the age of twenty-two, with him he took the physically fit men of the country, the backbone of the countries economy, impacting it irreconcilable.[26] What Alexander had done to Macedon was not gaining it international recognition but to weaken its economy divide families and eventually leave it in turmoil and repressing expensive wars with Greece after 323BC. As Bosworth notes “. The hero of Macedon was Philip, who had built his country’s supremacy. His son had squandered that inertance”[27]

Conclusion

As has been illustrated the Macedonian kingship did indeed change throughout the reign of Philip, Alexander, the Diadochi and the Epigoni whilst Philip was a uniting figure having gained the support and adoration of the Macedonian people which Alexander used initially and expanded upon both developed the army and aims of the Macedonian people. What the latter did, however, was to push the army too far both geographically and emotionally, he created an aggressive army willing to stand up to those in charge and remove support haphazardly to better themselves. What this established was a difficult situation for the Diadochi to contend with each other, creating limited objectives and a return to smaller kingdoms working to retain success to keep their thrones, this success however did not mean conquest but stability. With the Epigoni done was bastardise the lives of their fathers, with the Ptolemaic dynasty turning men into Gods to cement their legitimacy at the expense of seeking success which was the model of kingship of the reigns of old.

Bibliography

1. Anson, E.M (2013) Alexander the Great: Themes and Issues. QCAT [Online]. Available at: http://encore.qub.ac.uk/iii/encore_qub/record/C__Rb2064135__Sanson__Ff%3Afacetavailability%3Az%3Az%3AOnline%3A%3A__P0%2C2__Orightresult__U__X4?lang=eng&suite=qub (Accessed: 14th April 2018).
2. Bosworth, A.B. (1986) ‘Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon ‘, Hellenistic Studies, 106(1), pp. 1-12.
3. Bosworth, A.B. (2005) The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under the Successors, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Burke, E.M. (1983) ‘Philip II and Alexander the Great ‘, Military Affairs, 47(2), pp. 67-70.
5. Burn, A.R. (1959) Alexander and the Hellenistic Empire, London: The English University Press.
6. Cuthbert, L. (1917) ‘The Diadochi and the Rise of King-Worship ‘, English Historical Review, 32(127), pp. 321-334.
7. Edward, M. (1991) ‘The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly ‘, Historia, 40(2), pp. 230-247.
8. Ellis, J.R. (1982) ‘Phillip and the Peace of Philokrates’, in Adams, L.W. and Borza, E. N. (ed.) Philip II, Alexander the Great and Macedonian Heritage. Washington: University Press of America, pp. 43-59.
9. Ellis, W.A. (1994) Ptolemy of Egypt. QCAT [Online]. Available at: http://encore.qub.ac.uk/iii/encore_qub/record/C__Rb2023933__Sptolemy__Ff%3Afacetavailability%3Az%3Az%3AOnline%3A%3A__P0%2C1__Orightresult__U__X6?lang=eng&suite=qub (Accessed: 19th April 2018).
10. Errington, R.M. (1970) ‘From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C’, Journal of Hellenistic Studies, 90(1), pp. 49-77
11. Erskine, A (2002) ‘Life after Death: Alexandria and the Body of Alexander ‘, Greece and Rome, 49(2), pp. 163-179.
12. Fredricks-Meyer, E.A. (1990) ‘Alexander and Philip: Emulation and Resentment’, The Classical Journal, 85(4), pp. 300-315.
13. King, C.J. (2013) ‘ALEXANDER’S DIADOCHS AND THEIR DESTRUCTIVE WARS ‘, The Classical Journal, 108(3), pp. 362-368.
14. Lewis, D.M. ‘The Cambridge Ancient History’, 2(6): The Fourth Century BC (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1994), p 37
15. Markle, M.M. (1978) ‘Use of Sarissae By Phillip and Alexander the Great of Macedon’, American Journal of Archaeology, 82(4), pp. 483-497.
16. Perlman, s (1985) ‘Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon’, Historia, 34(2), pp. 153-174.
17. Samuel, A.E (1988) ‘Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels ‘, The American Historical Review, 93(5), pp. 1270-1286.
18. Tarn, W.W. (1928) ‘Ptolemy II’ The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, 14, (¾) pp. 246-260
19. Walbank, F.W. (1982) ‘Sea power and the Antigonids’, in Adams, L.W. and Borza, E. N. (ed.) Philip II, Alexander the Great and Macedonian Heritage. Washington: University Press of America, pp. 213-236.
20. Wheatley, P (1995) ‘Ptolemy Soter’s Annexation of Syria 320 B. C. ‘, The Classical Quarterly, 45(2), pp. 433-444.
21. Worthington, I. Philip II of Macedonia (Yale: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 13

[1] A.R. Burn. (1959) Alexander and the Hellenistic Empire, London: The English University Press.p.254.

[2] M. Edward. (1991) ‘The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly ‘, Historia, 40(2), pp. 230-247.

[3] S. Perlman. (1985) ‘Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon’, Historia, 34(2), pp. 153-174. P.174.

[4] Ellis, J.R. (1982) ‘Phillip and the Peace of Philokrates’, in Adams, L.W. and Borza, E. N. (ed.) Philip II, Alexander the Great and Macedonian Heritage. Washington: University Press of America, pp. 43-59.

Samuel, A.E (1988) ‘Philip and Alexander as Kings: Macedonian Monarchy and Merovingian Parallels ‘, The American Historical Review, 93(5), pp. 1270-1286.

Burke, E.M. (1983) ‘Philip II and Alexander the Great ‘, Military Affairs, 47(2), pp. 67-70. P. 67.

[5] Burke, Philip and Alexander, p.70.

[6] E.M.­­­­ Anson. 2013) Alexander the Great: Themes and Issues. QCAT [Online]. Available at: http://encore.qub.ac.uk/iii/encore_qub/record/C__Rb2064135__Sanson__Ff%3Afacetavailability%3Az%3Az%3AOnline%3A%3A__P0%2C2__Orightresult__U__X4?lang=eng&suite=qub (Accessed: 14th April 2018). P.230.

[7] Samuel, Philip and Alexander as Kings, p.1273.

[8] A.B. Bosworth. (1986) ‘Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon ‘, Hellenistic Studies, 106(1), pp. 1-12. P.3.

[9] A.B. Bosworth. (2005) The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under the Successors, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[10] Errington, R.M. (1970) ‘From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C’, Journal of Hellenistic Studies, 90(1), pp. 49-77. Pp. 62-73.

[11] King, C.J. (2013) ‘ALEXANDER’S DIADOCHS AND THEIR DESTRUCTIVE WARS ‘, The Classical Journal, 108(3), pp. 362-368.

[12] Worthington, I. Philip II of Macedonia (Yale: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 13

[13] Ellis, Ptolemy, p.125.

[14] Errington, Babylon, p.76.

[15] Lewis, D.M. ‘The Cambridge Ancient History’, 2(6): The Fourth Century BC (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1994), p 37

[16] Fredricks-Meyer, E.A. (1990) ‘Alexander and Philip: Emulation and Resentment’, The Classical Journal, 85(4), pp. 300-315. Pp. 313-315.

[17] Cuthbert, L. (1917) ‘The Diadochi and the Rise of King-Worship ‘, English Historical Review, 32(127), pp. 321-334. Pp. 330-332.

[18] Bosworth, Legacy of Alexander, p.136.

[19] Ellis, Ptolemy, p.88.

[20] Burke, Philip and Alex, p.69.

[21] Anson, Themes and Issues, p.101.

[22] A. Erskine, (2002) ‘Life after Death: Alexandria and the Body of Alexander ‘, Greece and Rome, 49(2), pp. 163-179.

[23] W.W. Tarn, (1928) ‘Ptolemy II’ The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, 14, (¾) pp. 246-260. P.248.

[24] P. Wheatley, (1995) ‘Ptolemy Soter’s Annexation of Syria 320 B. C. ‘, The Classical Quarterly, 45(2), pp. 433-444. Pp. 441-4.

[25] F.W. Walbank, (1982) ‘Sea power and the Antigonids’, in Adams, L.W. and Borza, E. N. (ed.) Philip II, Alexander the Great and Macedonian Heritage. Washington: University Press of America, pp. 213-236. P. 222.

[26] Erskine, Life after Death, p.172.

[27] Bosworth, Decline, p.11.