Introduction
International sports like the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup have become key forces in worldwide urban development in recent decades. These ambulatory events of a defined length that draw a high number of people, have a huge amplified reach, come with substantial expenses, and have major implications on the physical environment and the inhabitants. Mega-events not only result in the building of new sports stadiums and transportation connections, but they also change municipal government and regional development plans, affecting cities (and inhabitants) in general. Hosting an international sports event is currently the single greatest effort in urban development for many localities. Material investments in the metropolitan area through creation of new sports stadiums, highways, airports, hotels, security systems, railway lines, and conference centers, often cost more than US$10 billion, which is many times the logistic cost of setting up the event itself. This essay presents an assessment of the effectiveness of two international sports events, namely the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup in bringing about impacts to major cities where they have been held.
Impacts
Entrepreneurial Urbanism
International sports events are usually seen as a way to acquire a competitive edge in the inter-urban rivalry for limited finance, investment, and publicity. As a result, strategies of commercialization, return-on-investment mentality, and welfare system retrenchment may speed the promotion of urban entrepreneurialism. The entrepreneurial motivation was never more evident than in Rio de Janeiro, where a series of events (the 2014 FIFA World Cup as well as the 2016 Olympic Games) resulted to the commercialization of sporting and transportation infrastructure, with accompanying price spikes for consumers. It also hastened the renovation and corporate investment in favelas in a cycle of amassing via dispossession (Freeman, 2012).
These mega-events also sustained and promoted entrepreneurial regimes in London, Vancouver and South Africa, but not as dramatically as in Brazil. Public to private partnerships were a common delivery system in London and Vancouver, where governments channeled public funds to private companies and fostered government privatization. Schemes of social inclusion should be implemented via mega events aiming at forming entrepreneurs and disseminating neoliberal policies. The FIFA International Cup in South Africa was linked to rhetoric of distribution via economic progress and dreams for world cities. It rushed commercialization and privatization in South African hosting towns, diverting funds from projects intended to address apartheid’s effects.
However, Sochi is an anomaly. Neither entrepreneurial discourse nor commercialization or the corporate sector had a significant part in the mega-planning event’s. The Russian federal state oversaw the development, financing, and delivery of the majority of the infrastructure, demonstrating Russia’s strong central command centralization.
Displacement
Substantial relocation of inhabitants has been a hallmark of international sports events dating back to at least 1988. In conjunction to coercive residence displacement, such as via confiscation or compulsory removals, mega events often result in demographic redistribution by market processes. The many gentrification steps involved in Olympic host cities may be led by the government, either via purposeful strategies that drive flow of capital into specified city regions, or through the lack of public rules that ensure the entitlement to housing affordability.
The two international events in Brazil, wherein gentrification and forced migration were pervasive, caused the greatest displacement. According to one analysis, between 2009 and 2015, more than 22,000 households were transferred from Rio de Janeiro (Alm, 2014). On the other hand, the World Cup that took place in South Africa resulted in the destruction of informal housing in various host towns, as well as substantial upgrading procedures as part of the event’s beautifying projects.
Displacement was also seen in London and Sochi, albeit not in a similar magnitude. The Winter-Games organizers in Sochi relocated roughly 800 individuals for the building of the coastline cluster of venues, generating widespread disagreements about proper compensation. Several hundred houses in London were forcibly relocated as part of Olympic-related redevelopment efforts. Several hundred local firms were also relocated from the Olympic Village location. Both Vancouver and London missed their affordable homes and home security commitments for Olympic complexes, contributing to indirect residential pressures like increased rents as a result of re-development.
Material Transformation
International sports events have become gigantic construction projects in their own right as their magnitude has grown. Capital costs for improved infrastructure to having new stadiums with fiber optic cables together with power plants—can go into billions of dollars and construct whole new neighborhoods or towns.
Sochi was the city in this survey that saw the most drastic shift. Not only were all of the sporting facilities constructed from the ground up, but the Russian government also invested hundreds of billions of dollars on highways, railway, and power grid. A new community developed up around the mountainous winter sports resort.
The build-up to the 2016 Rio Olympics resulted in a significant alteration of the city’s physical environment that went well beyond sporting facilities. It resulted in the creation of 4 new bus rapid-transit lines, 2 additional Olympic parks, a subway line extension, major office and luxury apartment development, and the tearing down of many favelas to make way for Olympic infrastructures (Alm, 2014).
Material shifts were noticeable in Vancouver and London, albeit they were more limited than in Rio and Sochi, where they affected the whole metropolis. The establishment of the Olympic park in Stratford as well as its role as a core for property development were the most notable aspects in London. While the influence on the built environment in London was focused in one section of the city, physical intervention in Vancouver were more widespread but lower in size. The Olympic village in the city’s heart, a train link to the airstrip, and a few new venues across the city, as well as the mountain site in Whistler, were among them (VanWynsberghe, 2014).
The modifications in the physical environment of hosting towns were typically lower than during the Olympic Games since the World Cup activities are spread across numerous locations. As a result, the extent of World Cup-related operations in S. Africa and Brazil paled in comparison to the Olympic Games.
Event as Catalyst
One of the most appealing aspects of hosting international sports events for cities is the potential for a catalytic influence on urban growth. According to Amora (2015), an Olympic Games “expedites [a city’s] infrastructure construction by up to ten years” (p. 234). However, other researchers have shown these events serve as a catalyst for current plans rather than drawing policymakers’ attention to new ones (Sanchez, 2013).
The evidence for the Olympic Games in Sochi, Vancouver and London serving as catalysts is mixed. For each instance, the event aided in the acceleration and concretization of preexisting urban development plans, as well as attracting additional resources from the national and/or regional governments which would not have been accessible normally. In London, the logic and effectiveness of using the Olympic Games like a catalyst were arguably most evident. The 2012 Olympic Games were integrated into an established urban redevelopment scheme in E. London, and the national government provided financial assistance for faster redevelopment of the Lower Lea Valley. The event accelerated the train link between the airports and the main square in Vancouver, as well as the renovation of an essential roadway between Vancouver and the highlands and the expansion of the conference center (Chan, 2013). Nevertheless, unlike in London, initiatives were more fragmented, lacking the broader coherence with a grand plan. Sochi, too, used the Olympic Games to secure the implementation of a detailed national target program for infrastructure renovations in the region that the state had set in place prior to the bid (Müller, 2014). Yet, in all of these three situations, the events also created additional elements to the urban development budget, particularly sports facilities, acting not just as a stimulus but also as a means of redirecting resources to new projects.
The Olympic Games in Rio, on the other hand, forced major adjustments in urban development plans and diverted major investment flows. The construction of the town’s metro line, in example, was adjusted at great expense to fit event-specific goals. Another significant innovation in urban planning was the coupling of the Porto-Maravilha-PPP with the Olympic Games. Indeed, the mayor pressed through with a new grand plan in 2011 to better connect mega event planning with official government policy (Zirin., 2016).
As in case of a two World Cups, early expectations were strong that they would serve as development accelerators. However, these expectations were dashed in both S. Africa and Brazil, since investments were focused on stadiums and airports, with little contribution to overall urban growth. “With the World Cup, Brazil has missed a fantastic chance,” Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes stated. “FIFA asked for stadiums, and Brazil has only supplied stadiums” (quoted in BBC, 2013). Nearly 80% of the projected public transportation projects in Brazil were not completed (Amora, 2015).
The World Cup in S. Africa did not live up to its promises to incorporate and develop the underprivileged. Instead, over half of the cash was redirected to stadium building, and resources were substantially distorted in favor of the rich, as in the instance of the transfer of the stadium in Cape Town to the affluent Green Point district (Sanchez, 2013).
Redevelopment
Rehabilitation of brownfield or underserved metropolitan areas is a major motivator for mega sports event bidders. “As well as rejuvenating existing metropolitan areas, the Sports may offer the spur for the establishment of new urban districts on industrial wasteland, abandoned ports, or derelict railway yards,” says the International Olympic Committee (IOC, 2012, p. 40). The practice of linking urban rebuilding to hosting an event has grown so ubiquitous that experts are now considering event-led regeneration as a distinct category.
The extent to which urban revitalization was a goal of hosting the event varies greatly in our situations. On the one hand, there have London and Rio de Janeiro, both of which had reconstruction ambitions as a primary motive for hosting the event. Just the Olympics, London said (London Bidding Committee, 2004, p. 3), could “change one of the most neglected sections of the nation for centuries to come,” depicting the Lower Lea Valley as a marginal, unused area ready for reconstruction (Alm, 2014). To preparation for hosting the World Cup and the Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro embarked on a massive pacification and relocation drive in favelas, or informal communities (Gaffney, 2016). It also kicked off the city’s greatest reconstruction project in the historic port region (Sánchez, 2013).
On the other hand, the Olympics in Sochi and the World Cup in S. Africa both had new buildings built, frequently on greenfield property, rather than repurposing brownfield regions or upgrading underprivileged communities (Müller, 2014). In all instances, the finances were dominated by the significant construction of new sports stadiums, buildings, and public transportation linkages
Vancouver and the World Cup in Brazil, the last two instances, are in the center of the range. Each project included major rehabilitation as well as new construction. The Olympic Village in Vancouver was utilized to not only restore industrial coastal wasteland, but also to construct new infrastructure, such as a train connection to the airport. Finally, the World Cup in Brazil enabled real-estate vectors in So Paulo, Recife, and Natal to expand via infrastructural development and new stadium building (Gaffney, 2016).
Underutilized Infrastructure
The focused demand of hundreds of thousands of people during an event puts significant strain on city infrastructure. For this reason, host towns are required to sign hosting contracts with the IOC or FIFA wherein they promise to supplying certain capabilities, such as a specific room capacity in different classifications or a certain airport passenger capacity. Nevertheless, this infrastructure often proves to be too massive or outmoded for post-event usage, resulting in “white-elephants” (Alm, 2014).
In this study, the cities with the least unused infrastructure were Vancouver and London. Infrastructure for non-sports purposes, like housing and transportation, has typically satisfied public demand. Many new sporting facilities in the two cities are in high demand, although they are extensively financed, like the Olympic Stadium in London (Clark, 2014).
Sochi is virtually the polar opposite of Sochi. Its most costly project, a more than US$10 billion integrated road-rail connection from the seaside to the highlands, sees little usage of the rail track, with only six trains daily in each direction. Hotel capacity is underused for the majority of the year, forcing some hotels and resorts to go down less than a year after the event (Müller, 2014).
The outlook for the 2 World Cups is likewise grim. New or rebuilt stadiums, as well as various transportation infrastructure upgrades, were among the major infrastructure investments in the S. African and Brazilian host cities. Most stadiums have significantly more capacity than the number of attendees. In S. Africa, the majority of World Cup venues are unable to fulfill their operational expenses, with some even without permanent tenants (York, 2014). In cities like as Brasilia, Manaus, and Natal, stadiums are either underutilized or do not have anchor tenants (Garcia-Navarro, 2015).
Conclusion
During an event, the concentrated demand of hundreds of thousands of people exerts tremendous pressure on local infrastructure. As a result, host cities must sign hosting contracts with the IOC or FIFA, promising to provide particular capabilities such as a specific lodging capacity in various categories or a specific airport passenger capacity. Though tremendous redevelopments and growth take place in these cities, the analysis has shown that negative re-settlement pressures and, infrastructure that is often too large or obsolete for post-event use, culminates to “white-elephants” are negative effects felt by these cities (Alm, 2014).
In particular, Vancouver and London were found to have the least underutilized infrastructure in this analysis. Non-sports infrastructure, such as housing and transportation, has often met public demand. Many new athletic facilities in both cities are in great demand, despite being well-funded, such as London’s Olympic Stadium (Clark, 2014). On the other hand, Sochi’s most expensive project, a more than US$10 billion integrated road-rail link from the seashore to the highlands, sees just six trains per day in each way. The bulk of the year, hotel capacity is underutilized, leading several hotels and resorts to close less than a year following the event (Müller, 2014).
The two World Cups have a similarly bleak outlook. The significant infrastructure improvements in the South African and Brazilian host cities included new or reconstructed stadiums, as well as numerous transit infrastructure enhancements. The capacity of most stadiums far exceeds the number of spectators. The majority of World Cup sites in South Africa are unable to cover their operating costs, with some even being without regular tenants (Chan, 2013). Stadiums in places such as Brasilia, Manaus, and Natal are either underused or lack anchor tenants (Dixon, 2005).
References
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