Introduction
This essay seeks to explain that causes are necessary for their effects, but many are not sufficient for the exerted effect to infer necessity or make a causal inference. A cause is regularly and inevitably followed by an effect or a consequence. Various philosophical underpinnings determined that causes are necessary, citing an existing phenomenon-cause and subsequent phenomenon-effect. I will be relying on the philosophical underpinnings in literature from the infamous philosophers Mackie, David Hume, Russell, David Lewis, and Mill to argue on the necessity and insufficiency.
The cause-and-effect relationship
Cause in various modifications has been defined as the assemblage of the positive conditions in the absence of the negatives, leaving it as a subject to the negative and positive conditions which can either deter or enable causation; hence, the effect. There is no direct impression of a necessary connection between cause and effect. Hume, while not openly denying the existence and connection between the two, also accepts the idea of cause and effect. The reason for the lack of necessity is that connection in itself may be insufficient to justify the relationship (Hart and Honore, p. 2). Hume defined and described cause and effect as the object pattern, in touch with another, under the exertion of influence from another, with all the conditions in permanence or maintained resemblance; when these elements are placed in a relational perspective, they should produce the same effects.
These elements occur in invariable succeeding order, as invariable antecedent and consequences, which make the cause and effects, respectively; hence, the three conditions for a cause to occur. However, the conditions for occurrence can differ, causing a fact that Mackie described as a producing cause. A producing cause is the secondary cause of an effect that resulted from an original plan. For example, a wife plans on poisoning his husband but does not want to do it herself; therefore, she hires her maid to put the poison in his food. The poison kills the husband. Thus, the cause of the effect could be the poison, the wife killing her husband, or the maid putting the poison in his food. Therefore, as Strevens (p. 8) illustrates, the cause is not necessary for an effect lest all conditions for the event to occur are met.
As Russell implied in his support for Hume’s theory, “We must ask ourselves: when we assume a specific relation, cause-and-effect, or do we merely assume invariable sequence?” (Psillos, p. 21). I will use an example to explain this argument. For instance, A, a cause, leads to B, an effect. Now, do all As lead to Bs? Maybe not. For example, naked electric wires cause deadly shocks. Does this happen in all circumstances, or are there cases where facilitators or inhibitors lead to a different result? These elements are then conceived conditions for A to cause B.
The universal law of causation posits that every consequence or outcome is connected to a specific antecedent or antecedents, which is either a singular or plural factor that happens in particular manners (Mill, p. 327). If something came to be, it is connected to an invariable factual cause, object, or event, which certain circumstances may cover for them to occur.
Various philosophers, such as David Hume, made invaluable contributions to the concept of causation, proposing and establishing the regularity view of causation (RVC). The RVC posits that a cause is spatiotemporally contagious to the effects, and causes eventually lead to impact. As Hume emphasized, there is no sufficient reason to justify the causal beliefs. Lest there is sufficient evidence of conjoining of these elements in the past, it cannot be assumed that the same relationship can be maintained further.
The philosophers Hume, Mill, and David Lewis established and refined the regulatory theory of causation, which posits that a cause is often followed by subsequent effect; hence, the inferred necessity. The latter established the counterfactual theory of causation, which rose above and gained more fame than the Humean theory. The foundational concept of this theory is that causes are regular and often followed by effect, which happens in an invariable successive pattern. These theorists describe the cause and effects as genuine patterns whereby one inevitably leads to another.
To understand if causes are truly necessary, one needs to consider the facts of claimed effects. For example, what does it take, or what is really necessary for an event to occur, and if the cause would be definitely linked to the outcome. The claims, which are the cause and effects, should be related, and they should constantly aim at achieving something.
Addressing the issue of constant conjunction
If at all it is agreed that causes lead to effects, the A- the cause, is always expected to produce The effect. When this happens, and they are associated, causal inference is then made. According to Hume, humans then develop a memory of past events and expect that the same will always occur as perceived. The expected order is referred to as “a regular order of contiguity and succession” (Psillos, p. 27). So, when an outcome is seen, it is commonly perceived that the cause was present. Hume continued to explain that cause and effect relationship can only be inferred if the relationship can be preserved, implying that it can only happen if there is a constant conjunction or disjunction. For instance, in the case of a fire breaking out due to a short circuit, the conjunctions and disjunctions differ. Therefore, cause and effect cannot be implied. Ducasse, in an attempt to refute Hume’s statements, identified that the definition of causation according to Hume was false, or rather inappropriate, as it could be easily refuted.
Problems with causation
Infamous philosophers such as Hume identified various problems with causation, identifying that although they may be necessary for an effect, they cannot in their entirety be tied to the effect. First, the cause cannot be evidently linked to the effect. The resulting phenomenon could be merely an invariable succession. Another problem of causation was suggested by Hume, whereby he explained that identifying a particular cause A as a result of effect B implies an inevitable constant conjoining, whereby in the future, the same result is expected. The problem here is that the same consequence does not always follow actions, and they often vary depending on the different conditions under which they occur.
After posing several arguments against causation, Hume determined insufficiency in the cause-and-effect relationship. While analyzing the relationship between necessity and sufficiency, Kim also determined that these aspects are relevantly applicable to the entities connoted as property-like or properties themselves (Kim, p. 438). Explaining the cause-and-effect relationship looks pretty logical when using these elements. Therefore, causation may not be logically applicable in terms of ideologies or non-factual systems.
What is needed for a causal inference?
It has been established that there is no outcome without an action that triggered it. Therefore, a cause is necessary for an effect to occur, but contrary, a causal inference cannot be made. Therefore, something is required for this to happen. According to Psillos, rational underpinning is necessary to infer a cause and the subsequent relationship (Psillos, p. 28). Presumption of resemblance is necessary for this concept, whereby the elements are supported by pure reasons or undoubtable facts, or they should be grounded in previous experiences that have adequately and without a doubt proven the existence of the relationship between the two elements.
An unconditional invariable sequence is also necessary to underpin the cause. The cause can only be synonymous with causation if the condition above is met. The unconditional aspect should be the uniformity of occurrence, whereby the event should be caused under the same conditions without any countering elements (Mill, p. 339). For example, day and night are unconditional phenomena that occur as antecedents that cause invariable consequences. The prospects of this causation identify the lack of irregularities, which tend to happen in several causes and effects.
The requirements for a causal inference can be described in three processes of conditions. The first condition for a cause to be inferred is that it should momentarily precede the effect, meaning it should always come before the effect. Secondly, it should be attached to its effect, meaning that an effect cannot occur without a definitive or factual cause; without a cause, an effect cannot be assumed to have occurred. The third condition to be defined as a cause is that all the elements similar to the cause, in object or relation, should always produce the effects. For example, if we say that the sun causes light and heat, the same intensity of the simulation or something similar to the sun should produce the same effect.
Are they sufficient?
On the matter of whether a cause is sufficient for the effect, Mill posits that the causes are rarely adequate to exert effect. According to Mill (P.328), the phenomenon is a result of the assemblage of its causative conditions. It is rare for a single antecedent to have a consequence; therefore, an effect is a result of multiple antecedents, hence the argument that a cause is not sufficient to create an effect.
The definition of the minimum sufficient cause has bothered many philosophers, citing defectiveness in the presented definitions. Kim defined minimal sufficiency, providing a better understanding of the term as; “An event E is a minimal sufficient condition for P if and only if it is representable (i.e., is named)by an expression of the form ‘A1…An.’ Containing no redundancies such that Al…A. is sufficient for P and the deletion of any of the A’s results in a condition not sufficient for P” (p. 435). Such a definition does not consider the elimination of the defined grounds for the cause, lest the minimal sufficient condition is understood in a logical form.
For instance, if a person consumed a particular drink, it would be concluded that he or she died following the consumption. This may be true; however, other people who may have consumed the same element remained well. This single out the drink as just a cause, which resulted in an effect following the presence of other conditions. Therefore, the resulting death, which is the effect in this case, can be considered as an invariable consequence that happened following other conditions, such as food interacting with other elements in the body. Therefore, philosophically speaking, it would be incorrect to name either of the elements of death as the cause because none would have been adequate to cause the effect without the other. All the presenting conditions of the cause were indispensable for the effect.
When aiming at accuracy to determine the sufficiency of a cause, it is pertinent to address and enumerate all the possible conditions involved in the event happening, lest they be overlooked. For instance, in the event that someone drinks extremely cold water in the snowing season and ends up getting cold, these elements, with the body factors such as lack of immunity, could be implicated as the cause of the cold, but a singular antecedent cannot be identified.
Mackie described conditions as being both necessary and sufficient to cause effects. Giving the example of a short circuit causing fire, he posts that the fire could not have broken out had there not been an inflammable material nearby. He also states that if there had been automatic sprinklers nearby, the fore could have been stopped in time. This leaves the event or effect totally reliant on these two conditions, which could have been necessary and sufficient for the different outcomes. A more formal analysis of the cause and effect statement from Mackie is presented below (Mackie, p. 246). The formula below assumes that the element of causation is in the INUS condition.
‘A’ stands for an INUS condition
‘B’ stands for positive conditions- enabler
‘C’ stands for negative condition- prohibition
‘DEF’ and ‘GHI’ are all the necessary and sufficient disjunctions following ‘ABC.’
In applying this to the example provided above, the elements above provide a sufficient cause for the fire. These are the minimal sufficient conditions for the fire to either break out or be stopped. Now, if the terms conjoined with ‘A’, ‘BC’ and the disjunction are replaced with formula ‘X’ and a single term ‘y’, then the INUS condition will be described as A is an INUS condition that will only produce the effect, X and Y are necessary but insufficient. In this case, the INUS condition A is not sufficient to produce an outcome (Mackie, p. 246). The outcome in this case is described as P.
Therefore, A (X or y) = P. This explains the insufficiency in all the conditions. A, without X and y, is not sufficient enough. X and y without A are also not sufficient enough. Therefore, they need to be paired for a significant effect.
However, this does not rule out the possibility of the singular-antecedent phenomenon. Mackie suggested a theory or formula for singular causation, whereby the INUS condition ‘A’ directly results in the outcome ‘P.’ The necessary and sufficient conditions in this case are in the form (AX or y), (A or y), AX, A (Mackie, p. 247). In this case, X represents the factors for A. They need to be sufficient and necessary for the effect. The disjunction y, in this case, does not pair with the INUS condition; it needs to be absent for the occasion in question to happen. Mackie emphasized that this is not always the case where A causes P, but this is applicable in a case where A is the only minimal condition required and sufficient for P. An example in this case is during a football match, an excellent goalkeeper is injured and cannot play. First, one needs to understand that he is very good, and his team has always won against the competing team. His injury led to his replacement in the next game, whereby one sub-goalkeeper was posted, and within the first half, they had already lost to score 0-2. In this case, the scores against his team could be directly attributed to the injury. Had he not been injured, he could have played in the subsequent match, preventing his team from losing. Therefore, A was necessary for P.
Mackie continued to emphasize that singular causation cannot in its entirety be complete unless statements of necessity and sufficiency have been added (Mackie, p. 254). In non-material conditions, singular causes are deemed both necessary and sufficient. For instance, we have already established in the case of fire that conjunction and disjunction were the only sufficient elements to cause the fire; however, this statement lacked the necessary conditions. Had it not been for the short circuit, the fire could not have broken out, rendering the rest immaterial and short circuit a necessary and sufficient element for the fire.
Other authors have also refuted the claim of singular causation, identifying the need for external forces for the event to occur. Mill identified the cause as a sum of positive and negative conditions, which makes the exigencies of description (Mill, p. 339). If these aspects are realized, they will result in invariable consequences. The negative conditions can be described as the absence of counteracting conditions that could divert the course of action. This model is strongly based on the grounds that the counteracting cause can be exerting its own separate and sufficient cause. In doing so, the separate cause exerts the same effect of the same kind and quantity.
Conclusion
As seen in the arguments above, causes are necessary for their effects. However, they may be insufficient; hence, conditions apply for some causes to have effects. To establish an argument that cause leads to effects, one needs to consider the relationship between the antecedents and consequences if they are constantly relational and simultaneous. In sufficiency, one needs to consider whether the cause is sufficient or requires other positive or negative conditions to produce effects.
Work Cited
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus, and Tony Honoré. Causation in the Law. OUP Oxford, 1985.
Hume, David. “An enquiry concerning human understanding.” Seven masterpieces of philosophy. Routledge, 2016. 183-276.
Kim, Jaegwon. “Causes and events: Mackie on causation.” The Journal of Philosophy 68.14 (1971): 426-441.
Mackie, John L. “Causes and conditions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2.4 (1965): 245-264.
Mill, John Stuart. “A System of Logic London.” Parker and Sons (1843).
Psillos, Stathis. Causation and Explanation. Vol. 8. McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 2002.
Strevens, Michael. “Mackie remixed.” (2007).
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