Bhagavad Gita is derived from the central text that originates from the Hindu philosophy, in which a passage investigates intention and moral responsibility concepts.it is evident in chapters 15- 18 that lord Krishna is seen advising Arjuna, who from the philosophy is the main protagonist, on the importance of the actions taken by every individual and the intentions that surround one’s moral responsibility (Bina, 375). As a result, the passage raises the philosophical question of whether one is morally always responsible for their intentions or, at the same time, whether their actions also carry the burden of assessing moral responsibility.
One plausible view from the philosophy is that moral responsibility mainly focuses on the individual’s intention. This view argues that most intentions aim to motivate the actions’ intentions. They thus can be termed as the true determinants of moral worth. Research proves that this perspective a person with good intentions can mainly be considered a morally responsible person even if their actions are associated with negative consequences; for instance, if an individual has a plan of assisting another individual but without knowing harm to the other person due to unforeseen situations at that time their helping intentions matters a lot. The view is insightful because it mostly recognizes the benefits of having good intentions when demonstrating their moral character and commitment to ethical behavior.
The view, mostly from the philosophical approach, argues that we can never always control the outcomes. Still, we can easily control our intentions and simultaneously strive to act under moral principles. Sometimes, the view perspective can be seen as incomplete as research mostly overlooks the negative impacts of the actions and the consequences associated with moral responsibility.
The other perspective argues that moral responsibility must always be based on intentions and actions. The view mainly contends that while good intentions are commendable, on the one hand, they do not necessarily absolve an individual from the consequences derived from their actions. According to this perspective, you cannot prove one has good intentions if one’s actions lead to harm or injustice to the other party. Let’s say, for instance, a person intends to help someone, but in the long run, he ends up harming the other party. They will still be morally responsible for all the negative consequences associated with their actions. The perspective view is crucial in that it mostly focuses on the needs of individuals at any given time. They need to mind the underlying consequences of their actions, and thus, they are responsible for them.
The philosophical question based on whether moral responsibility mainly lies in the intentions or the actions is evident from the Bhagavad Gita; thus, the existence of the two plausible views perspectives in which the first view focuses on the moral responsibility that is based on one’s intentions as they are based on one’s moral character and ethical behavior commitment, the second view on the other hand argues in that moral responsibility should consider both the intentions and actions because always actions and consequences are crucial in assessing individuals moral worth(Lamba et al,68).
Both views aim to give insights into the complex nature of moral responsibility, thus highlighting the benefits of actions and intentions on moral culpability determination. However, the second view aims to provide an elaborate understanding, thus at the same time having potential harm considerations that are attributed actions and external factors that impact moral responsibility negatively. The philosophical question reflects the existing relationship between intention and moral responsibility.
Works Cited
Lamba, Shweta Vishnu, Madhu Jagadeesh, and Abhijit Deshpande. “Emotional Intelligence as the Core of Intelligence: A Perspective Based on the Bhagavad Gita.” Pastoral Psychology 72.1 (2023): 65-83.
Gupta, Bina. “Bhagavad Gītā as duty and virtue ethics: Some reflections.” Journal of Religious Ethics 34.3 (2006): 373-395.
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