Statutory interpretation plays a major role in judicial activity, considering the fact that it depends not only on the understanding of the laws passed by the Parliament but also on the judicial power to apply certain meanings to the text of the laws. Statistics can be the main resource of law, but they are sometimes drafted in vague ways that can be subject to many different interpretations. A body of constitutional rules for statutory interpretation, which judges use to determine what certain statutory provisions convey, is what makes statutory interpretation rules. On the other hand, even the most rigid of regulations are not always straightforward, while judges might sometimes demonstrate a certain leeway in their application, directly causing varied interpretations. This article intends to shed some light on the laws of statutory interpretation and to show the amount of freedom judges have while applying them, fruitfully engaging with case law.
While the literal rule of statutory interpretation is one of the critical rules in statutory interpretation, it states that judges should give a certain meaning to words in a statute. It would make no sense without meaning that the exact words have to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and literal sense as long as they do not result in absurdity. This legislation was famously remembered in the case of Whiteley v. Chappell (1868), where the defendant was found guilty under a statute that had made it a crime to impersonate any person allowed to vote (vLex n.d.). The accused had posed as a dead person, and she was released because the law only related to people who were alive and individually entitled to vote. This example represents a direct method for law interpretation despite an extended sentence, which may be considered unfair.
Yet, the ultimate goal is not stagnating, and judges may not be binding to the theory when it is needed. In Jones v. DPP (1962), the ticket was under the statute, which made an offence to impersonate anyone whose name was in the electoral roll (Fennell,2020). As in this case, if the impersonation of a dead person is punished, it will happen. However, the defendant is convicted because of the mischief rule that determines the purpose or ‘mischief’ that any law was resolved for when judges use the literal meaning of the words.
The following rule of statutory interpretation is the golden rule. This rule permits judges to go against the literal meaning of words when it would end up in a sense of inappropriateness to follow the words. This principle was illustrated in the Adler v. George (1964) case, whereby the defendant was prosecuted for the act of obstructing armed forces members within the area that advanced to the perimeter for a prohibited one (Hutton,2020). The defendant faced a conviction despite the fact that he did not technically enter the protected site, as that would lead to the injustice of using a literal meaning of the words./The defendant was found guilty; however, this was not due to his technically being inside the site as this would have unfairly applied the literal meaning of the words.
The way of interpreting statutes based on purposes is different from a word-by-word interpretation: mind purpose, not specific words. It is worth mentioning that this approach was confirmed in the Pepper v. Hart case of 1993, when members of the House of Lords allowed a reference to Hansard (the official report of parliamentary debates) in statutory interpretation even though under the general rule parliamentary debates are not used in statutory interpretation (Magyar,2021). In a word, the decision illustrates that judges are permitted to deviate from overly strict rules of statutory interpretation, which are provided for the sake of the intention of the legislating body.
Finally, I propose that although judges whom all statutory rules to be followed expect amiably to defend the rational, judgmental, and subversive rules at the same time, there may, in some cases, be the occurrence of ambiguities which lead to the judge’s freedom in deciding on the hazy rules. Another aspect is that an overlapping set of regulations have been floated in courts, deigning the statute as the contrary proposition of the Parliament or as a relieving body when faced with results which are absurd or unjust. However, the judicial review in case law shows that judges are also capable of understanding how the statute drafted by Parliament to achieve the agenda fits in the interpretation that, in reality, judges enforce, which they do just by ways provided by the law.
Reference list
Fennell, C., 2020. The law of evidence in Ireland. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Hutton, C., 2020. Legal interpretation: The category of ordinary meaning and its role in legal interpretation. In The Routledge Handbook of Forensic Linguistics (pp. 79-92). Routledge.
Magyar, J.J., 2021. The slow death of a dogma?: The prohibition of legislative history in the 20th century. Common Law World Review, 50(2-3), pp.120-154.
vLex. (n.d.). Whiteley v Chappell. [online] Available at: https://vlex.co.uk/vid/whiteley-v-chappell-806800329.
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