Background
Genocide is any of the following crimes carried out to wholly or partially eradicate a federal, racial, ethnic, or religious group.[1]. Genocide is one of the most severe and abhorrent international crimes, defined in the 1948 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” The case of Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33) is significant in the framework of “international criminal justice.” This case is a landmark in the field of genocide, as it was the first time that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) authenticated the massacre committed in Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995[2].This case highlights the complexity of proving the crime of genocide, despite its precise definition. Despite the accurate description of genocide, it is hard to show evidence in court due to its heinous nature and lack of evidence. The critical problem, in this case, is the Hard in demonstrating the massacre crime. “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” and “The Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” define genocide to include certain protected groups, but proving the crime itself is complex and requires scrutiny of the evidence collected. With good reason, the Genocide Convention has raised attacks against groups identified based on ethnicity, nationality, tribe, and religion to the pinnacle of human rights abuses.[3]. These attacks have been raised to this position because they constitute genocide. This difficulty has been further highlighted in the study of Nevenka Tromp, which examines the “Transitional and post-transitional narratives about genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The crime of massacre is hard to validate evidence because it is not well defined, and the legal definition of the massacre can vary from one country to the next. This is evident in the circumstance of Radislav Krstic, where the ICTY had to rely on the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” and the “Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal” for the Former Yugoslavia to define genocide and to convict him of aiding and abetting genocide.
Literature Review
The case of Radislav Krstic is of utmost significance when considering the definition and proof of genocide. Radislav Krstic was a Bosnian Serb General charged with supporting and aiding genocide during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. He was found guilty by the ICTY for his role in the “Srebrenica massacre of 1995,” in which 8,000 Bosnian Muslim boys and men were killed[4]. The case was influential in establishing the massacre as a distinct crime, separate from crimes in contradiction of humankind and war crimes “under international law.” The ICTY found the elements of genocide as the following actions are considered genocide against a federal, racial, ethnic, or religious group[5]. (1) imposing living conditions that are intended to cause physical harm to the group as a whole or in part; (2) massacring members of the group; (3) inflicting severe bodily or mental injuries on members of the group; and (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. The ICTY’s judgment on Radislav Krstic also confirms the legal principle of supporting and helping as a form of criminal responsibility. The difficulty of proving genocide lies in the complex landscape of the crime. It is a difficult way to obtain evidence of the perpetrator’s intent to commit genocide and proof of the actual acts of genocide. Even when such evidence is available, it must be interpreted in light of the particular context of the crime. For example, the ICTY’s judgment in the case of Radislav Krstic noted that the Bosnian Serb forces’ actions must be seen in the context of a long-running conflict, in which the Bosnian Serbs had been subject to attack and persecution before the Srebrenica massacre.
The difficulty of proving genocide is further complicated because state actors often perpetrate the crime, making it difficult to obtain evidence and prosecute those responsibly. This is particularly true in the circumstance of Radislav Krstic, a member of the Bosnian Serb military. The ICTY had to rely on circumstantial evidence, such as the figure of Bosnian Muslims murdered and the circumstance that the Bosnian Serb forces had control of the area in question, to establish Krstic’s guilt. In the case of Radislav Krstic, the ICTY recognized that massacre had occurred in Srebrenica. The court found that “Bosnian Serb military armies had targeted the Bosnian Muslim people of Srebrenica, killing more than 7,000 men and boys in the massacre.[6]. The court also found that Krstic had aided and abetted the genocide by providing logistical support for the Bosnian Serb forces, including transporting troops and supplies to the area. The evidence presented in the case demonstrated that the perpetrators intended to eradicate the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica and that Krstic had knowledge of this intent. As such, the ICTY was able to establish that genocide had been committed in Srebrenica and that Krstic had aided and abetted it. While the crime of massacre is well well-defined in international law, it can be thought-provoking to prove in practice. To prove that a genocide has been committed, prosecutors must establish that the perpetrators intended to destroy a protected group and that the perpetrators had knowledge of this intent. This can be difficult, as perpetrators may attempt to hide their true intentions and understanding of them.
Additionally, it can be challenging to prove that a protected group was specifically targeted, as opposed to other individuals or groups. The case study of Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33) is a significant one when it comes to a discussion of genocide and its parameters. This case was heard before the ICTY. This was a primary case to bring a conviction of genocide upon those responsible for the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995. In this case, the ICTY established that massacre is lawbreaking beneath international law and can be defined, although it is difficult to prove.
The charges, the jury’s decision, and the appeals all stand out as distinctive aspects of the case. Krstic was accused of participating in genocide and mass murder, committing crimes against humanity, and breaking norms for conduct in wartime. He was charged with being a member of a “joint criminal enterprise,” in which members of VRS and the police, including himself, committed a massacre, crimes against humankind, and war criminalities against Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) civilians in the Srebrenica area, in July 1995. The Verdict was delivered on August 2, 2001; Krstic was convicted to 46 years in jail after being found guilty of assisting and encouraging genocide, torture, destruction, murder, displacement, and other heinous actions[7]. He was found not guilty of complicity in genocide but guilty of conspiracy in the other four charges. Appeal: On April 19, 2004, Krstic’s sentence was lowered to 35 years by the court of appeals, which found that he had not intended to commit genocide and that he had not had powers over the VRS soldiers that had engaged in the genocide[8]. However, the chambers of the appeals court apprehended that he knew the plan to remove the Bosnian Muslim people from the Srebrenica area and had assisted in implementing the plan.
What worked, in this case, was the fact that the ICTY was able to use circumstantial evidence to piece together the events that led to the Srebrenica massacre. The prosecution used Krstic’s statements and actions before and during the massacre to prove his involvement. Additionally, the ICTY relied on international law to establish the legal framework for the trial, which allowed them to determine Krstic’s guilt based on the ideologies of justice and the rights of human beings. The lack of physical evidence that could be used to directly prove Krstic’s guilt did not work in this case. This lack of evidence made it difficult for the ICTY to establish outside a realistic uncertainty that Krstic was accountable for the massacre. Additionally, the defendants, in this case, were not provided with adequate access to international lawyers and resources that could have helped their defense.
To make it easier to prove the crime of genocide, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” should expand the defined used to describe genocide to incorporate acts such as “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” and “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” In addition, “The Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has clarified the definition by adding that it includes acts such as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, arbitrary imprisonment, and other inhumane acts.” These changes help to make it easier to prove the crime of genocide as they provide a more detailed definition of what constitutes genocide. In addition, “The Misjudging the History at the ICTY: Transitional and Post-Transitional Narratives about Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina Nevenka Tromp” report should identify several factors that can be considered when evaluating whether an act constitutes genocide. These factors include the level of violence used, the number of victims, the scale of the attack, and the degree of organization and planning. This helps to ensure that all relevant factors are considered when determining whether a crime of genocide has been committed. Additionally, while the crime of genocide is clearly defined, it can be challenging to prove that the intent to commit genocide was present. However, “the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Misjudging the History at the ICTY, Transitional and Post-Transitional Narratives About Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina Nevenka Tromp” report should come up with procedures that would make it easier to prove the crime of genocide.[9]. This is important in confirming that those accountable for obligating genocide are held responsible for their actions.
In conclusion, due to a lack of consensus on what constitutes genocide and the fact that state laws define the crime differently, proving genocide to have occurred can be challenging. Using the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” the ICTY was tasked with defining genocide in the case of Radislav Krstic and finally found him guilty of helping and supporting genocide. The issue of Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33) is an actual example of the difficulty in proving genocide, despite its clear definition in the“ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” The difficulty of proving genocide lies in its complex nature and the lack of physical evidence that can be used to establish the criminal’s determination to commit a massacre. The ICTY was successful in authenticating the genocide at Srebrenica and convicting Krstic of aiding and abetting genocide. However, this was only possible due to the circumstantial evidence presented, such as the number of Bosnian Muslims killed and the control of the area by the Bosnian Serb forces. This case highlights the difficulty of proving genocide and how understanding the context of the crime and the factors that can be considered when determining whether an act constitutes genocide is essential to successfully proving the crime.
Additionally, the recent developments in international law, such as the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” have made it easier to prove genocide, as they provide a more detailed definition of what constitutes genocide. The case of Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33) is significant in international criminal justice and the study of genocide, as it was the first time that the ICTY authenticated the genocide committed in Srebrenica and convicted an individual for assisting and aiding genocide. This case demonstrates the importance of understanding the context of genocide and the difficulty of proving it.
References
Drumbl, Mark. “Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic: ICTY authenticates genocide at Srebrenica and convicts for aiding and abetting.” Melbourne Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (2004): 434-449. https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1681119/Drumbl.pdf
Updated statute of the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf
Tromp, Nevenka. “Misjudging the History at the ICTY: Transitional and Post-Transitional Narratives About Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration 2020, no. 3 (2021): 1191-1223. https://www.europeanpapers.eu/fr/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2020_3_6_Articles_SS1_2_Nevenka_Tromp_00431_0.pdf
Groups protected by the Conventionpdf
PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIpdf
“Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” OHCHR. Accessed January 11, 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court.
[1] Updated statute of the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
[2] PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIpdf
[3] Groups protected by the Conventionpdf
[4] PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIpdf
[5] “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” OHCHR. Accessed January 11, 2023.
[6] Tromp, Nevenka. “Misjudging the History at the ICTY: Transitional and Post-Transitional Narratives About Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration 2020, no. 3 (2021)
[7] Drumbl, Mark. “Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic: ICTY authenticates genocide at Srebrenica and convicts for aiding and abetting.” Melbourne Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (2004): 434-449
[8]PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIpdf
[9] Tromp, Nevenka. “Misjudging the History at the ICTY: Transitional and Post-Transitional Narratives About Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration 2020, no. 3 (2021)