1a) According to Heathwood, something is intrinsically good if it is valuable purely for its own sake, independent of any further effects or consequences. Happiness is the key example he uses of an intrinsic good – the feeling of happiness is good in and of itself, apart from any results it might produce. Even if feeling happy didn’t lead to anything else beneficial, it would still be good to feel happy just for the basic experience of it (Heathwood, 2021). In contrast, instrumentally good things are only valuable to the extent they help enable or produce intrinsically good things as a means to an end.
For instance, money or material possessions do not tend to be seen as intrinsically valuable in themselves. Still, they allow one to obtain other things that do have intrinsic value, like leisure, relationships, happiness, etc. Heathwood specifically ties this to his view that welfare and well-being are ultimately grounded in subjective preference satisfaction – getting what you want is beneficial either because you want it for its own sake (intrinsically) or because it gets you something else you want (instrumentally) (Heathwood, 2021).
1b) Heathwood uses the extreme example of notorious serial killer Ted Bundy potentially deriving welfare gains from violently acting out his twisted desires and fantasies. Heathwood acknowledges the utter immorality but argues that strictly in terms of getting what one wants, even someone like Bundy could theoretically increase his well-being by satisfying his preferences through acts of rape, torture, murder, and assault (Heathwood, 2021). This is meant to shock the reader into accepting the counterintuitive implication that if welfare is 100% grounded in desire fulfillment, there may be no constraints – even horrific criminal acts could contribute to well-being by fulfilling the darkest of preferences.
However, rather than proving his point, this example goes too far by relying on such a universally condemned figure that it seriously risks undermining Heathwood’s argument. Using Bundy forces an intuition pump towards accepting an assumption (total preference satisfaction) that seems unbelievable when faced with such a clear moral monstrosity. Our moral instincts shout that surely unrepentant serial murders cannot boost welfare, no matter the killer’s preferences (Heathwood, 2021). There seem to be obvious reasons why purely subjective desire satisfaction cannot be the whole story. This reveals weaknesses in Heathwood’s account and arguments – our considered, reflective judgments suggest there are legitimate objective constraints on what sorts of preferences can actually increase well-being. Relying so heavily on a series of outrageous counterexamples opens Heathwood’s view to easy criticisms.
2a) Hooker puts forward a robust objective list account of welfare, clearly specifying several key elements he believes constitute real human good and flourishing, independent of just satisfying one’s unfiltered preferences:
Innocent pleasures – feelings of happiness, comfort, satisfaction, etc., derived from legal, ethical sources that don’t cause harm.
Friendship – having intimate, caring relationships and connections with other humans.
Achievement – exerting effort to accomplish goals and master difficult skills over time. Gives a sense of capability and control.
Knowledge – learning important new information about the world, academic fields, culture, and oneself. Intellectual curiosity.
Autonomy – the ability to make one’s own choices and self-direct the path of one’s life rather than live under others’ control.
2b) Although Hooker sees morality and beauty as still playing some role in welfare, he deliberately omits them from his list of core prudential goods. He argues we should be moral because it’s right, not because it directly benefits us. So, morality is only instrumentally valuable for the moral agent (Griffin, 2000). Beauty appreciation alone also does not constitute human flourishing unless combined with other aims like achievement. However, Hooker still grants indirect importance of morality and beauty for enriching life and welfare, just not as intrinsic elements themselves.
3a) Wolf argues that grounding well-being solely in terms of subjective pleasure or desire fulfillment is deeply problematic because people are often poor judges of what is actually good for themselves. We frequently want things that are quite damaging, irrational, or against our long-term interests – addictive drugs, junk food binges, destructive relationships, etc (Wolf, 2012). Our preferences can be mistaken, confused, short-sighted, inconsistent over time, and swayed by random whims or social pressure rather than what benefits us most. So, for Wolf, there seem to be clear cases where certain things like healthy food, exercise, and developing meaningful skills could be genuinely good for someone, whether they immediately want them or not at the moment (Wolf, 2012). Some objective standards independent of fickle preferences must constrain the concept of welfare. Perhaps what we would wish to do after careful, reasoned reflection captures welfare better than our immediate urges. But in any case, Wolf believes an adequate account cannot be solely grounded in pleasure or transitory desire but must incorporate more objective goods.
3b) Wolf develops a rich view of meaningfulness as central to well-being and sees this as going beyond mere happiness or preference satisfaction. Developing and engaging in what she calls “projects of worth” that connect us to ethical, social, creative, or intellectual ideals broader than just our narrow personal needs is key to meaning.
Examples of projects of worth could include raising children, furthering social/political causes, producing creative works tied to a larger tradition, or innovating in some academic field. These projects involve committing to difficult, enduring challenges that matter beyond just ourselves. Pursuing such large, rewarding projects and ambitions gives us a sense of purpose and engagement that resonates with well-being – despite often not enjoying the process each day (Wolf, 2012). By getting engaged in making or doing things greater than oneself and relating to cultures and grander traditions, one feels part of a tale beyond our fleeting lives. Hence, the concept of meaning is paramount to the well-being of Wolf, and the mere satisfaction of shallow preferences cannot account for this sort of significance. In the end, ideals-oriented undertakings make life worth living.
Journal Exercise
Wolf’s criticism challenges the extreme preference satisfaction approaches to welfare by pointing out that people commonly try to get what they are not supposed to have or that things dangerous for them are well-positioned in the preference list. Her point resonated with me because the frequency of temporary pleasures amuse me without regard to true benefits, for delaying important tasks to watch series which I know won’t serve my purpose.
Heathwood responds to Wolf’s statement with an extreme case: he can gain welfare from acting on criminal preferences, even Bundy could. However, the use of irredeemable monsters clouds rational analysis. In the class, we talked about Sociopaths who have no empathy. Even though they may find pleasure in inflicting suffering, for us, it becomes unbearable that such behaviour will improve their quality of life. Our basic ethical sensibilities decree that ethical concerns should extend far beyond what mere desire permits.
After the retrospection, Heathwood is too dependent on pumping intuitions from a deviant case, skewing the data. As Wolf underlines, people typically want things which are against all the logic and common sense. I remember that eight-year-old me thought dinner being cake was pure heaven. Even in less severe cases we prefer short-term pleasures over long-term goods. I agree that both objective ethical standards and reasoned reflection limit welfare – not all preferences equal contribution. Maybe certain clearly important skills and decent ways of living rather boost actual thriving.
With an outlier criminal, Heathwood does not counter Wolf’s main point of criticism against pure subjective theories. Our actual moral intuitions are regarded as limitations rather than extensions to welfare the destructive preferences. Reasoning and ethical ideals should be made to support in determining welfare.
References
Heathwood, C. (2021). Happiness and Well-being. Cambridge University Press.
Griffin, J. (2000). Well-being and morality: Essays in honour of James Griffin. Oxford University Press.
Wolf, S. (2012). Meaning in life and why it matters (Vol. 35). Princeton University Press.
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